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
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
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
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ARTES SCIENTIA VERITAS





AN
ESSAY
ON THE
ORIGIN of EVIL.

BY
Dr. WILLIAM KING,
Late Lord Archbishop of *Dublin*.

Translated from the LATIN with large NOTES.

To which are added,
Two SERMONS by the same Author,
The former concerning DIVINE PRESCIENCE, the latter
on the FALL of MAN.

THE FOURTH EDITION CORRECTED.

By EDMUND LAW, D. D.
Master of St. PETER's College, CAMBRIDGE.

Επειρ εν αλλος τις τοπος των εν ανθρωποις εξετασενω δεομενω, δυδι-
ραλοσ εστι τη φυσει ημων, εν τατοις και η των Κακων ταχθειη αν
γενεισ. *Orig. cont. Cles. L. 4.*

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and J. BEECROFT in Pater-noster-Row, *London*.

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TO THE REVEREND

Dr. WATERLAND,

Master of MAGDALEN College in
CAMBRIDGE, &c. &c.

SIR,

IT is a common observation, that the generality of such Freethinkers as are serious, and have reasoned themselves out of the Christian Religion, have at the same time rejected the belief of a Deity. This must arise either from their entertaining some Principles that lead equally to both these absurdities ; or, which is more probable, from their having no Principles at all ; from mere Scepticism, and a habit of raising Objections without ever attending to the answers ; without proceeding on any settled grounds of enquiry, or endeavouring to establish any thing : a temper of

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mind which may easily bring a Man to disbelieve any thing. But whatever be the Cause of this, the Observation is remarkably verified in the present Age. Most of our modern Unbelievers have so far perplexed themselves with Difficulties about the Law of Nature, and right Reason, Liberty Divine and Human, Prescience, Providence, and the like, that they seem to be in universal Confusion. The chief design of the following Book is to clear up some of these Difficulties, to establish true and proper Notions, as well as to refute false and unworthy ones, concerning the Existence and Attributes of God, and his Government of the World; concerning the Nature and Condition of Man, the Obligations he lies under, the Rule and End of his actions; and to build the whole upon such Principles of Reason as are perfectly consistent with Revelation. This, 'tis hoped, will not be without its use at present, in stopping the growth of Irreligion by striking at the Root of it; it may have some influence toward settling the minds of the *unlearned and unstable*, and be sufficient tho' not to reduce them to a hearty profession of the true Faith, yet at least to hinder

DEDICATION.

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hinder them from falling into downright Infidelity ; especially if countenanc'd by a Person eminent for a thorough knowledge of these Subjects, confessedly an able Judge, an upright Defender, a bright Example of Religion both reveal'd and natural ; who is zealous to assert the truth and enforce the necessity of the Principal Doctrines and Institutions of the one, as well as to establish the true ground and fundamental Principle, and fix the proper Limits of the other : and above all, who has always the Courage to maintain these great Truths, howsoever unfashionable or unpopular they may be sometimes made.

These, Sir, are very obvious reasons for my being ambitious to prefix your Name to the following Work, and endeavouring to recommend it to the favour of one to whom its Author wou'd have been desirous to approve himself.

'Tis with pleasure also that I take this opportunity of declaring as well my sense of the great benefits that attend the perusal of your Writings, which must give equal warmth and conviction to all who have the least concern for Religion ; as my experience

of that candid condescension and communicative temper, which is ready to encourage and instruct every young enquirer after Truth.

To these more general Motives to an Address of this kind, give me leave to add the many private Obligations which in a particular manner demand an acknowledgment from

S I R,

Your most obliged

humble Servant,

EDMUND LAW.

THE TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

I Have always looked upon an Enquiry into the Cause and Origin of Evil, as one of the noblest and most important Subjects in Natural Religion. It leads us into the most exalted Speculations concerning the Existence and Attributes of God, and the Original of Things. It first endeavours to discover the true intent of the Deity in creating Beings at all, and then pursues that Intent through the several Works of his Creation: it shews how this is fully answered at present by the Inanimate and Brute Part, and how it might and should be, and why, and in what respect, it is not by the Rational. It contemplates the Divine Œconomy in the Government of the Universe, searches into the various Schemes of Providence, and takes in the whole Compass of Nature.

Neither is its Usefulness inferior to its Extent. It concerns every Man who pretends to act upon any serious Views here, or to entertain any solid Hopes of Futurity. The Knowledge of it, in some degree, is absolutely necessary in order to the settling in our Minds right Notions of the Nature and Will of God, and the Duties we owe him; in order to the due Apprehension of his Design in creating, preserving, and directing us; and to the regular Conduct of our Lives and Enjoyment of ourselves in that State and Condition wherein he has placed us. Nay, while we are ignorant of this one Point, what rational Pleasure can we take in knowing any other? When I enquire how I got into this World, and came to be what I am, I am told that an absolutely perfect Being produced me out of Nothing, and placed me here on purpose to communicate some Part of his Happiness to me, and to make me, in some measure, like himself—This End is not obtained;—the direct contrary appears;—I find myself surrounded with nothing but Perplexity, Want and Misery;—By whose fault I know not,—How to better myself I cannot tell. What Notions of God and Goodness can this afford me?—What Ideas of Religion?—

What Hopes of a future State? — For, if God's Aim in producing me be entirely unknown; if it be neither his Glory, (as some will have it) which my present State is far from advancing;—nor mine own Good, with which the same is equally inconsistent; how know I what I am to do here, and in what manner I must endeavour to please him? Or why should I endeavour it at all? — For, if I must be miserable in this World, what Security have I that I shall not be so in another too; (if there be one) since, if it were the Will of my Almighty Creator, I might (for ought I see) have been happy in both?

Such Thoughts as these must needs disturb a Person that has any real Concern for his Maker's Honour, or his own Happiness; that desires to pay him a reasonable Service, and answer the End of his Creation: in short, that happens to think at all upon these things, and to think for himself. And therefore an Endeavour to rid the Mind of some of these Perplexities, cannot sure be unacceptable, and a Solution of any one of these Doubts, is doing a piece of Service to Mankind which can never be unseasonable.— But the Usefulness, as well as Antiquity, of the present Debate; and the Absurdity of the Manichean Scheme of accounting for Evil, have been often explained, and need not here to be insisted on: all that ever seemed wanting to an entire Conquest over these Heretics, and their absurd Hypothesis, was only a tolerable Solution of the many Difficulties which drove them into it: and this our Author has effected, as I hope to make appear in the Sequel.

There are two general ways of Reasoning, called Arguments a Priori, and a Posteriori, or according to what Logicians commonly stile the Synthetic and Analytic Method: The former lays down some evident Principles, and then deduces the several Consequences necessarily resulting from them: The latter begins with the Phenomena themselves, and traces them up to their Original, and from the known Properties of these Phenomena arrives at the Nature of their Cause. Now the former of these is evidently preferable, where it can be had, since the latter must depend upon a large Induction of Particulars, any of which failing invalidates the whole Argument and spoils a Demonstration.

An Attempt therefore to shew that the Subject before us is capable of the former Method, must be very desirable; and this our Author seems to have done, without any precarious System, or illgrounded Hypothesis. His superior Excellence consists in having laid down, and previously established such solid, substantial Principles as may be drawn out in infinitum, and easily applied to all the Difficulties that attend the present Question.

He first of all enquires into the Nature and Perfections of the Deity, and his Design in the Creation; settles the true Notion of a Creature, and examines whether any could be perfect; and if not, whether all should have been made equally imperfect; or several in very different Classes and Degrees. Having proved the last of these Opinions to be the true one, he proceeds to the lowest Class of Beings, viz. Material ones: He enquires into the Nature and essential Properties of Matter, and the Laws of its Motion, and thereby establishes such Rules as direct us to the Solution of all the Difficulties attending it as distributed into various Masses, Systems, and Animated Bodies. He shews the unavoidableness, and absolute necessity of contrary Motions in Matter, for the same Reasons that it had any Motion at all, and consequently of Attrition, Corruption and Dissolution, and all the Natural Evils that attend them. In the next place, from the Nature of a Self-moving Principle, and the manner of its Operation, he deduces all the Irregularities incident to Volition, and the Actions consequent thereupon. He states at large the true Notion of Free-Will, and demonstrates the absolute Necessity for it in every Rational Being, in order to its Happiness. Then accounts for the several Abuses of it, and the Moral Evils arising from thence, and examines all the possible Ways of preventing them; and upon the whole, makes it appear that none of these could have been originally avoided, or can now be removed, without introducing greater; and consequently that the very Permission of these Evils, and the Production and Preservation of these Beings, in the present State, is the highest Instance of infinite Wisdom, Power and Goodness.

Now these are not mere Arguments ad Ignorantiam: This is not telling us that we must believe such and such things to be
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the Effects of an infinitely wise and good God, though no Marks of either Wisdom or Goodness appear in them; which though it may be true, and all that perhaps can be said in some particular Cases, yet has, I think, but very little Tendency towards either the Conviction of an Infidel, or the Satisfaction of a true Believer. When a Person is seriously contemplating any Parts of Nature, and solicitously enquiring into their several Ends and Uses, no Pleasure surely can arise to himself, nor Devotion toward the Author of it, merely from the Perplexity and Unaccountableness of those Parts. Nay every such Instance, one would think, must cast a damp upon his Spirits, and prove an ungrateful Reflection on his Weakness, a mortifying Argument of his Imperfection. Whereas one single Perplexity cleared up, or Objection answered, is a piece of real Knowledge gained; upon which he can congratulate himself, and glorify his Maker.

Our Author therefore was not content with mere Negative Arguments, and barely avoiding Difficulties, by removing all Defects from external things to ourselves, and multiplying Instances of the Narrowness and Weakness of Human Understanding: (which any one that thinks at all will soon be convinced of, and heartily desirous of having it somewhat enlarged and improved, to which this manner of Argumentation, I fear, contributes very little.) But he attacks his Adversaries in their strongest Holds, and plucks up the Manichean Heresy by the Roots: he shews by certain pre-established Rules, and necessary Consequence, that we can easily reduce all to one supreme Head, and clearly comprehend how the present State of things is the very best in all respects, and worthy of a most wise, powerful, and beneficent Author: And why, taking the whole System of Beings together, and every Class of them in its own Order, none could possibly have been made more perfect, or placed in a better. He proves, in the first place (as we observed) that no created Beings could be absolutely perfect, and in the next, that no manner of Evil, or Imperfection was tolerated in them, but what was, either in their Class and manner of Existence, absolutely unavoidable, or else productive of some Good more than equivalent: In both which Cases there will be the same Reasons for the Creation of such Beings in such Circumstances, together with their concomitant Evils, as there

there was for any Creation at all; For which the sole Reason will appear to be an Intention in the Creator of communicating Happiness to as many Beings as could be made capable of it, on the very best Terms; or a Resolution not to omit the least Degree of pure Good on account of such Evils, as did not counterballance it: Or (which is the very same, since it will be evident that the Prevention of all the present Evils, in any conceivable Manner, would have been of worse Consequence than the Permission of them) an Intention always to choose the least of two Evils, when both cannot be avoided.

This must be granted to come up to the Point; and when it is once made apparent, will be a full and sufficient Answer to that old triumphant Question, Πότεν το Κακόν; it will be an ample Vindication of the Divine Providence; a Demonstration of the Power, and Wisdom, and Goodness of God in the Production, Preservation, and Government of the Universe; and as much as a reasonable Man can expect or desire. And I heartily wish this Method had been taken by more of those Authors that have wrote on the present Subject, and the Argument pursued a little farther by Natural Light, in order to give some Light and Confirmation even to Revelation itself, in these inquisitive Days, wherein a great many seem unwilling to be determined by its sole Authority; wherein Men are not a little inclined to call every thing into question; and a weak Argument is sure to be exploded.—Even the most learned and ingenious Writer on this Subject often flies to Scripture when a Difficulty begins to press him: which, in my Opinion, is deserting the Argument, and owning with Mr. Bayle (in his Explanation touching the Manichees at the End of his Dictionary) “that the Question cannot be defended on any other foot.”—Whereas, if the Difficulty be really unanswerable by Reason, or a plain Contradiction to our natural Notions of God; if (as the fore-mentioned Author often urges) “we perceive by our clear and distinct Ideas, that such a thing is intirely repugnant to his Nature and Attributes,”—referring us to Scripture. which declares that an infinitely perfect Being did constitute it thus, will be no manner of Satisfaction, since (upon this Supposition) we cannot have greater Assurance that this Scripture comes from him, than we have that the Doctrine therein contained is absurd and impossible.

And what that ingenious Person's intent might be in representing the matter thus, and then referring us to Scripture for an Answer, I cannot determine. But sure I am, that his Account of it serves rather to betray the Cause, and undermine the Authority of both Reason and Revelation, and is enough (if no better could be given) to make a Person that argues consequentially, reject all kinds of Religion.

Farther, every one must have observed, that most Authors upon this Subject treat of God's Dispensations toward Man, as if they were speaking of one Man's Behaviour toward another. They think it sufficient to make the Almighty choose the most prudent, likely Means of bringing Man to Happiness; and act upon the highest Probability, though (upon what account soever it matters not) he fail of his End. Now this may indeed be the best manner of acting in all finite, imperfect Beings, and sufficient to acquit the Goodness, and Justice of God, but 'tis very far from satisfying his Wisdom. To a perfect Being who foresees the Effects of all possible Causes and Means, as the same Authors allow God to do, these only appear fit and eligible for the effects and Ends which they will certainly produce. Nor is it any Reason why I should pursue a Method which is apt and wont to succeed in most Cases, if I know it will fail in this. To a Person therefore that takes all the Attributes of God together, and considers the whole Scheme of Providence from end to end, it will not appear a complete and satisfactory Vindication of them, to assert that God either now makes Men, or suffers them to make themselves miserable, for rejecting that Happiness which he at first made them capable of, and endow'd them with such Powers, and placed them in such Circumstances as render'd it naturally possible and even easy to be attain'd by them: though this may indeed clear his Justice, and lay the Blame upon ourselves: And yet these Writers generally content themselves with going thus far: They bring all our Sin and Misery from the abuse of Free-Will, (i. e. a Power whereby Man might possibly have acted otherwise, and prevented it;) without ever explaining the Nature of this Principle, or shewing the Worth and excellence of it, and proving that, as far as we can apprehend, more Good in general arises from the donation of such a Self-moving Power, together with all these foreseen Abuses of it, than could possibly

possibly have been produced without it. To demonstrate this was an Attempt worthy of our Author, who has at least laid a noble Foundation for it, and seems to be the first that has proposed the true Notion of Human Liberty, and explained it consistently; All the Doubts and Difficulties attending which intricate Question will, I hope, be tolerably cleared up; or at least such Principles established as may be sufficient for that Purpose, by this Treatise of his, and the Notes upon it.

So much for the Subject and our Author's way of treating it. As for the Translation, 'tis barely Literal. I endeavoured to keep close to the Author's Sense, and generally to his very Words. I once intended to have cut off every thing that I could not defend, especially about the Beginning (which used to discourage most Readers from perusing the rest of his valuable Book, and might perhaps as well have been omitted;) but considering that he had involved it so closely in the rest of his Scheme, that the whole would seem confused without it, and that others might perhaps have a different Opinion of it, I contented myself with omitting part of his Notes, and obviating the rest all along, both from other Authors, and such Observations of my own as occur'd upon the Subject.

Some perhaps may think the frequent and long Quotations tedious, and introduced only to stuff up.—I can only answer that the Notes, and References together, were intended to point out a sort of Compendium of Metaphysics or Speculative Divinity, by directing the Reader to a Set of true Notions on the various Subjects which our Author touch'd upon, and which could not be found in any one particular Book, nor collected from several, without much Trouble, and Confusion, and unnecessary Reading. I chose rather to quote the very Words of the Authors, than either to use worse of my own, or pretend to discover what had been often discover'd before; or to repeat the same things over and over again, which is endless. 'Tis hoped the Reader will find that a citation of two or more Authors on the same Point is not always Tautology: and I believe it will appear that in the multitude of References no more than one is ever made to the same Place, except upon a very different Occasion, or in some different Light. A Writer often does more good by shewing the Use of some of those many Volumes which we have already, than by offering new ones; though this be of
much

much less Advantage to his own Character. I determin'd therefore not to say any thing myself where I could bring another conveniently to say it for me; and transcribed only so much from others as was judg'd absolutely necessary to give the Reader a short View of the Subject, and by that Sketch to induce those who have leisure, opportunity and inclination, to go farther and consult the Originals; and to afford some present Satisfaction to those who have not.

Since the publication of the former Edition, Archbishop King's Relations have obliged me with a large Collection of his Papers on the same Subject both in Latin and English. They contain an Explication and Defence of the principal parts of his Scheme, and afford very good hints for improving it in several points; especially with regard to the Union of the Soul and Body, and their mutual Influence; to Human Liberty; to the State of Adam in Paradise, and the Consequences of his Fall. The last of these is also fully discuss'd in the Sermon annex'd, which the Author had order'd to be printed after his decease, and which cannot but be acceptable to the Public. These advantages encouraged me to review the whole and endeavour to compleat the Author's design. To make room for the necessary Additions, I omitted all his Notes to the first Chapter, as well as some of my own which had no immediate relation to the main Subject. I have compared the Latin and English Papers together on each head, and give the Argument made up from them both. What is extract'd from them I have set down by way of Note under those parts of the Book which treat on the same things, with Capital Letters prefixed, to distinguish them from all the rest, which I am answerable for.

The great Value which the Author set upon this Work appears from the pains he has taken to vindicate it from the least cavil; in which view all that he has wrote would make a much larger Volume than his first. It was my intention to reduce it to as small a compass as possible, by inserting no more than what seem'd to give light to his main Scope, and was sufficiently clear. He begins with an account of the present state of the Controversy about the Origin of Evil, and offers many Arguments against the supposition of an absolutely Evil Principle, most of which are omitted, since few, if any, thinking Persons now a-days can be imagin'd to embrace so extravagant an Hypothesis; and therefore

fore it requires but little confutation. In the next place he lays down a summary of the chief Principles on which his Book is built, and then proceeds to rank his Adversaries into their several Classes, and consider the various Arguments which they have urged against him. The substance of his Answers, especially to such Objections as have been either omitted, or but slightly touched upon in the former Edition, will be given in their proper Places. The general view of his Scheme as laid down by himself, may perhaps be not disagreeable to the Reader before he enters on the Book, and is as follows.

1. All Creatures are necessarily imperfect and at infinite distance from the Perfection of the Deity, and if a negative Principle were to be admitted, such as the *PRIVATION* of the *PERIPATETICS*, it might be said that every created Being consists of Existence and Non-Existence; for it is nothing in respect both of those perfections which it wants, and of those which others have. And this Defect, or as we may say, Mixture of *NON-ENTITY* in the constitution of created Beings is the necessary Principle of all Natural Evils, and of a possibility of Moral ones; as will appear in the sequel.

2. An Equality of Perfection in the Creatures is impossible, (as our Adversarie sallow,) I add, neither would it be so convenient to place all in the same state of Perfection.

3. It is agreeable to Divine Wisdom and Goodness to have created not only the more perfect Beings, but also the most imperfect, such as Matter, so long as they are better than nothing, and no impediment to the more perfect ones.

4. Admitting Matter and Motion, there necessarily follows Composition and Dissolution of Bodies, that is Generation and Corruption; which some may look upon as defects in the Divine Work; and yet it is no Objection to his Goodness or Wisdom to create such things as are necessarily attended with these Evils. Allowing therefore God to be infinitely powerful, good and wise, yet it is manifest that some Evils. *viz.* Generation and Corruption, and the necessary Consequences of these, might have place in his Works; and if even one Evil could arise without the ill Principle, why not many? And if we knew the nature and cir-

circumstances of all things as well as we do those of Matter and Motion, it may be presumed that we could account for them without any imputation of the Divine Attributes. For there's the same reason for them all, and one Instance to the contrary destroys an universal Proposition.

5. It is not inconsistent with the Divine Attributes to have created some Spirits or thinking Substances, which are dependant on Matter and Motion in their Operations, and being united to Matter may both move their Bodies and be affected with certain Passions and Sensations by their Motion, and stand in need of a certain disposition of Organs for the proper exercise of their thinking faculty; supposing the number of those that are quite separate from Matter to be as compleat as the System of the whole Universe would admit, and that the lower order is no inconvenience to the higher.

6. It cannot be conceived but that some sensations thus excited by Matter and Motion should be disagreeable, and tend to dissolve the union between Soul and Body; as well as others agreeable. For 'tis impossible as well as inconvenient that the Soul should feel itself to be losing its faculty of thinking, which alone can make it happy, and not be affected with it. Now disagreeable sensation is to be reckoned among natural Evils, which yet cannot be avoided without removing such kind of Animals out of nature. If any one ask why such a Law of Union was established? Let this be his answer; Because there could be no better. For such a necessity as this flows from the very nature of the union of things, and considering the circumstances and conditions under which, and which only, they could have existence, they could neither be placed in a better State, nor governed by more commodious Laws. These Evils therefore are not inconsistent with the Divine Attributes, provided that the Creatures which are subject to them enjoy such benefits as over-balance them. 'Tis to be observed also that these Evils do not properly arise from the Existence which God gave to the Creatures, but from hence that they had not more of Existence given them; which nevertheless their State and the place they fill in the great Machine of the World could not admit. This Mixture there-

therefore of Non-existence supplies the place of an ill Principle in the Origin of Evil, as was said before.

7. The Happiness and Perfection of every thing or Agent arises from the due Exercise of those Faculties which God has given it, and the more Faculties and Perfections any thing has, 'tis capable of the greater and more perfect Happiness.

8. The less dependent on external things, the more self-sufficient any Agent is, and the more it has the principle of its Actions in itself, 'tis so much the more perfect; Since therefore we may conceive two Sorts of Agents, one which do not act, unless impelled and determined by external force, the other which have the Principle of their Actions within themselves, and can determine themselves to action by their own natural Power: 'tis plain that the latter are much much more perfect than the former. Nor can it be denied but that God may create an Agent with such a power as this, which can exert itself into action, without either the concurrence of God, or the determination of external Causes, so long as God by a general Concurrence preserves the Existence, Powers and Faculties of that Agent.

9. Such an Agent may prescribe to itself an End, and prosecute it by proper Means, and take delight in the prosecution of it, though that end might be perfectly indifferent to it before it was proposed, and be no more agreeable than any other of the same or a different kind would be, if the Agent had once resolved to prosecute it. For since all the pleasure or happiness which we receive, arises from the due exercise of our Faculties, every thing which is equally commodious for the exercise of our faculties, will give us the same delight. The reason therefore why one thing pleases above another is founded in the Act of the Agent himself, *viz.* his Election. This is largely explained in the Book itself, together with the limits within which it is confined, and shall be illustrated more fully hereafter.

10. It is impossible that all things should agree to all, that is, be good; for since the things are limited, distinct and different one from another, and are endowed with finite, distinct and different appetites, it necessarily follows that the relations of convenient and inconvenient must arise from

this diversity. Since therefore every created being is from the imperfection of its nature necessarily limited, and from that limitation there necessarily follows distinction and diversity, it follows that a possibility at least of Evil is a necessary attendant on all Creatures, and cannot be separated from them by any Power, Wisdom or Goodness whatsoever. For when a thing is applied to an Appetite or Being to which it is not appropriated, as it is not agreeable to it, it necessarily affects it with uneasiness; nor was it possible that all things should be appropriated to every Being, where the things themselves and the appetites are various and different, as they must necessarily be, if created, even in the most perfect manner.

11. Since some Agents have a power over their Actions, as above, and can please themselves in the choice of such things as may exercise their faculties; and since there are some ways of exercising them which may be prejudicial to themselves or others; 'tis plain that from this power there arises a possibility of choosing amiss, and they may exercise themselves to their own prejudice, or that of others.

12. And since in such a variety of things those that are beneficial or hurtful cannot be known by an intelligent Being which is in its own nature limited and imperfect, it was agreeable to the Divine Wisdom and Goodness to prescribe some Rules and Directions to such agents, in order to inform them of what would benefit or incommode them and their Fellow Creatures, *i. e.* what would be good or evil; that they might choose the one and avoid the other.

13. Since therefore, as was said before, an Equality of Perfections in the Creatures is impossible, neither would it be convenient for them to be placed in the same State of Perfection, it follows that there are various Orders and Degrees even among intelligent Creatures; and since some of the inferior Orders and Degrees are capable of those benefits which the superior ones enjoy, and since there are as many placed in those superior Orders as the System of the Universe allowed; it follows that the inferior ones, as a more convenient place could not be left for them, ought to be content with a lower portion of Happiness, which their nature makes them capable of, and to a higher than which they

they could not aspire without detriment to the superior which possesses that Station. For he must quit his place before another can ascend to it; and it seems hard and very inconsistent with the nature of God to degrade a Superior as long as he has done nothing to deserve it. But if one of a superior Order shall by his own act, without any violence or compulsion, voluntarily quit his place, or freely choose such things as deserve a Degradation, God would seem unjust to those who are in an inferior Degree, and by a good use of their Liberty become fit and qualified for a superior State, if he should refuse them the free use of their Choice. It seems unjust for God to condemn or degrade any one arbitrarily, but he is not to be blamed for suffering one to degrade himself by his own act and choice, especially when the use of that elective power belongs to the nature of an intelligent Being, and could not in the present state be prohibited without detriment to some other.

Here the Wisdom and Goodness of God seem to have exerted themselves in a most glorious manner, the contrivance appears to be the effect of the highest Policy and Prudence. For by this means God has shewn himself most equitable to his Creatures; so that no one can complain of, or glory in his lot. He that is in a less convenient Situation has no room for complaint, since he is endowed with faculties, and has power to use them in such a manner as to acquire a more commodious one; and he must be forced to own himself only in the fault if he continues deprived of it: and he that is now in a superior State may learn to fear lest he fall from it by an unlawful use of his faculties. The Superior therefore has a Dread that may in some measure diminish his happiness; and the inferior, Hope that may increase it; by which means they are both brought nearer to an equality; and in the mean time have the utmost provocation and incitement to choose the best, and make the most beneficial use of their faculties. This Contest, if I mistake not, makes for the good of the Universe, and much more than if all things were fixed by Fate and Necessity, and absolutely confined to their present State. Either God must have created no free Agents to be governed by the hope of rewards and fear of punishments, or this will be

the fittest means to that end, and worthy of a God. For what ground is there to complain of the Deity in this whole affair; except that when an equal share of happiness could not befall every one, he bestows the best on such as use their faculties aright, and takes away what he had given from those that abuse them? But more of this hereafter.

14. If what is laid down above be true, from thence 'tis manifest that all kinds of Evil, *viz.* that of *IMPERFECTION*, *PAIN*, and *SIN* may enter into a world made by the most wise good and powerful Author, and that its Origin may be accounted for without calling in the assistance of an Evil Principle.

15. 'Tis plain that we are tied down to this Earth and confined in it, as in a Prison, and that our Knowledge does not extend beyond the Ideas which we receive from the Senses; and who knows not how small a part we understand even of those Elements about which we are conversant? But since the whole Mass of Elements is as a Point in regard to the whole Universe, is it any wonder if we mistake when we are forming a judgment, or rather a conjecture, concerning the Beauty, Order and Goodness of the Whole from this contemptible Particle? This Earth of ours may be the Dungeon of the Universe, an Hospital of Madmen or a Work-house of reprobates; and yet such as it is, there is much more both of Natural and Moral Good than Evil to be found in it.

Thus far has the Controversy about the Origin of Evil proceeded in the Author's Book. For all that has been said above is either expressly contained in it, or may very easily be deduced from the Principles there laid down.

P. S. The Persons to whom I am more particularly obliged for the Papers abovementioned, are the Reverend Mr. Spence Rector of Donnaghmore, and the Reverend Mr. King Prebendary of St. Patrick's and Minister of St. Bride's, Dublin: who are desired to accept of this Acknowledgement, and to excuse the Freedom I here take of informing the Public, to whom I esteem it, as well as myself indebted.

The following Dissertation was composed chiefly by the late Reverend Mr. Gay.

PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION.

Concerning the

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE

OF

VIRTUE or *MORALITY*.

THOUGH all Writers of Morality have in the main agreed what particular Actions are virtuous and what otherwise, yet they have, or at least seem to have differed very much, both concerning the *Criterion* of Virtue, *viz.* what it is which *denominates* any Action virtuous ; or, to speak more properly, what it is by which we must try any Action to *know* whether it be virtuous or no ; and also concerning the *Principle*, or Motive, by which Men are induced to pursue Virtue.

As to the former, some have placed it in *acting agreeably to Nature*, or *Reason* ; others in the *Fitness of things* ; others in a Conformity with *Truth* ; others in promoting the *Common Good* ; others in the *Will of God*, &c. This Disagreement of Moralists concerning the Rule or Criterion of Virtue in general, and at the same time their almost perfect Agreement concerning the particular Branches of it, would be apt to make one suspect, either that they had a different Criterion (though they did not know or attend to it) from what they professed ; or (which perhaps is the true as well as the more favourable Opinion) that they only talk a different Language, and that all of them have the same Criterion in reality, only they have expressed it in different Words.

And there will appear the more room for this Conjecture, if we consider the Ideas themselves about which Morality is chiefly conversant, *viz.* that they are all *mixed Modes*, or

compound Ideas arbitrarily put together, having at first no Archetype or Original existing, and afterwards no other than that which exists in other Men's Minds. Now since Men, unless they have these their compound Ideas, which are signified by the same Name, made up precisely of the same simple ones, must necessarily talk a different Language; and since this difference is so difficult, and in some Cases impossible to be avoided, it follows that greater Allowance and Indulgence ought to be given to these Writers than any other: and that (if we have a mind to understand them) we should not always take their Words in the common Acceptation, but in the Sense in which we find that particular Author which we are reading used them. And if a Man interpret the Writers of Morality with this due Candor, I believe their seeming Inconsistencies and Disagreements about the Criterion of Virtue, would in a great measure vanish; and he would find that *acting agreeably to Nature*, or *Reason*, (when rightly understood) would perfectly coincide with the *Fitness of things*; the Fitness of things (as far as these Words have any meaning) with *Truth*; Truth with the *Common Good*; and the Common Good with the *Will of God*.

But whether this Difference be real, or only verbal, a Man can scarce avoid observing from it, that Mankind have the Ideas of most particular Virtues, and also a confused Notion of Virtue in general, before they have any Notion of the Criterion of it; or ever did, neither perhaps can they, deduce all or any of those Virtues from their Idea of Virtue in general, or upon any rational Grounds shew how those Actions (which the World call Moral, and most, if not all Men evidently have Ideas of) are distinguished from other Actions, or why they approve of those Actions called Moral ones, more than others.

But since the Idea of Virtue among all Men (however they differ in other respects) includes either tacitly or expressly, not only the Idea of *Approbation* as the Consequence of it; but also that it is to every one, and in all Circumstances, an Object of *Choice*; it is incumbent on all Writers of Morality, to shew that *that* in which they place Virtue, whatever it be, not only always will or ought to meet

meet with Approbation, but also that it is always an Object of *Choice*; which is the other great Dispute among Moralists, *viz.* What is the Principle or Motive by which Men are induced to pursue Virtue.

For some have imagined that *that* is the only Object of Choice to a rational Creature, which upon the whole will produce more Happiness than Misery to the Choofer; and that Men are, and ought to be guided wholly by this Principle; and farther, that Virtue will produce more Happiness than Misery, and therefore is always an Object of Choice: and whatever is an Object of Choice, That we approve of.

But this, however true in Theory, is insufficient to account for Matter of Fact, *i. e.* that the generality of Mankind do approve of Virtue, or rather virtuous Actions, without being able to give any Reason for their Approbation; and also, that some pursue it without knowing that it tends to their own private Happiness; nay even when it appears to be inconsistent with and destructive of their Happiness.

And that this is matter of Fact, the ingenious Author of the *Enquiry into the Original of our Idea of Virtue* has so evidently made appear by a great Variety of Instances, that a Man must be either very little acquainted with the World, or a mere *Hobbiſt* in his Temper to deny it.

And therefore to solve these two Difficulties, this excellent Author has supposed (without *proving*, unless by shewing the insufficiency of all other Schemes) a *Moral Sense* to account for the former, and a *publick* or *benevolent Affection* for the latter: And these, *viz.* the Moral Sense and Public Affection, he supposes to be implanted in us like *Instincts*, independent of Reason, and previous to any Instruction; and therefore his Opinion is, that no account can be given, or ought to be expected of them, any more than we pretend to account for the Pleasure or Pain which arises from Sensation; *i. e.* Why any particular Motion produced in our Bodies should be accompanied with Pain rather than Pleasure, and *vice versa*.

But this Account seems still insufficient, rather cutting the Knot than untying it; and if it is not akin to the Do-

ctrine of *Innate Ideas*, yet I think it relishes too much of that of *Occult Qualities*. This ingenious Author is certainly in the right in his Observations upon the Insufficiency of the common Methods of accounting for both our *Election* and *Approbation* of Moral Actions, and rightly infers the Necessity of supposing a Moral Sense (*i. e.* a Power or Faculty whereby we may perceive any Action to be an Object of Approbation, and the Agent of Love) and public Affections, to account for the principal Actions of human Life. But then by calling these *Instincts*, I think he stops too soon, imagining himself at the Fountain-head, when he might have traced them much higher, even to the true Principle of all our Actions, our own *Happiness*.

And this will appear by shewing that our Approbation of Morality, and all Affections whatsoever, are finally resolvable into *Reason* pointing out *private Happiness*, and are conversant only about things apprehended to be means tending to this end; and that whenever this end is not perceived, they are to be accounted for from the *Association of Ideas*, and may properly enough be called *Habits*.

For if this be clearly made out, the necessity of supposing a Moral Sense or public Affections to be implanted in us, since it ariseth only from the Insufficiency of all other Schemes to account for human Actions, will immediately vanish. But whether it be made out or no, we may observe in general, that all Arguments *ad Ignorantiam*, or that proceed *a Remotione* only (as this, by which the Moral Sense and public Affections are established to be Instincts, evidently does) are scarce ever perfectly satisfactory, being for the most part subject to this Doubt, *viz.* Whether there is a full Enumeration of all the Parts; and liable also to this Objection, *viz.* That though I cannot account for Phenomena otherwise, yet possibly they may be otherwise accounted for.

But before we can determine this Point, it will be necessary to settle all the Terms: We shall in the first place therefore enquire what is meant by the *Criterion* of Virtue.

SECT.

SECT. I.

Concerning the Criterion of Virtue.

THE Criterion of any thing is a Rule or Measure by a Conformity with which any thing is known to be of this or that sort, or of this or that degree. And in order to determine the Criterion of any thing, we must first know the thing whose Criterion we are seeking after. For a Measure presupposes the Idea of the thing to be measured, otherwise it could not be known (since what is the proper Measure of one thing is not so of another) whether it was fit to measure it or no. Liquids, Cloth, and Flesh, have all different Measures; Gold and Silver different Touchstones. This is very intelligible, and the Method of doing it generally clear, when either the Quantity, or Kind of any particular Substance is thus to be ascertained.

But when we extend our Enquiries after a Criterion for abstract, mixed Modes, which have no Existence but in our Minds, and are so very different in different Men; we are apt to be confounded, and search after a Measure for we know not what. For unless we are first agreed concerning the thing to be measured, we shall in vain expect to agree in our Criterion of it, or even to understand one another.

But it may be said, if we are exactly agreed in any mixed Mode, what need of any *Criterion*? or what can we want farther? What we want farther, and what we mean by the Criterion of it is this; *viz.* to know whether any inferior, or particular thing do belong to this mixed Mode or no. And this is a very proper Enquiry. For let a Man learn the Idea of Intemperance from you never so clearly, and if you please let this be the Idea, *viz.* the Eating or Drinking to that degree as to injure his Understanding or Health; and let him also be never so much convinced of the Obligation to avoid it; yet it is a very pertinent Question in him to ask you, How shall I know when I am guilty of Intemperance?

And if we examine this thoroughly, we shall find that every little difference in the Definition of a mixed Mode will require a different Criterion. *e. g.* If Murder is defined the

the *wilful* taking away the Life of another, it is evident, that to enquire after the Criterion of Murder, is to enquire how we shall know when the Life of another is taken away *wilfully*; i. e. when one who takes away the Life of another does it with that malicious Design which is implied by *Wilfulness*. But if Murder be defined the *Guilty* taking away the Life of another, then to enquire after the Criterion of Murder, is to enquire how it shall be known when *Guilt* is contracted in the taking away the Life of another. So that the Criterion of Murder, according to one or other of these Definitions, will be different. For *Wilfulness* perhaps will be made the Criterion of Guilt; but *Wilfulness* itself, if it want any, must have some farther Criterion; it being evident that nothing can be the Measure of itself.

If the Criterion is contained in the Idea itself, then it is merely *nominal*, e. g. If Virtue is defined, The acting agreeably to the Will of God: To say the Will of God is the Criterion of Virtue, is only to say, what is agreeable to the Will of God is *called* Virtue. But the *real* Criterion, which is of some use, is this, How shall I know what the Will of God is in this respect?

From hence it is evident, that the Criterion of a mixed Mode is neither the Definition of it, nor contained in it. For, as has been shewn, the general Idea is necessarily to be fixed; and if the *Particulars* comprehended under it are fixed or known also, there remains nothing to be measured; because we measure only things unknown. The general Idea then being fixed, the Criterion which is to measure or determine Inferiors, must be found out and proved to be a proper Rule or Measure, by comparing it with the *general Idea* only, independent of the inferior things to which it is to be applied. For the truth of the Measure must be proved independently of the Particulars to be measured, otherwise we shall prove in a Circle.

To apply what has been said in general to the Case in hand. Great Enquiry is made after the Criterion of *Virtue*; but it is to be feared that few know distinctly what it is they are enquiring after; and therefore this must be clearly stated. And in order to this, we must (as has been shewn) first fix our Idea of Virtue, and that exactly; and then
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our Enquiry will be, how we shall know this or that less general or particular Action to be comprehended under Virtue. For unless our Idea of Virtue is fixed, we enquire after the Criterion of we know not what. And this our Idea of Virtue, to give any Satisfaction, ought to be so general, as to be conformable to that which all or most Men are supposed to have. And this general Idea, I think, may be thus expressed.

Virtue is the Conformity to a Rule of Life, directing the Actions of all rational Creatures with respect to each other's Happiness; to which Conformity every one in all Cases is obliged: and every one that does so conform, is or ought to be approved of, esteemed and loved for so doing. What is here expressed, I believe every one, or most, put into their Idea of Virtue.

For Virtue generally does imply some relation to *others*: where *Self* is only concerned, a Man is called *prudent*, (not virtuous) and an Action which relates immediately to *God*, is stiled *Religious*.

I think also that all Men, whatever they make Virtue to consist in, yet always make it to imply *Obligation* and *Approbation*.

The Idea of Virtue being thus fixed, to enquire after the Criterion of it, is to enquire what that Rule of Life is to which we are *obliged* to conform; or how that Rule is to be found out which is to direct me in my Behaviour towards *others*, which ought *always* to be pursued, and which, if pursued, will or ought to procure me *Approbation*, *Esteem*, and *Love*.

But before I can answer this Enquiry: I must first see what I mean by *Obligation*.

S E C T. II.

Concerning Obligation.

Obligation is the necessity of doing or omitting any Action in order to be happy: i. e. when there is such a relation between an Agent and an Action that the Agent cannot

be happy without doing or omitting that Action, then the Agent is said to be *obliged* to do or omit that Action. So that Obligation is evidently founded upon the Prospect of *Happiness*, and arises from that necessary Influence which any Action has upon present or future Happiness or Misery. And no greater Obligation can be supposed to be laid upon any *free Agent* without an express Contradiction.

This Obligation may be consider'd four ways, according to the four different manners in which it is induced : First, that Obligation which ariseth from perceiving the natural Consequences of things, *i. e.* the Consequences of things acting according to the fix'd Laws of Nature, may be call'd *Natural*. Secondly, that arising from Merit or Demerit, as producing the Esteem and Favour of our Fellow Creatures, or the contrary, is usually stiled *Virtuous*. Thirdly, that arising from the Authority of the Civil Magistrate, *Civil*. Fourthly, that from the Authority of God, *Religious*.

Now from the Consideration of these four sorts of Obligation (which are the only ones) it is evident that a full and complete Obligation which will extend to all Cases, can only be that arising from the Authority of *God* ; because God only can in all Cases make a Man happy or miserable : and therefore, since we are *always* obliged to that conformity call'd *Virtue*, it is evident that the immediate Rule or Criterion of it is the Will of God. But is the *whole* Will of God the Criterion or *Virtue* ? No. For though the whole Will of God is equally obligatory ; yet, since *Virtue* was defined to be the conformity to a Rule directing my Behaviour with respect to my *Fellow-Creatures*, the Will of God can be no farther concern'd about *Virtue*, than as it directs me in that Behaviour.

The next Enquiry therefore is, what that Will of God in this particular is, or what it directs me to do ?

Now it is evident from the Nature of God, *viz.* his being infinitely happy in himself from all Eternity, and from his Goodness manifested in his Works, that he could have no other Design in creating Mankind than *their* Happiness ; and therefore he wills their Happiness ; therefore the means of their Happiness : therefore that my Behaviour, as far as it may be a means of the Happiness of Mankind, should be

be such. Here then we are got one Step farther, or to a new Criterion : not to a new Criterion of Virtue *immediately*, but to a Criterion of the *Will of God*. For it is an Answer to the Enquiry, How shall I know what the Will of God in this particular is ? Thus the Will of God is the immediate Criterion of Virtue, and the Happiness of Mankind the Criterion of the Will of God ; and therefore the Happiness of Mankind may be said to be the Criterion of Virtue, but *once removed*.

And since I am to do whatever lies in my Power towards promoting the Happiness of Mankind, the next Enquiry is, what is the Criterion of this *Happiness* : i. e. How shall I know what in my Power is, or is not, for the Happiness of Mankind ?

Now this is to be known only from the *Relations* of things, (which Relations, with Respect to our present Enquiry, some have call'd their *Fitness* and *Unfitness*.) For some Things and Actions are apt to produce Pleasure, others Pain ; some are convenient, others inconvenient for a Society ; some are for the good of Mankind ; others tend to the detriment of it ; therefore those are to be chosen which tend to the good of Mankind, the others to be avoided.

Thus then we are got one step farther, *viz.* to the Criterion of the Happiness of Mankind. And from this Criterion we deduce all particular Virtues and Vices.

The next Enquiry is, How shall I know that there is this *Fitness* and *Unfitness* in things ? or if there be, how shall I discover it in particular Cases ? And the Answer is, either from Experience or Reason. You either *perceive* the Inconveniencies of some Things and Actions when they happen ; or you *foresee* them by contemplating the Nature of the Things and Actions.

Thus the Criterion of the *Fitness* or *Unfitness* of things may in general be said to be *Reason* : which Reason, when *exactly* conformable to the things existing, i. e. when it judges of things as they are, is called *Right Reason*. And hence also we sometimes talk of the *Reason of things*, i. e. properly speaking, that Relation which we should find out by our Reason, if our Reason was right.

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The expressing by outward Signs the Relations of things as they really are, is called *Truth*; and hence, by the same kind of Metaphor, we are apt to talk of the *Truth*, as well as *Reason of things*. Both Expressions mean the same: which has often made me wonder why some Men who cry up *Reason* as the Criterion of Virtue, should yet dislike Mr. *Wollaston's* Notion of *Truth* being its Criterion.

The Truth is, all these just mentioned, *viz.* the Happiness of Mankind; the Relations, or Fitness and Unfitness of things; Reason and Truth; may in some sense be said to be Criteria of Virtue; but it must always be remember'd that they are only *remote* Criteria of it; being gradually subordinate to its immediate Criterion, the Will of God.

And from hence we may perceive the Reason of what I suggested in the beginning of this Treatise, *viz.* That the Dispute between Moralists about the Criterion of Virtue, is more in Words than Meaning; and that this Difference between them has been occasion'd by their dropping the immediate Criterion, and choosing some a more remote, some a less remote one. And from hence we may see also the Inconvenience of defining any mix'd Mode by its Criterion. For that in a great measure has occasion'd all this Confusion; as may easily be made appear in all the pretended Criteria of Virtue above mentioned.

Thus those who either expressly exclude, or don't mention the Will of God, making the immediate Criterion of Virtue to be the Good of Mankind; must either allow that Virtue is not in all Cases *obligatory* (contrary to the Idea which all or most Men have of it) or they must say that the Good of Mankind is a sufficient Obligation. But how can the Good of Mankind be any Obligation to *me*, when perhaps in particular Cases, such as laying down my Life, or the like, it is contrary to my Happiness?

Those who drop the Happiness of Mankind, and talk of the Relations, the Fitness and Unfitness of Things, are still more remote from the true Criterion. For Fitness without relation to some *End*, is scarce intelligible.

Reason and Truth come pretty near the Relations of things, because they manifestly presuppose them; but are still

still one step farther from the immediate Criterion of Virtue.

What has been said concerning the Criterion of Virtue as including our Obligation to it, may perhaps be allow'd to be true, but still it will be urg'd, that 'tis insufficient to account for matter of Fact, *viz.* that most Persons, who are either ignorant of, or never consider'd these Deductions, do however pursue Virtue themselves, and approve of it in others. I shall in the next place therefore give some account of our Approbations and Affections.

SECT. III.

Concerning Approbation and Affection.

MAN is not only a *sensible* Creature, not only capable of Pleasure and Pain, but capable also of *foreseeing* this Pleasure and Pain in the future consequences of Things and Actions; and as he is capable of knowing, so also of *governing* or directing the Causes of them, and thereby in a great measure enabled to avoid the one and procure the other: whence the Principle of all Action. And therefore, as Pleasure and Pain are not indifferent to him, nor out of his Power, he pursues the former and avoids the latter; and therefore also those things which are *Causes* of them are not indifferent, but he pursues or avoids them also, according to their different Tendency. That which he pursues for its own sake, which is only Pleasure, is called an *End*; that which he apprehends to be apt to produce Pleasure, he calls *Good*, and approves of, *i. e.* judges a proper means to attain his end, and therefore looks upon it as an Object of choice; and that which is pregnant with Misery he disapproves of and stiles *Evil*. And this Good and Evil are not only barely approved of, or the contrary; but whenever view'd in Imagination (since Man considers himself as existing hereafter, and is concern'd for his Welfare then as well as now) they have a *present Pleasure* or Pain annex'd to them, proportionable to what is apprehended to follow them in real Existence; which Pleasure or Pain arising from

from the Prospect of future Pleasure or Pain is properly call'd *Passion*, and the Desire consequent thereupon, *Affection*.

And as by reflecting upon Pleasure there arises in our minds a *Desire* of it ; and on Pain, an *Aversion* from it (which necessarily follows from supposing us to be sensible Creatures, and is no more than saying, that all things are not *indifferent* to us) so also by reflecting upon Good or Evil, the same Desires and Aversions are excited, and are distinguish'd into *Love* and *Hatred*. And from Love and Hatred variously modify'd, arise all those other Desires and Aversions which are promiscuously stiled Passions or Affections ; and are generally thought to be implanted in our Nature *originally*, like the Power of receiving Pleasure or Pain. And when placed on inanimate Objects, are these following ; Hope, Fear, Despair and its opposite, for which we want a Name.

SECT. IV.

Approbation and Affection consider'd with regard to Merit, or the Law of Esteem.

IF a Man in the pursuit of Pleasure or Happiness (by which is meant the Sum total of Pleasure) had to do only with inanimate Creatures, his Approbation and Affections would be as described in the foregoing Section. But, since he is dependent with respect to his Happiness, not only on these, but also on rational Agents, Creatures like himself, which have the Power of governing or directing Good and Evil, and of acting for an End ; there will arise different means of Happiness, and consequently different Pursuits, though tending to the same End, Happiness ; and therefore different Approbations and Affections, and the contrary ; which deserve particularly to be consider'd.

That there will arise different means of Happiness, is evident from hence, *viz.* that Rational Agents, in being subservient to our Happiness are not passive, but voluntary. And therefore since we are in pursuit of that, to obtain which

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we apprehend the concurrence of their Wills necessary, we cannot but approve of whatever is apt to procure this Concurrence. And that can be only the Pleasure or Pain expected from it by them. And therefore as I perceive that my Happiness is dependent on others, I cannot but judge whatever I apprehend to be proper to excite them to endeavour to promote my Happiness, to be a means of Happiness, *i. e.* I cannot but *approve it*. And since the annexing Pleasure to their Endeavours to promote my Happiness is the only thing in my Power to this end, I cannot but approve of the annexing Pleasure to such Actions of theirs as are undertaken upon my account. Hence to approve of a Rational Agent as a means of Happiness, is different from the Approbation of any other means; because it implies an Approbation also of an Endeavour to promote the Happiness of that Agent, in order to excite him and others to the same concern for my Happiness for the future.

And because what we approve of we also desire (as has been shewn above) hence also we *desire* the Happiness of any Agent that has done us good. And therefore *Love* or *Hatred*, when placed on a rational Object, has this difference from the Love or Hatred of other things, that it implies a desire of, and consequently a pleasure in the Happiness of the Object beloved; or if hated, the contrary.

The Foundation of this Approbation and Love (which, as we have seen, consists in his voluntary contributing to our Happiness) is called the *Merit* of the Agent so contributing, *i. e.* that whereby he is entitled (upon supposition that we act like rational, sociable Creatures; like Creatures, whose Happiness is dependent on each other's Behaviour) to our Approbation and Love: *Demerit* the contrary.

And this Affection or Quality of any Action which we call *Merit*, is very consistent with a Man's acting *ultimately* for his own private Happiness. For any particular Action that is undertaken *for the sake of another*, is *meritorious*, *i. e.* deserves Esteem, Favour, and Approbation from him for whose sake it was undertaken, towards the Doer of it. For the Presumption of such Esteem, &c. was the only Motive to that Action; and if such Esteem, &c. does not follow, or is presumed not to follow it, such a Person is reckoned

unworthy of any favour, because he shews by his Actions that he is incapable of being *obliged* by Favours.

The Mistake which some have run into, *viz.* that Merit is inconsistent with acting upon *private Happiness*, as an ultimate End, seems to have arisen from hence, *viz.* that they have not carefully enough distinguished between an inferior, and ultimate End; the end of a particular Action, and the end of Action in general: which may be explained thus. Though Happiness, private Happiness, is the proper or ultimate End of all our Actions whatever, yet that particular means of Happiness which any particular Action is chiefly adapted to procure, or the thing chiefly aimed at by that Action; the thing which, if possessed, we would not undertake that Action, may and generally is called the *End* of that Action. As therefore Happiness is the general End of all Actions, so each particular Action may be said to have its proper and peculiar End: Thus the End of a Beau is to please by his Dress; the End of Study, Knowledge. But neither pleasing by Dress, nor Knowledge, are ultimate Ends, they still tend or ought to tend to something farther; as is evident from hence, *viz.* that a Man may ask and expect a Reason why either of them are pursued: Now to ask the *Reason* of any Action or Pursuit, is only to enquire into the *End* of it: But to expect a Reason, *i. e.* and End, to be assigned for an *ultimate* End, is absurd. To ask why I pursue Happiness, will admit of no other Answer than an Explanation of the Terms.

Why *inferior Ends*, which in reality are only Means, are too often looked upon and acquiesced in as *ultimate*, shall be accounted for hereafter.

Whenever therefore the *particular* End of any Action is the Happiness of another (though the Agent designed thereby to procure to himself Esteem and Favour, and looked upon that Esteem and Favour as a means of private Happiness) that Action is meritorious. And the same may be said, though we design to please God, by endeavouring to promote the Happiness of others. But when an Agent has a view in any particular Action distinct from my Happiness, and that view is his only *Motive* to that Action, though that Action promote my Happiness to never so great

great a Degree, yet that Agent acquires no *Merit*; *i. e.* he is not thereby entitled to any Favour or Esteem: Because Favour and Esteem are due from me for any Action, no farther than that Action was undertaken upon my account. If therefore my Happiness is only the pretended End of that Action, I am imposed on if I believe it real, and thereby think myself indebted to the Agent; and I am discharged from any Obligation as soon as I find out the Cheat.

But it is far otherwise when my Happiness is the sole End of that particular Action, *i. e.* (as I have explained myself above) when the Agent endeavours to promote my Happiness as a Means to procure my Favour, *i. e.* to make me subservient to his Happiness as his ultimate End: Tho' I know he aims at my Happiness only as a means of his own, yet this lessons not the Obligation.

There is one thing, I confess, which makes a great alteration in this Case, and that is, whether he aims at my Favour *in general*, or only for some particular End. Because, if he aim at my Happiness only to serve himself in some particular thing, the Value of my Favour will perhaps end with his obtaining that particular thing: And therefore I am under less Obligation (*cæteris paribus*) the more *particular* his Expectations from me are; but under Obligation I am.

Now from the various Combinations of this which we call Merit, and its contrary, arise all those various Approbations and Aversions; all those Likings and Dislikings which we call *Moral*.

As therefore, from considering those Beings which are the *involuntary* means of our Happiness or Misery, there were produced in us the Passions or Affections of Love, Hatred, Hope, Fear, Despair, and its contrary: So from considering those Beings which *voluntarily* contribute to our Happiness or Misery, there arise the following. Love and Hatred, (which are different from that Love or Hatred placed on involuntary Beings; that placed on involuntary Beings being only a Desire to possess or avoid the thing beloved or hated; but this on voluntary Agents being a Desire to give Pleasure or Pain to the Agent beloved or hated)

hated) Gratitude, Anger, (sometimes called by one Name, Repentment) Generosity, Ambition, Honour, Shame, Envy, Benevolence: and if there be any other, they're only, as these are, different Modifications of Love and Hatred.

Love and *Hatred*, and the Foundation of them (*viz.* the Agent beloved or hated being apprehended to be instrumental to our Happiness) I have explained above. *Gratitude* is that Desire of promoting the Happiness of another upon account of some former Kindness received. *Anger*, that Desire of thwarting the Happiness of another, on account of some former Diskindness or Injury received. And both these take place, though we hope for, or fear nothing farther from the Objects of either of them, and this is still consistent with acting upon a Principle of *private Happiness*.

For though we neither hope for, nor fear anything farther from these particular Beings; yet the Disposition shewn upon these Occasions is apprehended to influence the Behaviour of other Beings towards us; *i. e.* other Beings will be moved to promote our Happiness or otherwise, as they observe how we resent Favours or Injuries.

Ambition is a Desire of being esteemed. Hence a Desire of Being *thought* an Object of Esteem; hence of *being* an Object of Esteem, hence of doing *laudable*, *i. e.* useful Actions. *Generosity* and *Benevolence* are Species of it. Ambition in too great a Degree is called *Pride*, of which there are several Species. The Title to the Esteem of others, which ariseth from any meritorious Action, is called *Honour*. The Pleasure arising from Honour being paid to us, *i. e.* from others acknowledging that we are entitled to their Esteem, is without a Name. *Modesty* is the fear of losing Esteem. The Uneasiness or Passion which ariseth from a Sense that we have lost it, is called *Shame*. So that *Ambition*, and all those other Passions and Affections belonging to it, together with *Shame*, arise from the Esteem of others: which is the Reason why this Tribe of affections operate more strongly on us than any other, *viz.* because we perceive that as our Happiness is dependent on the Behaviour of others, so we perceive also that that Behaviour is dependent on the Esteem which others have conceived of us; and consequently that our acquiring or losing Esteem, is in effect

effect acquiring or losing Happiness, and in the highest Degree. And the same may be said concerning all our other Affections and Passions, to enumerate which, what for want of Names to them, and what by the confusion of Language about them, is almost impossible.

Error will be accounted for hereafter, for a Reason which will then be obvious.

Thus having explained what I mean by *Obligation* and *Approbation*; and shewn that they are founded on and terminate in *Happiness*: having also pointed out the Difference between our Approbations and Affections as placed on involuntary and voluntary Means of Happiness; and farther, that these Approbations and Affections are not innate or implanted in us by way of *Instinct*, but are all *acquired*, being fairly deducible from supposing only sensible and rational Creatures dependent on each other for their Happiness, as explained above: I shall in the next place endeavour to answer a grand Objection to what has here been said concerning Approbations and Affections arising from a prospect of private Happiness.

The Objection is this,

The Reason or End of every Action is always known to the Agent; for nothing can move a Man but what is perceived: but the generality of Mankind love and hate, approve and disapprove, immediately, as soon as any moral Character either occurs in Life, or is proposed to them, without considering whether their private Happiness is affected with it or no: or if they do consider any Moral Character in relation to their own Happiness, and find themselves, as to their private Happiness, unconcerned in it, or even find their private Happiness lessened by it in some particular Instance, yet they still approve the Moral Character, and love the Agent: nay they cannot do otherwise. Whatever Reason may be assigned by speculative Men why we should be grateful to a Benefactor, or pity the Distressed; yet if the grateful or compassionate Mind never thought of that Reason, it is no Reason to him. The Enquiry is not why he *ought to be* grateful, but why he *is* so. These after-reasons therefore rather shew the Wisdom and Providence

dence of our Maker in implanting the immediate Powers of these Approbations (*i. e.* in Mr. *Hutcheson's* Language, a *Moral Sense*) and these Public Affections in us, than give any satisfactory account of their Origin. And therefore these Public Affections, and this Moral Sense, are quite independent on private Happiness, and in reality act upon us as mere Instincts.

Answer,

The Matter of Fact contained in this Argument, in my Opinion, is not to be contested; and therefore it remains either that we make the Matter of Fact consistent with what we have before laid down, or give up the Cause.

Now, in order to shew this Consistency, I beg leave to observe, that as in the pursuit of Truth we do not always trace every Proposition whose Truth we are examining, to a first Principle or Axiom, but acquiesce, as soon as we perceive it deducible from some known or presumed Truth; so in our Conduct we do not always travel to the ultimate End of our Actions, *Happiness*: but rest contented, as soon as we perceive any Action subservient to a known or presumed *Means* of Happiness. And these presumed Truths and Means of Happiness whether real or otherwise, always influence us after the same manner as if they were real. The undeniable Consequences of Prejudices are as firmly adhered to as the Consequences of real truths or arguments; and what is subservient to a false (but imagined) means of Happiness, is as industriously pursued as what is subservient to a true one.

Now every Man, both in his Pursuit after Truth, and in his Conduct, has settled and fixed a great many of these in his Mind, which he always acts upon, as upon *Principles*, without examining. And this is occasioned by the Narrowness of our Understandings: We can consider but a few things at once; and therefore, to run every thing to the Fountain-head would be tedious, through a long Series of Consequences; to avoid this we choose out certain Truths and Means of Happiness, which we look upon as **RESTING PLACES**, which we may safely acquiesce in, in the Conduct both of our Understanding and Practice;

tice ; in relation to the one, regarding them as *Axioms* ; in the other, as *Ends*. And we are more easily inclined to this by imagining that we may safely rely upon what we call *Habitual Knowledge*, thinking it needless to examine what we are already satisfied in. And hence it is that Prejudices, both Speculative and Practical, are difficult to be rooted out, *viz.* few will examine them.

And these RESTING PLACES are so often used as Principles, that at last, letting that slip out of our Minds which first inclined us to embrace them, we are apt to imagine them not as they really are, the *Substitutes* of Principles, but Principles themselves.

And from hence, as some Men have imagined *Innate Ideas*, because forgetting how they came by them ; so others have set up almost as many distinct *Instincts* as there are *acquired Principles* of acting. And I cannot but wonder why the *Pecuniary Sense*, a Sense of *Power* and *Party*, &c. were not mentioned, as well as the *Moral*, that of *Honour*, *Order*, and some others.

The Case is really this. We first perceive or imagine some real Good, *i. e.* fitness to promote our Happiness, in those things which we love and approve of. Hence (as was above explained) we annex pleasure to those things. Hence those things and Pleasure are so tied together and associated in our Minds, that one cannot present itself but the other will also occur. And the *Association* remains even after that which at first gave them the Connection is quite forgot, or perhaps does not exist, but the contrary. An Instance or two may perhaps make this clear. How many Men are there in the World who have as strong a taste for *Money* as others have for *Virtue* ; who count so much *Money*, so much Happiness ; nay, even sell their Happiness for *Money* ; or to speak more properly, make the *having Money*, without any Design or Thought of using it, their ultimate End ? But was this Propensity to *Money* born with them ? or rather, did not they at first perceive a great many Advantages from being possessed of *Money*, and from thence conceive a Pleasure in having it, thence desire it, thence endeavour to obtain it, thence receive an actual Pleasure in obtaining it, thence desire to preserve the

Possession of it? Hence by dropping the intermediate Steps between Money and Happiness, they join Money and Happiness immediately together, and content themselves with the phantastical Pleasure of having it, and make that which was at first pursued only as a *Means*, be to them a real *End*, and what their real Happiness or Misery consists in. Thus the Connexion between Money and Happiness remains in the Mind; though it has long since ceased between the things themselves.

The same might be observ'd concerning the Thirst after Knowledge, Fame, &c. the delight in Reading, Building, Planting, and most of the various Exercises and Entertainments of Life. These were at first enter'd on with a view to some farther End, but at length become habitual Amusements; the Idea of Pleasure is associated with them, and leads us on still in the same eager Pursuit of them, when the first Reason is quite vanish'd, or at least out of our Minds. Nay, we find this Power of *Association* so great as not only to transport our Passions and Affections beyond their proper bounds, both as to Intensity and Duration; as is evident from daily Instances of Avarice, Ambition, Love, Revenge, &c. but also, that it is able to transfer them to improper Objects, and such as are of a quite different Nature from those to which our Reason had at first directed them. Thus being accusom'd to resent an Injury done to our Body by a Retaliation of the like to him that offer'd it, we are apt to conceive the same kind of Resentment, and often express it in the same manner, upon receiving hurt from a Stock or a Stone; whereby the hatred which we are us'd to place on voluntary Beings, is substitute in the Room of that Aversion which belongs to involuntary ones. The like may be observ'd in most of the other Passions above-mentioned.

From hence also, *viz.* from the continuance of this *Association* of Ideas in our Minds, we may be enabled to account for that (almost Diabolical) Passion called *Envy*, which we promised to consider.

Mr. *Locke* observes, and I believe very justly, that there are some Men entirely unacquainted with this Passion. For
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most Men that are used to Reflection, may remember the very time when they were first under the dominion of it.

Envy is generally defined to be that Pain which arises in the Mind from observing the Prosperity of others : not of *all* others indefinitely, but only of some particular Persons. Now the examining who those particular Persons whom we are apt to envy are, will lead us to the true Origin of this Passion. And if a Man will be at the Pains to consult his Mind, or to look into the World, he'll find that these particular Persons are always such as upon some account or other he has had a *Rivalship* with. For when two or more are Competitors for the same thing, the Success of the one must necessarily tend to the Detriment of the other, or others : hence the Success of my Rival and Misery or Pain are join'd together in my Mind ; and this connection or association remaining in my Mind, even after the Rivalship ceases, makes me always affected with Pain whenever I hear of his Success, though in Affairs which have no manner of Relation to the Rivalship ; much more in those that bring that to my Remembrance, and put me in mind of what I might have enjoy'd had it not been for him. This may possibly cast some Light upon the black Designs and envious Purposes of the fallen Angels. For why might not they have formerly had some Competition with their Fellows ? and why may not such Associations be as strong in them as us ?

Thus also we are apt to envy those Persons that refuse to be guided by our Judgements, and persuaded by us. For this is nothing else than a Rivalship about the Superiority of Judgment ; and we take a secret Pride both to let the World see, and in imagining ourselves, that we are in the right.

There is one thing more to be observed in answer to this Objection, and that is, that we do not always (and perhaps not for the most part) *make* this Association ourselves, but *learn* it from *others* : *i. e.* that we annex Pleasure or Pain to certain Things or Actions because we see others do it, and acquire Principles of Action by imitating those whom we admire, or whose esteem we would procure : Hence the Son too often inherits both the Vices and the Party of his Father, as well as his Estate : Hence *National* Virtues and Vices,

Vices, Dispositions and Opinions : And from hence we may observe how easy it is to account for what is generally call'd the *Prejudice of Education* ; how soon we catch the Temper and Affections of those whom we daily converse with ; how almost insensibly we are *taught* to love, admire or hate ; to be grateful, generous, compassionate or cruel, &c.

What I say then in answer to the Objection is this :
 “ That it is necessary in order to solve the principal Actions
 “ of human Life to suppose a *Moral Sense* (or what is signify'd by that Name) and also *publick Affections* ; but I deny
 “ that this Moral Sense, or these public Affections, are innate, or *implanted* in us. They are acquired either from
 “ our own *Observation* or the *Imitation* of others.”

¶ *As the following Papers, which were originally printed in the Weekly Miscellany No. 7, 8, 9. are upon the same Subject with the foregoing Dissertation, and may possibly serve to illustrate it ; the Author has thought proper to insert them in this fourth Edition, together with some hints that he has met with in relation to the Origin of our Ideas, which may help to Explain Mr. Locke's Principles, and determine the Controversy about an innate Moral Sense ; and which are therefore here proposed for a more full Consideration.*

ON MORALITY and RELIGION.

THE very Notion of a reasonable Creature implies, that he propose to himself some *End*, and act in pursuit of it. The only Enquiry then can be, What End does Reason direct him to pursue, and by what *Means* shall he attain it? Now a *sensible* Being, or one that is made capable of Happiness or Misery, can reasonably propose to himself no other End than the Perfection of this Being, *i. e.* The Attainment of the one, and Avoidance of the other. He can have no Reason or Motive to pursue that which does not at all relate to him; and it is evident that nothing does relate to him, but that which has relation to his Happiness. If he be also endowed with *Liberty* of Will, it is impossible that any thing else should move or affect him; nor can any other Influence or Obligation be laid upon him without an express Contradiction. If therefore right Reason can only shew him to be what he is, and direct him to act accordingly, it is plain it can propose to him no other End but *his own Happiness*, beyond or beside which he can have no real Concern to know, to act, or to be.

Having seen the true End of Man consider'd as a sensible, rational, and free Being; we will in the next Place enquire after the Means of attaining this End. Now as Man is also *dependent* on other Beings for that Happiness of which he is made capable, the only Means of attaining it must be to recommend himself to the Favour of those several Beings on whom he does depend, and in Degrees proportioned to that Dependence. But as himself and all other Beings depend absolutely upon the Deity, who alone has their Happiness or Misery always in his Power, it is plain the Favour of God will be the only adequate and effectual Means to attain his End, *i. e.* Happiness upon the Whole: And therefore, whatever tends to procure the Divine Favour, will be of perpetual Obligation, and ought to be the prin-

principal Aim of all his Actions. As all Obligation is founded on the Desire of Happiness, and all our Happiness entirely depends on God, it is evident that his Will must be always Obligatory, and what alone is able to make any thing else so. And though he has framed and disposed the World in such a Manner that certain Actions will generally recommend us to the Favour of those other Beings to whom we stand related, and so may be said to become Duties to us, and if Universally followed, would bring universal Happiness; yet since all my Reason for pursuing them can only be their Fitness to bring Happiness to me, which in the present State of Things they are not always fit and likely to do, the Will of God must necessarily intervene, to enforce these Duties upon me, and make them universally binding.

As far indeed as certain Dispositions and Affections will recommend us to the Favour and Esteem of all those Persons with whom we are or may be concerned, and thereby bring more Happiness than Misery to us, so far we have a good Reason to indulge and exercise them; but when (upon what Account soever) they have not this Effect, but the Contrary, or at least have it not in so high a Degree as some other Dispositions and Affections would have (as is very often the Case;) What Principle in Nature will oblige us to the Exercise of them in such Circumstances? Nay, what Reason can we find to justify us in it, but only our Dependence on the Deity, who requires it; and who, we are assured, will either defend and support us here in the Exercise of them, or make us ample Amends hereafter for what we lose by them.

It is not then any *Relations* of Things which in themselves, and abstractedly consider'd, oblige us to the Practice of that which we call moral Virtue; but the Will of God which enjoins it, and which alone affords an *eternal and immutable Reason* for the Practice of it. We are able to conceive no kind of Reason or Obligation to act, but what is founded on Happiness, nor any fix'd and permanent Happiness, but what is founded on the Will of God: 'Tis therefore his Will properly and ultimately which we follow in the Practice of Virtue, and Virtue only, as it is agreeable to,

to, and an Indication of his Will ; wherein its Worth consists, and from whence it derives its Power of obliging.

And therefore to set aside the Deity in the Consideration of Virtue, must be to relax it from its true Principle, to take it off its only Foundation : and to endeavour to exalt Morality into an Independency on his Will, is to undermine and destroy it. Any other Principle but this, will either come short of the Mark, or carry us from it.

Thus they who teach that Virtue is to be practis'd for its *native Loveliness* and *intrinsic Worth*, must either affirm that it is lovely and valuable they know not for what, or why ; *i. e.* have no distinct Ideas to these fine Words ; or must mistake the Means for the End. Virtue, we find, is lovely for its good Effects, and truly valuable on account of the Consequences that will certainly attend it, either by the Laws of Nature, or positive Appointment ; therefore they will call it *lovely in itself*, or *absolutely* so ; and tell us it is to be pursued purely *for its own sake*, and exclusively of all the aforesaid Consequences ; *i. e.* exclusively of every thing that is good and valuable in it.

They who follow Virtue for the immediate *Pleasure* which attends the Exercise of it, must either take it for granted that we have some innate Instinct or Affection, which at all times infallibly directs, and forcibly inclines us to what is Right, (all which is as false as Fact can make it) or else they practice Virtue for a Reason which is common to any other Practice, and will equally lead them to any ; a Motive which accompanies every strong Persuasion or settled Habit of Mind, whatever may be its future unforeseen Consequences. To do what either our Judgment approves, or we have chose and set our Hearts upon, will give us this immediate Pleasure in any Course of Life ; especially in one which we can pursue without external Disturbance, or which happens to have the Vogue of the Place, or Esteem of our Acquaintance, to encourage and confirm us in our Pursuit.

They who describe Virtue to be *following Nature*, go upon a Principle near akin to the foregoing, and full as bad : For if our Nature, as far as it concerns Morals, be in a great measure of our own making, as we have Reason

son to suppose; if it may be greatly corrupted and perverted, as all allow; this will be a very erroneous, at least an absolutely uncertain Guide. It will amount to no more than this, Do always what you like best; or, Follow your present Humour.

They who practice Virtue for present *Convenience, Interest, or Reputation*, stand upon more solid Ground; which nevertheless will often fail them, as we have seen above. The like has been observ'd concerning *Reason*, and the *Relation of Things*.

IN our last, we endeavoured to establish the following Conclusions. Private Happiness, upon the Whole, is the ultimate End of Man: This absolutely depends on, and can effectually be secured only by the Will of God; the Will of God therefore is our only adequate Rule of Action, and what alone includes perpetual Obligation.

We shall here endeavour more distinctly to point out the Reason and Necessity for such a Rule, and shew what kind of Conformity to it will secure the End proposed. The End of all, we said, was private Happiness. Now as we are assured that the Deity had no other Design in framing the World at first, nor can have any End in continuing to preserve and govern it, but to lead us all to as much Happiness as we are capable of; his Will and our Happiness become perfectly co-incident, and so may safely enough be substituted one for the other. He proposes only the Good of his Creatures by being obeyed, and makes it the Rule and Reason of all that he enjoins; and knows the most effectual Methods of attaining it: An absolute implicit compliance with his Will may therefore not improperly be called our ultimate End; nay, ought to be esteemed and acted on as such in all particular Cases. As it is an infallible Rule and adequate Measure of our Duty, it must oblige us to an Action when we can see no farther Reason for it; and it is highly necessary and fit it should. Our Knowledge of the Nature of ourselves, and those about us, is very short and imperfect; we are able to trace
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our Happiness but a few Steps through the various Consequences of Things, and Reasons of Action; and are frequently apt to deviate from the Paths of Truth into Error and Absurdity. We stand in need therefore of some *Rule* on which we may constantly depend, which will always guide and direct us in our Pursuit; and this, as we have seen, can only be the Will of that Being in whose Hands we always are, and who is both able and inclined to reward us to the uttermost. Our next Enquiry then must be, how we shall secure this Reward to us, or what will certainly obtain his Favour; and that is, in one Word, *Obedience*; the having a Regard to his Will in all our Actions, and doing them for this Reason only, because they are well pleasing to him, and what he requires of us.

That this must be the only Means of recommending ourselves to his Favour, the only true Principle which can make our Actions properly virtuous or rewardable by him, is very plain: For nothing can in Reason entitle me to a Reward from another, which has no manner of Relation to him; and nothing can have any relation to the Deity, but what is done *on his Account*, in obedience to his Command, or with an Intent to please him. The *Matter* of the Act can neither be of Advantage nor Disadvantage to him; therefore the *Intention* is all that can make it bear any Relation to him. In one Sense indeed the material Part of the Act may relate to the Deity, *viz.* As it tends in its own Nature to further or oppose the Designs of his Government: But this will never relate to him in such a manner, as to make the Agent a proper Subject either of Reward or Punishment for it. To make one a Subject of Reward for any particular Action, his Will must be concerned in it so far as to intend to merit the Reward which is annexed to the Performance of it, or at least to will and intend the Performance of that Action as so proposed. To be a proper Subject of Punishment, a Person must intend the Breach of some Law, or at least the Neglect and Disregard of it; or the Commission of such an Act as he knows, or might know, if he desired, to be a Breach of it. Consequently it is the Aim and Design of an Action only which makes *Guilt* or *Merit* imputable to the Agent; and in that Aim
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and Design does the Guilt or Merit of it wholly consist. From hence then we may compute the Value or Defect of any particular Action in a Moral or Religious Account. As far as it is intended to obey the Will of God, and advance the Ends of his Government, in Preference of or Opposition to any other Interest or Inclination; so far it is meritorious with or acceptable to him: As far as it is done in compliance with any particular Interest or Inclination, in opposition to, or with a greater Regard had to it than to the Will of God, or in actual Disregard of that Will; so far, and in such Circumstances it is offensive or injurious to him: As far as it is done without any distinct End, or any distinct Consideration of the Will of God in that End, so far it is at best purely indifferent, and of no moral or religious Account at all. If the End of any particular Action terminate in ourselves *immediately*, and we have no farther View in it than the Attainment of some temporal Advantage, Honour, or the like; the Action can but be innocent at best; we serve not God herein, but ourselves; and when we attain the natural good Effects thereof in this Life, we have our Reward. Nothing can intitle us to any supernatural and extraordinary Recompence from the Deity in another State, but what was done purely on his account; in Obedience to his Will, or in order to recommend us to his Favour. And though we cannot properly *merit* any thing of God, by reason of those innumerable Benefits received from him, which we shall never be able to repay; by reason of our manifold Transgressions which our good Works cannot atone for; and because of the many Defects attending even the best of them, which render them not so good as they might and ought to be; though for these Reasons, I say, we cannot properly *merit* any thing of God; yet nevertheless by *Covenant* and *Promise* we may be certainly entitled to his Favour, so far as we comply with those Terms of Salvation which he has proposed, and perform such Duties as he has commanded, purely in *Obedience* to him; which is the only Principle (as we have seen) that can make any thing rewardable by him.

Not that it is necessary that we should always have this Principle explicitly in view, and be able to deduce every
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particular Action immediately from a Consideration of the Will of God, in order to make it acceptable to him : It may, it is hoped, be sufficient, if we have a general Intent of serving him in the whole of any considerable Undertaking; and an express Regard to him whenever he appears to be more immediately concerned in any Part of it. Our imperfect Understanding will not allow us to trace up every thing to our ultimate End ; we find it necessary therefore to fix several inferior and subordinate ones, wherein we are forced to acquiesce, both in our Knowledge and our Practice ; and it is sufficient to recommend and justify an Action, if it can be fairly deduced from any of these subordinate Ends, and have some Connection or other with what is manifestly our Duty. Nay farther, some Actions which are directed to no distinct End at all, though in themselves indeed they be no proper Subjects of Reward (as was observed) yet they may become such by virtue of certain *Habits*, whereof they are Consequences, and for which Habits we are properly accountable : and the Reason of this is evident. As we cannot have our main End constantly in view, it is necessary for us to acquire such Habits of acting as may lead us almost insensibly to it, and carry us on our Journey, even when we are not thinking of it. These Habits therefore, if they be rightly founded and directed, must intitle us to a Reward for all the several Actions which flow from them, even when the first Foundation is forgot. Thus a Servant sufficiently deserves both the Title and Reward of being faithful and obedient, if he have acquired such Habits of constant Diligence in his Master's Business, as will carry him regularly through it, though he seldom consider the End of all his Labour, or think of his Master in it.

WE have, in two former Papers, considered the true End of human Actions, and the Means of attaining it. We have laid down the only adequate *Rule* or Criterion of Morality, as also removed some of the false and insufficient ones usually proposed. We have inquired into the

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Motive, Ground, or *Principle* on which Virtue ought to be pursued, and pointed out the proper Method of applying it. To compleat our Design upon this Subject, we shall now examine the *material* Part of Virtue, and obviate some Mistakes that have arisen, and may still arise on that Head.

The most common one is to put the *Matter* of any Duty for the whole Duty. Thus some have defined moral Goodness to be nothing more than chusing, willing, or procuring *Natural Good*, including both Private and Publick : Others make it to consist in producing the greatest Degree of *Pleasure*, i. e. in the Agent himself ; or in pursuing *private Happiness* : But except these Writers intend to treat only of the *material Part* of Virtue, whenever they describe it in such Terms, their Descriptions are evidently partial and defective. Moral Goodness, or Moral Virtue in Man is not merely chusing or producing Pleasure or Natural Good, but chusing it without View to present Rewards, and in Prospect of a future Recompence only. For, observe how the Case stands. The greatest Natural Good of all is so provided for by God himself, by the strong Appetites he has implanted in Men, or the Necessities he has laid them under, that there is no Moral Goodness, no Virtue at all in chusing it. The greatest Natural Good I call what concerns the Being of the Moral World ; and the second greatest, what concerns their *Well-being*. Now God has taken care to preserve the World in Being, to continue both the Species and Individual. 1. By implanting a very strong Love of Life in every Man. 2. By the Appetites of Hunger and Thirst. 3. By warm Desires for propagating the Species. 4. By the *Στοργή* of Parents towards their Offspring. 5. By necessitating Men to unite in Society, and mutual Offices of Trade, &c. Upon these five Articles depends the very Being of Mankind : And God would not trust such weighty Things as those to the weak Reason of Man, but has provided for them by never-failing Appetites and Necessities ; insomuch that there is no Virtue in chusing those Actions, but in regulating or moderating them.

There is no Moral Goodness in eating and drinking, though a Natural Good, necessary to keep up Life : No Moral Goodness in propagating the Species, though that also

also must come under the Notion of chusing Natural Good : No Moral Goodness in pursuing the *Στοργή* before-mentioned, nor in carrying on any Trade for the Service of the World ; though without these Things the World could not subsist. Moral Goodness therefore lies not in chusing the greatest Natural Good, but in chusing any Natural Good, when not impelled to it by *Necessity*, nor moved by *present* Pleasure or Reward. Eating and Drinking is not Virtue, because we do it to satisfy Hunger and Thirst, and to please the Appetite : But the Virtue is in regulating and moderating the Appetite, that that very Appetite which is necessary for the Being of the World, may not be carried to such an Excess as to disturb its Well-being. The like may be said of the rest.

The Case is the same in Acts of the most immediate beneficial Tendency, whether they be directed to the Publick in general, to inferior Societies or particular Persons : To defend, assist, relieve a Friend or Fellow-Citizen ; to serve and support him in his Credit or Fortunes, Body or Mind : If this, which commonly goes by the Name of Moral Goodness, proceed from selfish Views, or no distinct View at all ; from a Prospect of future Advantage in this Life, or from the present Pleasure of performing it ; it is nothing. To preserve the Rights, Laws and Liberties of our Country, to improve and reform a whole Nation, to engage in Enterprizes that will be of universal Benefit to Mankind ; any or all such Actions, though never so good in their Effects, and right as to the *Matter* of them, yet if they be wanting in Point of Principle ; if they are done for Profit, Honour, or out of mere Humour, nay out of the most disinterested Benevolence itself ; so long as there is no Regard had to the Deity in them, they cannot be reckoned strictly Virtuous, nor claim a Place in Morals or Religion.

Moral Goodness therefore is not barely the willing or producing *Natural Good*, whether private or publick. This would be denominating the Whole from a Part ; the Fault of all those Definitions formerly mentioned. Thus they who describe it to be *following Nature*, neither settle the *Matter*, nor establish any determinate *Rule* ; and if they have a

Principle, it is either false or inadequate, as was before observed. They who determine it to be acting according to *Reason*, *Truth*, or the *Relations of Things*, at most lay down only the *Rule*, and *Matter*; but give us neither any distinct *Principle*, nor *End*. They who define it to be *Obedience to the Will of God* only, leave out the material Part, *i. e.* Do not shew what the Will of God requires, or wherein it consists: Neither do they sufficiently inform us *why* we ought to obey it, or direct us to what we call our ultimate End. A complete Definition of Virtue, or Morality, should take in all these Particulars, and can be only this: *The doing Good to Mankind, in Obedience to the Will of God, and for the Sake of everlasting Happiness.*

E. L.

T H E

Nature and Obligations of MAN, As a sensible and rational BEING.

1. **A**LL our primary, simple Ideas proceed from Sensation, external or internal; the latter of which may be extended through most parts of the Vessels of the Human Body, and is extremely complicated; and will be found perhaps upon examination to produce much greater and more various Effects than we are commonly aware of. From the one or the other of these we receive continual impressions while we are awake; and from the united force of several such impressions, may arise a new species of Sensation, or an Idea different from any that appear'd in any of the individuals. Thus various liquors, meats, and medicines producing a general agitation or composure in what is call'd the nervous System, raise as general a kind of rapturous gaiety, or tranquil delight: and *v. v.* which bears so near a resemblance to some intellectual operation, that it is often mistaken for such; and in reality is as distinct from the mere *Taste* of all such liquors &c. as any objects of the Sense and Intellect are from each other.

2. By our faculties of repeating and enlarging, of comparing, and compounding, or abstracting these and their several Objects we raise a secondary set of Ideas, still more mixt and diversify'd, but yet of the same general nature; which often go under the name of *intellectual*, from the intellect's being so evidently employ'd about them; but all grow out of the old Stock, all flow from the same Source, *i. e.* are originally form'd from Sense and wholly grounded in it: as may in part appear from the *words* we use in describing them, *v. g.* to *apprehend*, *comprehend*, *conceive*, &c. which are (as Mr. Locke observes) words manifestly *taken from the operation of sensible things, and apply'd to certain modes of thinking*. B. 3. C. 1. §. 5.

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3. The contemplation of these very Faculties, by which we mold and modify the original materials of our knowledge, produces a third set of Ideas, still more remote from the first origin; and therefore term'd Ideas of *pure* Intellect, as more immediately arising from and terminating in the reflex view of these same intellectual and active powers, and of their several operations: *v. g.* perceiving that we do perceive, &c. considering what it is to compare, compound &c. and what these and the like powers extend to and infer. Whence we form all the notion we have of a *Spirit*.

4. Man is a compound of corporeal Organs, (most of them conveying sensitive impressions, as observ'd above) and the distinct powers of *perception* (in the latter sense of that word) or *Thinking* in general, and voluntary *Action* in close union with these.

5. We may observe likewise that these latter, which are generally stiled active powers, are not always in exercise, any more than some of the passive, sensitive ones are; their Exercise being manifestly suspended during some bodily disorders, and altogether ceasing in the intervals of what is called *sound* Sleep. Whence it appears that Thought and voluntary Action cannot in strictness be essential, or immutably necessary to any one part of our Constitution; but rather is connected with and dependent on a certain disposition of the whole frame, or a regular State of the chief branches of it.

6. Some of these sensible Ideas are in certain respects agreeable to us, others the contrary; the former being, in all probability, such as tend to the preservation of each individual, the latter to its destruction.

7. A foresight of them likewise, or of their several *Causes*, has the same effect in some degree; nay sometimes may be so form'd as to produce it in a higher degree than the objects themselves would, were they present. Thus may the Imagination crowd the pleasures or pains of a day, a year, an age into one moment, and thereby make the impressions of these two last Classes far more general and extensive, as well

well as more intense and exquisite, than any of the particular sensitive ones of which they are composed.

8. And as a prospect of these and their causes is productive of the same kind of pleasure or pain that attends the presence of each, so the *pursuit* of the former and avoidance of the latter becomes also agreeable, and all that as sensible and rational Beings we can be concerned about; since the sum total, or the aggregate of these same pleasures or pains, is our supreme, ultimate *Happiness* or *Misery*; the attainment of the one, and security from the other, our most *perfect* State: the necessary means of attaining to which End compose our *natural Good*, and in the regular intended pursuit of it consists our *moral Goodness*.

9. Now as most of these means of Happiness lie in the power of others, who being of the same nature with ourselves, can only be induced to contribute to it, or to co-operate with us in procuring it, by a settled disposition in us of doing the like to them on all occasions; hence the contracting of such disposition, and a regard to their good in the general course of our actions becomes necessary to our own; in the design'd prosecution of which lies the *formal*, and in the actual production of it the *material* part of Virtue; both which in common acceptation constitute the whole of our *merit* with respect to each other.

10. Not that the promoting of another's Happiness is ever of itself immediately, or by any kind of natural or innate Principle, productive of our own: as well might one feel by another's Senses, or be made happy by his Feelings without any real participation of them; as well might we suppose a man to act entirely on another's motives, as judge any thing good, right and fit for him to do, or to communicate to another, merely because that thing is good and fit for the other to receive, or pleasant to enjoy; except that same enjoyment is in some measure relative to his own proper Rule or End, or can be made right and reasonable for him to pursue by some such medium as connects it with his natural Principle, that constant and invariable ground of Action, *i. e.* his own Happiness.

11. Nor is it difficult to find or form such a Connection from what was hinted above; *Reason* discovers it, as well from the natural Consequence of things; benevolent affections in each person being apt to generate correspondent ones in others, and each beneficent act to engage a return of like good offices; as from the positive appointment of the Deity, who designs the common Happiness or perfection of all rational Beings, according to the nature he has given them, and the Circumstances under which he has placed them; having made them with no other view that we can conceive, than in order to have this communicated to them in the most effectual manner; and who must consequently approve of every instance of their co-operation with him in the same design, and assuredly reward each regular course of Action in his Creatures that tends to promote it.

12. His *will* in this respect is therefore the general *Rule* or true *Criterion* of Morality, as what infallibly must, and what alone can, effectually secure to us our ultimate End, Happiness upon the whole; Happiness in some certain *State*, above and beside the natural consequence of all our virtuous Acts and Habits; and who will in that State make us most ample amends for whatever pains we take here, or whatever loss and inconvenience we can possibly undergo in prosecuting of them; and thereby makes such prosecution an invariable Duty to us, or constitutes a perfect and perpetual *obligation* thereto.

13. The same thing may be either traced out thus by Reason and demonstrated, or come at in a more compendious way, which yet will have equally strong and permanent Effects upon our Constitution, nay commonly more sudden and more striking ones; on which account it is often mistaken for self-evidence or intuition: — I mean the power of ASSOCIATION, which was just hinted at by Mr. *Locke*, but apply'd to the present purpose more directly by the Author of the foregoing *Dissertation*, and from him taken up and consider'd in a much more general way by Dr. *Hartley*, who has from thence solv'd many of the Principal

incipal appearances in Human Nature, the sensitive part of which, since Mr. *Locke's* Essay, had been very little cultivated, and is perhaps yet to the generality a *terra incognita*; how interesting soever, as well as entertaining, such Enquiries must be found to be: on which account it is much to be lamented that no more thoughtful persons are induced to turn their minds this way; since so very noble a foundation for improvements has been laid by both these excellent Writers, especially the last: whose work is, I beg leave to say, in the main, notwithstanding all its abstruseness, well worth studying; and would have been sufficiently clear and convincing had he but confined his observations to the plain *Facts* and Experiments on which it was first founded, without ever entering minutely into the *Physical Cause* of such Phenomena; as the great *Newton* wisely did in the point of *Gravitation*, throwing his whole Theory of that same *Æther* and its Vibrations, into some modest *Queries*: notwithstanding his very probable supposition that both Gravitation in the greater Orbs, and all sensation and muscular Motion in all animal Bodies, might depend upon it.

14. Nor will perhaps this Principle of *Association* appear of less extent and influence in the intellectual World, than that of Gravity is found to be in the Natural. It is already discovered to be an universal *Law of our Nature*, intimately connected with the mutual operations of the Mind and Body, notwithstanding the odd whimsical appearance it first made in Mr. *Locke's* Essay, (though he applied it to better purposes in his *Conduct of the Understanding*, §. 40.) and its being so often slighted as a *vague, confused* Principle by later Writers; particularly Dr. *Hutcheson*, *System of Moral Philosophy*, p. 55, &c. And though we may possibly never comprehend the Cause that actuates it, or the instrument by which it is exerted (any more than we can hope to see the Bond of Union between Mind and Body; though this, by the bye, may seem a fair step towards it) yet 'tis enough for our present purpose if the Principle itself has been so far explained by the worthy Author abovementioned, as thence to demonstrate that the Moral sense may be wholly.

generated from sensitive Pleasures, and supported by them : which I apprehend to be done effectually. See his *Observations on Man*, V. 2. p. 471, &c.

15. If the forementioned account of our acquiring this Moral Sense be admitted, it is shewn in reality to be no more than a *Habit*, which is never of itself a sure and sufficient Rule, but wants some other regulation ; and like all other habits should be grounded on some solid Principles of Reason, and ever subject to them.

16. But whether this account be admitted or not, Mr. Locke has plainly proved that it must be acquired some how or other, since there are no kind of *practical principles innate*, or so much as *self-evident* ; nor can our knowledge of any moral Propositions be *intuitive* ; *since it requires discourse and reasoning to discover the certainty of their truth*, B. 1. C. 3. § 1. *which plainly depends upon some other truth antecedent to them, and from which they must be deduced*, *ibid.* and Men may very justly demand a Reason for every one of them, *ib.* § 4. which reason lies in another province, and must be fetched from the *natural relations* of the things and persons that surround us, *i. e.* from sensitive pleasure and pain, on which hinge all our Passions turn, and from whence must be derived the great Rule of our Actions, *ib.* § 3. 6, &c. and B. 2. C. 20.

17. The same judicious writer (Mr. Locke) has accounted for that *variety of Moral Rules* visible amongst Men, *from the different sorts of Happiness they have a prospect of*, § 6. as also from their *Education, Company and Customs of their Country*, § 8. any of which serves to set Conscience on work, and thereby tends to diversify their moral rule ; which if it were innate, or (what comes to the same thing) any natural Sense or Instinct, must one would think be uniform and invariable : but whether any such be found among our Species is after all *a matter of Fact* determinable only by those who are well conversant in the early education of Children, and duly qualified to make just observations on their original frame and native dispositions. If this
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had been more carefully attended to, with what the same able Writer has delivered concerning the true History of the Human Mind, I fancy a right Theory of Morals might long ago have been laid down with more success; and in particular we should have been satisfied that any such Principle as will perpetually influence and effectually induce us to promote the Happiness of others absolutely and entirely independent of our own, can never be wrought out of our original Feelings; or spring from that primary and purely native stock of our Ideas, on which are grounded all the Tribe of natural Appetites, and the whole Furniture of the Human Mind. It must therefore either be superinduced by Reason, in view of attaining our great End, as observed above; or come in under the Head of *Association*, and by way of Habit, without any ultimate End or distinct view at all. Those of the other side of the Question may chuse which of these two they like best.

18. From the whole it will appear, that there is properly but *one original source* of our Ideas, i. e. *Sensation*; nor any original pleasures or pains beside sensitive ones, however variously combined, abstracted or enlarged: and therefore any innate intellectual determination, or Moral Principle wholly underived from and naturally independent of these, seems an *impossibility*. The Intellect perceives only what is in things, and if there be nothing in the Mind originally beside these same sensitive Pleasures or Pains, then can it constitute no other Class fundamentally different from these, and much less opposite to them, whatever alterations or improvements may be made amongst them: and the *Medicina Mentis* will, like that of the *Body*, be all composed of the same sort of Ingredients, however mixed and altered in the Composition.

If Mr. *Locke's* plan were once rightly understood we should have little room for any dispute about the different natures of these two, or the distinct Principles that actuate and govern them. We should soon find that all sound Philosophy in *Morals* is entirely built on *Natural* Philosophy, and never to be separated from it. But we seem not yet to have
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lx *The Nature and Obligations of Man, &c.*

followed this great Author up to his first Principles, or duly traced the consequences of his System, notwithstanding his having been so long and justly admired amongst us; and most of the inveterate prejudices that used to attend his confutation of the old idle Doctrine of innate Ideas and Instincts be now well nigh worn out. Though perhaps even yet there may be left enow to prevent an impartial examination of his Scheme; the aim and tendency whereof is no other than to reduce the foundations of our Knowledge, and our Happiness, to that original *Simplicity* which Nature seems to observe in all her Works.

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Concerning the Origin of EVIL.

CHAP. I.

Containing some Principles previously necessary to the Understanding and Solution of the difficulty about the Origin of Evil.

SECT. I.

Of the Knowledge of External Objects.

IT is allowed that external objects are made known to us from without by the Senses; but we have entirely forgot how *Light, Colours,* and other external Things at first affected our Senses and entered the Mind; nor can we easily recollect the rise and progress of our Knowledge concerning these Things.

That sensations represent external things to us, or at least discover the presence of them.

However it is agreed that the *Conceptions* which we have of these either represent to us the Things themselves, or at least discover the *presence* or *operations* of them: That the sensation of *Light*, for instance, arises from its being presented to the Eye; and so in all other Objects of the Senses.

II. But it is to be observed that the representations of Things which we have from the Senses, are by no means simple, but very much confused and complicated; for Example, the Eye represents to the Mind *burning Wax*, i. e. a thing that is hard, round, capable of being melted in the Fire, red, and

That these are confused and complicated, but afterwards separated

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by the understanding; an instance of this in burning Wax. when softened by heat changeable into any Figure, susceptible also of various Colours; and lastly, resolvable into *Smoke*. The Eye exhibits all these Properties in the burning Wax almost at one glance, but the *Understanding* separates those things by Reflection, which the Sight had conveyed to the mind collectively. For it perceives that the Wax preserves its Essence and Denomination, though from round it be turned into square, from hard and red, into soft and black. From whence it appears that all these Properties are *extrinsecal* to it, but that which continues under all these Changes is called its *Nature* and *Substance*.

The first distinction of our conceptions into sensible Qualities and Substance.

III. By *Substance* I here understand a thing which the Mind can conceive by *itself* as *distinct* and *separate* from all others: For that Thing, the Conception of which does not *depend* upon another, nor include or suppose any other, is to us a *Substance*; and accordingly we distinguish it by that Name; But that which implies *dependence* in its conception we call a *Mode*, or *Accident*. For instance, we can conceive a certain portion of *matter*, such as Wax, setting aside all others, and also without any particular *Figure*: But we are not in like manner able to conceive any particular Figure without matter. Wax therefore is a *Substance*, for our conception represents it as *distinct*, *divided* from, and *independent* of all other things: Nor is it necessary to the knowledge thereof that we join the conceptions of other things when we think of it: for the conceptions of that and these *contribute* nothing to, nor stand in need of each other in order to their being understood. But *Colour*, *Figure*, *Softness* and *Hardness* are *modes* or *accidents*, since they cannot be conceived without something that is *coloured*, *figured*, *soft*, or *hard*; but they enter not into the *Substance* or *nature* of Wax, for *that* remains, whatever may become of *these*.

IV. But when this is resolv'd into *smoke*, or *flame*, it has no longer the name of *Wax* given to it. We call the thing *Wax* which is applicable to a certain peculiar use ; but when it is once resolv'd into *smoke* or *flame*, it becomes unfit for that use to which *Wax* is subservient ; and therefore changes its *Essence*, and *Appellation*. What then does it carry along with it under all mutations ? It is always *extended*, and capable of *motion* or *rest* ; and has always parts which are *separable*, and *exclude* one another out of the same place ; the Substance therefore which is attended with these Qualities or Properties we call *Matter*. (1.)

V.

NOTES.

(1.) Our Author's Notion of *Substance*, as including all the constituent Properties of any thing, seems to be more plain and agreeable to nature, and therefore of greater use in Philosophy than that which is commonly received. We find by experience that a thing will always exhibit the same appearances in some respects though it admit of Change in others : or in Mr. *Locke's* Language, that certain numbers of simple Ideas go constantly together, whereas some others do not : The former of these we call the *Substance*, Thing or Being itself, the latter are termed its Modes or *Accidents*. Thus the substance of *Body*, as far as we know of it, consists in Solidity and Extension ; which being necessarily finite, it also becomes capable of Division, Figure and Motion. These are its original, inseparable Qualities which constitute the thing, and seem not to depend on any thing else as a *Subject*. But a particular Figure, Motion, &c. are only Accidents or Modes of its Existence, which do not necessarily attend it, though they themselves cannot be supposed to exist without it. The substance of *Spirit* consists in the Powers of thinking and acting, which likewise admit of various Modifications. This seems to be all that we can learn concerning the nature of things from observation and experience. To enquire into the *Manner* how these, which we call Properties, exist together, or to attempt to explain the *Cause*, Ground or Reason of their Union is in vain ; to assign the word *Substance* for a representation of it is saying nothing ; it is setting a mere word for what we have neither any Idea of nor occasion for. Indeed if we consider these primary Qualities as needing something to inhere in, we are obliged to seek for something to support them ; and by the same way of reasoning we may seek

Whatitis. V: What is observable in Wax, may also be observed in any other Substance, which we know by

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seek for something else to support that other something, and so on; and at last shall find no other support for the whole but the cause which produced it. Mr. *Locke* though he gave into this way of talking yet he has sufficiently shewn his dislike of it in *B. I. C. 4. §. 18. B. 2. C. 13. §. 18, 19, 20. and C. 23. §. 23. and elsewhere**. Dr. *Watts* is of opinion, 'that it is introducing a needless *Scholastic* Notion into the 'real nature of things and then fancying it to have a real 'Existence.' *Logic* p. 14 The Author of the *Procedure, Extent, &c.* affirms, 'that as far as we directly know the essential 'Properties of any Substance, so far we have a direct knowledge of the Substance *itself*; and if we had a direct Knowledge of *all* the essential Properties of any Substance, we 'should have an *adequate* knowledge of that Substance; for 'surely, if there be any meaning in words, the knowing any 'of the essential Properties of a thing is knowing *so much* of 'its very Substance or Essence; † meaning the same by these two last words, though Mr. *Locke* uses them in a very different Signification; the former being only that which makes any thing an *Ens* or Being; the latter that which makes it a Being of this or that *Sort*: Of which below.

In short, whatever is understood by this word *substance*; it cannot as Mr. *Locke* observes † be applied to God, Spirits and Body in the same sense; and therefore the application of this and the like doubtful Terms to Subjects of a very different nature (especially that of *Substratum*, which more apparently confines our thoughts to Body) must needs occasion Error and Confusion.

But though our Author's notion of Substance be very defensible, he has applied the word *Matter* to the Idea of *Body*, whereof *Matter* is only a partial Conception containing nothing more than the Idea of a solid Substance which is every where the same. These two terms therefore cannot be put one for the other, as Mr. *Locke* observes § though indeed they are often used promiscuously.

Upon this occasion it may not be improper to observe that the various signification of these general Terms *Matter, Substance, Essence, &c.* will serve to convince us in the first place, that these words don't denote the manner how things really exist, but only our manner of conceiving them, and secondly, that

* Comp. Mr. *Colliber's* Enquiry into the Existence and Nature of God. p. 227. 228. and Dr. *Sherlock's* Vindic. of the Trin. p. 69. &c. and Dr. *Watts's* Philosophical Essays. Ess. 2. † B. I. C. iii. p. 80, 81. † B. II. C. xiii. § 18. § B. III. C. x. § 15.

by the *Senses*. For all things that are perceived by the *Senses* admit of the like changes, and the above-

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that there is no real Existencies strictly conformable to this our manner of conceiving them, *i. e.* in *Generals*. For if either these general Terms stood for things really existing under such a Precision, or this our way of conceiving things were fixed by Nature, neither of them would be so various and uncertain as we find they are. The end of making these *General Conceptions* is to range things into *Sorts* for the convenience of Language. The manner of acquiring them is as follows.

We are at first only acquainted with particular Substances ; but observing that as these particular Substances differ in some respects, so they agree in others, (*i. e.* though this particular excites in the mind some simple Idea or Ideas, which another does not, yet there are some Ideas excited equally from both) we take no notice of those Ideas in which two or more particular substances differ, but select those only in which they agree, and connect them into one complex Idea by giving them one Name. Which complex Idea becomes General, *i. e.* it may be affirmed of, or belongs to, or is found in more than one particular Substance ; and the several Substances of which it is affirmed, &c. are said to be contained under that General Idea. General Ideas of Substances therefore are not made by *adding* all or any of the particular Ideas found in each Substance, or by that refined method, which the Author of the *Procedure* imagines, of adding and omitting them at the same time ; but only by *leaving out* all those Ideas in which two or more particular Substances differ, and retaining those in which they agree. And from general Ideas thus made we proceed to more general ones in the same way, *viz.* by always dropping the particulars wherein they differ. Thus observing a certain agreement among Individuals and omitting the rest, we form an Idea of the several *Species*. In like manner leaving out the distinguishing marks of each Species, we get an Idea of the *Genus*, such as *Man*, *Beast*, or of a higher Genus, such as *Animal* : and again by dropping that by which Animals are distinguished from all other things we acquire the still more general or partial, Idea of *Being* or *Substance*. When any one of these general Ideas is found in a particular thing it is called the *Essence* of that thing : *Essence* therefore is only that general abstract Idea in the Mind by which we determine any thing to be of this or that *sort*, which sort we signify by such a general name as *Animal*, or *Matter*. So that the same Quality may be essential or not essential to any thing according as that thing is ranked under a different *sort*.*

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* See Locke B. III. C. vi. §. 4, 5, &c.

abovementioned properties continue both *under*, and *after* all these motions and mutations. Any
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In the same way that we make General Ideas of Substances we also consider single *Properties, Modes* and *Relations*, viz. by separating them from all other Properties, &c. with which they are found in Nature, or from all particular Subjects in which they inhere, and leaving only so much as remains in common, and includes, or may be affirmed of every Property, &c. of that kind: Thus observing that all Bodies agree in being *extended*, as well as solid, though they differ never so much in magnitude and figure, we take the former of these Properties apart from the latter, as also from any particular Magnitude or Shape, and call it *Extension* in the abstract; which being thus made general it will comprehend all particular Extensions, and may be enlarged every way and amplified in *infinitum*: We can conceive it as existing beyond the limits of Body, and by adding the confused Idea of a *Substratum* to it, it will become independent and serve both as a common *measure* and a common *Receptacle* for all Bodies, which probably constitutes our Idea of *Space*. See *Notes* 3 and 9. In the same manner we form an *Universal Mode*, v. g. Observing a train of Ideas succeeding one another in our minds at certain distances, and being conscious that we ourselves exist while we receive them, or that our own existence is commensurate to this succession, we get the Idea of *continuing*. Observing also that several other things *continue* as well as ourselves, we find that the same affection belongs to them; but it being an endless work to form as many distinct Ideas of this kind as there are things that thus continue, we abstract from particular Existences and make one general Idea of *Continuance*, which serves for all; and this is *Duration*.

The Parts or Periods of this common Duration we call *Time*; and every thing which is commensurate to them is measured by it, and said to exist in it, after the same manner as was observed before of *Space*.

Mix'd Modes and *Relations* are Combinations of Ideas of different kinds voluntarily put together and connected by their names. Such as *Goodness, Gratitude, Identity, Necessity, &c.* These are apparently the work of the Mind, and though many of them have a real foundation in Nature, and may be found by observation in the concrete, yet they are generally got before from information or invention, abstracted from particular Subjects, and lodged in the mind with general names annexed to them, according as the circumstances of persons and conveniences of Life require. See *Locke*, B. III. C. iii.

Sect. I. Concerning the Origin of Evil.

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sensible Object, however changed, is always extended, moveable, consisting of solid, distinct and divisible parts.

VI.

NOTES.

I have been the longer on this Subject of *Abstract Ideas*, since notwithstanding what Mr. Locke has hinted, the nature of 'em seems to be but little understood, otherwise we should never hear of our Ideas of *Infinity*, of *Space*, *Duration*, *Number*, &c. requiring an external *Ideatum* or *objective* reality; — of their being real Attributes and necessarily inferring the Existence of some immense and eternal Being; — whereas all universals, or abstract Ideas, such as these evidently are, (See Dr. Clarke's Answer to the 4th letter) exist under that *formality* no where but in the Mind, neither have they any other foundation, nor can they be a proof of any thing, beside that power which the mind has to form them.

If the nature of *Mix'd Modes* and *Relations* were sufficiently attended to, I believe it would not be asserted that our Ideas of perfect Goodness, Wisdom, Power, &c. are all inadequate and only negative. — that all our knowledge of these Perfections is improper, indirect, and only *analogical*, — and that the whole kind, nature, Essence and Idea of them is entirely different when applied to God from what it is when predicated of his Creatures. Whereas these being arbitrary combinations of Ideas made without regard to any particular Subject in which they may inhere, they are evidently their own Archetypes and therefore cannot but be *adequate* and *positive*: They are what they are immutably and universally; their *Natures* and *Essences* must be the same wherever they are found, or to whatsoever subject we apply them, so long as the same number of Ideas are included under the same word; and nothing more is requisite than that the Ideas thus put together be consistent to make all our knowledge concerning them, *real*, *proper*, *direct*, *adequate* and *universal*. See Locke, B. IV. C. iv. §. 5, 6. &c.

I shall trouble the Reader no farther on this Head than only to observe that the method of forming general Ideas (which our Author had advanced in his first Note, and which is since used by the Author of *Procedure*, &c.) by making the Idea of one Individual stand for the whole Species, must be wrong on this very account, *viz.* that according to the forementioned scheme *Universals*, such as *Animal* or *Matter* would have a real Existence in the same precise manner in which we consider them; whereas under such Precisions they are confessedly the creatures of our own Minds and exist no where else. We have nothing at all to do therefore with *Analogy* in forming *Abstract Ideas*, we can never come at them by substituting one particu-

That this Definition does not reach the *Idea* of matter, but only shews us the Mark to distinguish it by.

VI. Not that this is a Definition, or *Idea* (2.) of *Matter*, any more than the former was of *Substance*, but that hereby we are acquainted with its presence, and distinguish it from every other thing; as we know a Man by his Countenance, and other Circumstances: Nor is it necessary that these should be applicable to all *Substance*, at all times, and to that alone: For it is enough if for this particular Time and occasion we know the particular *Substance* we are talking of by them; and sufficiently distinguish it from other things.

How we come to the knowledge of Space.

VII. It is to be observed farther, that when a part of this matter is removed another succeeds into its Place, but is not in the same Place consistent with it. *Place* therefore seems to be something beyond, beside and distinct from the *Matter* which it receives. For as from hence that Wax was successively capable of different forms, figures, colours and changes, it appears that something is in it beside, and different from all these, which we call the *Matter* of the Wax: So in like manner from hence that the same *Place* or *Space* receives more

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lar for the rest; but on the contrary must conceive them by removing all particularities of Existence and leaving only what remains in common, as explained above. See *Locke*, B. III. C. iii. §. 7, 8, 9. or *Watts's* Logic, Part I. C. iii. §. 3. or the words *Abstraction* and *General* in *Chambers's* Dictionary.

(2.) Our Author confines this word *Idea* to the sense in which it was first used by *Plato*, viz. as an Image or Representation of the supposed *Essence* of things; in which sense it was attributed peculiarly to God, who was said to perceive things immediately by their *Essences*, whereas we only know them by certain *Marks* or *Characters*, or by *Analogy*.

Our Author had endeavoured to explain this in his Note upon the place; which is omitted as we apprehend it to be much better explained and more conveniently applied by *Mr. Locke*, who makes the word *Idea* stand for every thing about which the Mind is conversant, or which can be the object of Perception, Thought or Understanding; In which large sense we have an *Idea* of *Matter* or Body, as well as of *Substance*, or of *Space*.

more and different Bodies and Particles of matter successively, but cannot admit more than one at the same time, it will appear that *Place* or *Space*, is as distinct from *Matter* or Body as Wax is from the Colours successively received, and does not depend on them any more than Wax does on any particular Form.

VIII. If therefore we set aside, or annihilate *What it is*. *Matter*, whatsoever still remains will all belong to the nature of *Space*; as in the former case when we had set aside the Properties of *Wax*, that which belonged to the *Matter* or substance of it remained. If you ask what that is? I answer, first *Local* Mobility is to be set aside, for that seems peculiar to *Matter*. Secondly, an actual *separation* of Parts, for what is immoveable cannot be divided. Thirdly, *Impenetrability*, or Solidity; for that supposes Motion and is necessary to the Production of it. It remains therefore that *Space* (as we conceive it) be something extended immoveable, capable of *receiving* or *containing* *Matter*, and penetrable by it. Though therefore we have not a *Definition* or *Idea* of *Space*, properly so called; yet we can hereby sufficiently distinguish it from every other thing, and may reason about it as much as we have occasion.

IX. These three conceptions, namely, of sensible Qualities (viz. *Motion*, &c.) of *Matter* and *Space*, seem to be the chief of those which we have from without, and so natural to us that there is no reasonable Man but perceives them in himself. There are some who deny that *Space* is any thing distinct from *Matter*, nor is it much to our purpose whether it be or no: Yet we cannot without offering Violence to our Understandings, deny but that the *Conception* of *Space* is distinct from the conception of *Matter*. (3.)

These three Conceptions, viz. of sensible Qualities (v. g. Motion, &c.) of *Matter* and *Space*, seem to be the chief of those that are external.

SECT.

NOTES.

(3.) Though so much noise has been made about *Space*, (which *Leibnitz* justly calls an Idol of some modern *English* Men;) and so great use made of it in demonstrating the divine Attributes,

S E C T. II.

Of the Enquiry after the First Cause.

An enquiry concerning Motion, Matter, and Space: whether they exist of themselves.

I. Supposing these three, viz. *Motion, Matter, and Space*, we are in the next place to examine whether they be of themselves, or of something

NOTES.

Attributes, in a way which some stile *a priori*; yet, I am forc'd to confess that I cannot possibly frame any other Notion of it, than either, first, as the mere *negation* or *absence* of *Matter*, or secondly, as the extension of *Body*, consider'd abstractly or separate from any particular *Body*; or thirdly, as a *Subject* or *Substratum* of that same *general extension*, for which last Notion see N. 9.

Now according to the first Supposition we may indeed have a *positive Idea* of it, as well as of *Silence, Darknes*, and many other Privations; as Mr. *Locke* has fully proved that we have, and shewn the Reason of it, B. III. c. viii. §. 4. But to argue from such an Idea of Space, that Space itself is something external, and has a real existence, seems altogether as good Sense as to say, that because we have a different Idea of *Darkness* from that of *Light*; of *silence* from that of *sound*; of the *absence* of any thing, from that of its *Presence*; therefore *Darkness, &c.* must be something positive and different from *Light, &c.* and have as real an Existence as *Light* has; And to deny that we have any positive Idea, or, which is the very same, any Idea at all, of the Privations above-mention'd (For every Idea, as it is a perception of the Mind, must necessarily be positive, though it arise from what Mr. *Locke* calls a privative Cause) to deny, I say, that we have these Ideas, will be to deny Experience and contradict common Sense. There are therefore Ideas, and *simple* ones too, which have nothing *ad extra* correspondent to them, no proper Ideatum, Archetype, or objective Reality, and I don't see why that of *Space* may not be reckon'd one of them. To say that *Space* must have existence, because it has some *Properties*, for instance, *Penetrability*, or a capacity of receiving *Body*, seems to me the same as to urge that *darkness* must be something because it has the power or property of receiving *Light*; *Silence* the property of admitting *Sound*; and *Absence* the property of being supply'd by *Presence*, i. e. to assign absolute Negations, and such as by the same way of reasoning may be apply'd to *Nothing*, and then call them positive properties; and so infer that the *Chimera* thus clothed with them must needs be something. Setting aside the names of

thing else? If they exist of themselves, the Enquiry is at an End. For those things that exist by *Nature* are causes of *Existence* to themselves, *i. e.* do not stand

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of its other pretended properties (which names also are as merely negative as the supposed properties to which they belong) those that attribute *extension* to space seem not to attend to the true notion of that Property, which, as the Schoolmen define it (and let them who like not this definition try to give us a better) is to have *partes extra partes*, and as such, *i. e.* as including *Parts* (which parts, as they differ in situation from each other, may have things predicated of some of them different from those which can be predicated of others) it appears plainly inconsistent with their own Idea of what they call simple, uniform, indivisible space. and is applicable to *Body* only. And to attribute Extension or Parts to space, according to the first notion of it laid down by us, will be the same as to talk of the extension or parts of *Absence*, of *Privation*, or of mere *Nothing*. Lastly, to ask if Space under the second Notion of that word, (*i. e.* as Extension in the Abstract) be extended or have parts, is apparently absurd; it is the same with that noted Question of the Man, who being told that to have Riches, was to be rich, ask'd if Riches then themselves were Rich?

Well then, according to the first Supposition, Space will be mere *non entity*, or nothing, *i. e.* nothing can be affirm'd, but every thing denied of it: According to the second, it will be only an *abstract Idea* form'd in the mind from a property peculiar to matter, which property abstracted in Idea cannot itself admit of any other properties, nor be applicable to the *Divine Nature*, nor capable of positive *Infinity* in any respect. As to the last, 'If Space, says Dr. Cudworth, be concluded to be nothing else but the *extension* and *distance* of *Body*, or matter consider'd in *general* (without respect to this or that particular body) and *abstractly* in order to the Conception of *Motion* and the mensuration of things, then do we say that there appeareth no sufficient grounds for this *positive Infinity* of Space, we being certain of no more than this, that be the World, or any figurate Body, never so great, it is not impossible but that it might still be greater and greater without end. Which *indefinite increasableness* of Body and Space seems to be mistaken for a *positive infinity* thereof. Whereas for this very Reason, because it can never be so great, but that *more* magnitude may still be added to it, therefore it can never be positively Infinite.

stand in need of any *external cause*; if they depend on something else, there will be a question about that also, what it is, and what are its properties.

II. We

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'To conclude therefore, by Space without the finite World, is to be understood nothing but the possibility of Body farther and farther without end, yet so as never to reach to Infinity.*

Hence appears the weakness of that common Argument urg'd by *Gassendus*, *Dr. Clarke*, and *Raphson*, for the *absolute Infinity of Space*, viz. From the impossibility of setting *bounds* or *limits* to it: since that, say they, would be to suppose *Space* bounded by *something* which *itself* occupies *Space*, or else by *nothing* both which are contradictions.

Which Argument either first of all supposes that *Space* is really some *thing*, or some positive *Quality*; which wants to be proved. Or else improperly applies bounds and bounders, to mere non-entity, or bare possibility; which has nothing to do with the Idea of Bounds.

If therefore we take *Space* in the first Notion laid down, then its unboundedness will (as *Dr. Cudworth* says) signify nothing but the possibility of Body farther and farther without end; according to which Sense, let us state their usual Question in other Words, and the great fallacy and impropriety of it will appear. What is there, say they, *beyond* this *Space*? You must imagine more such *Space*, or *nothing*. What is there say we, *beyond* this *possibility of Existence*? You must either imagine *more* such *possibility of Existence*, or mere *nothing*, i. e. *non Existence*. What Consequence can possibly be drawn from such an odd kind of Argumentation?

But if *Space* be taken in the second Sense, i. e. as *Extension in abstracto*, then the meaning of our *not being able to set bounds to it* will only be, that we have a power of enlarging our abstract Idea in *Infinitum*, or that we always find in our selves the same ability to add to, or repeat it; and if we always find that we can add, we shall never find that we cannot add, which (as a very eminent Writer on the Subject † observes) is all the Mystery of the Matter, and all that can be understood by infinite *Space*.

But it is farther urg'd that there must be something more in the present Case; for we find not only a Power of enlarging the Idea, but find it impossible to set bounds to the thing; whereas, we can enlarge the Idea of Matter to Infinity, and can also set bounds to the thing itself. In answer to the first part of this Objection it is ask'd, What thing, I pray you, but the thing in your own mind, that is, the Idea? Prove it to be a thing and then we'll enquire whether it has bounds or not; but to say the

* True Intell. Syst. P. 644 & 766. † Dr. Waterland MS.

II. We must presume that all our conceptions of simple Objects without us are true, *i. e.* represent the

We are to form our Judgment of things whether they exist of themselves, or require a Cause from our simple Conceptions when there is no ground to suspect a Fallacy.

NOTES.

the thing is infinite or boundless, before you have prov'd it to exist, or to be a Thing, is too large a step to take. The above-mention'd excellent Writer solves the Difficulty arising from the second part of the Objection by another parallel Case, ' When I consider the number of the Stars, I can go numbering ' on in my thoughts still more and more Stars *in Infinitum*, but ' I can set bounds to them, can suppose number finite, but ' to number itself I can set no bounds. Yet what is Number? Nothing but an abstract Idea, nothing *ad extra*, and to say that number is infinite, comes only to this, that we can set no bounds to our Faculty of Numbering, it being always as easy to add to a thousand, or a Million, one more, &c. as to One. Well then, to set bounds to number in the abstract, is to set bounds to the Faculty itself, and to deny that it is in my Power to add, when I plainly perceive that I can; and so is a direct Contradiction. But as to the number of Stars, or Hairs, or Men, or any thing, I can set bounds to that, without any contradiction, because it still leaves me in possession of the power of numbering, which I find I have; and which does not require any subject, *ad extra*, but may go on independent of any, and indifferent to all. Now to apply this to other cases: The Mind finds in itself the faculty of enlarging and extending its Idea of extension. It can apply it to Matter, or can let it alone: Can suppose Matter infinitely expanded, or can set bounds to it. But to set bounds to all Extension, as well imaginary as real, is cramping the Faculty, is denying it the power of enlarging, which is always present to the mind, and which she can never lose; and, in a word, is a contradiction. Any, either imaginary, or real Subject is sufficient for the mind to exercise its Faculties upon; and so if you either suppose God or Matter, or Space to be infinitely extended, it is equally satisfied with any. All that she requires, is, that she may be able to enlarge the Idea of Extension. But if you take from her Extension itself, that is the Idea of it, and the power of adding to it, you deprive her of her Faculty, and deny her a power which she finds she has. In a word, we can set bounds to any thing that still leaves us the power of enlarging or extending infinitely, as we find we always can: and if we would speak strictly, it is not *number* that is *infinite*, nor *extension* infinite, which are nothing but *notions* abstracted from things: But the mind of Man is able to proceed numbering or extending infinitely, that is, without ever coming to any Stop or Bounds. For to set Bounds is to deny and destroy the

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the things as God would have them known to us, except we elsewhere discover some *Fallacy* or *Prejudice*

NOTES.

‘ Faculty itself: If it could not always do it, it could not do it at all: He that can add one to one, as often as he will can never find an end of numbering, nor he that can double an Inch as often as he will, find an end of enlarging; it is all nothing more than repeating one of the easiest operations or exercises of the Mind, and it will always be a contradiction for any rational Mind to want it. The Case being plainly thus, I think it should not be ask’d, why a Man cannot set bounds to Number or Extension, but how he comes to have the Faculty of counting and repeating, which is really tantamount to the other, and what it ultimately resolves into. And then, I suppose, the Answer is very easy, and we need not go to the utmost Limits of the World to enable us to resolve the Riddle.

‘ I cannot but smile to observe how grossly we are often imposed upon by Words standing for abstract Ideas, for want of considering how, and upon what Occasions, these abstract Ideas were invented for the help of weak and narrow Conceptions, and have been used so long till they are thought to stand for real Things.

This, I think, is a solid and ample confutation of the Argument drawn from the *Idea* of *Space* and its imaginary *Infinity*. We shall only add a Word or two to shew that *Duration*, (as well as *Space*,) *Number*, and all *Quantity*; any thing which can be considered only by way of parts, or in Succession; is absolutely repugnant to, or incapable of true positive infinity in any respect. Now by a positive, or *Metaphysical Infinite* we always mean that which is absolutely *Perfect* in its kind, which cannot admit of *Addition*, or *Increase*. It is an *Idea* of a certain Quality in the *Abstract*, which has no mixture of the contrary Quality in it, no *failure* or *defect*; and which therefore is our *Standard* to which we always refer, and by which we try all imperfections, all mix’d or finite Qualities, which are for this reason call’d imperfect, because they fall short of our original Standard, and are properly *negations* of it: Consequently our *Idea* of *Perfection* must be a positive one, and prior to that of *Imperfection*; as will appear from *Cudworth* cited in *Remark* 1. where the Reader may find a full account of this positive Infinity, and how we get the *Idea* of it and are able to distinguish it from that negative one explain’d by *Mr. Locke*, which is frequently confounded with it. To return,

If then a *Metaphysical Infinite* means *perfect*, or *that to which nothing can be added*, it is plain that *Duration*, *Number*, and all *Quantity*, the very Nature and *Idea* of which includes

per-

judice adhering to them. For we can judge of things no otherwise than from our Conceptions.

Nor

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perpetual *Increasableness* or *Addibility* must be essentially incapable of this absolute or positive Infinity, in like manner as *Cudworth* has shewn of Space and Body in the Passage referr'd to above. Farther, if we attend to the Notion of an *Infinite Series*, and take a view of the manifold Absurdities which accompany it in any manner of conception, (from which absurdities we draw our only proof of a *first Cause*, or *God*) we shall be necessarily led to exclude from Infinity all such things as exist *Serialim*, or must be conceiv'd as consisting in and composed of *successive parts*, i. e. such a *Duration*, *Number*, *Space*, *Motion*, *Magnitude*, &c. all which, when said to be infinite, are nothing but so many *infinite Series*, and therefore liable to the same absurdities; as the abovemention'd Author has demonstrated of them all together, *Intell. Syst.* p. 642, &c. and of *Motion* in particular, p. 843. The same is shewn of *Duration* or *Time*, by *Dr. Bentley*, *Boyle's Lect. Sermon 3.* or by *Sir M. Hale*, *Primitive Origination of Mankind*, §. 1. c. iv. or *Bishop Stillingfleet*, *Origines Sacrae*, B. III. c. i. prop. 7, 8. See also the confutation of an *Infinite Series* of successive Beings in the beginning of Note 10. and Rem. b.* The like is shewn of *Number* and all *Quantity*, by the Author of the *Impartial Enquiry into the Nature and Existence of God*, p. 24, &c.

* If any Number be absolutely or infinitely great, it can be for no other reason than because it is absolutely or in its very nature incapable of increase without an absolute contradiction. But the very nature of all Quantity infers on the contrary a necessity of the encrease of its Greatness on the supposition of the least addition: For since no Quantity is more or less *such*, or possesses more or less of the nature of Quantity, than another, it follows that all Quantities being of the same general Nature must severally bear a proportion to each other. For example, that can be no Unit which by the addition of an Unit will not become two: and by parity of reason, that is no Million which by the addition of a single Unit will not increase to the greatness of a Million and an Unit. For if it be but a Million after the Addition of an Unit, it is plain, it must before that Addition have been less than a Million by an Unit. — The like may be said of all other Quantities, p. 25.

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* How this is consistent with the *Eternity* of God, and what the true meaning of that Attribute is, See Note 10. Rem. c. or *Dr. Bentley's Boyle's Lect. Sermon 3d.*

Nor are we to seek for any other *Criterion of Truth* than that a Conception of any thing offered to the Mind

NOTES.

The learned Dr. *Clarke* endeavours to evade these Arguments about *Parts*, &c. by denying that any Number of Years, Days, and Hours: or of Miles, Yards, or Feet, 'can be considered 'as any *aliquot*, or *constituent* parts of infinite *Time* or *Space*, or 'be compared at all with it, or bear any kind of proportion to 'it, or be the foundation of any Argument in any Question 'concerning it.' *Demonstr. of Div. Attr.* p. 37, 38. 5th Edit. But does not this look something like avoiding one great difficulty by admitting a greater? For how do we come at our confused Idea of infinite Quantity but by first having a clear Idea of some certain part of that Quantity; in *Space*, for instance, of such a stated Length as a *Foot*; in *Time*, of an *Hour*, and then by doubling, trebling, or any way multiplying that same Idea as long as we please, and still finding as much room for or possibility of multiplying it as we did when we began? See *Locke* B. II. c. xvii. §. 3. But does this Idea of Infinite (which seems to be the only one the Doctor ever thought of) when applied to *Time* or *Space*, alter the very *nature*, *essence*, and *idea* of that *Time* and *Space*? Do not we still consider it as an infinity of the *same* Time and Space; or as consisting in a continual *addibility* of such portions of Time and Space; or as a *Whole* made up of numberless such parts of time and space as are of the same kind with these hours and feet? To say that infinite Space has no parts, is as *Leibnitz* urges in his fourth Letter to Dr. *Clarke*, No. XI. p. 99.) 'to say that it does not 'consist of finite Spaces; and that infinite Space might subsist, 'though all finite spaces should be reduced to nothing. It is 'as if one should say, in the *Cartesian* supposition of a material, 'extended, unlimited World, that such a World might subsist, 'though all the Bodies of which it consists, should be reduced 'to nothing*'. It is therefore impossible to conceive that hours and feet, &c. should not be *aliquot parts* of infinite Time and Space, and that these parts should not bear some kind of Proportion to this Infinity. These parts indeed will never reach our *positive*, *absolute* Infinite (i. e. that to which nothing can possibly be *added*) because they include a perpetual addibility, as we observed, which is called their *Infinity*, and which is a direct contradiction to what we call a positive Infinite: And therefore positive Infinity applied to them is falsely applied, and a positive infinity of Matter, Number, Time, Space, or any quantity that consists of parts, or must be considered in succession.

i. e.

* See this plea fully confuted by Mr. *Collier*, *Impartial Enquiry into the Existence and Nature of God.* B. II. C. ii. p. 157, &b.

Mind forcibly extorts Assent; as there is no other Criterion of Objects perceived by the Senses, than that an Object, by its Presence forces us to perceive it even

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i. e. to which this negative infinite, and this only, is and must be apply'd, are all contradictions. Now instead of answering this Argument against the absolute Infinity of Time and Space, Dr. Clarke first of all *supposes* that Time and Space are absolutely infinite, and then because, according to this our way of conceiving Infinity (which yet is the only way we have of conceiving it in these things) they could not possibly be infinite, he argues that we must not consider them in this way, namely as if their *parts* had any relation at all to their *Infinity*. But should not the Argument rather be revers'd, and the consequence of it stand thus? This is our only way of conceiving any infinite applicable to these Things, but this way we cannot conceive these to be positively infinite (or positive Infinity cannot be apply'd to these) without a contradiction; therefore we cannot at all conceive these to be positively infinite without a contradiction, or therefore these are not positively infinite.

There is indeed a certain use of the term *infinite* among Mathematicians, where this reasoning of Dr. Clarke's might be admitted, but that is only where they consider Quantities relatively, and not absolutely, and therefore that can have no place where we are considering real Existences. Thus when Geometricians say that one Quantity is infinitely less than another, they mean that their infinitely small Quantity is no *aliquot* part of, bears no proportion to, or cannot be compared with the other; but proportion is (nothing real but) purely relative, and therefore the term infinite apply'd here must be so too. Thus for instance, the Angle of Contact made by a Curve and its Tangent is infinitely less than any rectilinear Angle, *i. e.* bears no Proportion to it, is no Measure of it, or cannot any ways be compared with it. But this is nothing to Infinity in the Sense in which Dr. Clarke has used it; since by that he must mean some determinate thing, something of which real Existence may be predicated, which is very different from Infinity in a relative Sense, as it is sometimes considered by Mathematicians; or in a progressive and indefinite one, which is the Sense in which it is applied to Quantities increasing or decreasing without End; and therefore what relates to these Infinites cannot be the Foundation of any Argument concerning the other. The equivocal Use of the Word *Infinite* in these different Senses by jumbling Mathematics and Metaphysics together has, I believe, occasion'd most of the Confusion attending Subjects of this Kind.

even against our Wills. If therefore the Conceptions, which we have of these three before mentioned, represent them to us as existing *necessarily*, so that they cannot be separated from Existence even in Thought, we must affirm that these exist of *themselves*, and require no *Cause* of their *Existence*. But if we can conceive these once not to have been, to have begun to be, or to be capable of Annihilation, 'tis plain that *Necessary Existence* belongs not to them, nor are they of themselves; they must therefore have their Being from something else. For, since they may either exist or not exist, Existence is not of their Nature, and if it be not of their Nature, they must have it from without; and there wants a Cause by which this Indifference to or Possibility of either Existence or Non-existence, may be determin'd. Nor do we judge a Cause in things to be otherwise necessary than as they are in their own Nature *indifferent*, that is, *passive* in regard to Existence. For, if our Conceptions represent something to us as necessary in its own Nature, we enquire no farther about the Cause whereby it exists. (4).

III. IF

NOTES.

(4.) The Sum of what our Author is here endeavouring to prove is that neither *Matter* nor *Motion* (and he will shew the same by and by of *Space*) can be independent or self-existent, and consequently that they require some cause of their Existence distinct from and antecedent to themselves. And tho' he frequently makes use of that confused equivocal Term, *necessary Existence*, yet he seems to apply it only in a negative sense for *Self-Existence* or *Existence without Cause*, which is as much as his Argument requires. For where any thing appears to be an effect, as *Matter* and *Motion* do, we must require a Cause; where no such *Causedness* can be discovered, we call the Thing *Self-existent*, tho' perhaps it really be not so, but might proceed from something else; and where an absurdity would follow from supposing any Being not to have existed once, or not to exist for the future, we say there's a *necessity* for supposing that it did and will always exist; or we stile that Being *necessarily Existent*: which is perhaps as far as we can go. But as these Words, *Necessary Existence* seem to have

III. If we apply this to our Conceptions of the Things in question, it will appear whether they be self-existent, or require a Cause. In the first Place let us examine *Motion*, which is really *Action*, but in all Action it is necessary, if we may trust our Thoughts, that there be an *Agent* and a *Patient*, without these we have no Notion of Action. In *Motion* therefore, since that is Action, there is required an *Agent* and a *Patient*. We have indeed the Patient, namely *Matter*; We must in the next Place see what is the Agent: *viz.* Whether *Matter* produces Motion in itself; or (to speak properly) Whether Motion be coeval with it, natural, and necessarily adhering to its Essence, as Figure is to Body. But if we remember what was laid down above, and carefully examine the Sentiments and

*Tis proved that *Motion* requires a Cause, tho' it be supposed eternal; and that Matter is not the Cause of it.

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have been taken to denote some *positive, extrinsic Principle* of Existence; and which accordingly is often stiled *antecedent, absolute, original Necessity*; a *Necessity simple, and uniform, and absolutely such in its own nature, in itself, &c.* It may be of some use to consider the several Things to which these Terms are apply'd, and what Ideas we fix to them; which will perhaps convince us that they are all merely *relative*.

Necessity is chiefly and primarily apply'd to *Means*; and when it is thus apply'd, it evidently has *Relation* to some *End* to be attain'd by those *Means* of which its affirm'd. Thus, when we say such a thing is necessary, we mean that some *End* cannot be attain'd without the Existence of that thing. Thus Religion is *necessary* to a Rational Creature, or more properly, to the Happiness of a Rational Creature, *i. e.* a Rational Creature cannot attain Happiness, its ultimate End, without Religion. Farther, Means being a Relative Idea, whatever is affirm'd of Means as *Means*, must be Relative also; or which is much the same, must be an Affection of a Relative Idea, *v. g.* When we say, any Action is *Good, Fit, Right, Reasonable, &c.* all these Terms are or should be apply'd to it, as it is conceiv'd to be a Means to some End, and consequently are relative; therefore to call any Action *fit, &c. in itself*, will be the same as to affirm any thing to be *relative in itself*, which is nonsense.

Necessity is also applied to *Truth*, and then it has relation to some other Truths, either antecedent or consequential, according to the different manner in which that Truth is

and Conceptions of our Minds, it will appear that the Nature of Matter (as far as we know of it) is indifferent to *Motion*, or *Rest*, and moves not except it be moved. Motion therefore does not follow from its Nature, nor is it contained in its Essence, nor do we conceive it to arise from thence: Matter is therefore merely passive in regard to Motion, and an Agent must be sought elsewhere. If you say it has been in Motion from Eternity, you'll be

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proved to be *necessary*, *i. e.* according as the Proof is direct or indirect. When the Proof is direct, *i. e.* when the truth of any Proposition is shewn to follow by unavoidable Consequence from some other truth before known; then the *Necessity* of that Truth arises from the Relation which it has to some antecedent Truth: When the Proof is indirect, *i. e.* when the Truth of any Proposition is shewn, by shewing that the Supposition of the contrary to that Truth, *i. e.* the denying that, would imply the Negation of, or be inconsistent with some other known Truth; then the *Necessity* of that Truth arises from the Relation which it has to some consequential Truth. *Necessity* is also applied to Axioms; and then it has Relation to the Terms themselves, *i. e.* it arises from the Relation which is between the terms, and means that supposing or laying down those Terms, that Relation or Connection between them cannot but be. Farther, the same may be said of *Truth*, as of *Means*; Truth being relative also; consequently such Phrases as these, *true or false in itself*, a *Contradiction in itself*; or *absolutely such*, &c. are very absurd ones.

Necessity is also applied to Existence, and then it arises either from the relation which the Existence of that thing of which it is affirmed has to the Existence of *other things*; or from the Relation which the Existence of that thing has to the *Manner of its own* Existence. In the former Signification, when *Necessity* of Existence has Relation to the Existence of other things, it denotes that the Supposition of the Non-existence of that thing of which *Necessity* is affirmed, implies the Non-existence of things which we know to exist. Thus some independent Being does *necessarily exist*. Because to suppose no independent Being implies that *there are no dependent Beings*, the contrary of which we know to be true; so that *Necessity* of Existence in this Sense, is nothing else but *Necessity* of Truth as related to Consequential Truth. And this sort of Proof is called *Demonstratio a posteriori*.

When

be never the nearer; for Duration alters not the Nature of Things. If it has moved from Eternity, it has had an eternal Cause; and since Matter is only passive with respect to the Motion which is in it, if it was from Eternity, it was still *passive only*, and there wanted an eternal Agent to produce eternal Motion (5) in it: For eternal Action cannot be more

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When the Necessity of Existence arises from the Relation which the Existence of any thing has to the *Manner* of its own Existence, then Necessity means that that thing of which it is affirm'd exists after such a Manner that it never could have not existed. Thus every *Independent Being*, or every being existing without a Cause, is necessarily existing. Because such a Being from the *very manner* of its existing, could not begin to exist, therefore must always have existed, *i. e.* does necessarily exist. For to suppose a Being to *begin* to exist, is to suppose a *Mutation*, *viz.* from Non-entity to Entity; and to suppose a *Mutation* is to suppose a *Cause*; For if there's no Cause, every thing must continue as it was. Therefore every Being which had no Cause of Existence, *i. e.* which is independent, cannot begin to exist, consequently cannot be supposed not to exist, *i. e.* is necessarily existent. This some call *Demonstratio a Priori*.

Necessity as applied to Existence in these two Ways, must carefully be distinguished. For tho' an independent Being cannot be necessarily existent in the former Sense, without being so in the latter also; yet it may be necessarily existent in the latter Sense without being so in the former. There may be two or more necessarily existent Beings in the latter Sense, *i. e.* with regard to *Independence*. though in the former, *i. e.* in relation to this *System*, there can be but one necessarily existent Being; which may serve to shew us the inconclusiveness of Dr. Clarke's seventh Proposition. And upon the whole, I think we may be convinced that no Ideas can possibly be fixed to these terms, *Necessity absolute in itself*. See also the latter Part of N. 10. and R. e.

(5.) Eternal Motion seems to be a Contradiction, [See infinite Series in N. 3. and *Colliber's* Impartial Enquiry, c. 7. and Rem. b.] unless we could conceive two Eternals, one before the other; as every mover must, in the order of our Ideas, necessarily operate before the moved: These things therefore which imply Beginning, Change, Succession, or Increase, are finite as well in Duration, as in any other respect, and consequently the Suppositions here and below are all impossible ones.

more easily conceived, without an eternal Agent, than temporary, without a temporal one. But you'll say, what is eternal, since it was never made, requires no Cause. Why so? Suppose the Sun to have shined from Eternity, and the Earth, nourished by its Heat, to have undergone eternal Vicissitudes of Seasons; had those Vicissitudes therefore no cause? Would they be ever the less dependent on the Sun as their Source and Original? Hence it appears that Eternity of Action does not exclude an active Cause, and it is so far from Truth that such Action was never produced, because it is conceived to have been from Eternity, that we must rather say it has always been produced. For in the Instance given it appears that the Sun did always, and from Eternity, cause the change of Seasons: Not that I think the Sun really was, or could be eternal; but if Motion should be supposed eternal (which is the only Subterfuge left to them that deny the Necessity of an Agent, in order to the Existence of Motion) the Sun might equally be eternal with its Light and their Effects. And if this be granted, it will plainly appear, that *Eternity of Action* does not exclude an *Active Cause*. If then we follow the guidance of our Thoughts, we must acknowledge that there is something beside *Matter* and *Motion*, which must be the Cause of Motion.

That *Matter* requires a Cause of its existence.

IV. Secondly, as to *Matter* itself, if we may suppose it to have had a Beginning, or to be annihilated, *necessary* Existence will manifestly not be implied

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Of how little Importance that old Controversy is, whether *Matter* be eternal, may be gathered from Note 1. which shews that there is properly no such thing as *Matter*, distinct from *Body*, i. e. a *solid Substance every where the same*, which that Word denotes, and which is not to be found in that precise manner of Existence. But if, with our Author, we take *Matter* for *Body* only, this as it undergoes perpetual Changes is in its very Nature incapable of Eternity by Remarks c. and d.

(6.) These

implied in its Nature, for that may be taken from it, at least in Thought; but a thing cannot be separated from its Nature or Essence even by the Mind: If therefore Existence were *essential* to Matter, it could not be divided from it even in Thought; that is, we could not conceive Matter not to exist. But who doubts whether he can do that? Is it not as easy to conceive that *Space* which the Material World occupies to be *empty*, that is, void of Matter, as *full*? Cannot the Understanding assign to the Material World a Beginning and an End? They who admit of *Space*, or a *Vacuum* (6.) cannot deny but Matter is at least mentally

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(6.) These two Words *Space* and *Vacuum*, tho' they ought perhaps to have both the same meaning, *i. e.* neither of them to mean any real thing or Quality existing in Nature, but only a Negation of Matter and its Qualities; yet as the former is more evidently a positive Term, it is apt to convey an Idea of something positive, and thereby lead us to frame some imagination of that something, and so at length draw us into a Notion quite different from that, which the latter Word more naturally offers, and which comes nearer to the Truth of the Case; and therefore it seems not quite so convenient to use these two Words promiscuously. It may be doubted whether our substituting the former of these terms for the latter, when the Ideas usually fixt to them have in reality little to do with one another, may not have given rise to most of the Disputes against a *Vacuum*, which have been carried on by many able Writers. *Vacuum*, in Natural Philosophy, is (according to the true import of the Word) only *Emptiness*, or absence of Matter, *i. e.* a Term that implies mere Negation; tho' when we come to prove that Matter exists not every where, or that there is really any such emptiness or absence of Matter, we are obliged, thro' the Defect of Language, to make use of positive Terms about it, *viz.* that there *is a Vacuum* in this or that Place, or that there is a real Foundation in Nature for supposing it. Hence, probably, Metaphysicians, when they come to consider it, being used to the Contemplation of abstract Essences, are led to understand it as something positive, which might properly be said to *be here* and *there*, &c. Their next Step is to bring it under the *Imagination*, and so finding the Idea of Space or Extension in some Measure connected with this Emptiness, they easily substitute one for the other, and often

tally separable from Existence. For Space may be conceived either full or empty; that is, with Matter,

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change the negative Idea into a positive one, and define *Vacuum* to be *Extension void of Solidity, or Space without Body* †, whereas the Ideas of Vacuity and Extension have no real Connection with each other, as was said before, tho' they be very apt to go together. These two distinct Ideas then being both included under the Word *Vacuum*, it becomes equivocal, and consequently that may be affirm'd or deny'd of it according to the one Idea, which cannot according to the other, and here is room for endless Juggle. *v. g.* It may be said that there is a real Foundation in Nature for supposing a *Vacuum* in the negative Sense of the Word, *i. e.* as signifying mere Emptiness; but the same Thing may be denied of it in the positive *i. e.* as standing for pure Extension, which is an *abstract Idea* form'd by the Mind itself, and as such has no Foundation any where else. Again, Philosophers, who take a *Vacuum* for Space or Extension in the Abstract, stiffly deny that there is a *Vacuum* in Nature, which is true indeed of absolute Space, which exists only in the Mind, but is not so of Vacuity or absence of Matter, which has as real a Foundation in Nature as Matter itself has; except we'll argue that it cannot be said to be or to have *Existence* predicated of it, because it is only a Negation; which is playing upon and puzzling one another with Words. To illustrate what has been said of the Disputes about a *Vacuum*, I shall present the Reader with some Arguments brought against it by Mr. *Green* and *Bayle*; which may be of use to us so far as they overthrow the Reality of absolute, simple Space, which they do effectually, tho' I take them to be mere Quibbles with regard to the End for which these Authors seem to have quoted them. They may serve also for another Instance of the great Confusion caused by a jumble of Mathematics and Metaphysics together: An Example of which was given before in the Word *Infinite*, N. 3.

“ Extension into Length, Breadth and Thickness, or what
 “ is called mere Space, or Distance, is a Quantity abstracted
 “ by the Mind, as all other Mathematical Quantities are; as
 “ a Line, or Superficies; and can be no more imagin'd to
 “ exist in Nature alone, than Length or Breadth can. A Line
 “ is produced from the flowing of a Point; a Surface from
 “ the flowing of a Line; and a Space or Mathematical Solid
 “ from the flowing of a Surface: But it is owned that there
 “ is no such real Point, and consequently no such Line in
 “ being, therefore no such Surface. And what Reason can
 “ there be assigned why we may not go on one Step farther,
 “ and from the same Principles conclude there is no such Solid.

“ For

† *Locks* B. 2. C. 13. §. 22.

ter, or without it. The Notion therefore of the Creation of Matter, is no more repugnant to our Conceptions, than the Creation of Space.

V.

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“ For how is it possible for a Superficies which has not a Being,
“ and is imaginary and abstracted, to produce an Effect which
“ is not equally so.

“ We have said, that Length, Breadth, and Thickness is
“ the Definition of imaginary Space; and it is likewise the
“ Notion we have of *Vacuum*, as to the Nature and Essence
“ of it; for the foreign Properties of Light, or Heat, or
“ Sound, &c. are not included in the Conceptions our Minds
“ have formed of Room to move in, or simple Space. If
“ therefore the Definition of imaginary Space and a *Vacuum*,
“ are the same, and a *Vacuum*, is real Space, it follows, that
“ real Space and imaginary are the same, which is a Contra-
“ diction. Since to abstract any thing in the Mind from Be-
“ ings as they really exist, is not to consider Beings as they
“ really exist.

“ From this Idea of *Space*, being only an abstracted one, it
“ is easy to give an Account of what *Place* is, namely, that it
“ is only a Portion of this abstracted Space, we have menti-
“ oned, separated from the rest, and applied to that Body
“ which it considers as a Measure of its Capacity. Therefore
“ primary or absolute Place also, as well as Space is a Crea-
“ ture of the Mind, and nothing really existing, as some Phi-
“ losophers imagine. *Mr. Green's Principles of Natural Phi-*
“ *losophy*, B. 1. C. 4, 8, 18.

“ Let us rummage as much as we please into all the Re-
“ cesses of our Mind, we shall never find there an Idea of an
“ unmoveable, indivisible, and penetrable Extension. And
“ yet if there is a *Vacuum*, there must exist an Extension es-
“ sentially endued with these three Attributes. It is no small
“ Difficulty to be forced to admit the Existence of a Nature,
“ of which we have no Idea, and is besides repugnant to the
“ clearest Ideas of our Mind. But there are a great many o-
“ ther Inconveniences which attend this. Is this *Vacuum*, or
“ immoveable, indivisible, and penetrable Extension, a Sub-
“ stance or a Mode? It must be one of the two, for the ade-
“ quate Division of Being comprehends but these two Mem-
“ bers. If it be a Mode, they must then define its Substance;
“ but that is what they can never do. If it be a Substance, I
“ ask whether it be created or uncreated? If created, it may
“ perish without the Matter, from which it is distinct, cea-
“ sing to be. But it is absurd and contradictory that a *Va-*
“ *cuum*, that is, a Space distinct from Bodies, should be de-
“ stroyed, and yet that Bodies should be distant from each
“ other,

That it is not necessarily existent, as appears from the confession of these Persons who suppose Space to be the Image of Body.

V. But whether there be any such Thing as Space or no, we are certain that we have an *Idea* of it

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“ other, as they may be after the Destruction of the *Vacuum*. But
 “ if this Space distinct from Bodies is an uncreated Substance,
 “ it will follow either that it is God, or that God is not the
 “ only Substance which necessarily exists. Which Part so-
 “ ever we take of this Alternative, we shall find our selves con-
 “ founded. This last is a formal, and the other at least a
 “ material Impiety : For all Extension is composed of dis-
 “ tinct Parts, and consequently separable from each other ;
 “ whence it results, that if God was extended he would not
 “ be a simple, immutable, and properly infinite Being, but a
 “ Mass of Beings, *Est per aggregationem*, each of which would
 “ be finite, though all of them together would be unlimited.
 “ He would be like the Material World, which in the *Cartesian*
 “ Hypothesis, is an infinite Extension. And as to those
 “ who should pretend that God may be extended without be-
 “ ing material or corporeal, and alledge as an Argument, his
 “ Simplicity, you will find them solidly refuted in one of Mr.
 “ *Arnauld's* Books, from which I shall cite only these Words :
 “ *So far is the Simplicity of God from allowing us Room to think*
 “ *that he may be extended, that all Divines have acknowledged,*
 “ *after St. Thomas, that it is a necessary Consequence of the*
 “ *Simplicity of God, not to be extended.* Will they say, with
 “ the Schoolmen, that Space is no more than a Privation of
 “ Body ; that it hath no Reality, and that, properly speak-
 “ ing, a *Vacuum* is nothing ? But this is such an unreason-
 “ able Assertion, that all the modern Philosophers who de-
 “ clare for a *Vacuum*, have laid it aside, though never so con-
 “ venient in other Respects. *Gassendus* carefully avoided any
 “ Reliance on such an absurd Hypothesis ; but chose rather
 “ to plunge himself into the most hideous Abyss of conjectur-
 “ ing, that all Beings are not either Substances or Accidents,
 “ and that all Substances are not either Spirits or Bodies, and
 “ of placing the Extension of Space amongst the Beings, which
 “ are neither Corporeal nor Spiritual, neither Substance nor
 “ Accidents.

“ Mr. *Locke*, believing that he could not define what a *Va-*
 “ *cuum* is hath yet given us clearly to understand, that he
 “ took it for a positive Being. He had too clear a Head not
 “ to discern, that nothingness cannot be extended in Length,
 “ Breadth, and Depth. Mr. *Hartæker* hath very clearly ap-
 “ prehended this Truth. *There is no Vacuity in Nature* saith
 “ he, *this ought to be acknowledged without Difficulty, because*
 “ *it is utterly contradictory to conceive a mere Non-entity, with*
 “ *all the Properties which can only agree to a real Being.* But if
 “ it

it though whence we had it, Philosophers are not agreed. Those that deny any Distinction between it

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“ it is contradictory that Nothingness should be endued with
“ Extension or any other Quality, it is no less contradictory
“ that Extension should be a *simple Being*, since it contains
“ some things of which we may truly deny what we may truly
“ affirm of some others, which it includes. The Space filled
“ up by the Sun is not the same Space that is taken up by the
“ Moon; for if the Sun and the Moon filled the same Space,
“ these two Luminaries would be in the same Place, and pe-
“ netrated one with another, since two Things cannot be pe-
“ netrated with a third, without being penetrated betwixt
“ themselves. It is most evident that the Sun and Moon are
“ not in the same Place. It may then be said truly of the
“ Space of the Sun, that it is penetrated by the Sun; and it
“ may as truly be denied of the Space penetrated by the Moon.
“ There are then two Portions of Space, really distinct from
“ one another, by reason that they receive two contrary De-
“ nominations of being penetrated and not being penetrated by
“ the Sun. Which fully confutes those who venture to assert
“ that Space is nothing but the Immensity of God: And it is
“ certain that the divine Immensity could not be the Place of
“ Bodies, without giving room to conclude that it is composed
“ of as many real distinct Parts as there are Bodies in the World.
“ It will be in vain for you to alledge, that Infinity hath no
“ Parts; this must necessarily be false in all infinite Numbers,
“ since Number essentially includes several Units. Nor will
“ you have any more Reason to tell us that incorporeal Ex-
“ tension * is wholly contained in its Space, and also wholly
“ contained in each Part of its Space: For it is not only
“ what we have no Idea of, and besides, thwarts our Ideas of
“ Extension; but also what will prove that all Bodies take up
“ the same Place, since each could not take up its own, if the
“ Divine Extension was entirely penetrated by each Body nu-
“ merically the same with the Sun and with the Earth. You
“ will find in Mr. *Arnauld* †, a solid Refutation of those who
“ attribute

* *Tota in toto, & tota in singulis partibus*: that is what the Schoolmen say of the Presence of the Soul in a human Body, and of the Presence of Angels in certain Places.

† *Arnauld*, Letter 8 and 9 to Father *Malebranche*. See also a Book of *Peter Petit*, de *extensione Animæ & rerum incorporearum natura*. And *M. de la Chambre*'s Answer to it, which he published at *Paris*, Anno 1666, 4to with this Title, *Defence de l'Extension & de parties libres de l'ame*.

All the Reasons he alledges to shew that Extension and Spirituality may be together are so weak, that they are only good to shew the Falsity of his Assertion.

it and Body, bid us imagine Matter or the World to be annihilated; and then, if we remember the Things that did exist, without considering of what Kind they were, but only that they were without the Mind, we have what we call *Space*. If this be true, then it will be certain that Matter is not Self-existent: For we may consider it as annihilated, neither can we attribute any other Nature to it, than such as answers to our Conceptions of it. If Space therefore, according to them, be a Phantasm of Body, that is, an Idea of Body recalled to mind which formerly was, but now is not, or is it not supposed to be, 'tis certain that Body or Matter, so far as we know any thing of its nature, is indifferent as to existence or non-existence. It has not therefore Existence of itself; for that which exists by Necessity of Nature, Existence enters into its *Idea*, nor can it be conceived otherwise than as existing.

And of those who deny *Space* to be distinguishable from Matter, any other-wise than as Extension in general is from a particular Extension.

VI. Others deny that *Space* is distinguishable from Matter, any other way than as a *generic* Quantity is from a *particular* one; For as when Individuals are changed, the Nature of Man or Animal remains unchanged: So when Body is changed or translated into another Place, the Extension of the Place which is occupied remains unchanged, namely empty, or filled with another Body. I would not spend a Censure on this reasoning; but granting it to be true, it would follow that Body or Matter contains nothing in the Idea of it, which might induce us to

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"attribute to God the diffusing himself throughout infinite
 "Space. *Crit. Dis.* p. 3083, 3084. He concludes pag. 3085.
 "If the Nature of penetrable or impenetrable Extension draws
 "along with it such a large Train of Inconveniencies, the shortest
 "Way is to assert that it hath no other Existence than in our
 "Mind." If any Person want any more Arguments against the
 Existence of simple Extension, or the Application of it to a
 Spirit, he may find enow in Bayle, p. 2790, 3077, &c. See
 also Episcopius. *Insp. Theol.* p. 294.

believe

believe that it is of itself, or exists by the Necessity of its Nature : but on the contrary, that it may be annihilated at least in Conception.

If therefore we consult our Ideas, we must confess that Matter does not exist necessarily, but is as indifferent to Existence or Non-existence, as to *Motion* or *Rest* ; i. e. is in that respect merely passive. It requires a Cause then which may determine it to *Existence* no less than to *Motion*. For that which is not of itself must necessarily be of another, nor can we know that any thing is of itself, otherwise than from the Ideas which we have of its nature ; if these represent the nature of any thing as *necessarily* existing, so that we cannot conceive it not to be, we enquire no farther about its cause ; if not, we fly to a Cause ; nor is the Understanding satisfied till it has found one. Why are we inquisitive about the Original of Man, or any thing else ? but only because our Conceptions represent these as indifferent in themselves to *Being*, and therefore as requiring some Cause of their Existence distinct from themselves. From the nature then of *Matter* as well as *Motion*, we are forced to admit of *another* Principle to be the Cause of both.

VII. Thirdly. As to *Space*, many doubt whether its nature be distinguishable from existence. Whether it can be annihilated even in thought, or conceived not to have been. For when the whole material World is annihilated in the Mind, the Idea of *Space* remains, as of a thing yet existing ; it obtrudes itself upon the Understanding, and suffers us not to assign any beginning or end of its Existence. It forces us therefore to confess, whether we will or no, that it exists ; nor does it seem to require a Cause why it exists, since it is of such a Nature as being self sufficient, must have existence of itself. For what will be self-existent, if that be not, which cannot even be conceived not to exist?

That *Space* seems at first Sight inseparable from Existence.

*Tis
shewn
that this
may arise
from Pre-
judice.

VIII. This seems to argue strongly for the *Self-existence* of Space. Yet a Doubt may arise whether this Inability of our Understanding to separate the Nature of *Space* from Existence, proceed from that *same Nature* of Space, or rather from the *Imperfection* of our Reason. For though all our simple Conceptions must for the most part be looked upon as true, as we said before *, yet these are to be excepted from this Rule in which we find any Grounds of Fallacy or *Prejudice*. And in this reasoning about Space, it is to be suspected that we connect Existence with its Nature merely out of *Prejudice*.

Without
supposes
Space;
while
therefore
we con-
ceive some
thing to
exist with-
out us,
we cannot
annihilate
Space in
Thought.

IX. We may understand how this comes to pass, if we consider 1st. That our Conceptions come for the most part *from without*, when therefore something is presented to our Minds, we always conceive it as without us: This Notion therefore of *external* and *internal* adheres to all our Conceptions, and we continually assign a *Place* to every thing which we happen to think of; but that there should be any thing external, or which has a *Place* and no *Space*, is inconceivable. As long then ~~then~~ as we think of any thing external, we cannot but at the same time believe that Space exists, in which Space we conceive that thing to exist. For while we suppose any thing existing beside ourselves, that necessarily seems to be without us; but imagine all Externals removed, and turn the Mind upon itself, and that *without* will be taken away, and together with it the necessity of *Space* or *Place*. For while we conceive nothing to exist beside ourselves, *i. e.* our *Minds*, we don't think of this *without*, that is, of *Space*, nor see any necessity for its Existence. (7.)

X.

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(7.) From hence, I think, it appears sufficiently that *Space* were it granted to have any real Existence at all, I mean to be any thing more than an Idea in our Minds (which some perhaps will not be very ready to grant, from an attentive Consi-
deration.

* Sect. II. Parag. II.

Sect. 2. Concerning the Origin of Evil.

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X. It is to be observed farther, that when we annihilate any thing in our Mind, we consider it as some- That things are conceived to be annihilated by substituting something else in the Room of them; but we have nothing to substitute for Space.

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deration of the Notes 3. and 6.) yet it cannot be supposed to exist necessarily, in Dr. Clarke's sense of *necessary Existence*. For according to him, * 'Whatever' is necessarily existing, there is need of its Existence, in order to the Supposal of the Existence of any other Thing; so that nothing can possibly be supposed to exist, without presupposing and including antecedently the Existence of that which is necessary. Therefore the supposing of any thing possibly to exist alone, so as not necessarily to include the presupposal of some other thing, proves demonstrably that *that* other thing is not necessarily existing; because, whatsoever has necessary Existence cannot possibly, in any Conception whatsoever, be supposed away. There cannot possibly be any Notion of the Existence of any thing, there cannot possibly be any Notion of Existence at all, but what shall necessarily preinclude the Notion of that which is necessarily existent.

Now if we can consider our own Souls as existing alone and without this *Space*, without considering it as a *causa sine qua non*, or in any other respect; without *presupposing*, or any ways including it: This (according to the Doctor himself) will prove demonstrably that *Space* is not necessarily existent. But let any one shew us what necessity there is for the Existence of *Space*, in order to the supposal of the Existence of a *Spirit*. Let him try whether he cannot conceive an *immaterial thinking Substance*, without the Idea of *Space* or *Extension*; nay, whether he can possibly conceive it with them: whether these Ideas are at all applicable to an immaterial Being, and not rather repugnant and contradictory to the very Notion of it; whether they belong not solely to *Matter*, and if that were annihilated, might not easily be supposed away. Few, I believe, beside Dr. Clarke, can apprehend how *Space* is (as he calls it in his 4th Reply to *Leibnitz*) † the *Place of all Ideas*. I'm sure *Space* and *Spirit*, and the distinct Properties of each, appear to me as distant and incompatible, as the most remote and inconsistent things in nature; and an *extended Soul* seems just such another Phrase as a *green Sound*, an *Ell of Consciousness* or *Cube of Virtue*. Dr. Clarke grants ‡ that *Extension does not belong to Thought*, (as our Author has indeed proved in many of its Modes, in Parag. XIV. and XV.) and at the same time endeavours to shift off the Consequence by answering, that *Thought* is not a Being. But where's the Difference in this Respect? Don't we frame our Idea of the *Being* from its constituent

* Answer to the first Letter, p. 10. † N. 29. p. 144.

‡ Answer to the second Letter, p. 16.

something evanescent, and removed out of Sight ; but yet we look upon some other thing as substituted

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stituent Properties? And if these have no manner of relation to Extension, why should the supposed Being to which they belong have any? † Which Being is indeed nothing but the Aggregate of these Properties. See Note 1. I'm apt to think that our conceiving *Substance* by way of *Substratum*, has led us into the Notion that all kind of Substances must be *extended*; and 'tis perhaps impossible for us to *imagine* any such thing as an *Unextended Substance*; but yet Reason convinces us that there are many real things of which we can form no *Imagination*. And that there are Beings in Nature to which no manner of Extension can possibly be applied, we find sufficiently proved by *Cudworth* ||. Among the various Arguments there produced this is the Substance of one. ' If the Soul be an *extended Substance*, then it must of necessity be either a *Physical Point* (for a *Mathematical Point* has no *Extension*) or *minimum*, the least Extension that can possibly be; — or else it must consist of *more* such *Physical Points* joined together. As for the former of these, it is impossible that one *single Atom*, or *smallest Point* of extension should be able to perceive distinctly all the *variety* of things, *i. e.* take notice of all the *distinct* and *different* Parts of an extended *Object*, and have a *Description* or *Delineation* of the whole of them at once upon itself: (for that would be to make it *divisible* and *indivisible* at the same time) As for the latter, if the Soul be an extended Substance consisting of *more* *Points* one without another, all concurring in every *Sensation*, then must every one of these *Points* either perceive a *Point* and *Part* of the *Object* only, or else the *whole* *Object*: Now if every *Point* of the *extended Soul* perceives only a *Point* of the *Object*, then is there no one thing in us that perceives the *whole*; or which can compare one *Part* with another. But if every *Point* of the *extended Soul* perceives the *whole* *Object* at once consisting of many *Parts*, then will the former Absurdity return. And also there would be innumerable *Percipients* of the same *Object* in every *Sensation*, as many as there are *Points* in the *extended Soul*: And from both these Suppositions it would alike follow that no *Man* is one single *Percipient*, or *Person*, but that there are innumerable distinct *Percipients*, or *Persons* in every *man*. Neither can there be any other Supposition made besides those three forementioned; As that the whole *extended Soul* should perceive both the *whole sensible object*, and all its several *Parts*, no part of this Soul in the mean time having any Perception at all by itself; be-

' cause

† See R. h. at the end of this Chapter.

|| *Intell. Syff.* p. 823. — 832.

tuted in the room of that which disappeared; thus when *Accidents* are removed, we conceive the *Substance*

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* cause the whole of an *extended Being* is nothing but *all the Parts* taken together; and if none of those *Parts* have any *Life, Sense, or Perception* in them, it is impossible there should be any in the *whole*. But in very truth, to say that the whole Soul perceiveth all, and no *Part* of it any thing, is to acknowledge it not to be *extended*, but to be *indivisible*, which is the thing we contend for.

Where Mr. *Colliber* might have found a sufficient Answer to his Argument for the Soul's *Extension* from its receiving *Ideas of extended Things**. And to his Maxim, that *like is known by like*, and by Consequence a Subject absolutely void of extension could have no *Ideas of extended things*†.

* Nay the Soul (says *Cudworth*) conceives *extended things* themselves *unextendedly* and *indivisibly*; for as the difference of the whole *Hemisphere* is contracted into a narrow Compass in the Pupil of the Eye, so are all distances yet more contracted in the Soul itself, and there understood *indistinctly*: for the thought of a *mile distance*, or 10,000 Miles, or semi-diameters of the Earth, takes up no more room in the Soul, nor stretches it any more than does the thought of a *foot or inch*, or indeed of a *Mathematical Point*‡.

The foregoing Arguments against the simplicity of *Extension*, as well as those in Notes 3. and 6. conclude equally against Mr. *Colliber's Amplitude or Expansion*||. Since, if it be any thing real, it must have parts really distinct from one another; which distinct parts can never be the subject of an undivided Quality, nor any addition of them ever reach a positive Infinity. But in truth, these Words *Expansion, Amplitude, &c.* don't seem to imply any positive thing or quality distinct from material *Extension*, or indeed to have any determinate meaning at all; like the *Ubi* of the School-men, which was not place, but something else, they did not know what, and must belong to Spirits, tho' how or why they could not tell.

The last mention'd Writer has a second Argument for the *Amplitude or Expansion* of the *Divine Nature*, grounded on another Maxim, viz. *Nothing can bestow what it has not in itself*: but God has created *material expansion*, therefore he must be expanded himself, p. 223. Which Argument is answer'd by our Author in the 18th Paragr. who shews that such *Expansion* is a mere *imperfection*, as well as *materiality*, and consequently is equally inconsistent with the perfection of the *Divine Being*. See also Rem. h.

* *Impartial Enquiry*, p. 222.

† *Intell. Syst.* p. 827, 829, &c.

‡ *Ibid.* p. 223.

|| *Impartial Enquiry*.

Space remaining; setting aside *Matter*, we substitute *Space*; but when *Space* is removed, we have nothing to substitute in its stead, except material or external Things; but all these suppose *Space*, and cannot be conceiv'd without it; no wonder then that we cannot annihilate *Space*, while we conceive these as existing. If therefore we would come to a right Understanding of the Nature of *Space*, we must not apply our Minds to any thing *material* or *external*, but attend to our own Thoughts and Sensations, which have no relation to external Things or to Quantity: And when our Minds are thus employed, there will appear to be no more Necessity for the Existence of *Space* than of *Matter*.

We attempt to annihilate while those things continue which suppose it, and therefore it cannot be annihilated.

XI. It proceeds therefore from *Prejudice*, and an unwary way of thinking, that we couple *necessity of Existence* with *Space*; neither do we observe that for this very Reason we cannot conceive *Space* not to exist, because we imagine those things still existing, which cannot exist without *Space*; which is no greater a Wonder than if any one intent upon the Mobility of the Heavenly Bodies, should complain that he could not annihilate the *Matter* of them, while the *Motion* continued; for material and external things have no less Dependance on and Connection with *Space*, than Mobility has with *Matter*; if then we conceive God only to exist, while he contemplates himself as existing alone, he can no more be judged to stand in need of *Space*, or be conscious of it as actually existing, than we are while we contemplate only the reflex Acts of the Mind. But when he willed external Things, he made *Place* or *Space* for them to exist in.

God cannot be conceived not to exist.

XII. It may be objected that *we can separate Existence from God* after the same manner as we endeavour to remove it from *Space*. For the Mind being reflected on itself, and solely intent upon

upon contemplating its Operations, may deny God to exist as well as Space. If therefore we deny Space to be self-existent, because we can consider our Mind as existing alone in Nature, and consequently Space as not existing; why may not we, by the same way of reasoning, deny that God is *self-existent*? I answer, we are conscious that we do not exist of ourselves, while therefore we contemplate ourselves and our intellectual Operations, we are necessarily carried to some Cause; being certain that we have Existence from another, and not of ourselves; we cannot therefore exert even one act of the Understanding but it must have a necessary Connection with some Cause distinct from us.

XIII. We cannot therefore conceive ourselves as the only Beings in nature, for we must admit, along with us, the Cause from which we derive Existence, which is a confused Conception of God. But the same cannot be said of Space; for the Operations of our Mind are so intimately perceived by us as to have no necessary Connection with Space, and we understand clearly enough that these may be, tho' there were no Space, and do not stand in need of it for their Existence. If we conceive ourselves as consisting of both *Body* and *Mind*, 'tis certain we stand in need of Space for our Existence, and during that Conception, 'tis impossible for us to conceive Space to be annihilated; viz. because such a Conception has a necessary Connection with Space. After the same manner, if we conceive ourselves to be *Mind* only, yet we must own the Existence of God. For a finite Mind requires a Cause from which it may receive Existence, no less than a Body does a Place in which it may exist; and from hence, in reality, it is that we attribute *Self-existence* to Space, because whenever we think of ourselves, we imagine ourselves to consist of both *Body* and *Mind*. While therefore we are conscious of

Because we are conscious that we do not exist of ourselves.

Smell,
Taste,
Hearing,
do not
give us
any notice
of the
existence
of Space.

our own Existence, we form our Belief of Space also as necessarily existing, since it is connected with the Conception of *Body*, i. e. of *ourselves*.

XIV. Secondly, It is remarkable that the Conceptions which we have from *bearing*, *smelling*, or *tasting*, tho' they be produced in us by external Objects, yet they have no Connection with the Conceptions of *Space*; for who can imagine the Longitude, Latitude, or Profundity of *Sound*, *Smell*, or *Taste*? If then we had only these three Senses, we should not so much as imagine that there was any Space. Our Conceptions therefore abstract from all Extension, nor do the Notions of external and internal adhere so closely to our Thoughts but we may lay them aside; and if we set these aside, the Self-existence of Space does not necessarily *obtrude* itself upon us. Now as the common People attribute *Smells*, *Tastes*, *Colours*, and other *sensible Qualities* to the Objects themselves, and believe that they exist in them; while they who attend better to their Thoughts, know that they exist only in the Mind, and are nothing in the things by which they are produced, beside the peculiar Motion and Texture of their Parts; after the same manner, 'tis probable, we are imposed upon in attributing necessary Existence to Space, because we observe that almost all our Thoughts are produced in us from without, and thereby accustoming ourselves to join Space with them, while we are conscious that we think, we conceive also that Space exists; Whereas, if we remember that all our Sensations, even those produced by external Things, such as *Smells*, &c. do not bring along with them the Notion of Space, we may easily lay aside this Prejudice, and withdrawing our Thoughts from the Contemplation of Space, may conceive it not *to be*.

XV. And this will appear, Thirdly, if by a reflex Act we view the *Mind itself* and its *Operations*; for nothing of Extension or Space offers itself in these; nor does the Mind, when employed about them, think at all of Space, nor is it conscious that it occupies Space: It withdraws therefore from the Conceptions of *internal* and *external*, and may conceive nothing to be in the World besides *itself*, and its *Cause*; i. e. can imagine Space to be non-existent. Thinking Beings then may exist without Space; It proceeds therefore from *Prejudice* that we join *Necessary Existence* with it.

The Mind reflected upon itself has no relation to Space, nor any necessity for it.

XVI. Fourthly, It is to be remarked that Space, so far as appears to our Conceptions, is of such a Nature as cannot be annihilated by *Parts*, for they are in such a manner united to and dependent upon one another, that if we suppose one Part, it will imply a Contradiction for the others not to exist. We can in Thought remove all Water out of a Vessel, or Chamber, and the Space interjacent between the Walls remains extended in Length, Breadth, and Depth: But the Space cannot be *removed*, since it is of its own Nature immovable, (8.) nor can it be *annihilated*; for Distance would remain between the Bounds, which cannot be without Extension, nor Extension without a Subject; but Space, as far as we can conceive it, is the primary *Subject* (9.) of

We may conceive Space to be annihilated all together, but not by Parts.

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(8.) That is, as I have often hinted, if we suppose it to have any *real Nature* or to *exist* at all, it must, as our Author says, exist every where, and cannot be removed by parts. And in this Sense should the Words of Sir Isaac Newton be understood*. "*The order of the parts of Space is immutable; remove these from their places, and you will remove them, as I may say, from themselves.*" For to suppose it all at once away, seems so far from amounting to that *absurd Supposition* mention'd by Dr. Clarke†, that it is no more than what must be conceiv'd in every *Annihilation* of any thing, which is the

C 3

total

* Princ. Schol. ad def. 8.

† Answer to the 6th Letter, p. 39.

(9.) of Extension; therefore it necessarily continues with Distance, nor can it be annihilated, unless we would have Extension without a Subject, that is into *Length*, *Breadth*, and *Depth* without any Thing *Long*,

NOTES.

total destruction or *taking away* of Existence, the removal of it, as we may say, *from itself*, or from Being: Which is a Supposition that is generally thought to carry no absurdity along with it.

(9.) Dr. Clarke affirms † that *Space* is not a *Substance*; and yet declares that it has real *Qualities* ‡. Is not this either to suppose *Qualities* or *Properties* inherent in one another? Or else, with *Gassendus*, to imagine some *middle* thing between *Substance* and *Accident*, which is neither of them, but partakes of both?

The learned Writer referred to in Note 3. is of the same Opinion with our Author in this Place, *viz.* that we are apt to conceive *Space* to be a sort of Substance or *Substratum* of *Extension*, and so are used to attribute that and other imaginary Qualities to it. 'The Idea of *Space* is not the Idea of 'Extension, but of something extended, it is the *Substratum* of 'Extension, and not *Extension* itself. But when I say it is 'the *Substratum*, do not imagine I make it be any thing 'without; it is an *Ideal Substratum*, and nothing more. When 'the Mind has been considering the Idea of *Extension* abstracted from the extended Bodies, from whence it first received the Idea, (whether as they were *Causes* or *Occasions* 'of it I consider not now) it is a very easy Step for the Mind 'to make farther, to frame an *imaginary Substratum* to support 'an *imaginary Extension*. And this is the more easy because the 'Idea we have of a *real Substratum* or Substance, the Support 'of real Qualities is dark and confused, an Idea of *somewhat*, 'and that's all. Now it is but joining the Idea of *somewhat* 'with the Idea of one Quality only, namely *Extension*, and 'we have an *imaginary Substratum* presently formed, that is, 'an Idea of *Space*, or an *Ideal* extended something. Whether 'this be not the very Case, I must leave to any Man to judge 'by reflecting on his own Ideas.

Again; To this Question, *Why may not Space be rather defined Extension in the Abstract, or imaginary Extension rather than the imaginary Substratum of imaginary Extension?* He answers, 'Extension in the general or in the abstract, is an Idea 'of pure *Intellect*, i. e. is to be understood, but cannot be 'imagin'd, any more than *Whiteness* in the general, or a 'thousand

† Answer to the 3d Lett. p. 22. and to the 4th, p. 28.

‡ Answer to the 6th Letter, p. 30.

Long, Broad and Deep. Hence it appears that Space cannot be *partially* annihilated, and from hence the Opinion of its *self-existence* might arise.

XVII. For since it is of such a Nature as must be annihilated either altogether, or not at all, they that attempted to annihilate it only by *Parts*, saw that it was impossible to be done, the Nature of the Thing remonstrated against a partial Annihilation, and

Hence arose the Prejudice for its self-existence.

NOTES.

thousand other the like abstract Ideas. But as soon as *Imagination* comes to deal with this general abstract Idea (or Ideas) it supplies it with an *imaginary* Substratum, and so makes the *general* which was *invisible*, be conceived as a *particular*, for the help of the Understanding. So if the *Imagination* comes to conceive any certain Degree of *Whiteness*, it supplies the Mind with some imaginary white Surface, and brings down the general Idea to a particular Object. In like manner, when it comes to conceive a *Length*, a *Breadth*, a *Thickness*, it supplies the Mind with a Substratum *pro hac vice*, such as may serve the Purpose, otherwise the Mind must rest in pure Intellect only, as in Numbers; and there is nothing more tedious or uneasy to the Mind generally than to be wholly *abstracted*; which is the Reason, by the way, that *Arithmetical* Demonstrations, tho' as clear and certain as any, are less delightful than *Geometrical*, and nothing more irksome than abstract Numbers. Now Space being the Object of the *Imagination*, and not of pure *Intellect*, as are all general, abstract Ideas, it is properly the *imaginary Substratum* of an *imaginary Extension*, or the general Idea of Extension particulariz'd in an *imaginary Subject*; and hence it is that *Space* is said to be extended, which would be Nonsense to say of Extension itself: And Bodies are said to be *in Space*, which would likewise be Nonsense to say of *Extension*. And so it is conceived as *immoveable*, *indivisible*, *infinite*. Immoveable, &c. all Properties of Substances; which makes it plain that it is conceived after the manner of Substance, and therefore is, because it can be nothing else, an *imaginary Substratum*, which the Mind takes to particularize, and thereby render conceivable its general Idea of Extension; which could not otherwise fall within the *Imagination*, nor be estimated any way but by abstract numbers, so many Yards, or so many Miles, 10, 20, 30; without attending to any thing but the numbers, and the meaning of the Words, Yards, Miles, &c. as it is when we reckon Ounces, Pounds, &c. of Weight. — Thus then you see how we come by the Notion of *Space*, and what it is. See also Note 3.

and if one Part be supposed, all others might be demonstrated to exist by necessary Connection. But if any one should suppose all extended things to be removed together at once, he would find nothing impossible in that Supposition: For one may imagine nothing to exist in Nature beside his own Soul, and the Cause on which it depends; which, as a thinking Being, includes nothing of Extension in it: Every thing that is extended may therefore be separated from Existence. But they that attempted this by Parts, when they found it impossible, did not scruple to resolve the Cause into the Self-existence of Space; tho' in reality it did not arise from thence, but from this, that they attempted to separate things naturally inseparable, namely, the Parts of Space one from another.

We are certain of a *first Cause* in what manner soever the Dispute about Space be determined.

XVIII. But whether there be any such Thing as Space, or no; whether its Extension be distinguished from the Extension of *Body*, or not: Be it nothing at all; Be it mere *privation of Contact*, as some are pleased to term it; be it mere *Possibility* or *Capacity* of existing, as others; be it, lastly, either something *created*, or of *itself*, and *necessarily existing*; yet still, as far as we know any thing of the Nature of it, 'tis an *indolent* thing, it neither *acts*, nor is in the least *acted upon*; it cannot therefore, as mere *Extension*, under which Notion only it appears to us, be the *Cause* of *Matter*, or impress *Motion* on it. There must then necessarily be another *Cause* of *Matter* and *Motion*, that is *active*, *self-existent*, and the Cause of all *Things* and *Actions*, which, since they are not of themselves, require a *Cause*.

S E C T. III.

Of the First Cause.

WHAT this *active Principle* is we cannot apprehend otherwise than by *Reason*, for it occurs not to the Senses, unless by its *Effects*; nor is it perceived by them any more than *Light* is by the Ears: Our Reasonings therefore about this Principle will be like those of a *blind Man* about *Light*. A *blind Man* may be assured that there is a certain thing called *Light*, which the Eye can perceive, as the Nose can Smell; he may be taught also by them who see, to understand many Advantages of *Light*, namely that it can *direct* the Steps, that it can *warm*, that it derives its Origin from a large remote Body, *i. e.* the *Sun*; that by the help of it very *distant* Bodies may be perceived, with their *Forms* and other *Qualities* unknown to him; and that *Fire* which affords only *heat* to him, can give *Light* also to them who see: Lastly, that it arises from some Motion in the minutest Particles of a *Fluid*.

Our Reasonings about the first Cause are like those of a blind Man about Light, since it is not an object of Sense.

II. From these *external Properties* he might discourse of *Light*, and in some Measure understand the Reasonings of other Men upon it; he would believe it to be distinct from *Heat*; he would eagerly desire, and willingly undergo many Hardships, to enjoy the Benefit of it; yet would he never have any such Sense of it as those who see. After the same manner we may know many things about this active Principle, which we are compelled, by the force of Reasons, to believe certainly to exist, tho' we are no less ignorant of what it is in itself, than the blind Man is of the Sensation which *Light* produces in those who see*.

Yet we know a great many things concerning it.

III. For

* This Comparison is farther illustrated by the Author of the Procedure of Human Understanding, in his Introduction: Concerning the use which is made of it, See Rem. k.

That all
other
things
proceed
from it.

III. For instance; In the first Place we are certain that all other things come from this *active Principle*: For nothing else, as we have shewn before †, contains in itself *Necessary Existence* or *active Power*, entirely independent of any other; as therefore itself is from none, so all others are from it. For from hence we conclude that this Principle does exist, because after considering the rest of the things which do exist, we perceive that they could neither be nor *act*, if that had not existed, and excited Motion in them.

That it is
one.

IV. *Secondly*, We are certain that this Principle is *One*, similar and uniform: For *Matter* is, as to its *Essence*, every where *One* and *alike*; the same must be said of Space, if we grant it to be any thing distinct from Matter: much more must the Cause which fills Space with Matter be *One*, *simple* and *uniform*. (10.)

V. *Thirdly*,

NOTES.

(10.) This Argument (as well as some others hereafter mention'd) were the Foundation of it true, can but be call'd a presumptive one at best: nay, in truth the contrary will rather follow from the *multiplicity* and *diversity* of created *Substances*. We shall therefore endeavour to give a distinct proof of the *Being* and *Attributes* of God, so far at least as the knowledge of them may affect our present Subject.

Now these seem capable of a clear deduction from this one *self-evident Principle* * *I exist. I myself exist*: therefore *something exists*. If *something exists now*, then something has existed *always*. Otherwise that something which now exists, must *once* either have been made by *nothing*, i. e. been *caused* by no Cause, which is absurd; or else have *made* itself, i. e. have *acted* before it *existed*, or been at once both *Effect* and *Cause*; which is also absurd; or, lastly, (which is the only supposition left) it must have been produced by something, which had its Existence from something *else*, which also depended on some *other* Cause, and so on in an *infinite Series* of caus'd or successive Beings, without any eternal or first Cause; which is also absurd. For either *some one* Part of this infinite Series has not been *successive* to any other, or else *all* the several Parts of it have been successive: if *some one* Part of it has not, then there

was

† §. 2. Paragr. 3, 4, 5, &c. and Remark c.

* See Remark a. at the end of Chap. I.

V. *Thirdly*, That it is *Infinite* both in *Nature* and *Power*: For since it exists of *itself*, there is nothing Infinite in Nature and Power.

NOTES.

was a *first*, which destroys the Supposition; if all the several Parts of it have been successive to each other, then they have all once been *future*; and if they have been all once future, then there was a time when *none* of them existed; and if there was a time when *none* of them existed, then either all the Parts of this *infinite Series*, and consequently the *whole*, must have arisen from *nothing*, which is absurd; or else there must be something in the *whole* beside what is contained in all the parts; which is also absurd. Or thus: Since all the Parts of this *infinite Series* are *successive* or *future* to one another, they must once either have been all future, *i. e.* *non-existent*, (and then the second absurdity will follow, *i. e.* *that this whole Series arose from nothing*) or else all but some *one*, (and then the first will follow, *i. e.* *that it had a Beginning*) which *one* added to the rest either makes them *infinite*, which is absurd; or they are *infinite* without that one, and then that one added to them, either makes one more than *infinite*, or adds nothing at all; both which are Absurdities.

If it be said that an Infinite Series is supposed to have no *whole*; I grant it, and on that very Account the Supposition is absurd, since whatsoever has *Parts* must have a whole, which whole is nothing but a certain number or aggregate of these Parts. But as no number can be so great but that we may assign a greater, it follows that neither Number itself, nor any thing to which number can be applied, *i. e.* which consists of *Parts*, is capable of real absolute Infinity*.

From the Impossibility of an Infinite Series we gather the Eternity† of *some one Thing or Being* [That every one is not in like manner eternal *a parte ante*, or never had a Beginning; particularly that no *Body* or *material System* can be so (and the same Reasons hold equally against any *imperfect immaterial Substance*) is sufficiently prov'd in the Enquiry into the Evidence of the Christian Religion‡.]

From Eternity comes Independence or Self-existence. For that which never had a Beginning of Existence, could not possibly have any Cause of that Existence (for then it would not be the *first Cause*, contrary to what we have proved above) or could depend upon no other thing for it, *i. e.* must be independent of all others; or, which is the same thing, must exist of itself, *i. e.* be *self-existent*.

Eternity *a parte post*, or necessary Existence; or an impossibility of every ceasing to be, follows from Independence§. For what depends upon no Cause can never be alter'd or destroy'd by

* R. b. † R. c. ‡ R. d. § R. e.

nothing that can bound its *Nature* or *Power*. 'Tis to be observed farther, that the number of *possible* things

NOTES.

by any, (as is shewn in Note 4. and Remark e.) and therefore must continue as it is.

From Independence comes also *Omnipotence*. For a Being that depends upon no external Cause for his Existence, and has *active Power*, (as was shewn at the same time that we proved his Existence, and by the same Medium) cannot depend upon any for the exertion of that Power, and consequently no *limits* can be applied to either his Existence or Power. For *Limitation* is an *effect* of some *superior cause*, which in the *present* Case there cannot be: consequently to suppose *Limits* where there can be no *Limiter*, is to suppose an *Effect without a Cause* *.

To suppose this Being limited in or by its own *Nature*, is to suppose some *Nature antecedent*, or *limiting Quality superior* to that Being, to the Existence of whom no Thing, no Quality is in any respect *antecedent* or *superior*: And to suppose that there is no such thing as *Action* or *Power* in a Being which appears to be the Fountain of all Action and Power, is (if possible) the worst Supposition of all.

Liberty is also included in the Idea of Omnipotence: *Active Power* implies *Freedom*; *Infinite Power* is *absolute Freedom*. What therefore has no Bounds set to its Power, what can have no opposition made to its Will, nor Restraint laid on its Actions, must both will and act *freely*. This Attribute is also proved from the Beginning of Motion, and the Creation and Disposition of *indifferent* things †.

But tho' this Being is *free*, and as such the Author of *Change* in other *Beings*, yet he must himself be *Unchangeable*. For all *Changes* have a Beginning, and consequently are Effects of some *prior Causes*: But there can be nothing *prior* to the Existence of this Being, as he is *eternal*; neither any *Cause* of it, as he is *independent*; nor consequently any *Change* in it: except we could suppose him to *change himself*, which is the same Absurdity as to *produce* himself, i. e. to be at the same time both *Effect* and *Cause*.

Thus we come to the Knowledge of an *Eternal, Independent, Omnipotent, Free and Unchangeable Being*.

Omniscience, as well as some of the foregoing Attributes, may be more easily deduced thus. We find in ourselves such Qualities as *Thought* and *Intelligence*, *Power*, *Freedom*, &c. of which we have *intuitive Knowledge*, as much as of our own *Existence*; and that to have these is a *perfection*, or better than to be with-
out

* Rem. f. † See Note E. and the References.

things is conceived by us to be infinite, at least in *Power*, but nothing can be *possible*, to which there is

NOTES.

out them: We find also that these have not been in us from *Eternity*, consequently they must have had a *Beginning*, and consequently some *Cause*, (for the same reason that a *Being*, beginning to exist in time, requires a *Cause*) which *Cause*, as it must be *superior* to its *Effect*, has them in a *superior Degree* *; and if it be the *first Cause*, as itself can depend upon no *other*, must have them in *perfection*, or in an *infinite* or *unlimited Degree* (if these Words can properly be here apply'd †.) Since *Bounds* or *Limitation* would be without a *Limiter* (as has been shewn) i. e. an *Effect* without a *Cause*.

The *Phænomena* of *Nature* also lead us up to *One* such first *Cause*, which is sufficient for their Production, and therefore none else are *necessary*; and tho' *several* more *independent* Beings might possibly exist, yet would they be no *Gods* to us; for they would have no manner of Relation to us, nor we any thing to do with them ‡. Since therefore the same Reason holds for no more than *One* such, to suppose more than one is at least unreasonable.

These seem to be all the *simple* Attributes observable in the Divine Nature, which, as they are differently combin'd by us, come under different Names. Thus the unlimited Exercise of God's *Knowledge* and *Power* demonstrates him *Omnipresent*, i. e. at all times and in all places so present with every Creature as to have an absolute *Knowledge* of and *Power* over it; always to supervise and govern it ||.

His enjoying all conceivable Perfections in an entire absolute manner, denotes him Infinite, or rather absolutely *Perfect* §; and, which is the same thing, his being capable of no *want*, *defect*, or *unhappiness* whatsoever, defines him *All-sufficient*.

The *Moral* Attributes of God may be deduced from these natural ones, and are immediate Consequences of them when exercised on other Beings. They seem to be the Perfection of his external Acts rather than any new internal Perfections of his Nature, and may be termed his *secondary, relative* Attributes ¶.

And tho' the Existence of any moral Quality or Action is not capable of strict Demonstration, because every moral Action or Quality, as such, depends upon the Will of the Agent, which must be absolutely free: Yet we have as great Assurance that there are moral Qualities in God, and that he will always

* See the latter part of R. k. † See R. l. ‡ R. g.

§ See *Wollaston*, p. 70, 93.

¶ See the *Impartial Enquiry*, &c. p. 29, 63. or *Note 52*.

is not some power correspondent, that might actually effect

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always act according to these moral Qualities, as the nature of the thing admits, and may be as well satisfied of it as if we could demonstrate it †.

I shall begin again with a Self-evident Proposition.

Pleasure is different from *Pain*; consequently there is a *difference* in things. *Pleasure* is *fit* for, or *agreeable* to the nature of a sensible Being, or (as these words are commonly used) a *natural Good*; *Pain* is *unfit*, or is a *natural Evil*: Consequently there is a *natural fitness* and *unfitness* of things; or (which is the very same, and what these Terms should always mean) *Natural Good* and *Evil*.

The voluntary *Application* of this natural Good and Evil, to any *Rational Being*, or the Production ‡ of it by a rational Being, is *Moral Good* and *Evil*: Consequently there is such a thing as *Moral Good* and *Evil*. An *Inclination* to and *Approbation* of this *Moral Good* is in every rational Creature §, and is perfective of its Nature, and therefore it must be communicated by, and consequently be inherent in the Creator §.

To act agreeably to this Inclination and Approbation is also a *Perfection*; the contrary an *Imperfection*; consequently the former, as it is a *Perfection* found in some Degree in the Creature, must belong to and be in the highest Degree in the Creator, who has been already prov'd to have all *natural Perfections* in an infinite and perfect Degree ††; and therefore he must have all *moral ones* so too.

As his *Knowledge* and *Power* are *perfect*, he must always both perceive and be able to pursue this *Moral Good*. And as his *Happiness* is *complete*, there can be no possible Reason why he should ever *will* the contrary; nay, there is a good Reason why he should not, namely, otherwise a perfect Thing would contradict itself, and will a *Defect* or *Imperfection*, i. e. be perfect and not perfect at the same time: or a Being infinitely happy, and who loves and approves himself because he is so, would hate and disapprove the very same thing in others, i. e. would love his own Nature, and yet hate any thing that resembles it; which is absurd ¶. It follows then that he must always *know*, be *able*, and *willing* to do, and therefore *actually* do what is absolutely *best*, i. e. produce the greatest sum of *Happiness*, or be absolutely and completely *Good*.

This also was included in the Inclination and Approbation above mentioned. For if he has given us Benevolent Affections

† See *Ditton* on Moral Evidence, p. 1, c.

‡ R. i.

§ See the latter Part of Rem. i.

§ R. k.

†† R. l.

¶ See *Scott's Works*, V. 2. Disc. XIV. p. 30.

effect it; since therefore the things that are possible cannot

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fections and a Sense which approves them, he must himself have both the same Affections, and the same Sense of them †.

Again; the Idea of *Goodness*; properly implies a Disposition to communicate Happiness to others; if then this Being be *good*, he must actually have communicated Happiness to others; and *vice versa*, if he have communicated Happiness to others, he must be *good*: But this Being has communicated Happiness to others, therefore he is *Good*.

The Idea of *Wisdom* implies his Knowledge and Observance of the most proper Methods of effecting this, and is included in his *Omniscience*; it being nothing but that very Knowledge consider'd with relation to Practice. It appears farther from considering the only *Causes* of *Imprudence* in Men, which are either *Ignorance*, *Partiality*, or *Inattention*; none of which can have place in God: He cannot be ignorant of any thing, since both all things and their *Relations* to each other, proceed from him: He cannot be *aw'd* by any *Power* or *sway'd* by any *Interest*, since (as has been shown) he is *independent* and *all-sufficient*; and he cannot be *inattentive*, since he always sees every thing *intuitively* and at once; and consequently he must always *know* and do what is *fittest* and *wisest* to be done.

From which also follows his *Justice*: For he that sees all the *Circumstances* of things and the *Qualifications* of Persons and has *Ability* to regulate these, and no manner of *Temptation* to do otherwise, must certainly suit these Circumstances to those Qualifications, or provide that Persons receive the natural and proper Consequence of their Actions; or (which is the same) do with every Person what is exactly *just* and *right*.

The same also holds for his *Holiness* and *Veracity*, or rather *Faithfulness*. As to the former, he must always dislike and detest Evil, since it can never become in the least agreeable to his *Perfections*, or serviceable to his *Use*: As to the latter, he must adhere to *Truth*, as it is a *Perfection*, and co-incident with *Good*, &c. since he can have no possible *Reason* or *Motive* to deviate from it *.

Thus may we reason about the several moral Perfections of the supreme Being, as they are commonly distinguish'd. But that which should chiefly direct us in these our Enquiries is the Idea of his *Infinite Goodness*, which implies, or rather includes them all †. Nay, all the other moral Attributes (if they

† See R. i.

* See Bp. Wilkins Nat. Rel. C. 10. p. 142. 6th Edit.

† See Tillotson Sermon. 90. 2d. Vol. Fol. p. 672. Or Stackhouse's Body of Divinity C. 5. Sect. 12. p. 101.

cannot be limited, there must also be a Cause infinitely powerful. For as one Possibility requires an equal

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they can properly be called Attributes) are so far from existing apart from this, that they ought to be consider'd only as so many different *Views* of the same *Goodness* in the Creator, and various *Sources* of *Happiness* to the Creature. These are always *sub-ordinate* to and *regulated* by this one principal Perfection and brightest Ray of the Divinity. Thus we conceive his *Justice* to be exerted on any Being no farther than his *Goodness* necessarily requires, in order to the making that Being, or others, *sensible* of the *heinous* Nature and *pernicious Effects* of *Sin*; and thereby bringing either *it*, or some *others*, to as great a Degree of *Happiness* as their several *Natures* become capable of †. His *Holiness* *hates* and *abhors* all *Wickedness*, only as the *necessary Consequence* of it is absolute and unavoidable *Misery*; and his *Veracity* or *Faithfulness* seems to be no farther concerned for *Truth*, than as it is connected with and productive of the *Happiness* of all rational Beings: to provide the properest *Means* for attaining which great *End* is the exercise of his *Wisdom*.

I have all along declin'd the Argument *a priori*, drawn from the Antecedent *necessity* of *Existence*, as well for the Reasons given in R. c. as also, because it seem'd not to carry *some* Attributes so far as they might be deduced *a posteriori*, and to be scarce consistent with *others*. That the *Self-existent* Being, for instance, is not a *blind*, *unintelligent* Necessity, but in the most proper Sense an *understanding* and really *active* Being, cannot be demonstrated strictly and properly *a priori*, as Dr. Clarke says || with a great deal of Reason; and how *absolute Necessity* is reconcileable with *absolute Freedom* seems hard to conceive. For why should not this Necessity extend to all the *Operations*, the *Wills*, the *Decrees*, as well as the *Existence* of the first Cause; and take away that Freedom of Determination, that entire *Liberty* of *indifference*, which our Author has sufficiently proved †, to be a property of God himself, as well as *Man*? And if we cannot admit it in one Case, why should we in the other? I don't say this *Necessity* is inconsistent with perfect *Freedom* as the former is an *Imperfection*, since we do not conceive it to be such any farther than as it proceeds *ab extra*, from some superior Cause *imposing* it. But this I say, that be it what you please, the very *Nature* and *Idea* of it seems repugnant to that of *Freedom*, i. e. the *Power* of *determining* in *Cases* *absolutely indifferent*, *without any previous Reason*, *Impulse*, or *Necessity whatsoever*; and consequently these two can

‡ R. m. || *Demonst.* p. 52. 5th Edit.

† Chap. 5. §. 1. Subj. 4. and elsewhere.

equal Cause, so infinite Possibilities require a Cause infinitely powerful. (II.)

VI. *Fourthly,*

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can never be *co-existent* in the *same Cause*. He that considers this attentively will, I believe, find it to be more than a mere *Quibble* on the Words †.

Lastly, This *Necessity* of Existence, being (as Dr. Clarke contends †) *simple* and *uniform*, without any possible *difference* or *variety*, should admit of no difference or variety of any sort, or in any respect; and consequently must exclude all *diversity*, or *different Kinds* of *Perfection* (as well as different *Persons*) from the Divine Nature, which is suppos'd to exist thereby. It must be utterly inconsistent with that Variety of Attributes, such as *Knowledge* and *Power*; &c. which we conceive to be very *distinct* Properties, and which Dr. Clarke, and every one else, concludes to be essentially in God.

If the *Learned Doctor's* Notion of *absolute Necessity* proves all this, I humbly conceive it proves too much, and if it does not prove this, I cannot apprehend how it proves any thing at all.

(II.) I shall give the Reader this Argument as it is propos'd after another manner by Dr. Fiddes, and the Answer to it by Mr. Colliber.

' To say a thing is possible, is to say there is some *thing*, some *power* or other capable of producing it. For *nothing*, or what has no power, can produce *no effect*. The Power therefore which is to bring what is *possible* into *Being*, is necessarily suppos'd already to exist; otherwise a *Perfection* might arise out of *non entity*, or without a Cause; and what we conceive possible would be *really impossible*. *'

Which the *Author* of the *Impartial Enquiry*, &c. confutes by a parallel Instance.

' If a Person having first proved the Existence of a Power that is perfect; and made it appear that a perfect Power can not but extend to whatever is a capable Object of Power, or includes not a Contradiction; should proceed to prove that the *Act of Creation* implies no Contradiction, and then at last should conclude that therefore *Creation* is a possibility (*i. e.* effectible by the exercise of that perfect or almighty Power, whose Existence he had before demonstrated) I conceive there could be no reasonable exception against such a method of arguing. But if, on the contrary, he should say, ' I plainly perceive there's no Contradiction in the Supposition of the Creation, or production of a thing that was not, and should

† See R. e. and Note 43. † *Demonst.* Prop. 7.

* *Theolog. Spec.* p. 15.

Free.

VI. *Fourthly*, Since *Space* is conceived as merely *idle* and *indifferent* with respect to *Repletion* or *Vacuity*;

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'should from thence immediately infer that a Power capable of Creation exists, this would be a very preposterous way of demonstrating: Which yet is the same method with that of the present Argument †.'

The same way of reasoning has been made use of by the *Cartesians* and several of our own Philosophers to demonstrate the Being and Attributes of God from our Ideas of them in the following manner.

We can have no Idea of any thing, but what has either an *actual* or a *possible* Existence; but we have an Idea of God, *i. e.* of a Being of infinite Perfections, which may possibly exist; therefore he must have an actual Existence: For actual Existence is a Degree of Perfection, and the foremention'd Idea, according to the Supposition, includes all possible Perfection, therefore it must include that, otherwise we should have an Idea of something absolutely perfect without one possible Degree of Perfection, which is a Contradiction in Terms.

But this is all begging the Question. For it is not the bare *supposing* it to have all possible Perfections that infers its *actual* Existence, but the *proving* it to have them. Indeed if we suppose it to have all possible Perfections, we must at the same time necessarily suppose it to exist, since Existence is a possible Perfection; otherwise we should suppose it to have all possible Perfections, and yet to want one, which is a Contradiction. But still this is only an Existence *ex Hypothesi*, a true Consequence from doubtful Premises, and which will as easily follow from the supposal of its having but any *One* perfection, since that must necessarily imply existence. The certainty then of such actual existence does by no means follow from the supposed *possibility* of it, as these Men would be understood: This Conclusion will never hold good; what cannot be supposed without a Contradiction, certainly does not *exist*, therefore what can be supposed without a Contradiction certainly *does*.

Others endeavour to prove the *existence* of God from our *Idea* of him after this manner. Whatever we have an *Idea* of, that either *is*, or if it be not, it is *possible* for it to *be*; but we have an Idea of an *Eternal* and *necessarily existent Being*; therefore such a Being either *is*, or it is *possible* for it to *be*. But if such a Being either now *is not*, or once *was not*, or ever will *not actually be*, it would not be *possible* for it *to be at all* (except it could make itself, or be made by Nothing) contrary to the former Part of the Supposition: nor
would

† *Impartial Enquiry*, p. 178.

entity; since the *Matter* which fills Space is in like manner merely passive and indifferent with respect to *Motion* and *Rest*; it follows that the *Cause* which fills Space with Matter, and produces Motion in that Matter, is perfectly *free*; so that the Creation and Motion of Matter must be the Works of free Choice, and not Necessity, in the Agent. For, if the Agent effected these by Necessity, they would also be necessary Effects, and could not be conceived to be in themselves indifferent to Existence

or

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would it be either *Eternal*, or *necessarily Existent*, contrary to the latter. Therefore such a Being now is, and always was, and ever will be. Or shorter thus: Our Idea of God is an Idea of something which implies no contradiction, and therefore such a Being may *possibly be*; and therefore he *must actually be*, or else he *could not possibly be*, which is contrary to the Hypothesis.

Now to make this or the like Argument of any force, it must be clearly prov'd that we have such an *Idea* of a *necessarily existent Being* as will infer its actual existence; (which may perhaps appear something doubtful from Remark c.) and also, that this Idea is *strictly innate* or *connate* with us, and consequently capable of being urged *a priori*, for a Proof of the Existence of some Being correspondent to such an Idea; (which is now generally given up) For if this Idea be only gathered *a posteriori*, viz. by a deduction of Arguments from our own Existence, then it is only a Consequence of these Arguments, and cannot itself be alledg'd as a distinct one. For how can any Idea consequent upon some certain proofs of something *a posteriori*, be an antecedent, independent proof of the same thing *a priori*? Besides, either these arguments are enough to convince any Man of the Existence and Perfections of God, or they are not; if they are, this is *unnecessary*; if they are not, this is *insufficient*; nay, it is *none at all*, since 'tis a bare consequence of these, and entirely founded in them, and therefore must stand or fall with them. It is submitted to the Reader whether the famous Arguments drawn from our Ideas of *Eternity*, *Infinity*, &c. be not of the same kind with the foregoing. Those that have a Mind to be farther acquainted with the proofs of a Deity drawn from the *Idea*, may find the Question fully discuss'd in *Cudworth*, p. 721, &c. or in *Fiddes's Theol. Spec.* B. 1. P. 1. C. 9. or in the Impartial Enquiry into the Existence of God. B. 2. Part 1. See also *Parker. Disput.* VI. Sect. 19, 20, 24: or *Ode. Theol. Nat.* p. 26, 31, &c.

* For

or Non-Existence, as proceeding from a necessary Cause*.

That it is
a conscious
intelligent
Being, and
Omniscient

VII. *Fifthly*, Tho' by our outward Senses, and the Notices which they convey to us, we cannot go beyond *Space, Matter, Motion, sensible Qualities*, and this *active Principle* which we are speaking of; yet, if we inspect our own Minds, we may contemplate a *Self-conscious* and *thinking Principle* within us, whose Actions are to *will, refuse, doubt, reason, affirm* and *deny*, which carry nothing of Extension along with them, nor necessarily include it in them, nor have any Relation to *Place* or *Space*; but are entirely abstracted from the Notions of *external* or *internal*. That there is such a Principle in us we are certain, not only from our Senses, or the impulses of external Objects, but also from Reflection and Self-consciousness. 'Tis to be observ'd farther, that we can at our Pleasure move some Parts of Matter, and shake the Limbs of our Body by Thought only, that is, by Volition †, whence it appears, that Motion may be produc'd in Matter by Thought; and that something of this Kind is to be attributed to the first Cause, in order to put Matter into Motion, nay, to bring it into Being. *Cogitation* also, *Will* and *Consciousness*, or Faculties equivalent to these, are necessary to a *free Cause*, and on that Account to be attributed to the first Cause, being (as shall be shewn below) perfectly Free; Which Cause, since it is infinite (as we have prov'd) in its Essence and Power, it must be so likewise in *Intelligence*, viz. *Omnipotent* and *Omniscient*.

VIII. *Sixthly*,

* For an excellent Illustration of this Argument, see Dr. Clarke's *Demonstrat.* p. 24, 25, 26. and 65, 66, 67. 5th Edit. See also Cudworth, p. 667, &c. and the *Impartial Enquiry*, p. 31, 32, &c.

† That *Volition* and *Action* are perfectly distinct, and must proceed from two different Powers, See Note 42. That *Action* also is two-fold, See Note 43.

VIII. *Sixthly*, Since this Principle (which we call *God*) is the Cause of all things, and infinite in *Knowledge* as well as *Power*, it follows that he acts, not by blind impulse, but *for an End*; and has order'd his Works by such Wisdom, as to be consistent with themselves, and not destructive of each other.

That he acts for an End.

IX. *Seventhly*, Since God is perfect in himself, since all Things subsist by his Providence, and stand in need of him, but he of none; and since he can neither be profited nor incommoded by his Works, nor affected by their Good or Evil; it follows that he made these Things for no advantage of his own, and that he neither receives nor expects any Benefit from them. For by creating things without himself, he must necessarily have sought either their Benefit or his own; but what Benefit can God seek for himself, who possesses all Good? That certainly which was wanting to him, and necessarily must be wanting to a Being even absolutely perfect, till he has created something; I mean the Exercise of his Attributes *without*, the communicating of his Power and Goodness: That therefore only must he be supposed to have sought in the Creation and Disposal of his Works. (12.) Not that *Externals* can add

That the end of Creation was to exercise the power, and to communicate the Goodness of the Deity.

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(12.) Some have objected here, that according to this Notion, there must have been a Time before the Existence of any created Beings, when God was neither infinitely *happy*, nor absolutely *good* *. But the one Part of this Objection evidently arises from a Mistake of our Author's Notion, who has often told us, that he does not suppose any thing external to the Deity, to add the least to his own Happiness, or essential Perfections; (and indeed to think otherwise, would be worse than to imagine the Fountain fed by its own Streams; or the Sun enlighten'd by its own Rays) but only to *manifest* them to us his Creatures, and encrease *our* Happiness and Perfection, by our *Knowledge* and *Imitation* of them. The *other* part cannot be of force against Creation in any *particular* time, because it will hold equally against it in *all* times; Against the very possibility of Creation in general: since with God there is no *prior*

D 3

and

* See Bp. Pearson on the Creed, 2d. Edit. p. 62, 63.

add any thing to *God*, for they have no manner of Proportion to his *Power* or *Nature*; but he has in himself the adequate Exercise of his Power, namely in the Contemplation and Love of himself. Externals therefore can neither encrease or diminish the Exercise of his Powers, which before was *infinite*. God is indifferent therefore as to these, nor does his Exercise *without* please him, otherwise than as he has chosen to exercise himself thus; as will be shewn below*. And hence it manifestly follows that the World is as well as it could be made by infinite Power and Goodness. For since the Exercise of the Divine Power, and the Communication of his Goodness, are the Ends for which the World was framed, there is no doubt but God has attained these Ends.

X. I

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posterior, no difference of time applicable to his Existence, as we have endeavour'd to prove in R. c. Besides, is it not absurd to talk of *Time*, before the beginning of Things, which (as we have shewn in the same Place) can only be conceived as *co-existent* with, or rather *consequential* to the Being of these things? 'Tis in vain therefore to ask, why were not Beings created *sooner*? Since no Part of Duration conceivable can ever be assigned when some were not created, and every Period of Time has equal relation to Eternity. 'As to the second Sense of the Question (says *Cudworth*) Why the World tho' it could not possibly be from Eternity, yet was no sooner, but so lately made? We say that this is an *absurd Question*, both because Time was made together with the *World*, and there was no *sooner* or *later* before *Time*; and also, because whatsoever had a Beginning, must of Necessity be once but a *Day* old. Wherefore the World could not possibly have been so made by God in time, as not to be once but *five* or *six Thousand Years* old and no more, as now it is," p. 887. See the same more at large in *Fiddes's Theol. Spec. B. 3. Part 1. Chap. 2.* and in *Bentley's Boyle's Lect. p. 232, 235.* 5th Edit: or *Jenkin's Reasonableness of Christianity, Vol. 2. C. 9.* or *Sir M. Hale's Prim. Originat. of Mankind, S. 1. C. 6.* Where you have all the absurd Queries of that kind solidly and acutely answer'd.

(A.) We

* See Chap. 5. §. 1. Subf. 4.

X. I know 'tis commonly said, that the World was made for the *Glory of God*: But this is *after the manner of Men*. For *Desire of Glory* is attributed to God in the same manner as *Anger, Love, Revenge, Eyes and Hands* (*A.*) When therefore the Scripture teaches us, that the World was created for the *Glory of God*, 'tis to be understood that the Divine Attributes, namely *Power, Goodness and Wisdom*, shine forth as clearly in his Works, as if he had no other intent in making them beside the Ostentation of these Attributes; nor could they have answer'd that end more fitly if they had been design'd for *Glory*: But strictly speaking, the Power of God is infinite, and when he acts for the Good of his Creatures according to that infinite *Power*, he is *infinitely good*. Infinite knows no Bounds, nor has the

When the World is said to be created for God's Glory, 'tis after the manner of Men.

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(*A.*) We see many Things are ascribed to God in Scripture by way of *Accommodation*; as Hands and Feet, Heart, Anger, Revenge, and Repentance. And since we understand all these to be spoken of him by way of Condescension to our Capacity, why should we not understand the *Desire of Glory* to be ascribed to him in the same way? Especially since we must conceive God to be obliged by his Goodness to set a great value on his *Glory*, and to require the promoting of it from us as a principal Duty. For the Good and Advantage of all reasonable Creatures depends on the Obedience that is paid to God's Law; and there cannot be a more effectual Means to promote that Obedience than a due Sense of the great and glorious Attributes of God; of his Wisdom, Power, Justice, and Goodness. The more lively these are represented to intelligent Beings, the more willing and careful they will be to obey God, and the more afraid to offend him; and therefore it is agreeable to the Goodness of God to exact our Endeavours to beget this Apprehension in us and all other thinking Beings. Not for any Advantage this *Glory* brings to God; but because the Reputation of the Lawgiver and Governour of the World is a Means necessary to advance the Good of his Creatures, and therefore it is our Duty and Interest in the highest Degree to promote that *Glory*: and therefore God may be said to do all things *for his Glory*, because if that were the end of all that he has done, he could not be more concerned for it, nor would it be more our Duty to promote it.

the Goodness of God any other Bounds beside his *Wisdom* and *Power*, which are also infinite. And in reality this makes most for the *Glory of God*, viz. to have created a World with the greatest *Goodness*. (13.)

XI. By

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(13.) 'The Reason why God made the World (says the *learned Author* so often cited above) was from his own overflowing and communicative Goodness; that there might be other Beings also happy beside himself, and enjoy themselves. And afterwards, 'God did not make the World merely to ostentate his Skill and Power, but to communicate his Goodness, which is chiefly and properly his Glory, as the Light and Splendor of the Sun is the Glory of it*.

We have a fine Paragraph or two to the same purpose in *Mr. Wollaston's Delin. of the Religion of Nature*, p. 115, — 120.

The same Notion is well stated in *Scot's Christian Life*; where the Glory of God and the Happiness of Man are shewn to be co-incident†. As this seems to be very often misunderstood, it may not be improper to insert a Passage or two from that excellent Author. '† A true Survey and inspection of God's Nature will instruct us, that being *infinitely perfect*, as he is, he must be *infinitely happy* within himself; and so can design no self-end without himself; and consequently that the end for which he requires our Service, is not any Advantage he expects to reap from it, or farther addition to his own Happiness, he being from all Eternity *past*, as completely happy as he can be to all Eternity *to come*; and therefore what other End can he be supposed to aim at, than our Good and Happiness? It is true indeed, he designs to glorify himself in our Happiness; but how? not to render himself more glorious by it than he is in himself, for it is impossible; but to display, and shew forth his own essential Glory to all that are capable of admiring and imitating him, that thereby he might invite them to transcribe that Goodness of his into their Nature, of which his Glory is the Shine and Lustre, and thereby to glorify themselves; and what can more effectually display the Glory of a Being who is infinitely wise and powerful, and good, than to contrive and effect the Happiness of his rational Creatures, who, of all others, have the most ample Capacity of Happiness?

And again: '|| But doth not the Scripture tell us, *that he doth all things for his own Glory*, and that he obtains this End, as well by punishing, as by rewarding his Creatures? Very true,

* *Intell. System*, p. 886.

† See Vol. 1. p. 4.5.

‡ Vol. 2. Chap. 6. p. 434, 435. || Vol. 2. p. 204. Fol.

XI. By *Good* I here understand that which is *convenient and commodious*, that which is *correspondent* to the *Appetite* of every Creature. God therefore created the World with as great Convenience and Fitness, with as great Congruity to the Appetites of things, as could be effected by infinite *Power, Wisdom, and Goodness*. If then any thing inconvenient or incommodious be now or was from the beginning in it, that certainly could not be hindered or removed even by infinite Power, Wisdom and Goodness. (14.)

That God made the World as well as it could be made by the highest Power, Goodness and Wisdom.

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“ true, but then it is to be consider’d that the Glory he aims at, consists not in receiving any *Good* from us, but in doing and communicating all *Good* to us. For infinite Goodness can no otherwise be glorified, than by its own overflowings and free communications, and it can no otherwise be glorified in the Punishment of its Creatures, but only as it doth good by it: For should it punish without good reason, it would reproach and vilify itself: but if it doth it for good reason, it must be because it is good either for *itself* or *others*: for *itself* it cannot be; for how can an infinitely happy Being reap any *Good* from another’s Misery? And therefore it must be for the Good of others, either to reduce those who are punished, or to warn others by their Example from running away from their Duty and Happiness. So that to do Good is the end of God’s Punishment; and because it is so, he is glorified by it: And considering that he is so infinitely happy, that he can no ways serve himself by our Miseries; it is impossible he should have any other end in concerning himself about us, but only the great, God-like one of doing us Good, and making us happy.” See also Discourse 14 in the same Vol. p. 302.

To the same Purpose is *Smith’s* excellent Discourse of the *Existence and Nature of God*, Ch. 4. and 7.† And *D’Oyly’s* first Dissertation, p. 122. and *Rymer’s* General Representation of Revealed Religion, p. 260, — 267. and p. 511. Bp. *Russ’s* Remains 1st Discourse; and Bp. *Burnet’s* Exposition of the Articles, p. 27. 4th Edit. and our Author’s Sermon on Divine Predestination, &c. §. 33. For a sufficient Answer to the Objection drawn from *Prov.* 16. 4. see *Tillotson’s* 2d Vol. of Sermons, Fol. p. 681.

(14.) Our Author rightly concludes from the Nature and Will of God, as discover’d above, that nothing can be made by him (by whom are all things made) really unworthy of, or incon-

† See Select Discourses, p. 136. and 147, and 393.

inconsistent with these; however unaccountable and irregular things may at present seem to us; For, having demonstrated the Divine Perfections in one Sense *a priori*, i. e. prior to the Examination of particular Phenomena, no seeming difficulties or objections whatsoever *a posteriori*, i. e. from these Phenomena, ought to invalidate the Belief of them, but should be all over-ruled by, and give way to these; except they amount to an equal degree of *Clearness* and *Certainty* with the Proofs of these themselves; and also cannot possibly admit of any manner of *Solution* consistent with them; neither of which Cases can ever be made out, as will, I hope, appear from the following Chapters of this Book.

REMARKS referred to in Note 10.

[Remark a.] **T**HAT this Proposition must be allow'd for *self-evident*, and as such, incapable of *proof*, appears from the *absurdities* which they all run into who attempt to prove their own Existence from any other *medium, viz.* from any of their *operations*. 'I think, say they, therefore I am:' i. e. I, who *am*, think; therefore I, who *think*, *am*. I being supposed to *exist*, do think, therefore this *thinking* proves that *Existence*. Is not this plainly arguing in a *circle*, and *proving* a thing by *presupposing* it? And is it not full as clear to me first of all that I *am*, as that I *think*? Tho' I could not be certain of my Existence except I *perceiv'd* something; yet sure the perception of my own Existence must be both as *early* and as *evident* as any other perceptions. The first Proposition therefore is *self-evident*. I begin with our own Existence because we have *intuitive Knowledge* of no other.

[R. b.] See the absurdity of this infinite Series, as to Generations, Motion, Number, Magnitude, in the Notes 3, and R. d. All or any of which Arguments demonstrate the Absurdity of it, as it is fairly and fully stated by Dr. Green in his late *Philosophy**. Where you see the true old *Atheistic Series* in a different dress from that in Dr. Clarke's 2d Proposition.

The same way of reasoning is made use of in a *Philosophical Essay towards an Eviction of the Being and Attributes of God*, by Setb Ward†. This Piece being scarce as well as curious, an extract from it may not be disagreeable, 'That the World was not eternal, but created, is demonstrable from things that are visible: Our Argument shall be from Generation. Whatsoever is begotten, was begotten of some other; for nothing can possibly beget or make itself, otherwise it will follow

* B. 6. C. 5. §. 8. p. 763.

† 2d. Edit. Oxf. 1655.

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follow that the same thing is, and is not, both at one instant, seeing it is both the producer, and the thing to be produced. It is to be produced, and so it is not yet; it is likewise a producer, and that supposeth that it is in Being: It is therefore in Being, and it is not in Being, that's a manifest contradiction. Wherefore nothing can generate, make, or produce itself: wherefore every thing that is begotten, is begotten of some other, and then the other which begot it, either was itself in the same manner begotten, or it was not; if it was not, we are already come to the first Principle, which was unbegotten; and so have discover'd a Godhead. If it was begotten, either we must follow up the Course of successive Generation to some first Production from a Cause eternal, or else we must necessarily say that the Course of Generations had no beginning, and consequently that infinite Successions are already past, which is as much as to acknowledge that an infinite Number of Successions are past, and if past, then they are at an end; So we have found an infinite Number which hath had an end, that is another Contradiction. Again; if any shall affirm that the Course of Generation had no beginning, but that the number of them hath been infinite: Let us put a Case, and reason with him. We will imagine the Generations of *Abraham*, for Example, and *Joseph* the Son of *Jacob* the Son of *Isaac*, the Son of *Abraham*. I demand therefore whether before the Birth of *Abraham* there had past an infinite Series of Generations, or not? If the Series was finite, the Work of Generation had beginning; which is the Conclusion I contend for: if the Series past was infinite; then at the Birth of *Joseph*, 'tis evident that more Generations were past, so we have found a Number greater than that which was suppos'd to be Infinite: and consequently that was not Infinite; so that it was both Infinite and not Infinite, a manifest contradiction.

But if we say that *Abraham's* was Infinite, and that so was *Joseph's* also, then it will follow that the Number of *Abraham's* was equal with the Number of *Joseph's*; but *Abraham's* was but a Part of *Joseph's*, wherefore the Part is equal to the Whole. Else admit that *Abraham's* was finite, but when it came to *Joseph*, that then the Number was Infinite, it follows then that a finite Number added to a finite shall make an Infinite, which likewise is against the common light of reason. We see therefore that supposing the Eternity of the World, or the Infinity of Generations, doth force the Mind to contradictions, and consequently the Fiction is vain and utterly impossible. And as we have argued in the way of Generation, so we may likewise in every thing where there is a Motion, or Mutation, that is, in all the parts of the visible World.

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* The Creation therefore of the World, from the visible things thereof, is manifest. *Q. E. D.**

And again †. 'Well, having concluded the Creation and Beginning of the World, we see it follows that thence we conclude the Eternal Power and God-head; that is, the Eternity and Power of the God-head. As for Eternity, we have by undeniable Consequence resolved all Motions in the World into the Bosom of a First-mover, and if we suppose him a First-Mover, the Supposition will evidently conclude that he is Eternal, *i. e.* that he is without Beginning of Essence, or without any term or limit of Duration. For if it had any Beginning of Essence or Duration, that beginning of Being presupposeth a priority of not-being, (that is, actual Being is not of the Essence of it) and so that we may, without any Contradiction, suppose it not to be yet in Being; that is, we may bring our Understandings, without Error, to the Apprehension of it as being yet in the State of Power only, or Potential-being, so as things are in their Causes. So then, let us conceit it in this State, and compare this State with the other when it had Being; and it is evident that this Passage, or Transition from want of Being to a Being, cannot be without a Motion, nor Motion without an actual Mover; but that which moves a Thing from not-being to a State of Being, is necessarily a precedent Mover to that which from it receives its Being: So then that which is supposed to be the first original Mover will have a Mover, which shall of necessity have gone before it, and consequently it will be both a First and not a First-Mover, which is a plain Contradiction. Instead of multiplying Arguments without necessity, we will only return by the Footsteps of our Analysis, and so from the Being of the first Mover conclude the Eternity. If it be a first Mover, then it had no former Mover; and if so, then it never was produced from Nothing into Being; and if so, then it never had any beginning of its Being, then it is Eternal. Therefore whatsoever is the first Mover, it must of necessity likewise be Eternal: but from the common affections of things visible, we did before demonstrate an Original and first Mover: Wherefore the Visible things of this World, they likewise do evict the Eternity of the God-head ‡.

'And that God was a God of Power, it was demonstrated then, when we found him to be the first Cause and original Mover and Creator of the World ||.

[R. c.] The generally receiv'd Notion of Eternity, as consisting in a continual addibility of *successive Duration*, is, I think, the very same thing as an *infinite Series*, and consequently liable to the same objections: We must therefore try to rescue

* P. 19.

† P. 22.

‡ P. 25.

|| P. 34.

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rescue this Divine Attribute from such an absurd interpretation.

Now, if we attentively examine our *Idea of Eternity*, I believe we shall find that it amounts to thus much: *viz. uniform, invariable Existence*: or *simple Existence* join'd with *Necessity*: by which last Word we only understand an *Impossibility of having ever began, or of ever ceasing*. This I apprehend to be all that can consistently be affirm'd of the Divine Existence in this respect, and perhaps we may more easily and safely determine what the manner of it is *not*, than what it is; *v.g.* that it continues not by *time*, or in *place*. Indeed *local Extension* and *successive Duration* are modes of the Existence of most Beings, and therefore we find it very difficult to consider any Existence without them: But as we have endeavoured to shew the possibility of removing the *former* from the Divine Essence, in Notes 3, 6, and 7. so here, I think, it may be shewn also that the *latter* has no necessary connection with it, but rather the contrary.

In order to do this, it will be necessary to explain what we mean by *Time*, which (according to Mr. Locke) is of the very same kind with *Duration*; and may properly be term'd a *part* of it. This is very well defin'd by Leibnitz, to be the *Order of Succession of created Beings*. We manifestly get the Notion of it by reflecting on the Succession of Ideas in our Minds, which we are apt to conceive as a *Chain* drawn out in length, of which all the particular Ideas are consider'd as the *Links*. Whereas, had we but one *invariable perception*, without any such Succession of Ideas in our Minds, we could have no such Notion as this of *Duration*, but that of pure *Existence* only. Now *Existence* being evidently a simple Idea, (tho' perhaps *Duration* be not) is consequently incapable of a Definition, and we need, I think, only observe of it here, that if we join our Idea of *Duration* to it, we still add nothing to the Idea of it as it is in *itself*, but merely a relation to *external things*; which Idea of *Duration* therefore seems purely accidental to it, and no necessary Ingredient of the former Idea, which is complete without it. *Time* then, or *Duration*, is an Idea entirely resulting from our Consideration of the Existence of Beings with reference to a real or imaginary *Succession*. Whence it will follow in the *first* place, that we cannot possibly frame any Idea of this kind of *Duration* without taking in *Succession*; and secondly, that we cannot easily separate the *Existence* of any finite, changeable Beings from this kind of *Duration*.

Our next Enquiry must be whether this Idea of *Duration* be connected with the Existence of those Beings entirely as they *exist*, or only as they exist in such a *particular manner*: Whether it belongs to all *Existence*, as *Existence*, or only to a particular *Sort* of Existence, *viz.* that which includes the foremen-
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tion'd relation to Succession. The latter, I think, will appear more probable, when we reflect that it is only from the *variableness* and *contingency* of our own Existence, that all our Successions spring: Whereas, were we entirely *independent*, we must be absolutely *immutable*, and invariably *permanent*; and also, that we can contemplate even this Existence of ours without any Succession, *i. e.* we have a Power of confining our Thoughts and attending to one Idea *alone* for some small time (if that Word be excusable here) exclusive of all other Ideas and consequently exclusive of Succession. This Mr. Locke allows, being what he calls an *Instant*, which, says he, 'is that which takes up the Time only of one Idea in our Minds, without the Succession of another, wherein therefore we perceive no Succession at all*.'

Succession therefore does not appear to be necessarily join'd with the Idea of absolute existence, since we can consider *one* (for how small a time soever) *without*, and *independent* of the *other*. Nay, lastly, there is a certain existence to which it cannot possibly be in any sense apply'd, and that is a *Perfect* one. Suppose this perfect Being *alone* in nature, as we must believe him once to have been, and then what *change* of Nature, or *Succession* of Ideas can be found? What *flux* of Moments, what *alteration* or *increase* can we imagine in his own uniform, invariable Essence? What Idea have we of *Duration* as apply'd to his Existence, antecedent to his *Willing* and *Creating* External things? Such Duration then as we are acquainted with, can, I humbly apprehend, have no manner of relation to this immutable Being, while supposed to exist alone: But as soon as he determined to exercise his several Attributes in the production of something without himself, then we have reason to think that *Time*, *Succession*, and *Increase* began. "Tho' the eternal Being had no necessary Succession in his own Nature, yet being perfectly *self active* and *free*, thence it proceeded, that the exercise of his freedom in decreeing and producing the Creatures, in such a manner and order as was judged fit by his most perfect Wisdom, became the Original of whatever real Succession has been in Nature, and such Succession as we are apt to conceive to have preceded, is no other than imaginary."†

To the several Objections against this Notion drawn from God's eternal *Wisdom*, *Ideas*, *Decrees*, &c. See a sufficient Answer in the same place.

I shall transcribe this Author's reply to the most common and considerable one about the Schoolmens *punctum stans*, which we also esteem as indefensible an Hypothesis as the other.

"Some

* Essay on *Human Understanding*, B. 2. Ch. 14. §. 10.

† *Impart. Enquiry*, p. 208.

R E M A R K S.

“Some will possibly object that if there was once no real Succession in Nature, it will follow that the divine Existence was then at least (as 'tis usually said to be) *Instantaneous*. But to this it may be replied that Existence is nothing, if distinguished from the Being which exists. Consequently there can no real Quantity belong to it as so distinguished. Wherefore it cannot properly be denominated either *finite* or *infinite*, *successive* or *instantaneous*. For these are Attributes which have a Reference to *Quantity*, and can no more agree to existence, which is but a *Mode* of Beings, than they can to Necessity, or Contingence, which are Modes of Existence. To define Eternity or necessary Existence by Infinity or the Negation of Limits, seems to be no less impertinent, than to define Virtue by the Negation of *Red* or *Blue*. For Existence (which has no Quantity or Dimensions) hath no more Analogy to Extension and Limits, than Virtue (which hath no Colour) hath to *Red* or *Blue*. And for the same Reason it is no less improper to define it to be *instantaneous*, since even an *Instant* (as likewise an Atom) is conceived as quantity, though the minutest imaginable. But if it cannot properly be denominated instantaneous, much less can it be successive.”

To which give me leave to add the Testimony of *Cudworth*.† Having confuted the absurd Notion of the World's Eternity, he adds: “Here will the Atheist think presently he has got a great advantage to disprove the Existence of a God. Do not they who thus destroy the Eternity of the World at the same time also destroy the Eternity of the Creator? For, if Time itself were not Eternal, then, how could the Deity or any thing else be so? The Atheist securely taking it for granted, that God himself could not be otherwise Eternal than by a successive flux of infinite Time. But we say that this will on the contrary afford us a plain Demonstration of the Existence of a Deity. For since the World and Time itself were not infinite in their past Duration, but had a Beginning, therefore were they both certainly made together by some other Being, who is, in order of Nature, senior to Time, and so without Time, before Time: He being above that successive Flux, and comprehending in the Stability and immutable Perfection of his own Being, his Yesterday and to Day, and for Ever. Or thus; Something was of Necessity infinite in Duration, and without a Beginning; but neither the World, nor Motion, nor Time, i. e. no Successive Being was such; therefore is there something else, whose being and Duration is not successive and flowing, but permanent, to whom this Infinity belongeth. The Atheists here can only smile, or make Faces; and shew their little

* *Impartial Enquiry*, p. 210. See also *Episcopius Inst. Theol.*
L. 4. C. 9.

† *Intell. Syst.* p. 644. &c.

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"little Wit in quibbling upon *nunc stans*, or a *standing Now* of *Eternity*; as if this *standing Eternity* of the *Deity* (which with "so much reason hath been contended for by the ancient *genuine Theists*) were nothing but a *pitiful small moment of Time* *standing still*; and as if the Duration of all Beings whatsoever must needs be like their own; Whereas the Duration of every thing must of necessity be agreeable to its Nature; and therefore as that whose *imperfect Nature* is ever *flowing* like a River, and consists in *continual Motion*, and *changes* one after another, must needs have accordingly a *successive* and *flowing Duration*, sliding perpetually from *present* into *past*, and always posting on towards the *future*, expecting something of itself which is not yet in Being, but to come; so must that whose *perfect Nature* is *essentially immutable*, and always the *same*, and *necessarily existent*, have a *permanent Duration*; never losing any thing of itself once present, as sliding away from it; nor yet running forwards to meet something of itself before, which is not yet in Being, and it is as contradictory "for it ever to have begun, as ever to cease to be."

After all, it must be again confessed, that the Idea of Succession (as Mr. *Colliber* observes) so insinuates itself into our Idea of Existence, and is so closely connected with the Existence of all finite Beings, that we find it extremely difficult to imagine the Eternal Existence of God, any otherwise than as an Eternal continued Series or Succession.

Our constant Conversation with material Objects makes it almost impossible for us to consider things abstracted from *Time* and *Place*, which (as was observed before) are Modes of the Existence of most things, and therefore we are apt rashly to apply these Considerations to the great Author and Preserver of all Things. We seem to think that as the most exalted Idea we can form of God's *Eternity* and *Omni-presence* must be infinite *Duration*, and unbounded *Extension*, so these are to be strictly and positively attributed to him; whence must follow all the Absurdities of *Past* and *Future*, *Extension* in *this* and *that* Place as compatible with the Divine Essence. Whereas *absolute positive Infinity* (such as belongs to God *) does, in its very Notion exclude the Consideration of *Parts*; since no Addition of any Parts whatsoever can amount, or in the least degree approach to it. (Though such negative Infinity as belongs to all *Quantity*, cannot possibly be considered otherwise.†) So that whosoever acknowledges God's Perfections to be strictly *infinite*, does by that Confession, deny that they may be considered as made up of *Parts*: That *Immensities* can be composed of any *finite Extensions*, or *Eternity* consist of multiplied *Durations*, and consequently, that there can be *Length* or *Space*, *Distance* or *Time*, *past* or *future*, with the *Infinite and Eternal God*‡. When there-

* See Note 3. and R. 1. † See Note 3. and R. 1.

‡ See *Locke* on Hum. Und. B. 2. C. 15. § 42.

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therefore we say that God *always was*, or *ever will be*, we don't mean by these and the like Words, that his Existence has strictly any relation to Times past or future, that it is at all increased, altered, or affected thereby; but only thus much is intended, *viz.* that whenever we suppose any other Beings existing, or Time and Succession begun, then it was, is, or will be possible for these Beings to affirm in any Part of this their Time or Succession, that God *also exists*. In the same manner as it may be affirmed of some Propositions that they always were and will be true, that they are true in this or that, and every Place: though such Assertions are exceedingly improper, because Propositions or necessary Truths have no manner of Relation to either Time or Place. All Expressions therefore which imply Succession, such as, *was*, *will be*, *always*, *when*, &c. as well as those that imply Locality, such as *Ubi*, *where*, &c.† can only be applied to finite temporary things, which exist in Time and Place: With which things so existing, as well as every Point of Time and Place, the Deity is supposed to be *co-existent*; though his own Nature and Essence be very different from these, and have properly no manner of relation to or connection with them. If then we will attribute *Duration* to him, it must be *permanent*, *unsuccessive* Duration, *i. e.* Duration of a quite different kind from what we meet with here. But it is to be remembered that we don't pretend to explain the *Nature* of Eternity, or to determine the *manner* of such Existence as excludes all *Succession*; since it is sufficient for us here to shew the possibility of conceiving the thing in general, the certainty of it having been demonstrated already, when we proved that something must be *Eternal*, having also shewn that Eternity could not consist in successive Duration.

If then the Divine Existence cannot include succession of Parts, or our kind of Duration, (which perhaps by this time may not seem altogether improbable) neither can his *essential Attributes*. His *Knowledge*, *v. g.* can have no relation to times *past* or *future*, to *fore* or *after*; nor can any object be said to be at a *Distance* from it, or any imaginary distance set *Bounds* to it.

The chief Reason why *we* don't perceive and know any thing that has a real Existence, is because that Existence is removed from us by the Distance of *Time* or *Place*; But this Reason cannot hold with God, who is (though in a manner far different from his Creatures) always *present* to *all* times and places, and consequently must behold all things existing therein, as well as we see any object at due Distance directly before us. Thus he that is travelling on a Road cannot see those that come behind or are gone far before him; but he who from some *Eminence* beholds the *whole* Road from end to end, views at once all the distant travellers succeeding one another. But this,

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† See R. h.

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I think, is so evident in itself that neither Argument nor Simile can make it more so. See *Martin's Discourse of Natural Religion* Part 1. C. 8. or Note 76.

Hence then appears the Impropriety of those Terms, *Divine Prescience, Predestination, &c.* which have so long puzzled the World to no manner of Purpose; And the only Conclusion at last must be, that all things which ever *were* or *will be*, which with respect to some former or latter times, and to Persons placed therein, may be called *past* or *future*, are always equally and at once *present* to the view of God; that to him strictly and absolutely *a thousand Years are as one Day*, and *one Day as a thousand Years*, and that whatever Difficulties seem to attend this conception of things being *successive* to us, and not so to him, can be no Argument against the Matter itself, which is demonstrable; but only one of the many Instances of the Weakness of Human Understanding in things pertaining unto God.

Against the common Notion of *Eternity*, see the *Speætor*, N^o. 590. or Sir M. Hale's *Prim. Orig. of Mankind*. § 1. c. 6. p. 123. or a *Philosophical Essay, &c.* by Seth Ward, p. 23. or Grew's *Cosmologia Sacra*, B. 1. c. 1. par. 9. or *Ode, Theologia Naturalis*, p. 220.

Both this Attribute and Omnipresence are also well treated of by J. Smith, in his Discourse concerning the *Existence and Nature of God*, C. 2. § 4, 5. *Select Discourses*, p. 125, 126, &c. and by D. Martyn, *Discourse of Natural Religion*, Part 1. C. 7. and Dr. Sherbeck on the *Trinity*, p. 76, &c.

[R. d.] 'Here we find certain *Chains of Causes and Effects*, and many Parts of this *System* owing their *Existence*, and the *manner* of their *Existence*, to a preceding Cause, consequently we cannot, with any Possibility of Reason, assert that the *whole* System exists without a Cause, for this is the same as to assert that the *Parts* do not belong to the *whole*. Again, a material System composed of Parts that are *changeable*, cannot exist without a Cause *distinct* from, and *prior* to such a System. For wherever there is a *Change*, there must be a Cause of that Change, otherwise there would be a *Beginning* without a Cause. The Cause of this Change cannot be in the *materials* of this System for the very same Reason; therefore it must be in something *distinct* from and *prior* to the System itself. The same will be the Case as to *Motion* in a material System; there is no Motion but what is the effect of a *former* Motion, consequently there is no Motion in such a System which has been from *Eternity*, or which has not been *Caused, &c.*'

'From the *Imperfection* also, or *Unhappiness* which we see in this System, in *Man* particularly; from the *Frame and Constitution* of it, 'tis evident that it did not exist without a cause.

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* See *Collier's Impartial Enquiry*, p. 31, 32, &c.

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'The Question then will be, what is the Cause of its Existence? Now that cannot be in *itself*, for then a thing would be before it was, which is a Contradiction. It follows then, that some other Being is the Cause of its Existence, and the next Question will be, *who* is this Being? Now as whatever began to exist must owe its Existence to some *preceding Cause*; so that Cause, if it has not existed eternally, must likewise owe its Existence to some *other* preceding Cause, and that to *another*, and so on till we ascend to (the *first Cause*, or to) a Being that is *Eternal*, and exists absolutely *without Cause*. And that there is such a Being is evident, otherwise, as nothing could begin to exist without a Cause, so nothing that is not eternal could ever have existed. †

[R. c.] That the Idea of *Self-Existence* can imply nothing more than a *Negation of Dependence* on any Cause; and that *necessity of Existence* can only be considered as a Consequence resulting from such Independence seems very clear. A Being which is the first of all Causes, itself absolutely uncaused, cannot have any thing in any manner of Conception *prior* to it, or which may be considered as a positive *Ground* of its Existence. We can therefore only prove his Existence *a posteriori* and argue from the manner of it in a *negative* way. See Note 4. From the order of Causes we gather that he must necessarily have been from all Eternity, otherwise his Existence would have arose from nothing; and that he must continue to all Eternity, otherwise an end would be put to that Existence by nothing. But this is still only a *Consequential* Necessity arising from the Absurdity which would attend the contrary Suppositions, and to infer any thing from hence concerning the *Modus* of the Divine Being seems to be building a great deal more on this Argument than it will bear. This is indeed a *Reason* by which we find that he must always exist, but it is a Reason to *us* only, and does not affect *his* own Nature, or the Cause of it, and when it is applyed to that, I think 'tis used equivocally. Conceiving that he cannot possibly be supposed not to exist, is far from conceiving *how* or *why* he actually *does exist*; we can easily shew a Reason for the one, but it seems above human Comprehension to account in any Respect for the other: Nay, the Attempt to do it seems altogether as absurd and useless, as endeavouring to shew how or why a thing is what it is: How a First Cause is a First Cause; or why Truth is Truth.

Farther: This *eternal Being*, we say, is *Independent*; or, which is the same thing, *Self-existent*, i. e. his Existence depends upon nothing *beside* himself? But does it therefore positively

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† Enquiry, p. 11, 12, 18, &c. See also Dr. Bentley's Boyle's Lect. Sermon 6. p. 127, &c. 5th Edit. and the other Authors referred to in Note 3.

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depend upon himself? Will it follow that because he has no *external* Cause, therefore he must have an *internal* one? Or because no ground or reason of his Existence can be drawn from any other Substance, therefore one must be contained in his *own Substance, or self*? This is using the Word *Self-existent* in two different Senses, both as *negative* and *positive*, which have no manner of Connection with each other, and the latter of which will perhaps appear to be no very good one. It is not then apparent yet that there needs any *Physical Reason* at all for the Existence of the *eternal, independent Being*.

Nor, Secondly, if there did, would this *Necessity of Nature* usually assigned as such, serve for that Purpose. For first it is not the Substance itself, that would be to make the same thing the Ground of itself; which is nonsense. 'Tis therefore a *Perfection, Property or Attribute* of that Substance (we know no other Distinction) and as such must, in the Order of our Ideas, be Consequent upon the existence of that Substance in which it is supposed to inhere. Whatever it is, it has in some respect or other a relation to the Subject to which it belongs. Let it then be an *Attribute sui generis, cujuscunque generis* (if we mean any thing at all by this Word) it must be *predicated of*, and *presuppose* its Subject, and consequently cannot, according to the Order of our Ideas, be the antecedent ground or foundation of it. And to endeavour to clear it (as some do) by making it not an Attribute of the Substance, but of the attribute of the Substance; or as they phrase it, a *Property of a Property*; is only thrusting it still farther back, and making it posterior in conception to both the Substance and its Attribute or Property.

But Thirdly, supposing this *Necessity*, this *Ground or Reason*, could be considered as antecedent to the Divine Nature, and inferring its actual existence, we are got but one step farther yet; for, will there not be the same necessity for demanding a reason for that reason, a ground for that ground, and so on *in infinitum*? And what shall we get by such an endless progression? Why should we not stop at a first *Being*, as well as at this *Ground*, which must itself want a foundation if the other does, since there cannot be any intuitive Knowledge in either: and the same reasons which are given for stopping at this *Ground* will hold equally for stopping before we come at it, and convince us that we might as well, or perhaps better, acquiesce in the actual Existence of the first Being. We must then rest somewhere: We must either admit one first Cause of all Things and Qualities, itself existing without Cause (for that is implied in its being called the first) or an *infinite series of Beings* existing without any original Cause at all; *i. e.* either *some one thing* must be without a Cause or *every thing*.

Here then are two Difficulties; the less is to be chosen, let us see which that is. Now if the *Manner of Existence* in all these Beings

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Beings were entirely the same, I grant it would be as easy to suppose *all* of them *existing* without a Cause, as *One*. But here I think lies the Difference: There was a time when all of them, except one, were indifferent either to *existence* or *non-existence*; were nothing. Therefore for them that were once indifferent to *existence* or *non-existence*, to be actually determined into *Existence*, to be brought from *nothing* into *something*, or made what they once were not; is a real *change*, an *action*, an *effect*, and as such, must require some *changer*, *agent*, *cause*. But on the other hand, all that we know of this *one* Being, is, that it *now exists* and *always* did so; that it never had a *Beginning* of its *existence*, was never changed from what it is, never *made* or produced: Here is no *effect*, and therefore no *reason* nor *room* for a *ground* or *cause*. Nay, to assign one in any respect *prior* to its existence, as it must be supposed to be if considered as a Cause; (and it must be considered as a Cause, or extrinsic Principle, if considered at all; I mean so as to be made any use of in the present Question, or to infer any thing concerning actual Existence) I say, to assign any Ground *prior* to the *existence* of this Being, would be to prove this Being *not eternal*, nor the *first Cause*: as attempting to prove a *self-evident* proposition is endeavouring to shew that proposition not to be self-evident by assigning a *clearer*.

Now to lay down some *necessity*, *ground*, or *reason* of Existence, must either be to propose it by way of *Causality*, or to fix no manner of Idea at all to these Words: and indeed no manner of Idea seems possible to be fixed to them, which is not utterly inconsistent with existing without Cause, as that Being is proved to exist. For why do we consider that *Ground* or *Reason* in the order of our Ideas as antecedent to the Existence of the Being, otherwise than as it seems in the Order of Nature antecedently necessary to the Existence of that Being? To which nevertheless we allow, that no *Thing*, *Mode*, *Quality* whatsoever can be really antecedent.—The Case will be no better if we imagine this necessity *co-etaneous*, or *co-existent* with the Existence of the Being which is supported by it; Since this is to suppose that actually existing already, in order to the Existence of which this necessity is introduced; and also seems much the same as an effect *co-existent* with its Cause. For as we said before, this *Necessity* must either be a *Cause*, or *nothing* at all to the present purpose. And that it was proposed as such by the Author that introduced it, is I think pretty plain, from his terming it sometimes a *formal Cause*, and sometimes one which *operates*.*

The whole Case then seems to stand thus. On the one hand there is a certain *alteration* made, a positive *effect* produced

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without

* See Dr. Clarke's Answer to the 3d. Letter, p. 473. and Answer to the 6th. p. 488. Lines 1, 8, 35. Seventh Edition.

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without a *Cause*; which is a clear Contradiction. On the other hand there is a *difficulty* indeed, but not an apparent Contradiction: There is somewhat existing of which we can give no *account* (the manner of whose *Existence* is different from that of any thing else) which will admit of no *Cause*, the Idea of which is entirely repugnant to that of *Causality*.

This may be hard to conceive, but cannot be denied without affirming something worse, namely an express contradiction, as has been shewn above. In order to set this in as clear a light as is possible, I shall take the Liberty to insert a Passage from the learned Writer cited in Note 3. and 9. 'The Idea of a Self-Existent Being is the Idea of a *Being that always was, is, and will be*, because he always was, is, and will be infinitely able to be. If you ask why he is so, I know not; Why I believe so, I think I know; it is because he has *in fact* existed from all Eternity, which he could not have done, had he not been infinitely able to exist. If you ask after the ground or foundation of this *infinite Ability*, it is the same that is the ground or foundation of all his other Perfections, his infinite Nature, Essence or Substance; if you ask farther for the ground of that, I must call it trifling: if you assign *absolute Necessity*, I must ask what's next? Or what that means? Or refer you to the *Indian Philosopher's Elephant and Tortoise*, as the best comment upon *absolute, antecedent Necessity*.'

Neither need we run ourselves into such Absurdities as these: This independent Being *exists because it does exist*; or, it exists by *chance*. Since it is enough for us to say, *There can be no Reason why it does exist*; or, which is the very same thing still, no Cause, either *Efficient or Formal*; no causal Necessity, or antecedent Ground of its Existence.

I shall only beg leave to observe one thing more in this place, namely, that all the abovementioned reasoning about *necessary existence* seems to be built upon that false Maxim which *Leibnitz* lays down as the foundation of all Philosophy (and which Dr. Clarke was very ready to grant him, since it was the foundation of his own Book on the Divine Attributes) namely, that *Nothing is without a reason, why it is rather than not, and why it is so rather than otherwise*. Though the Dr. is soon forced to deny this very Principle, when (in his Way of considering Time and Space) he proposes the *mere Will of God*, as the only reason why the World was created at such a certain period of time, and in such a particular point of Space.* Of which *Divine Will*, or of its determination, according to himself, there can possibly be no manner of *reason*, since he supposes these effects of the divine Will to be, in every possible manner of Conception, absolutely equal and indifferent, and consequently it would be absurd to suppose any reason of such special Will, or such

* 3d Reply, N^o. 5. p. 81.

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such particular *determination*. If then we may suppose two things in nature absolutely and in every respect *equal* (which *Leibnitz*, to be consistent with himself, and I believe for no sufficient reason else, found it necessary to deny) the preference of one of these before the other must be absolutely without a *reason*. And though there may be a sufficient reason for a person's *acting* in general, rather than not acting at all, yet (as *Leibnitz* well observes*) except there be one also for his acting in a certain *particular manner*, which in the present Case there cannot be (according to Dr. *Clarke's* own Concession †) the abovementioned Principle is intirely overthrown. See more of this in Note 42. and the latter part of N. 45.

The same Argument will hold against *Locke's Hypothesis of Anxiety*, if it be considered as the sole and absolute determiner to all Action ‡, since it can never determine the *Mind* to *Will* one Action before another, where both are entirely equal; of which kind numberless occur in life, as will be shewn at large in its proper place.

[R. f.] For a Being to be *limited*, or *deficient* in any respect, is to be *dependent* on some *other* Being in that respect, which gave it just so much and no more ||; consequently that Being which in no respect depends upon any other, is not limited or deficient at all. For though *Figure*, *Divisibility*, &c. and all manner of Limitation, is in one Sense (*viz.* in Beings *essentially* imperfect) as Dr. *Clarke* observes §, properly a mere *Negation* or *Defect*; yet in another, *viz.* in a Being which is essentially perfect in any respect, Finiteness must be conceived as a *positive Effect* of some Cause restraining it to a certain Degree. In all Beings capable of Quantity, Increase, &c. and consequently *uncapable* of *Perfection* or *absolute Infinity*; Limitation or Defect is there a necessary consequence of *Existence*, and closely connected with it, and is only a *Negation* of that Perfection which is entirely incompatible with their *Essence*; and therefore in these it requires no farther Cause. But in a Being naturally capable of *Perfection* or *absolute Infinity*, all Imperfection or Finiteness, as it does not necessarily flow from the *Nature* of that Being, it seems to require some *ground* or *reason*, which reason must therefore be foreign to it, and consequently is an effect of some *other*, external Cause, and consequently cannot have place in the First Cause. That this Being is capable of Perfection or absolute Infinity, appears, I think, from hence, that he is manifestly the Subject of one infinite or perfect Attribute, *viz.* *Eternity*, or *absolute invariable Existence*. His Existence has been shewn to be perfect in this one respect, and therefore it may be perfect in

E 4

every

* 5th Letter N^o. 17. p. 169. † N^o. 1, 2. p. 12. of his 4th Reply.

‡ See Note 45. || See *Scott* in Note 21. § *Dem.* p. 56, 57. 5th Edit.

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every other also. Now that which is the Subject of one Infinite Attribute or Perfection, and *may* have others so too, *must* have all of them Infinitely or in Perfection: Since, to have any Perfections in a finite limited manner when the Subject and these Attributes are both *capable* of strict *Infinity*, would be the fore-mentioned absurdity of positive *Limitation* without a Cause. This method of arguing, will prove any Perfection to be in the Deity *infinito modo*, when we have once shewn that it belongs to him at all: at least, will shew that it is unreasonable for us to suppose it limited, when we can find no manner of Ground for any Limitation, which is as far as we need, or perhaps can go.

[R. g.] That the Word *God* is generally understood in a *relative* Sense, see *Newton. Princ. Scol. Gen. sub. fin.* p. 523. &c. 3d. Edit. or *Maxwell's Appendix to Cumberland*, p. 106. or *Chambers* under the Word *God*.

To shew that there is only *one* Eternal Self-existent Being, which bears the Relation of God to us, seems to be going as far as either is necessary or natural Light will lead us. As Dr. *Clarke's* Demonstration of this and several other Attributes is entirely founded on his Idea of *Necessity* of Existence, as that also is on *Space, Duration, &c.* they must stand or fall together. They who endeavour to deduce it from *Independence*, or *Omnipotence* evidently presuppose it in their definition of these Attributes.

The foregoing Passage and part of Note 10, to which it refers, having been called in Question by the Author of *Calumny no Conviction*, or a *Vindication of the Plea for human Reason*, p. 58. &c. I shall endeavour to explain them in this Edition. *The Phenomena of Nature lead us up to one first Cause, which is sufficient for their Production, and therefore none else are necessary*; i. e. necessary to the Production of these Phenomena, according to the former Sense of *Necessity* laid down in p. 23.† and which is the only Sense that Word could be applied in here without Equivocation. *And though several more independent Beings might possibly exist, yet would they be no Gods to us; they would have no relation to us, nor we any thing to do with them*; i. e. if the Supposition of their Existence were not requisite to the Production of this System we could perceive no necessity for it at all, we could never discover it by our reason, and therefore it would be nothing to us. And though two or three such Beings should exist and act in the Formation and Government of their distinct Systems, or *agree in one*, yet till their Existence and Operations were made known to us, and a natural Relation discovered, nothing would be owing from us to them, they would have no *religious* or *moral* Relation to us (if I may so speak) we should have no reason to call any more than one of them *our* Creator, Preserver, and Governour, which Sense the Word *God* more especially bears, as this Author I'm sure will not deny.

Since

* See Note 3. and R. c. p. 65.

† 1st Edition.

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Since the same Reason holds for no more than one such, to suppose more than one is at least unreasonable. By an unreasonable Supposition here I mean a groundless one, or that which has no reason to support it, as the same Word is used concerning Infinity, p. 63.* It is unreasonable for us to suppose it limited when we can find no manner of Ground for any Limitation. Such Suppositions as these ought never to be built on in philosophy, but yet when they are advanced I should not think that my not seeing any reason for them is an effectual confutation of them. There may be many Beings in Nature that have no apparent relation to any thing that I know of, and consequently for or against whose Existence I can find no reason. I should be glad therefore to see upon what this Author grounds the following Consequence which he adds, 'the same Reason holds for no more than one, therefore there is but one.'—If by the Word Reason he means a Reason *a priori*, I must expect some better Proof of it than I have hitherto been able to meet with before I can admit it: And it was exclusively of any such that I asserted that they who endeavour to deduce the Unity from Independence or Omnipotence, presuppose it in their Definition of these Attributes; which I think they do in the following manner. Having proved the Existence of some first Cause, which as such can depend upon no other Cause for its Being and Perfections, and therefore must exist alone or be originally self-existent; (all which is demonstrable, but does not shew us why there may not be twenty such first Causes, all underived and so far independent) having got thus far in their Proof of Independence, they add another Idea to it and include an absolute Independence in every respect, an infinite extent or exercise of its several Attributes on every Being in Nature; which supposes that there are no other Beings of equal Perfections with himself, but that he exists alone, or is self-existent in another Sense of these Words, which does not at all follow from the former. In like manner instead of defining Omnipotence to be Power perfect in kind, which has no defect or mixture of weakness in it, or a Power in God over every thing which he has produced, (which is enough for our purpose, and all perhaps that can be strictly demonstrated, but yet does not infer Unity) they make it a Power over every thing which exists beside himself, which again supposes that there are no Beings of the same kind with himself, which I apprehend to be begging the Question. If this Author takes these two Attributes in the larger Sense, I should be obliged to him for a Proof of them from any Medium but that of antecedent Necessity, which I fear is a Principle that may with equal Reason be brought to prove any thing. I must confess that to me who am obliged to draw all my Notions and Arguments concerning the Deity from his Effects, it would be difficult to demonstrate

* 1st Edition.

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monstrate against the Supposition of more than one uncaused active Beings governing in their several Provinces, and each producing (not whatever was absolutely possible or fit to be produced * but) what was possible or fit for him to produce; tho' I don't know any Ground for such a Supposition. I shall make no observation on this Author's eight Arguments for the *Unity* till he has taken an Opportunity (as he promises †) to consider what has been said against the Principles on which they are founded, which I heartily desire. His Appendix shall be examined in its proper place.

[R. h.] We cannot include any such Notion in *Omnipresence*, as makes the Deity present in his simple Essence to (i. e. co-extended or co-expanded with) every point of the boundless Immensity; ‡ since this Idea of *Extension*, or *Expansion*, seems plainly inconsistent with that simple Essence. § Not that we suppose these Attributes of *Knowledge* and *Power* acting separate from his Essence; but we suppose his Essence to have no more relation to the Idea of *Space*, *Place*, *where*, &c. than either of these Attributes has. ||

Dr. Clarke's Query, 'How can it be shewn upon any other Principle than that of Necessary Existence, that his governing Wisdom and Power must be present in those boundless Spaces where we know of no Phenomena or Effects to prove its Existence?' ¶ is well answered by Episcopus. I shall give it in his own Words. 'Hoc (nempe Deum esse extra mundum) non modo prorsus est ἀκατάληκτον, sed etiam valde absurdum; quia totum atque omne illud spatium quod extra hunc mundum esse dicitur, nihil omnino reale est, sed pure pure imaginarium, & prorsus nihilum; ut autem Deus esse dicatur in pure pure imaginario, & prorsus nihilo, per se absurdum est: quia esse in dicit realem habitudinem aut denominationem ab eo in quo quid existit: Realis autem habitudo & denominatio a nihilo, sive ab eo quod nihil reale est, accipi nullo modo potest. Dicere Deum ibi habere intrinsicam & absolutam præsentiam qua in se ipso realiter existit, est fingere præsentiam sine Relatione aut denominatione ad id cui quid præsens esse dicitur, quod implicat contradictionem. Intrinsicam enim sive absolutam præsentiam, qua quid in se ipso realiter existit, non est præsentia in nihilo; sed meta essentia sive existentia extra nihilum.' |||

That a wise and powerful Being knows and acts upon all parts of the Universe is plain from Effects, but to go beyond this into what is called extramundane Space, and prove the Existence of Knowledge and Power where there is nothing to which they can be referred, nothing to be known or acted upon, is to us in-

* P. 59. † P. Last. ‡ Dr. Clarke's Demonst. p. 47.
§ See Note 6. || See Note 7. ¶ Answer to the 7th Letter, p. 499. ||| Inst. Theol. L. 4. c. 13. p. 294.

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incomprehensible. And no less so to speak of the *Presence* of these Attributes, or of a Being endowed with them, (*viz.* an immaterial unextended one) to any point or Part of Extension; except it be metaphorically, as eternal Truths are said to be the same in every time and place, &c. Though in reality they have no relation to either one or other, but are incommensurate to and of a nature quite different from both Time and Space, as we observed in R. c.

To argue that every Substance which affects another must be *present* to it, from the old Maxim that *nothing can act where it is not*, is still supposing that a Spirit exists *somewhere*, or is circumscribed by some Parts of Space: 'Tis confusing its Existence to one particular *Mode*, concerning the *Modality* of which we can only reason negatively, *viz.* that it is not the same as that of *Master*, or by way of *Extension* in any Sense.

To the trite Objection, that what has no *Magnitude*, or is *no where*, is therefore *Nothing*, see a sufficient Answer in *Cadworth*, p. 770, to 778, &c. How this agrees with *Phil's* Paradox, *that God is every where and yet no where*, see *ibid.* p. 773. But the strongest Confirmation of this Opinion, which Dr. *Morr* styles *Nullibiſm*, may be drawn from the learned Dr's Arguments against it in his *Encbir. Metaph.* C. 27.

[R. i.] By the above mentioned *Pleasure* or *natural Good*, I mean that *Pleasure* which every one feels in himself. By the *Production* of it here I understand both the producing such in himself, and also in others; to both which he is equally determined by his Nature, though from quite different Principles. To the former he is directed by Self-Love: To the latter by a certain disinterested benevolent Instinct or Affection; and that which determines him to approve this Affection and the Actions flowing from it is called his *moral Sense*. The former of these Instincts, as it implies Increase of Happiness, is only applicable to finite, imperfect Creatures: The latter may be common to us and the Deity; Who could have been determined to create us only by such a disinterested Benevolent Affection as this is supposed to be. This is always approved by the Moral Sense; though it may be doubted whether such a Sense be confined entirely to it. See *Butler's* Dissert. on the Nature of Virtue, p. 315.

The Object of both these Instincts is *natural Good*; and, I think, *moral Good* may be allowed to consist in the Prosecution of either, or both of them together, so long as the former is in due Subordination to the latter.

That all the Notion we can possibly frame of *Moral Good* or *Evil*, of *Virtue* or *Vice*, &c. consists entirely in *promoting* this *natural Good* or *Evil* is sufficiently confirmed by *Sherlock*. †
• Whereas, says he, we distinguish between *Moral* and *Natural*
• Good

† On Judgement, p. 20, to 24.

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‘ *Good and Evil*; the only difference between them is this, that
 ‘ *Moral Good and Evil* is in the *Will and Choice*, *Natural Good*
 ‘ and *Evil* is in the *Nature of things*; that which is *good* or
 ‘ *hurtful* to ourselves or others, is *naturally Good or Evil*; to
 ‘ *love*, to *chuse*, to *do* that which is *good* or *hurtful* to ourselves
 ‘ or others, is *morally Good or Evil*; or is the *Good or Evil* of
 ‘ our *Choice* or *Actions*. If you will recollect your selves, you
 ‘ will find that you have no other notion of *Good or Evil* but
 ‘ this: when you say such a Man has done a very *Good* or very
 ‘ *Evil* Action, what do you mean by it? Do you not mean
 ‘ that he has done something very good or very hurtful to him-
 ‘ self or others? When you hear that any Man has done *Good*
 ‘ or *Evil*, is not the the next Question, *what good* or *what hurt*
 ‘ has he done? And do you not mean by this, *Natural Good*
 ‘ or *Evil*? Which is a plain Evidence, that you judge of the
 ‘ *Moral Good or Evil* of Actions, by the *Natural Good or Evil*
 ‘ which they do.’ See more on this Subject delivered in the
 the same Place, with an elegance and perspicuity peculiar to that
 Author. And to the same purpose is *Turner’s Discourse* of the
Laws of Nature and the *Reason* of their *Obligation*.

This seems to be the ultimate *Criterion* of that *Fitness, Con-
 gruity, Reasonableness* and *Relation of Things*, so often repeated
 by some late Writers, *without* or *beyond* which I can fix no mean-
 ing at all to these words. And this Criterion should I think,
 have been more clearly and distinctly specified. For when you
 say any thing is *fit*; must we carry our Enquiries no farther? Is
 it not a very proper Question, to ask, *for what is it fit? Fit,*
Congruous, &c. as well as the Word *Necessary*, are mere rela-
 tive terms (as we observed in Note 4.) and evidently refer to
 some *End*, and what can the end be here but Happiness? ‡
 These *Relations, &c.* may perhaps in some tolerable Sense be
 called *Eternal* and *Immutable*, because whenever you suppose a
 Man in such certain Circumstances, such Consequences and
 Obligations did or will always certainly follow. ||

What is now good for me in these Circumstances and Re-
 spects, will always be so in the same Circumstances and Re-
 spects, and can never be altered without altering the Nature
 of things, or the present System: but we cannot imagine these
Relations therefore to be any real *Entities*, or to have existed from
 all *Eternity*, or to be antecedent to, or independent of the Will
 of God himself; as some Writers seem to have done, if they
 had any determinate meaning at all (for which see Mr. *Hutche-
 son’s* Illustrat. § 2. p. 250, 251.) We cannot, I say, imagine
 them

‡ See an excellent Piece entitled, *Divine Benevolence*; parti-
 cularly, pages 15, 22, 30, 31, 32.

|| See *Locke’s* Essay, B. 4. C. 11. § 14. or *Turner* on the *Laws*
 of *Nature*, and their *Obligation*, § 20. or Note 52.

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them to be either strictly *eternal* or *independent* of the Will of God, because they must necessarily presuppose a determination of that Will, and are in truth only Consequences of the Existence of things proceeding from that Determination.* Much less can we apprehend how these *Relations, &c.* 'Are to be chosen for their own Sakes and intrinsic Worth; or have a full obligatory Power antecedent to any reward or punishment annexed either by natural Consequence or positive Appointment to the Observance or Neglect of them.'† Since the Natural Good or Happiness consequent upon and connected with the Observance of them, is to us their sole *Criterion*, the *Argument* and *Indication* of their *Worth*, the Ground of all their *Obligation*.

The Notion of abstract *Fitness* is pretty well handled by *Turner*. 'The *Laws of Nature* [or which is the same, *Natural Right and Wrong*] are such Laws and Rules of Life, as to the Breach of which there is a natural Punishment annexed. For to say a thing is essentially good or evil, to call it by hard Names, and to affirm that it hath a Natural Turpitude; or, to pass a Compliment upon it, and call it a Moral Rectitude, and such like fine scholastic Terms — without assigning a particular Reason of Interest, why we should do the one or avoid the other, is as much as to say, a thing is good for nothing; or it is bad, but we know not why; or it is good or bad, for a Woman's Reason, because it is: And this Reason will serve as well to prove that Murder or Adultery are good things, as that they are bad ones.'‡

'The *Laws of Nature*, therefore, have every one of them their Sanction in *themselves*, || i. e. some things naturally tend to our Happiness, and others to our Misery, and for that Reason they become natural *Laws* to us, or are *Rules* to direct our Actions by; and we are *obliged* to do the one and avoid the other upon a Principle of Self-happiness, and Self-preference, which is the very Root and Spring of all Obligation whatsoever. ¶

'From whence we may discern the Vanity and Folly of those learned Men, who are used to talk so loudly of *essential Rectitudes*, and *eternal Notions*, and I know not what phantastical *Ideas*, in an abstracted way; whereas there is indeed nothing which is either good or bad merely *by itself*, but every thing which is good, is good, that is, useful to something; and every thing which is bad, is so with reference to some Nature or other, to which it is more or less pernicious and destructive; from whence it follows (the

'nature

* See our *Author*, C. 1. § 3. par. 9. and C. 5. § 1. par. 23. &c. and Note 52.

† *Evidences of Nat. and Rev. Religion*, prop. 1. § 7. p. 218.

‡ *Laws of Nat. &c.* § 1. || *Ibid.* § 2. ¶ *Ibid.* § 6.

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‘nature of Obligation being a result arising from the usefulness or hurtfulness of a thing proposed to be the Object of a free Agent’s choice, with respect to that Agent which is conversant about it) that all Obligation must be not of a simple, but of a compound, or concrete nature, and must always have an inseparable respect to the Interest or Happiness of those to whom that Obligation is binding. And it is not only true, that our Interest and our Duty are both of them the same, but that it is absolutely impossible any thing should be our Duty, which is not our Interest into the Bargain; for no Man can possibly be obliged to that which all things consider’d, will be to his Disadvantage †.’

Farther, most Authors who treat of the Production of this *Natural Good or Evil* in such a manner as to constitute Right or Wrong, moral Good or Evil, &c. appear either to equivocate in a double meaning of the Words: *viz.* as they imply producing Happiness either in *ourselves* alone, or in *others*, (which are two very different things, and should accordingly be always distinguish’d) or else to be deficient in pointing out a *Rule*, and proving an *Obligation* to it in the latter Sense, *viz.* with respect to *others*. This great defect in their Systems seems to arise from not sufficiently attending to the above mention’d *Moral Sense or Conscience*, (as the meaning of this latter Word is fix’d by Mr. Butler †) which is of itself both *Rule* and *Obligation*. As an *Instinct*, it directs us to approve such Actions as tend to produce Happiness in others, and so is a *Rule* whereby we determine all such Actions to be virtuous; as it gives us pain, or makes us uneasy at the Neglect of these Actions, or at the Practice of the contrary ones, it so far *obliges* us to pursue them, or makes the Practice of them necessary to our *Happiness*: Which is the true meaning of the Word *oblige*, (as was shewn in the *preliminary Dissertation*; and is proved more at large by *Cumberland* *.)

That, and that only can be said to oblige us, which is *necessary to our Happiness*, and every thing does so far oblige as it is necessary. Now, as the Sum of our Happiness depends upon the whole of our Existence, that only can be a *complete* and *indispensible* Obligation, which is equal and commensurate to the Sum total of our Happiness. Or, that Being only can absolutely and effectually oblige us, who has it in his Power to

† *Laws of Nature*, &c. §. 14. See also the Supplement to the *Nature of the Sacraments*, &c. The Essay on Moral Obligation, or *Divine Benevolence*, or Mr. Clarke’s *Foundation of Morality*, or Bp. Gasquet’s 1st Boyle’s Lect. p. 93, &c.

‡ *Serm.* 2d. and 3d.

* C. 5. §. 27. See also *Puffendorf*, B. 1. C. 6. §. 5. N. 4. and §. 8. Note 1.

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to make our whole Existence happy or miserable; and of consequence, the *Deity* who alone has that Power, must necessarily be taken into all Schemes of Morality, in order to superinduce a full, adequate Obligation, or such an one as will hold at all times, and extend to every Action; and an endeavour to exclude the Consideration of his Will, or to deduce all Obligation from any Principles independent of it, has, I think, occasion'd another great Defect in most of our modern Systems.

N. B. What has been here said about *Instinct, Affection, Moral Sense*, &c. may seem to imply that these are all *innate*: contrary to what was proved in the *Preliminary Dissertation*: And indeed this was drawn up at first upon a Supposition of the Validity of that Notion, which many may perhaps esteem valid still, and therefore I let the Argument stand in the old Terms: especially as it is not at all affected by the Truth or Falsity of that Notion; since it will really come to the same thing, with regard to the Moral Attributes of God and the Nature of Virtue and Vice, whether the *Deity* has *implanted* these *Instincts* and *Affections* in us, or has framed and disposed us in such a manner; has given us such Powers, and placed us in such Circumstances, that we must necessarily *acquire* them; they'll be alike natural, and equally valuable parts of our Constitution in either Sense, as all *Axioms* are equally certain and self-evident in Mr. *Locke's* Scheme of no innate Principles, and the old one.

And tho' I take *implanted Senses, Instincts, Appetites, Passions* and *Affections*, &c. to be a Remnant of the *Old Philosophy*, which used to call every thing *Innate* that it could not account for; and therefore heartily wish that they were in one Sense all *eradicated*, (which was undoubtedly the Aim of that great *Author* last mention'd; as it was a natural Consequence of his first Book) yet as common use has fix'd this Notion of Innateness to them, I am obliged to follow my *Author*, and treat of them in the common Language. Only let it be observed here once for all, that every Argument which is built upon these *Senses*, &c. will be equally conclusive whether they be *implanted* or *acquired*. As to the present point in particular, Mr. *Hutcheson* has fully proved that in fact we are led insensibly, and by the Circumstances of our Being, to love and approve certain Actions which we call virtuous: Which is enough for my purpose as was hinted above. Against the Notion of *implanted Instincts*, See *Veltbuysen de Principiis justitiae & decori*, p. 73, &c. *Amstel.* 1651. or an Essay on *Moral Obligation*, Chap. 5.

[R. k.] That God must have the same Judgment and Approbation of this Moral Good, which all Rational Beings naturally

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turally have ¶; and that we must judge of the Nature and Perfections of the Deity, only by that Nature and those Perfections which we derive from him, is, I think, very plain: I mean, that we must not endeavour to conceive the several Attributes of God by *substituting* something in him of a *quite different kind, and totally diverse* from that which we find in ourselves, (as the learned Author of the *Procedure of Human Understanding* seems to declare, p. 138, and elsewhere) even though that could be in some respects similar and *analogous* to this: But we are to suppose somewhat of the very *same kind and sort*, the same Qualities or Properties in general, to be both in him and us, and then remove all manner of *Defect* or *Imperfection* which attends the particular *Modus* or Degree of their Existence, as they are in us. Thus we ascribe to God all kinds of apparent Perfection observable in his Creatures, except such as argue at the same time Imperfection (v. g. Motion, which necessarily implies Limitation) or are inconsistent with some other and greater Perfection (v. g. Materiality, which excludes Knowledge and Liberty †.) We also remove from him all *want, dependence, alteration, uneasiness, &c.* In short, all that results either from simple finiteness, or from the mere Union of two finite imperfect Substances, such as constitute Man. And when we have thus applied every thing in every manner of Existence which seems to imply Perfection, and excluded every thing in every manner of Existence which implies or includes the contrary, we have got our Idea of an absolutely perfect Being, which we call God. 'Tis therefore attributing to God some real Qualities of a certain determinate kind, (v. g. Knowledge or Power, Goodness or Truth) the nature of which Qualities we do perceive, are directly conscious of, and *know*, which gives us an Idea or Conception of him, and a *proper* one too, (if any such Distinction of Ideas were allow'd) and not imagining some others, we cannot tell of what sort, totally different in nature and kind from any that we ever did perceive or know; which would give us no Idea or Conception at all of him, either proper or improper.

In like manner we frame a partial Conception of a Spirit in general (which we confessedly have) not by substituting some properties *different in kind* from those which we perceive in our own Spirit; but by supposing the very same properties, *i. e.* in kind (*viz.* *Thought* and *Action*) to be also inherent in some other immaterial Beings which we therefore call by the same Names.

¶ See *Scott's Christian Life*, Part 2. C. 1. p. 21, 22. 1st Edition.

† See *Tillotson*, Sermon 76. 2d Vol. Fol. p. 569, &c. Dr. *J. Clarke* on Moral Evil, p. 95, &c. and *Scott's Christian Life*, Part 2. §. 2. p. 447, &c. 1st Edit.

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Names. Now this is (as far as it goes) true, real knowledge, and may be apply'd and argu'd on intelligibly: but the other would, I fear, take away all possibility of arguing about the several Attributes or Properties of the Deity from those of ourselves, and *vice versa*; all our reasonings upon them (as the learned Author says of *Metaphor*, p. 134.) would be precarious; and without any solid foundation in the *Nature* of things. Such analogical Knowledge then as that, is (according to my Notions of Knowledge) strictly and properly none at all; and if the Author uses *Analogy* in that Sense, 'twill, I believe, be still taken only for a sort or degree of *Metaphor*, after all he has said, in the last Chapter of his first Book, to distinguish them:

I would here be understood to affirm thus much of the simple *Nature* only, or *Kind*, or our *abstract Idea* of these Qualities *themselves*, and not of the *manner* of their Existence: which two [though this Author is pleas'd to use them promiscuously in p. 84, &c.] seem yet very distinct Considerations. For we apprehend several Properties, or Qualities, as existing in our own Nature, independent of any particular manner; nay, in *very different manners*: v. g. Knowledge, either by Sensation or Reflection, by Deduction or immediate Intuition: Love attended with a certain degree of Pleasure or Pain; &c. and therefore we suppose that these Qualities may exist in the Divine Nature in a manner entirely different from what they do in us, and yet be the very same Qualities still; which *Modus* of the Divine Being, or of any of his Attributes, is totally unknown to us, and we can only guess at it by some distant resemblance or *Analogy*; which Analogy I would therefore apply to this *Modus* of Existence, and to this *only*; which seems sufficient for all the great Purposes of Religion, and in which Sense the Notion is exceedingly just and useful, but cannot, I think, be extended to our Idea of the *whole Nature* and *Genus* of the Attribute itself. For if the Divine Attributes be *toto genere* distinct and different from those Qualities which we esteem perfections in ourselves or others, if [as the same Author urges ¶,] '*the greatest perfections of those Creatures which fall under our Observation, and those we find in ourselves particularly* [and these he will grant to be all that we have any Idea of] *are really but so many Imperfections, when referr'd or attributed to the Divine Nature, as it is in itself, in any meaning whatsoever, even with the most exalted meaning we can possibly annex to them,*' [the Author understanding, I suppose, as usual, the *whole Nature* and *distinguishing kind* of those Qualities in themselves;] Then, how shall we discover which kind of Qualities God prefers before the contrary? How can we be certain that these in particular are agreeable to him? or how shall we hope and endeavour to make ourselves *like* him? Can we know the

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nature of one thing by another, entirely different from it? or can we imitate what we don't at all apprehend? 'It is foolish [says A.Bp. Tillotson] for any Man to pretend that he cannot know what Justice, and Goodness, and Truth in God are; for if we do not know this, 'tis all one to us whether God be good or not; nor could we imitate his Goodness: for he that imitates, endeavours to be like something that he knows, and must of necessity have some Idea of that to which he aims to be like; so that if we had no certain and settled Notion of the Justice and Goodness and Truth of God, he would be altogether an unintelligible Being: and Religion, which consists in the Imitation of him, would be utterly impossible ¶.' These Consequences will hold equally against the Doctrine deliver'd by our Author in the Sermon annex'd, if he did not suppose that there were some Qualities in Men in some respects really correspondent to those in God, and so very like them that nothing could be more so except that which exists in the very same Manner and Degree too, i. e. in a perfect one. If this be his meaning, [as is not improbable from his Answer to the like Objections in §. 22. where he declares that the Divine Attributes have much more Reality and Perfection in them than the things by which we represent them, &c.] If, I say, he be taken in this Sense, as I would willingly understand him, he is perfectly clear from the exceptions made above. I wish the learned Author of the *Procedure*, &c. could be shown to be so, who is generally suppos'd to have pursued his notion of *Analogy* farther than most Persons will be able to follow him. As he has charg'd our Author with a *mistaken way of treating the Subject*†, I hope he will be ready to excuse any for observing what they conceive to be a mistake in his own method, especially if they endeavour to shew directly that the foundation of *Analogy*, as he has placed it, is false and groundless‡: which Foundation is the general nature or distinguishing kind of these Qualities. Now the nature of the forementioned Qualities must either be wholly the same in God and us, or wholly different: if the former be maintain'd, then this analogical Sense is turn'd into an identical one; if the latter, then can no manner of Resemblance or *Analogy* be drawn between them; since one nature (as has been observ'd) cannot in the least help to represent or explain another quite different from it; I mean, in those very points wherein they differ; for that is to be different and not different, alike and unlike in the very same respect, at the same time: And then this analogical Sense is turn'd either into a *disparate* or quite opposite one, i. e. into no analogy at all: Or lastly, they must be partly the same, and partly different, or alike and un-

¶ See ABp. Tillotson's Sermon. 76. Vol. 2. Fol. p. 672. and p. 678.

† Introduction, p. 17.

‡ Ibid.

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like in *different respects* (which is the thing we contend for) viz. alike in *Perfection*, or in *being* Perfections of a certain kind, and unlike in *Defect*, or imperfection; i. e. mixed with the contrary Qualities: or the same in *Nature*, or *Essence*, but different in *Degree*, and the *manner* of Existence. Or take it thus: the Qualities *as such*, or consider'd in the *Abstract*, are the same; as existing in a particular *Subject*, different. In an infinite (or rather *perfect*) Subject, they exist *perfectly*, or in the *highest Degree*; they are *absolute*, without any *Mixture* or *Defect*. In a finite or imperfect one they are *limited*, *allayed*, or *defective*; they exist in an *imperfect Manner*, or *inferior Degree*. Consequently we conceive them to be alike in both as *Perfections*, or Qualities of a certain *nature* or *kind*; unlike only as mix'd with *Imperfection*, or as confin'd to a certain *Degree*. If therefore the Author finds this Analogy on the very *Nature* of the thing, he seems to incur the foremention'd absurdity, of supposing a nature contradictory to itself; i. e. analogous to something from which it is at the same time totally and entirely different. If, with us, he will please to distinguish between the *Nature* of the thing in general, and the particular *Modus* of its Existence, he must with us also remove this analogy from the former foundation, and fix it upon the latter. — Farther, no *Similitude* whatsoever, whether deduced from human Reason or Holy Scripture, can have force enough to persuade us, that the *whole nature* of these things is quite different from what we apprehend or can conceive them to be; since it is universally allow'd, that no comparison can [as we commonly say] *run upon all four*; or [which is the very foundation and design of this whole analogical Scheme] can ever constitute a proper and *conclusive Argument*, in order to prove to us such a paradox: and if so great Stress is to be laid on any, v. g. that of a *Looking-Glass*, used in a strict Philosophical manner, [as the Author of the *Procedure* seems to do ¶] why may not some urge it still farther, and argue that as the Image of your Face supposed to be seen in the Glass, is nothing real, solid, and substantial contain'd in the Glass itself, but barely an appearance exhibited in the Brain; so all the conceptions which we pretend to have of the Divine Nature and Attributes, are nothing at all in God himself, but mere Phantasms and delusive Images, existing only in our own Mind. This, will these Men say, must appear absurd at first Sight, and yet may be drawn from the Similitude with as much Propriety as the rest; consequently the whole Scheme of this *Analogy* is to be rejected as entirely false, and at last the true Medium of all our Knowledge in the Nature of these things, will be what we truly and properly *perceive* of them, in some small degree in *ourselves*.

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If it be objected here, that the *Nature* and *Modus* of any thing must be the very same, since by different Natures are only meant different *Manners* of Existence.

I answer: By the *Nature* of any thing, I understand its several *distinguishing Properties*. By the *Nature* of any *Property* I understand some certain positive *Mark* or *Character* which distinguishes that property from any others. Thus, by the nature of Body, I mean, solid, divisible, figur'd and moveable Extension. By the Nature of Solidity, I mean Resistance, or a power of excluding other Bodies out of its place; which Mark sufficiently distinguishes it from Divisibility, or any other property belonging to the same Body, as well as all the fore-mention'd properties distinguish a Body from something else: both which we may therefore properly enough be said to perceive or *know*; tho' perhaps we may never in like manner know *how* these several Properties are united together, and come to form one Aggregate or *Substance*; nor *whence* this Power or Property of Resistance proceeds, or how it is *caus'd*, which is what we understand by the *Modus* of each. So that knowing or having a clear determinate Idea of a certain Thing or Quality, so as to be able to distinguish it from another Thing or Quality, and always perceive it to be really *thus*; is quite different from knowing how the said Thing or Quality *comes to be thus*: *How* or *why* it is, are *Modes* of Existence, and differ plainly from *what* it is, or what *Idea* we have of it, which denotes its *Nature* or *Essence*.

Against this Notion of *Analogy*, as apply'd to the *whole Nature* of the Attributes of God, see *Fiddes's Body of Divinity*, B. 1. Part 2. c. 13. and his *Practical Discourses*, Fol. p. 234, &c. or *J. Clarke on Moral Evil*, p. 95, &c. or *Chubb's Tracts*, p. 146, &c. or, *the present State of the Republick of Letters* for July 1728. or, *a Vindication of the Divine Attributes*, by Dr. Edwards. See also the *Minute Philosopher*, V. 1. p. 247.

Some objections having been made to this Remark by an eminent Writer ¶, I shall here set down the Substance of his Arguments, and what I take to be an Answer.

In the first place, the learned Author would have it observ'd that in a comparison made between the Attributes of God and those Qualities which we esteem Perfections in ourselves, it is affirm'd that they are of the same *Nature* or *Essence*, and yet *partly the same and partly different*, p. 68.

Answer. *Nature* or *Essence* is only that which determines the *Species* of these Qualities, or denominates them of this or that *Sort*: this may be the same, tho' they be different in another sense of the word *Nature*, i. e. as including every thing which does or may attend the whole of their Existence. Thus *Goodness* or *Benevolence* is of the same *kind* in God, Angels and Men,

viz.

¶ Case of Reason, by W. Law, p. 68, &c.

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viz. a *Disposition to communicate Happiness*, which I call the *Nature* or *Essence* of it; but differs as it is attended with *Pleasure* or *Pain*; as *calm* or *passionate*, which I call *manners* of Existence: or as it is more or less *intense*, *pure* or *unmix'd*, which I term *Degrees* of Perfection.

For affirming things to be the same in nature which are in some respects very different, we have this Author's own Authority, p. 149. 'As Love is the same passion in all Men, yet it infinitely different; as Hatred is the same passion in all Men yet with infinite differences; so Reason is the same faculty in all Men, yet with infinite differences.

2dly. 'Tis urged that all the Attributes inherent in the Divine Nature are *necessary*, *eternal*, *infinite*, *immutable*, *independent*, &c. all the Qualities in human Nature the direct contrary, therefore they cannot be *partly the same*, but must be *wholly different*: as different in their *Nature* as mutable is from immutable, &c. Ibid.

Answer. *Eternity*, *Necessity*, &c. don't at all affect the Nature of these Attributes or Qualities in our sense of the Word *Nature*, i. e. do not make 'em to be Qualities of such a sort, any more than if they were in a contrary state. *Knowledge* is no more *Knowledge* for being *eternal* or *immutable*. Power is as much *Power*, whether it be independent or derived, whether it cease to morrow, or last for ever; and so of the rest.

3dly, If the Attributes in God and Qualities in Men be *alike in Perfection*, they must be alike in *Eternity*, *necessary Existence*, &c. because these things constitute the *Perfection* of the Divine Attributes, p. 69.

Answer. This is taking the Word *Perfection* in a sense different from that in which we understand it, and in which this Author himself seem'd to use it in the last Page, where he mentions *those Perfections which are in ourselves*. In this place he means the *absolute* perfection of any thing in *all respects*: I take it only for some certain Quality, which as such is called a *Perfection*, i. e. *valuable*, or the foundation of Happiness to a Being in one respect, tho' not in others. Thus Knowledge, as far as it is *Knowledge*, or can be intitled to that Name, is as much, or as *really*, a perfection in Man as in God: the Idea of this Quality as distinguishable from any other Quality is the same in both; tho' there be a difference as to extent or freedom from Ignorance, which is the *Degree* of it; or as it does, or does not consist in Deduction, or arise from Sensation, &c. which are *Modes* of its Existence. 'Tis therefore properly alike in *Perfection* or in its being a *Perfection* of a certain kind; unlike in *Defect*, or in being attended with Imperfection in Manner or Degree.

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4thly. If Power in Man and Power in God are alike in *Perfection* but unlike in *Defect*, they must be alike in *Omnipotence*, but unlike in *Defect of Power*. Ibid.

Ans. Rather they must be alike as far as they are simply *Power*, or agree in the general Idea of it; but unlike as far as they are *Power mix'd* with impotence; or as the Exercise of 'em is attended or not attended with *Uneasiness*. &c.

5thly. What is alike in *Perfection* must be alike in *Imperfection*, unless a thing may be like another in *Strength*, but not like it in the *want of Strength*. p. 70.

Ans. May not a thing be like another in having *some* Strength, tho' not like it in having the *same* Strength? sure it is no inconsistency to say things are of the same *Nature* or *Genus*, tho' in a different *Degree*.

6thly. That which differs only in *Degree* can only differ in a *certain Degree*. but *finite* and *infinite*, *mutable* and *immutable* can't be said to differ only in a *certain Degree*. Ibid.

Ans. An absolute or *metaphysical Infinite*, which is the only one that can be applied in the present Case, is a positive Idea of some certain Quality in the *Abstract*, in the *bighest Degree*, or to which nothing of the same kind can be added; since then there is a *bighest* in all such Qualities as *Goodness*, *Power*, &c. (contrary to what we find in mathematical Quantities) they may be said to differ in a *certain Degree*, see R. L. *Mutability* or *Immutability* are nothing to these Qualities *as such*.

7thly. To say that they differ only in a *Degree* or *Manner* of Existence supposes that *Degree* or *manner of Existence* signify the same thing, whereas they are exceedingly different. Ibid.

Ans. Or, is here taken *disjunctively*. Tho' these two amount to the same thing: A different *Degree* always implies a different *Manner* of Existence.

8thly. The Existence of God differs from the Existence of Man in the *Manner* of Existence, but not in the *Degree* of Existence. p. 71.

Ans. *Existence* is properly no Attribute, nor is it capable of Degrees.

9thly. If their manner of Existence must have all that Difference there is between finite and infinite, &c. then it can signify little whether you say they are different in their *Nature* or *Essence*, or only different in their *Manner* of Existence. Ibid.

Ans. Let the *Manner* in which Divine Knowledge exists be never so different from that of human Knowledge, yet so long as it is *Knowledge*, or agrees in the *general Idea* with what Men call Knowledge, it must signify something more than if it were *totally different*, of quite another *kind*, and had no more resemblance to it than *Knowledge* has to *Power*, as seems to be the Case upon the *Analogical Scheme*.

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10thly, Who can tell the *Nature* and *Essence* of any thing any farther than he knows the *Manner* of its Existence? Ibid.

Ans. The *Nature* or *Essence* of any Quality according to us, is only its *abstract Idea*, or that which determines it to be of this or that Sort, which must be the same in what *Manner* soever it exists, or is exhibited in any particular Subject. See Note 1.

11thly. But the foregoing Distinction supposes a real difference between these two, and that a thing has not such a *Manner* of Existence because it is of such a *Nature*, nor is of such a *Nature* because it has such a *Manner* of Existence. p. 72.

Ans. No more it is, in our Sense of the Word *Nature*. Knowledge does not come by Sensation or Reflection in particular because it is *Knowledge*, nor is it therefore Knowledge because it comes by Sensation or Reflection. *Goodness*, *Power*, &c. are of the same *general Nature* in Men and Angels, tho' they be more imperfectly displayed in the one than in the other; which can arise only from the different Capacities of the Subjects that receive them; or in other Words, from the different manner of their Existence in those Subjects; which *Manner* is therefore entirely independent on their *abstract Nature*, nor have they any relation to each other.

12thly. He must shew that the *Manner* of *Understanding*, *Will* or *Power* in God and Man is not at all owing to the *Nature* of *Understanding*, *Will* or *Power* in God or Man.

P. 73.

Ans. The *Manner* of these Qualities may be supposed to be very different, and yet the *Nature* of them (in our Sense of that Word) will continue the same, which shews sufficiently that the former is not owing to the latter. If *Will* be defined a *Power* of *Preferring* or *Choosing*; is not that the same whatever it prefers, or however it be moved so to do? Whether it choose Good or Evil, whether it be determin'd by Anxiety or the last Judgment, or nothing at all? If *Power* be an *Ability* to *produce Change*, is not that the same whether it be done in *Thought* or *Motion*, whether it be attended with *Pleasure* or *Pain*? If *Understanding* be a *Consciousness* of something, is not that the same whatever the manner be in which it is acquired, exercised, or exists? Is it more or less *Understanding* for being got by *Deduction* or immediate *Intuition*, by Eyes or Ears, or any other Way?

13thly. The Difficulties charg'd upon the Doctrine of *Analogy* are the same in the other Account, which says that the Divine Attributes are different in the *Manner* of their Existence from the *Qualities* of Men. For if they differ *infinitely* and *immutably* in their *Manner* of Existence, are we not as much at a loss to know what they are, and as unable to imitate that which stands at an *infinite* and *immutable* distance from us,

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as if we had said that it is different in *Nature* from our Qualities?

Ansiv. Is it not much more easy for me to *imitate* perfect or absolute Goodness, when I know the nature of Goodness in general, and see it partially exhibited in the World, than if I only believ'd it to be something *transcendently high* (as this Author describes it *) and *totally different* from any kind of Goodness which I can form an Idea of, and as *remote* as my Idea of Goodness is from any other Idea? If the nature of the Qualities be but fixt, the *Manners* of their Existence, however distant, alter not the Case, Tho' I don't see how those in the Deity can be properly said to be *infinitely* distant from these in us if we have any Degree at all of them, and if we have not, 'tis plain we can know nothing at all of them.

14thly. Let us suppose the Creation of all things out of nothing to be an *Effect* of Divine Power, and changing the Shape of a Piece of Wood to be an *Effect* of human Power. I ask whether these Effects are *toto genere* distinct and different in their *Nature*?

Ansiv. The Effects are different, the Idea of *Cause* or *Power* arising from these Effects is the same. I should have the Idea of Power *equally* (tho' not of *equal* Power) from seeing a *Change* made in a Piece of Wood, as from the Creation of it.

15thly. If the nature of Causes can be at all known by their Effects, is it not reasonable to suppose these Causes must be as different in their *Natures* as their Effects are? p. 75.

Ansiv. No: They both agree in the general Idea of *Cause*, which is all that we require to constitute their *Nature*; and all these Arguments are built only on a different Sense of that Term, as observ'd above.

16thly. Has any one lost his Reasons for fearing and adoring the Divine Power because it can only be compared to human Power, as *infinite* may be compared to *finite*? Has he nothing to *ground* his Fear upon, because this Power has such a *reality* as nothing can represent to him as it is in its own nature? &c. Ibid. p. 76, 77.

Ansiv. *Finite* and *Infinite* (wherever these Terms can properly be applied) suppose the same common *Nature*, *Kind* or *Sort*, and differ only in *Extent*. If therefore Divine Power, *Wisdom* and *Goodness* may be so compared to human Power, *Wisdom*, and *Goodness*, they are Qualities of the same *Nature Kind*, or *Sort*, which seems to be giving up the Question. — If they cannot be so compared I should be glad to know in what they are alike, or wherein this *Analogy* between them consists: Or in short, how we shall at all be the wiser by it

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it. For to believe the *Reality* of that which nothing can give us an Idea of as it is in its own Nature, will be at last I fear, no more than believing the reality of we know not what; which can never be a good Ground for any rational Devotion.

[R. 1.] By the Words, *Infinite Degree*, here and above, we don't mean any *indefinite Addition*, or encreasableness of these several Attributes partially consider'd (to which such terms are vulgarly, tho' not so properly apply'd) but only an entire absolute *Perfection*, without any kind of *failure* or *deficiency* in these respects: Which we have intimated in Note 3. * and elsewhere, to be our Notion of Infinity as apply'd to any of the Divine Attributes. Thus *Infinite Understanding* and *Knowledge* is nothing else but *perfect Knowledge*, that which hath no defect or mixture of *Ignorance* in it, or the Knowledge of whatsoever is knowable. *Infinite Power* is nothing else but *perfect Power*, that which hath no defect or mixture of *Impotency* in it: A Power of producing and doing all whatsoever is *possible*, i. e. whatsoever is *conceivable*, and so of the rest.

* Now, that we have an Idea or Conception of *Perfection* or a *perfect Being*, is evident from the Notion that we have of *Imperfection*, so familiar to us: *Perfection* being the *Rule* and *Measure* of *Imperfection*, and not *Imperfection* of *Perfection*, as a *straight Line* is the *Rule* and *Measure* of a *crooked*, and not a *crooked* of a *straight*. So that *Perfection* is first *conceivable* in order of Nature, before *Imperfection*, as *Light* before *Darkness*, a *positive* before the *privation* or *defect*. For *Perfection* is not properly the want of *Imperfection*, but *Imperfection* of *Perfection*.

* Moreover, we perceive several Degrees of *Perfection* in the *Essences* of things, and consequently a *Scale* or *Ladder* of *Perfections* in Nature, one above another, as of *living* and *animate* things above *senseless*, and *inanimate*; of *rational* things above *sensitive*; and that by reason of that *Notion* or *Idea* which we first have of that which is *absolutely perfect*, as the *Standard* by comparing of things with which, and measuring of them, we take notice of their approaching more or less near thereto. Nor indeed could these gradual *Ascents* be *infinite*, or without End, but they must come at last to that which is *absolutely perfect*, as the top of them all. Lastly, we could not perceive *Imperfection* in the most perfect of those things which we ever had Sense or Experience of in our Lives, had we not a *Notion* or *Idea* of that which is *absolutely perfect*, which secretly comparing the same with, we perceive it to come short thereof †.

* Where-

* P. 15, 16.

† Cudworth, p. 648.

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‘ Wherefore, since *Infinite* is the same with *absolutely perfect*, we having a Notion or Idea of the latter, must needs have of the former. From whence we learn also, that though the Word *Infinite* be in the Form thereof *Negative*, yet is the Sense of it, in these things which are really capable of the same, *positive*, it being all one with *absolutely perfect*: As likewise the Sense of the Word *Finite* is negative, it being the same with *Imperfect*. So that *finite* is properly the *Negation* of *infinite*, as that which in order of nature is before it, and not *Infinite* the *Negation* of *Finite*. However, in these things which are capable of no true *Infinity*, because they are essentially *finite*, as *Number*, *corporeal Magnitude*, and *Time*; *Infinity* being there a mere *imaginary* thing, and a non-entity, it can only be conceived by the *Negation* of *Finite*, as we also conceive *Nothing* by the *Negation* of *Something*, that is, we can have no *positive Conception* at all thereof. ||

Now, all this is not attempting to make the Attributes of God *positively infinite* by superadding a *Negative Idea* of *Infinity* to them: (as the Author of the *Procedure* &c. justly urges against Mr. *Locke*, in B. 1. c. 3. p. 82. and the same might with equal Justice be objected to Dr. *Clarke*, when he applies *infinite Space* and *infinite Duration* to the Deity, and calls one his *Immensity* and the other his *Eternity*.) But it is making them *positively* and *absolutely perfect*, by first proving them to have some *real Existence* in the Divine Nature, and then by removing from it all Possibility of *Want*, or *Deficiency*, *Mixture*, or *Allay*, as explained in the last Remark.

[R. m.] By the Word *Justice*, as it relates to Punishment, we mean the *Exercise of a Right*, or doing what a Person has a *Moral Power* to do. *Mercy* implies his *receding* from that *Right*, or not exerting that moral Power. When we apply these Terms to the Deity, we consider his Dispensations in a partial View, *viz.* only with Relation to the Person offending, and himself the offended; or as mere Debtor and Creditor, exclusive of all other Beings, who may be affected thereby, and whom therefore we should suppose to be regarded in these Dispensations. In this Sense these two Attributes have a distinct Meaning, and may both be always subordinate to *Goodness*, but can never be repugnant to each other. Thus, where a Creature has forfeited its Right to a Favour, or incurred a Penalty, by the breach of some Covenant, or the Transgression of some Law, the Creator, considered with respect to that Being alone, and in those Circumstances, has always a Right to withdraw the Favour, or to inflict the Penalty; and will prosecute that Right, whenever he finds it necessary to some farther End: But yet his Goodness may incline him often to suspend or remit it, on some foreign Motive, *viz.* on account

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count of the present Relation between the Criminal and other Men, in very different Circumstances, or in view of a future Alteration in the Circumstances of the Criminal himself. Now as these Motives belong to, and are generally known by God alone, though they may influence his Actions towards us, yet they don't at all affect his Right over us, and therefore ought not to diminish our Love, Gratitude, &c. to him in any particular Instance either of Judgment or of Mercy. Whenever we suffer for our Crimes, we have no Reason to complain of any Injury, nor can he, when upon the forementioned Motives he forgives us, ever injure himself. For Justice, considered barely as a *Right* or *Moral Power*, evidently *demand*s nothing, nor can properly be said to *oblige* one way or other : And therefore the Being possessed of it is at liberty either to suspend or exert it : but he will never use this Liberty otherwise than as his *Goodness* requires, consequently *Justice* and *Mercy* in such a Being can never clash.

Whether this Way of conceiving these Divine Attributes be not attended with less Difficulty than the common manner of treating them under the Notion of two Infinites *diametrically opposite*, must be left to the Judgment of the Reader.

As to the Nature of *Distributive Justice*, or the true Reason of *Rewards* and *Punishments*, see *Colliber's Impartial Enquiry*, B. 1. c. 11. prop. 12.

CHAP. II.

*Concerning the Nature and Division of
Evil, and the Difficulty of tracing its
Origin.*

By Evil we understand what soever is incommodious, inconvenient or troublesome.

GOOD and *Evil* are opposites, and arise from the Relation which things have to each other : For since there are some things which profit, and others which prejudice one another ; since some things agree, and others disagree ; as we call the former Good, so we stile the latter Evil. Whatever therefore is *incommodious* or *inconvenient* to itself, or any thing else ; whatever becomes *troublesome*, or frustrates any *Appetite* implanted by God ; whatever forces any Person to do or suffer what he would not, that is *Evil*.

Evils are of three kinds, those of Imperfection, those of Natural and Moral.

II. Now these Inconveniences appear to be of three kinds, those of *Imperfection*, *Natural*, and *Moral* ones. By the Evil of *Imperfection* I understand the Absence of those Perfections or advantages which exist elsewhere, or in other Beings : By *Natural* Evil, Pains and Uneasinesses, Inconveniences and Disappointment of Appetites, arising from natural Motions : By *Moral*, vicious Elections, that is, such as are hurtful to ourselves or others.

The Difficulty is how these come into the Work of a God of the highest Goodness and Power.

III. These Evils must be considered particularly, and we are to shew how they may be reconciled with the Government of an infinitely powerful and beneficent Author of Nature. For since there is such a Being, 'tis asked, as we said before, whence
come

come Evils? Whence so many *Inconveniences* in the Work of a most *good*, most *powerful* God? Whence that perpetual War between the very *Elements*, between *Animals*, between *Men*? Whence *Errors*, *Miseries* and *Vices*, the constant Companions of human Life from its Infancy? Whence Good to Evil Men, Evil to the Good? If we behold any thing irregular in the Works of Men, if any Machine answer not the End it was made for, if we find something in it repugnant to itself or others, we attribute that to the Ignorance, Impotence, or Malice of the Workman: But since these Qualities have no place in God, how come they to have place in any thing? Or, Why does God suffer his Works to be deformed by them?

IV. This Question has appeared so intricate and difficult, that some finding themselves unequal to the Solution of it, have denied, either that there is any God at all, or at least, any Author or Governor of the World: Thus *Epicurus*, and his Adherents: Nor does *Lucretius* bring any other Reason for his denying the *System of the World to be the Effect of a Deity*, than that *it is so very faulty*. * Others judged it to be more agreeable to Reason to assign a double Cause of things, than none at all. Since it is the greatest Absurdity in Nature to admit of Actions and Effects, without any Agent and Cause. These then perceiving a Mixture of Good and Evil, and being fully persuaded that so many Confusions and Inconsistencies could not proceed from a good Being, supposed a malevolent *Principle*, or God, directly contrary to the good one; and thence derived Corruption and Death, Diseases, Grievs, Miseries, Frauds and Villanies; from the good Being nothing but Good: Nor did they imagine that Contrariety and Mischief could have any other Origin than an Evil Principle. This Opinion was held by many of the

Some that were unable to solve this Difficulty have denied the Existence of a God, others have supposed a double one.

* B. 2. v. 180.

the Ancients, by the *Manicheans*, *Paulicians*, and almost all the Tribe of ancient *Heretics*. (15.)

V.

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(15.) In order to give some Light into the Opinions of these Men concerning the Origin of Evil, I shall transcribe a Paragraph from *Bayle's Dictionary*, in the Article *Manichees*, Remark D. where he introduces *Zoroaster* defending the two opposite Principles above mentioned, '*Zoroaster*, says he, would go back to the time of the Chaos, which with regard to his two Principles, is a State very like that which *Hobbs* calls the State of Nature, and which he supposes to have preceded the Establishment of Societies. In this State of Nature, one Man was a Wolf to another, and every thing belonged to the first occupier; none was Master of any thing, except he was the strongest. To get out of this Confusion, every one agreed to quit his Right to the whole, that he might be acknowledged the Proprietor of some Part; they entered into agreements, and the War ceased. Thus the two Principles weary of this Chaos wherein each confounded and overthrew what the other attempted to do, came at last to an Agreement; each of them yielded something, each had a share in the Production of Man, and the Laws of the Union of the Soul: The good Principle obtained those which procure to a Man a thousand Pleasures, and consented to those which expose him to a thousand Pains; And if he consented that Moral Good should be infinitely less in Mankind than Moral Evil, he repaired the Damage in some other kind of Creatures, wherein Vice should be much less than Virtue. If many Men in this Life have more Misery than Happiness, this is recompensed in another State; what they have not under a human Form, they find under another. By means of this Agreement, the Chaos became disembroiled, the Chaos, I say, a passive Principle, which was the Field of Battle between these two active ones. The Poets † have represented this disentangling under the Image of a Quarrel ended. You see what *Zoroaster* might object, valuing himself upon it that he does not throw any imputation upon the good Principle of having with full purpose produced a Work, which was to be so wicked and miserable; but only, after he had found by Experience that he could do no better, nor more effectually oppose the horrible Designs of the Evil Principle. To render his Hypothesis the less offensive he might have denied that there was a long War between the two Principles, and lay aside all those Fights and Prisoners which the *Manichæans* speak of. The whole might be

† *Hanc Deus & Melior Litem Natura diremit.* Ov. Met. l. i. V. 21.

V. And there are some still who think this Difficulty unanswerable. They confess, indeed, the

Sup-

There are some who are of opinion that it is un-

NOTES.

* be reduced to the certain Knowledge of the two Principles
 * that one could never obtain from the other but such and such
 * Conditions: an eternal Agreement might have been made up-
 * on this Foot.'

swerable, and that the *Manichees* of-

For a farther Explication and Amendment of their Hypothesis, and Replies to several Arguments urged against it, see better so-
 the Words *Manicheans, Marcionites, Paulicians, Origen* and *Zoroaster*, in the abovementioned Dictionary.

ferred a solution, by supposing

That there is no *Occasion* for any Hypothesis of this kind, two Prin-
 will be shewn in the following Chapters. Let it suffice in this ciples,
 Place to point out some of the Absurdities of the Hypothesis than the
 itself. And first, it may be observed, that the Supposition of *Catholics*
 an *absolute* and *infinitely Evil Principle* (if these Words mean do by
 such a Being as is totally opposite to the good One) is an owning
 Contradiction. For as this Principle opposes and resists only One.
 the infinitely good One, it also must be independent and in-
 finite: It must be infinite or absolute in Knowledge and Power.
 But the notion of a Being infinitely Evil, is of one infinitely
 Imperfect; its Knowledge and Power therefore must be infi-
 nitely imperfect; *i. e.* absolute Ignorance and Impotence, or no
 Knowledge and Power at all. The one of these Beings then
 is absolutely perfect, or enjoys all manner of positive Perfec-
 tions, consequently the other, as it is directly the Reverse, must
 be purely the Negation of it, as Darkness is of Light; *i. e.*
 it must be an *infinite Defect*, or *mere nothing*. Thus this *Evil*
 Being must have some *Knowledge* and *Power*, in order to make
 any opposition at all to the *Good One*: but as he is directly
 opposite to that Good or Perfect One, he cannot have the least
 Degree of *Knowledge*, or *Power*, since these are *Perfections*:
 therefore, the Supposition of such an Existence as this implies a
 Contradiction.

But supposing these Men only to mean (what any under-
 standing Person among them must mean) by this Evil Principle,
 an absolutely *malevolent* Being of equal Power, and other na-
 tural Perfections with those of the *Good one*. 'It would be to
 * no purpose (says ABp. Tillotson, †) to suppose two such op-
 * posite Principles — For admit that a Being infinitely mischie-
 * vous, were infinitely cunning, and infinitely powerful, yet it
 * could do no Evil, because the opposite Principle of infinite
 * Goodness being also infinitely wise and powerful, they would
 * tie up one another's Hands: So that upon this Supposition,
 * the Notion of a Deity would signify just nothing, and by
 * virtue of the Eternal Opposition and Equality of these Prin-

ciples,

Supposition of a double Principle to be absurd, and that it may be demonstrated that there is but one

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‘ciples, they would keep one another at a perpetual Bay, and
 ‘being an equal Match for one another, instead of being two
 ‘Deities, they would be two Idols, able to do neither Good nor
 ‘Evil.’

I shall only produce one Argument more as to Moral Evil, out of *Simplicius's* Comment on *Epietus*, which, by the Confession of *Bayle* himself, strikes home the Doctrine of Two Principles, though it be considered with the greatest Simplicity.

He says, || ‘It entirely destroys the Liberty of our Souls and necessitates them to Sin, and consequently implies a Contradiction. For, since the Principle of Evil is eternal and incorruptible, and so potent that God himself cannot conquer him, it follows that the Soul of Man cannot resist the Impulse with which he moves it to Sin. But if a Man be invincibly driven to it, he commits no Murder or Adultery, &c. by his own Fault, but by a superior external Fault, and in that case he is neither guilty nor punishable. Therefore there is no such thing as Sin, and consequently this Hypothesis destroys itself; since if there be a Principle of Evil, there is no longer any Evil in the World. But if there be no Evil in the World, it is clear there is no Principle of Evil; whence we may infer, that those who suppose such a Principle, destroy, by necessary Consequence, both Evil and the Principle of it.’

More of this may be seen in *Bayle's* Explanation concerning the *Manichees* at the End of his Dictionary, p. 66, &c. See also *Gurdon's Boyle's Lectures*, Sermon. 5. or *Stillingfleet's Orig. Sacra*, B. 3. C. 3. § 10, 12. or *Sherlock on Judgment*, 1st Ed. pag. 173.

Neither does *Bayle's* amendment of this Hypothesis free it from the Difficulty. He supposes the two Principles to be sensible of the above mentioned Consequence arising from their Equality of Power, and therefore willing to compound the Matter, by allowing an equal Mixture of Good and Evil in the intended Creation. But if the Quantity of Good and Evil in the Creation be exactly equal, neither of the Principles has attained or could expect to attain the End for which it was supposed to act. The Good Principle designed to produce some absolute Good, the Evil One some absolute Evil; but to produce an equal Mixture of both, would be in effect producing neither: One would just counterbalance and destroy the other; and all such Action would be the very same as doing nothing at all: And that such an exact Equality of Good and Evil must be the Result of an agreement between them is plain: For as they are by

one Author of all things, absolutely perfect and good; yet there is evil in things, this they see and feel: But whence, or how it comes; they are entirely ignorant; nor can human Reason (if we believe them) in any measure discover. Hence they take Occasion to lament our Unhappiness, and complain of the hard Fate attending Truth, as often as a Solution of this Difficulty is attempted unsuccessfully. The *Manicheans* solve the Phenomena of things a hundred times better (as these Men think) with their most absurd Hypothesis of two Principles, than the Catholics do with their most true Doctrine of one perfect, absolutely powerful and beneficent Author of Nature. For the *Manicheans* acquit God of all manner of Blame as he was compelled by the contrary Principle to suffer Sin and Misery in his Work, which in the mean while he opposes with all his Power. But according to the Catholics, as their Adversaries object, he permits these voluntarily, nay is the Cause and Author of them. For if, as these Men argue, there be but one Author of all things, Evils also should be referred to him as their Original; but it can neither be explained nor conceived how infinite Goodness can become the Origin of Evil. If God could not hinder it, where is his Power? If he could, and would not, where is his Goodness? If you say that Evil necessarily adheres to some particular Natures; since God was the Author of them all, it would have been better to have omitted those with the

con-

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by Supposition perfectly equal in *Inclination*, as well as *Power*; neither of them could possibly concede, and let its opposite prevail: The Creation therefore cannot be owing to such a Composition.

But the best Confutation of this Scheme may be found in the Chapter before us; where our *Author* shews that it does not at all answer the end for which it was introduced. This completes the absurdity of it.

concomitant Evils, than to have debased his Workmanship with an alloy of these Evils. (16.)

This Difficulty has exercised the Philosophers and Fathers of the Church; and some deny that it is answered yet.

VI. It is well known, that this Difficulty has exercised both the ancient Philosophers and Fathers of the Church: (17.) And there are some who deny that it is yet answered; nay, who undertake to refute all the Solutions hitherto offered; nor do I promise a complete one in every Respect, though

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(16.) Since this Objection contains all that can be said upon Evil in general; and it appears to me absolutely necessary for every Man to do Justice to Objections, who expects that others should receive any Satisfaction from his Answers, I shall insert it, as it is proposed in its full Force by *Cudworth*. || 'The supposed Deity and Maker of the World, was either willing to abolish all Evils, but not able; or was able and not willing: Or, thirdly, he was neither willing nor able: Or lastly, he was both able and willing. This latter is the only thing that answers fully to the Notion of a God. Now, that the supposed Creator of all things was not thus both able and willing to abolish all Evils, is plain, because then there would have been no Evils at all left. Wherefore, since there is such a Deluge of Evils overflowing all, it must needs be that either he was willing and not able to remove them, and then he was *impotent*: or else he was able and not willing, and then he was *envious*; or lastly, he was neither able nor willing, and then he was both *impotent* and *envious*.'

Almost the same occurs in *Lactantius* †, and is cited, and sufficiently refuted by our Author in C. 5. § 5. *Subsect.* the last: See also *Prudentius* in *Hamartigenia*, v. 640, &c.

The Substance of all *Bayle's* Objections may be seen in a late Book called *Free Thoughts on Religion*, &c. C. 5. p. 104, &c. The Answers to them follow in their proper Places.

(17.) Any one that wants to be acquainted with the Antiquity of this Dispute, or the Persons engaged in it, or the way of managing it made use of by the *Fathers*, may consult the Beginning of *Dr. Clarke's Enquiry* into the Cause and Origin of Evil; and *Bayle's Dictionary*, in the Articles *Manicheans*, Remark B. *Marcionites*, Remark F. and Fd. *Paulicians*, Remarks K. and KΔ. and *Zoroaster*, Remark E. Or *Cudworth*, from p. 213, to 224. or *Stillington's Origines Sacrae*, B. 3. C. 3. § 8, 9, 11, 12, &c. or *Fabric. Biblioth. Græc.* v. 5. p. 287. or his *Delectus Argumentorum*, &c. C. 15.

|| *True Intell. Syst.* p. 78, 79.

† *De Ira Dei*, C. 13. p. 435. Edit. Cant.

I hope to shew in the following Part of this Treatise that it is not wholly unanswerable.

VII. It is manifest that though Good be mixed with Evil in this Life, yet there is much more Good than Evil in Nature, and every Animal provides for its Preservation by Instinct or Reason, which it would never do, if it did not think or feel its Life, with all the Evils annexed, to be much preferable to Non-existence. This is a Proof of the Wisdom, Goodness, and Power of God, who could thus temper a World infested with so many Miseries, that nothing should continue in it which was not in some Measure pleased with its Existence and which would not endeavour by all possible Means to preserve it. *

There is more Good than Evil in the World.

VIII. Neither does the Supposition of an Evil Principle help any thing towards the Solution of this Difficulty. For the Asserters of two Principles maintain that the great and good God tolerates Evil purely because he is forced to it by the Evil One, and that either from an Agreement between themselves, or a perpetual Struggle and Contest with each other. For since the beneficent Author of Nature was hindered by the Evil Principle from producing all the Good he was willing to produce, he either made an Agreement with it to produce as much as he was allowed, but with a Mixture of Evil, according to the Agreement : or else there is a Mixture of Good and Evil proportionable to the Power which prevails in either of them. Hence they think the good God excusable, who conferred as many Blessings on the World as his Adversary permitted, and would have tolerated no manner of Evil, unless compelled to it by the adverse Power. So that he must either create no Good at all, or suffer an Alloy of Evil.

'Tis no less repugnant to Infinite Goodness to have created those things which he saw would be corrupted by another, than such as would corrupt themselves. The Supposition of a double Principle is therefore of no Service toward the Solution of this Difficulty.

All which very great Absurdities have this farther Inconvenience, that they do not answer the

very End for which they were invented. For he is no less culpable who created any thing which he knew would be rendered miserable by another, than if he had made that which he foresaw would bring Misery upon itself. If therefore God might, consistently with Goodness, create Things which he knew the Evil Principle could and would corrupt, as the *Manicheans* asserted; then he might, consistently with the same Goodness, have created Things that would corrupt themselves, or were to perish in a Tract of Time. If then, according to the Defenders of this Hypothesis, God ought to have omitted, or not created those Beings, in whose Natures Evil or Contrariety is inherent, he ought also to have omitted those, whose Natures he foresaw the Evil Principle would corrupt. And if there was so much Good in these, as made him think it better to create them, though they were to be corrupted some time or other by the opposite Principle, he might also judge it preferable to produce the same, though they were at length to perish by their own inherent Evils. Nor will God be forced to tolerate Evil in his Works more according to the *Manicheans*, than the *Catholics*. For as he might have not made those Beings which have Evils necessarily adhering to them, so he might also have not made those which he foreknew the contrary Principle would corrupt. After the same manner in both Cases he would have prevented Evil, and since he could, why did he not? The Supposition of two Principles conduces nothing at all therefore to the Solution of this Difficulty. (B.)

IX.

NOTES.

(B.) To this it has been objected, First, that the Recrimination is not just. because there is a great Difference between a Cause that doth not prevent an Evil which he could not prevent, and another that suffers one which he could have prevented; that it is agreed amongst all orthodox Christians that God could have prevented the *Fall of Adam*, and therefore the
Blame

IX. But if we can point out a Method of reconciling these Things with the Government of
 If it can be shewn that it does an no contradict infinite Power and Goodness to permit Evil, or that these necessarily arise from the exercise of them, then may the Difficulty be answered.

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Blame of it lies on him; Whereas according to the System of two Principles he could not hinder it, and therefore is excused this way, but not the other.

But I answer, it is plain that the Objector does not understand the Force of the Argument. For according to it, God could have prevented this Evil. He foresaw the ill Principle would corrupt Mankind, and he was under no Necessity to make such a Creature as Man, and thereby to gratify his Enemy, who, he saw, would make him miserable. He could therefore have prevented this Evil by not creating *Man*, and is full as blameable for making him that he foresaw the ill Principle would involve in Sin and Misery, as if those had befallen *Man* by his own ill use of his *Free will*.

But 2dly. Who are those Orthodox that agree God could have prevented the Fall of Man? Those that I am acquainted with represent the Matter otherwise. They say that considering the Nature of Man and the Station he held in the World, and the Inconveniencies that must have happened to the whole System of free Beings, by hindering *Adam* from the Use of his free Will, his fall could not have been prevented without more hurt than good to the whole Creation. There was no Necessity on him to sin, but there was a Necessity on God to permit him the Use of his free Will in that Case, and the Consequence of that being his Sin, God was under a Necessity notwithstanding his infinite Power, Wisdom, and Goodness to permit his Fall. He could have prevented it 'tis true by taking away Free Will from Man, that is by not making such a Creature as Man, according to the *Catholics*; and he could have prevented it the same way according to the *Manichees*; for according to them he was under no Necessity to make such a Creature; and 'tis as hard for one to give an Account why he did make him when he knew he would fall, as for the other; so far as I see, the Difficulty is equal on both Suppositions, and both must have recourse to the same Answer; *viz.* that the Wisdom of God judged it better to have Man with his Sin, than the World should want such a Creature.

But 3dly. 'Tis objected that the *Manichees* have in reality three Principles, two active, a good and a bad one, and a third passive or indifferent, that is *Matter*: || Though they vouchsafed the Name of Principles only to the active. That this indifferent Principle was the Prey of the first Occupier, and the Evil one seized it as soon as the Good, and would not suffer him to make good out of it, without a mixture of Evil.

G 3

But

|| This *Bayle* calls *Chaos*. See N. 15.

an absolutely perfect Agent, and make them not only consistent with infinite Wisdom, Goodness and Power, but necessarily resulting from them (so that these would not be Infinite, if those did not or could not possibly exist) then we may be supposed to have at last discovered the true Origin of Evils, and answered all the Difficulties and Objections that are brought upon this Head, against the Goodness, Wisdom, Power, and Unity of God. Let us try therefore what can be done in each kind of Evil; and first, concerning the *Evil of Imperfection*.

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But this is nothing to the Purpose; for it supposes a demonstrable Falshood, that Matter is self-existent, whereas there is nothing plainer than that Matter has a Cause; and to build Hypotheses on manifest Falshoods is unworthy a Philosopher.

2dly. Even in this way the good Principle might have prevented Evil; for he might have let the evil Principle alone with his Matter, and then he could never have made any thing of it; for his Productions must all have been absolutely evil, and whatever is so must immediately destroy itself, or rather in truth nothing could have been produced by such a Being.

All his works must have contained in them all imaginable Evil and Repugnancy; all the Parts of them must have been incongruous and inconsistent, and consequently have destroyed themselves and one another. Nay, such a Being could have properly no Power at all; for if he produced any thing which was consistent, it would be so far good, and so good would proceed from a Principle absolutely Evil, which is no less a Contradiction than that Evil should be produced by one absolutely Good: Which if it be allowed, there's no farther Occasion to enquire after the Origin of Evil at all. For that may proceed from an infinitely good Being, as well as good can from one infinitely evil. From hence it is evident that the bringing in of two Principles does not in the least account for the Origin of Evil.

|| See Remark d.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.
Of the Evil of Defect.

AS for the Evil of *Imperfection*, it is to be considered, that before the World was created God existed alone, and nothing beside him. All things therefore are out of nothing and whatsoever exists, has its Existence from God; neither can that Existence be different either in Kind or Degree from what he gave.*

Things can be no otherwise than as God pleased.

II. Secondly, God, though he be omnipotent, cannot make any created Being *absolutely perfect*, for whatever is absolutely perfect, must necessarily be self-existent. But it is included in the very Notion of a Creature, as such, not to exist of itself, but from God. An absolutely perfect Creature therefore implies a Contradiction. For it would be of itself and not of itself at the same time. (18.) Absolute Perfection is therefore peculiar to God, and if he should communicate his own peculiar Perfection

All created things are necessarily imperfect, since they do not exist of themselves.

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(18.) A *perfect Creature* is a Contradiction in terms. For if it be *perfect* it is *independent*; and if it be independent it is no *Creature*. Again; to suppose a created Being *infinite* in any respect is to suppose it *equal* to its Creator in that respect; and if it be equal in one respect, it must be so in all; since an infinite Property cannot inhere in any finite Subject, for then the Attribute would be more perfect than its Subject, all which is absurd. Granting therefore this one Principle, which cannot be denied, (*viz.* that an Effect must be inferior to its Cause) it will appear that the Evil of Imperfection, supposing a *Creation*, is necessary and unavoidable; and consequently, all other Evils which necessarily arise from that, are unavoidable also. What our Author has advanced upon the following Head seems perfectly copelusive.

G 4

(C.)

* See Scott in Note 32.

tion to another, (C.) that other would be God. The *Evil of Imperfection* must therefore be tolerated

NOTES.

(C.) This Position seems very agreeable to the *Catholic Faith*, which teaches that the *Father* did communicate his Nature and his Perfections to the *Son*, and with him to the *Holy Ghost*: Each of them therefore is very God under a different *Subsistence*. The Divine Nature which is inherent in them may be conceived to be of itself, but the *Modus* of Existence cannot. Now the Church looks upon the Nature thus subsisting as a *Person*. Not that it is a Person in the same manner as the human Nature subsisting by itself, but by Reason of a certain Similitude and *Analogy* which they have between them. Since Divine Matters are not Objects of the Senses, they cannot be known by Marks impressed upon us by Sensation; they are therefore conceived by Similitude, Relation, Proportion, or Connection with sensible things: The Passions, Affections, Intellect, and Will, are the Principles of our Actions, and therefore we attribute these to God. For if we were to do those things which God performs, these would be the Principles and Causes of them: We attribute therefore to God something analogous or equivalent to these, but we know that it is as distant as finite is from infinite. Nay, 'tis demonstrable that neither Will, nor Love, nor Anger, nor Justice, nor Mercy, are in God after the same manner, as they exist in and are conceived by us.* But we must make use of these Words because we have no better, and they sufficiently answer the End for which God would have us to know him. Now after the same manner we point out the Distinction declared in Scripture between the *Father*, *Son* and *Holy Ghost*, by the Word *Person*, because we have nothing nearer to compare them by; and the Representation under this *Analogy* shews us very well what we may hope for from each of them, and what Worship we ought to pay them. Tho' at the same time we are certain that these differ no less from human Persons, than the Divine Intellect does from human, or the Principles of Divine Actions from human Passions; for instance, Anger, Hatred, and the like. 'Tis strange therefore that Men who would be esteemed learned, should dispute against a Plurality of Persons in the Deity after the very same Way of Reasoning with which *Cotta* in *Cicero* argues against the Intelligence, Prudence, and Justice of God,† namely, because they cannot be in God after the same manner as we conceive

* See *Wollaston*, p. 115, 116. and *Episcopius* Inst. Theol. L. 4. C. 22. p. 310. or our Author's Sermon on Predestination, &c.

† *Qualem autem Deum*, &c. *Cic. de Nat. Deor.* § 15. Ed. Lond. See our Author's Sermon. § 37.

rated in Creatures, notwithstanding the Divine Omnipotence and Goodness: For Contradictions
are

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ceive them to be in Men; forgetting, in the mean time, that these are attributed to God by a kind of *Analogy* and *Accommodation* to our Capacity, and rather from the *Resemblance* of things done by God, to those done by us, than of the Principles from which they proceed. But the Scriptures and the Church have sufficiently forewarned us to beware of their erroneous Way of Reasoning. For when God is described under these Figures, Similitudes, and Analogies, lest we should take Images of things for the things themselves, and so fall into absurd Reasonings about them, the same things are denied of God in one Sense, that are affirmed of him in another. Thus God is often said to repent; and in another Place 'tis denied that he repents as a Man. Thus Light is ascribed to God, as his Habitation; and elsewhere, thick Darknes. He is often said to be seen, and yet is called invisible. The Father is God and Lord, and also the Son and the Holy Ghost; and yet it is said there is but one God and Lord. All which and more of the same kind, we must believe to be thus expressed for no other Reason but to hinder us from imagining them to be ascribed to God in the same manner as they are in us, || but Smatterers in Learning reject and ridicule these Forms of Speech as *Ænigmas*, being ignorant of both the Sacred and Ecclesiastical Dialect, which they refuse to learn, though we must make use of it in Divine Matters, or else entirely refrain from all reasoning about them. For since they are known no otherwise than by Similitude and Analogy, they cannot be described otherwise, as any one will find who tries. But it is no wonder if these Men, while they take similes for the things themselves, should easily imagine that they discover absurdities in them. If they do this on purpose, cunningly, and with an ill Intent, they are Villains; but if through Ignorance or Error, they deserve pity, if they did not swell with a proud Conceit of Science, and exalt themselves above the Vulgar; who yet are much wiser than these Philosophers. For they fear the Anger of God, love his Goodness, embrace his Mercy, adore his Justice, and give Glory to the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and yet believe in and worship one God, most perfect, and free from Passions. Whereas the Smatterers in Science have got nothing to place in the Room of these, which they themselves, much less the
Vulgar

|| *This is a good Inference from these and the like Expressions, but can hardly be supposed to have been the principal Design, much less the only Reason, of them. For more Instances of this Kind, see the forementioned Sermon, § 23, 37.*

are Objects of no Power. God might indeed have refrained from creating, and continued alone, self-sufficient, and perfect to all Eternity, but his infinite Goodness would by no Means allow it ; this obliged him to produce external things ; which things, since they could not possibly be perfect, the Divine Goodness preferred imperfect ones to none

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Vulgar, can understand; or which can equally excite the Affections of the Mind, or promote Piety. (D.)

(D.) It has been objected against the foregoing Paragraph and Note, that the Author by his Principles necessarily introduces Imperfection into the Godhead. For he owns whatever is not of itself is imperfect, but the Subsistences of the Son and Holy Ghost, that is their *Personalities*, as he confesses, are not from themselves, and therefore must be imperfect. To this I answer, that we may consider the Attributes of God, and likewise the *Personalities* in the Divine Nature, either abstractly, *i. e.* as distinguished in our Minds from the Nature ; or as they are identified with it. If we consider them abstractly it is true they are not from themselves, but from the Nature : So the *Wisdom* and *Power* of God are not from themselves but from the Divine Nature which necessarily includes Wisdom and Power : And so the *Personality* of the Son and Holy Ghost are not from themselves, but from the Divine Nature which necessarily includes the Father's begetting his Son, and the Holy Ghost's proceeding from both. But if we consider these as *in se* the same with the Nature, then they are from themselves ; the same Nature is in the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, and the three Personalities necessarily arise out of that Nature, and therefore may be said to be necessary and from themselves. I do confess the Personality of the Son is from the Father and that of the Holy Ghost from the Father and Son ; but this is still by the Necessity arising from the Nature. The Father begets the Son, not out of Choice, but Necessity of Nature ; and that Nature is in the Son, and therefore his Subsistence and Personality is from his own Nature, that is from himself, and he is *autogenus*. The Personality of the Son is indeed from the Father, but that doth not hinder it to be from the Nature in the last resort ; and necessarily too, though *mediante Persona Patris*. When therefore it is said that the Divine Nature which is inherent in them may be said to be of itself, but not the *Modus subsistendi*, it is not meant that the *Modus subsistendi* doth not proceed from the Nature which is in the Son and Holy Ghost, and so is in that Sense *ex se*, but that it is not immediately from it, but *mediante Patris Subsistentia*.

(E.)

none at all. Imperfection then arose from the Infinity of Divine Goodness. Had not God been infinitely Good, perhaps he might not have permitted imperfect Beings; but have been content in himself, and created nothing at all.

III. *Thirdly*, There are infinite Degrees of Perfection between a Being *absolutely perfect* and *Nothing*: Of which, if Existence be conceived as the First, every thing will be so many Degrees distant from Nothing, as there are *Perfections* to be found in it joyn'd with Existence. In this Scale then God will be the *Top*, and Nothing the *Bottom*; and how much farther any thing is distant from nothing, it is so much the more perfect, and approaches nearer to God. How much any thing can resemble God in Perfection, or how nearly approach to him (E.) we know not; but we are certain that there is always an infinite Distance between them. It must have been determin'd therefore by the Will of God, where he would stop, since there is nothing but his own Will to bound his Power. Now it is to be believ'd that the present System of the World was the very best that could be, with regard to

'Tis to be determined by the Divine Pleasure what Degrees of Perfection every thing must have, since all things are necessarily at an infinite distance from the highest Perfection.

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(E.) Supposing the World to be infinite, there would be, as far as appears to us, infinite Orders of Creatures descending gradually from God to Nothing: But since neither our Understanding can comprehend, nor does the Nature of Quantity and Motion seem to admit of Infinity or Eternity; 'tis better to refer the Matter to the Divine Will. For if any Infinity in Creatures be impossible, 'tis the same thing wherever we stop: Since all Finites are equally distant from Infinite. If therefore God had created twice, or a thousand thousand times as great, and as many Beings, and a thousand thousand Ages sooner than he has, the same Objections might be made, Why not before? Why not more? The World therefore must either have been created infinite and from Eternity, which the very Nature of the thing seems not to allow, or it is all one when and how great it might be, and not determinable by any thing besides the Divine Pleasure. See Chap. 5. §. 1 Subf. 4. and *J. Clarke on Nat. Evil.* p. 90, 93, 280, &c.

to the Mind of God in framing it. (19.) It might have been better perhaps in some Particulars, but

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(19) In order to confirm this belief, and come to a right Knowledge of the whole Question before us, it is necessary to enquire a little into the meaning of these Words; to consider (with reverence) what this Mind of God might be in framing the World, and what was the most proper Method of answering it. Now it appear'd from the Conclusion of the first Chapter and Note 13. that the sole Design of Almighty God in creating the Universe, was to impart Felicity to other Beings: and in the beginning of this Chapter it was proved that any Happiness thus communicated could not be *infinite*. His Design then is completely answer'd, if the greatest Degree of Happiness be imparted of which created Beings are capable, consistent with one another; or when the utmost possible Good is produced in the Universe collectively. This also shews us what we are to understand by *the very best System*, viz. one that is fitted for, and productive of the greatest absolute *general Good*: The *Manner* of effecting which comes next under consideration. As to this, it is queried in the first place whether all Animals ought to have been created equally perfect; or several in different Ranks and Degrees of Perfection; and secondly, whether God may be supposed to have placed any Order of Beings in such a fix'd unalterable condition as not to admit of advancement: to have made any Creatures as perfect at first as the Nature of a created Being is capable of. The former of these doubts is fully discuss'd in this and the following Chapter, §. 2. The latter seems not so easy to be determin'd. They who hold the affirmative argue from our notion of infinite or *absolute Goodness*, which must excite the Deity always to communicate all manner of *Happiness* in the very highest Degree, for the same reason that it prompts him to communicate it ever in any degree. But this, say they, he has not done, except he at first endow'd some Creatures with all the Perfection a Creature could possibly receive, and gave to every subordinate Class of Beings*, the utmost *Happiness* their several Natures were capable of. Neither can this Opinion be confuted from Holy Scripture, which declares that God made innumerable glorious Orders of *Cherubim* and *Seraphim*, all far above our Comprehension, and some, for any thing that we know, in the very next Step to the *Top* of the great *Scale* of *Beings*, and only *Second* to the Almighty. Those that hold the contrary Opinion distinguish between Happiness and Perfection, and think that these do not either necessarily imply, or inseparably attend each other. They deny therefore the consequence of the former Argument,

* Concerning these Classes, see Notes 22, and 24.

but not without some new, and probably greater inconveniencies, which must have spoiled the Beauty either of the whole, or of some chief Part.

IV. *Fourthly,*

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Argument, and assign this Reason for it, *viz.* because a being produced in the highest degree of natural Perfection which a Creature is capable of and still continuing in the *same*, will not receive as much *Happiness* in the main, as others that were placed in a much inferior State at the first. This, tho' it may appear something like a Paradox, yet upon farther consideration will perhaps be judg'd not improbable. Thus, for a Creature conscious of no deficiency of any thing necessary to its well-being, to meet with a perpetual accession of new, unknown Pleasure, to reflect with comfort on its past Condition, and compare it with the present, to enjoy a continued Series of fresh Satisfaction and Delight, and be always approaching nearer and nearer to Perfection, this must certainly advance the Sum of its *Happiness*, even above that of others, whose condition is supposed to have begun and to continue in that degree of perfection where this will end (if there could be any end in either) and which never knew defect, variety, or increase. A finite Being fix'd in the same State, however excellent, must according to all our Conceptions (if we be allow'd to judge from our present Faculties, and we can judge from nothing else) contract a kind of *Indolence* or *Insensibility* (*i. e.* cannot always be equally affected by an equal degree of Good in the Object) which Insensibility nothing but alteration and variety can cure. It does not therefore seem probable that God has actually fixed any created Beings whatsoever in the very highest degree of Perfection next to himself. Nay, it is impossible to conceive any such highest Degree, and the Supposition is absurd, since that which admits of a continual addibility, can have no *highest*. Since then the Creation cannot be infinite; and finites, how much soever amplified, can never reach Infinity or absolute Perfection*, we can set no manner of bounds to the creating Power of God: But must refer all to his Infinite Wisdom and Goodness: Which Attributes we know can never be exhausted, nor will, we believe, produce any Beings in such a State as shall not leave room enough for them to be still growing in Felicity, and for ever acquiring new Happiness, together with new Perfection.

This notion of a growing Happiness, is embraced by most Divines, and affords the strongest Motive for endeavouring to improve and excell in every Christian Grace. 'Tis beautifully touch'd by Mr. Addison. Spectator N^o. 111. "There is

* See Note E. or Q. or Dr. Bentley's Boyle's Lect. Sermon 6. p. 236, 237. 5th Edit.

All things could not be equally perfect, since some are Parts of others. **IV. Fourthly,** From hence it appears also that all Beings cannot have equal Perfections, For the World must necessarily be composed of various Parts, and those parts of others, and so on. But a Part

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“not, in my Opinion, a more pleasing and triumphant Consideration in Religion, than this of the perpetual Progress which the Soul makes toward the Perfection of its Nature, without ever arriving at a Period in it. To look upon the Soul as going on from Strength to Strength, to consider that She is to shine forever with new Accessions of Glory, and brighten to all Eternity; that She will be still adding Virtue to Virtue, and Knowledge to Knowledge, carries in it something wonderfully agreeable to that Ambition which is natural to the Mind of Man. Nay, it must be a Prospect pleasing to God himself, to see his Creation for ever beautifying in his Eyes, and drawing nearer to him by degrees of Resemblance.”

That the Happiness of Saints and Angels may be continually increasing, see Tillotson's 77th Sermon, Vol. 2d. Fol. p. 578, &c.

From these Considerations, and some which follow in the remainder of this Note, it may perhaps seem probable that in us, and all Beings of the like nature, changes from worse to better must be attended even with greater degrees of Pleasure than settled permanence in any the highest State conceivable of Glory or Perfection, and consequently become necessary to the completion of finite Happiness.

But in Opposition to all this, Bayle urges that Increase or Alteration is not in the least requisite to a lasting Felicity even in ourselves.

“That 'tis no ways necessary that our Soul should feel Evil, to the end it may relish what is Good, and that it should pass successively from Pleasure to Pain, and from Pain to Pleasure, that it may be able to discern that Pain is an Evil, and Pleasure is a Good. We know by Experience that our Soul cannot feel, at one and the same time, both Pleasure and Pain; it must therefore at first either have felt Pain before Pleasure, or Pleasure before Pain. If its first Sensation was that of Pain, it found that State to be uneasy, altho' it was ignorant of Pleasure. Suppose then that its first Sensation lasted many Years, without Interruption, you may conceive that it was in an easy Condition, or in one that was uneasy. And do not alledge to me Experience; do not tell me that a Pleasure which lasts a long time becomes insipid, and that a long Pain becomes insupportable; For I will answer you, that this proceeds from a Change

Part must needs come short both of the *Divine Perfection*, and the Perfection of the *Whole*. For it is nothing with regard to all the Perfections which it has not, whether these be Divine, or created; and since

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“ in the Organ which makes that Pain, which continues the
“ same as to kind, to be different as to Degrees. If you have
“ had at first a Sensation of six Degrees, it will not continue
“ of Six to the end of two Hours, or to the end of a Year,
“ but only either of one Degree, or of one Fourth Part of a
“ Degree. Thus Custom blunts the Edge of our Sensations:
“ their Degrees correspond to the Concussions of the parts of
“ the Brain, and this Concussion is weakened by frequent Re-
“ petitions: From whence it comes to pass that the Degrees
“ of Sensation are diminished. But if Pain or Joy were com-
“ municated to us in the same Degree successively for an hun-
“ dred Years, we should be as unhappy, or as happy in the
“ hundredth Year, as in the first Day; which plainly proves
“ that a Creature may be happy with a continued Good, or
“ unhappy with a continued Evil, and that the *Alternative*,
“ which *Lactantius* speaks of *, is a bad Solution of the Diffi-
“ culty. It is not founded upon the Nature of Good and
“ Evil, nor upon the Nature of the Subject which receives
“ them: nor upon the Nature of the Cause which produces
“ them. Pleasure and Pain are no less proper to be communi-
“ cated the second Moment than the first, and the third Mo-
“ ment than the second, and so of all the rest. Our Soul is also
“ as susceptible of them after it has felt them one Moment, as
“ it was before it felt them, and God who gave them, is no
“ less capable of producing them the second Moment than
“ the first †.”

As this is one of the strongest Objections, and applicable to all kinds of Evil, I have quoted it at length (tho' some parts may not relate immediately to our present purpose) and shall endeavour to give a full answer to it in the following Notes. It will be consider'd with respect to Moral Good and Evil, in Notes, 68, 83, 84. Let us confine ourselves at present to Natural Good, which may be divided into sensitive and intellectual. As to the former, we perceive that the Mind, for the Augmentation of its Happiness, is endowed with various Senses, each of which is entertain'd with a variety of Objects: now, any one of these Senses can convey so much Pleasure for some time as is sufficient to fill our present narrow Capacity, and engross the whole Soul. She can be entirely happy in the Satisfaction arising from the Sight, Hearing, &c. or from the

* See Note 79. p. 447. † *Critical Diss.* p. 2486.

since one Part is not another, nor the *whole*, 'tis plain that every Part wants the Perfections not only of the whole, but of other Parts also. And that the *whole* is more perfect than a *part* is evident from hence,

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the Memory, or any other Mode of Perception by itself. If therefore any one of these Organs could (as *Bayle* supposes) continue to communicate the same Degree of Pleasure to us for an hundred Years, all the rest would be unnecessary: But an All-wise Being, who cannot act in vain, has implanted this Variety of Senses in us; this then is a good Argument (to those who allow such a Being, upon the Belief of which I am now arguing) that none of these particular Senses could continue in its present State, and always communicate the same Degree of Happiness. Farther, his Supposition will appear to be impossible, from considering the Nature and Properties of that Matter of which the sensitive Organs are composed. If there be (as *Bayle* maintains) so close a Connection between the Soul and certain Modifications of Matter, as that the Degrees of sensitive Pleasures are diminished by a *Change* in the Organ, by weakening the Concussion of some parts of the Brain by *frequent Repetitions*; then we say, 'tis plainly impossible that the same Degrees should be continued by this Organ, which, as it is material, is perpetually exposed to this *Change*, and liable to Dissolution, and necessarily weakened by these *frequent Concussions*. Every Motion in it must in time be stopped by contrary ones, as our Author has fully shewn in Chapter 4. §. 1.

If he supposes that the same Degree of Pleasure may still be communicated tho' the Organ alters, he supposes that there is no such Connection between any Portion or Position of Matter and our Spirit; which is directly contrary to his former Supposition, and also to truth, as will perhaps appear from the following Chapter. If then *Bayle* imagines that the same or different Matter, when moved or at rest; or when moved in different Directions, may still affect the Mind in the very same manner, he must either take it for granted that the Affections of Matter are no Causes of the Sensations of the Mind, that is, contradict his former Supposition; or else he must suppose the same Effect to proceed from different Causes; either of which will tend equally to advance his System. But in reality, this Decrease of Pleasure in Familiarity and Custom does not perhaps entirely depend on any Change of the corporeal Organs, but on the original Faculties of the Soul itself, as may be gathered from some such Observations as this which follows. View a delightful Landkip, a pleasant Garden,

hence, that it necessarily includes the multiplied Perfection of every part; and besides, the parts when

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den, or any of the Figures which appear most *beautiful*, renew the Prospect once, or twice, to Day, to Morrow, and at several distant Periods; it shall afford a great degree of Pleasure for some time, while any *Novelty* may be supposed to remain; but that Pleasure perishes together with this *Novelty*, tho' the external Organs of Vision still continue perfect, and your Sensations are most evidently the same the last Day as the first. You are able to behold the same Scenes over again, with the same ease and acuteness, but not with the same Intensity of Delight. To attempt a Mechanical Solution of this by a supposed alteration of some imaginary *Traces* in the Brain (which yet, if they were allowed, cannot mend the matter a jot, as was just now shewn) will only throw us into still greater Difficulties, as any one that attentively considers the whole of that chimerical Hypothesis must conclude, and of which *Bayle*, who soon perceived the Defects and Absurdities of most other Systems, was undoubtedly convinc'd. It seems to me much more properly resolvable into a native Property of the Soul itself. Is it not probable that the Mind of Mind is originally framed with a Disposition for, or Capacity of being delighted with *Variety*? That it cannot be always on the same Bent, but as it is endow'd with different Faculties, so these relieve one another by turns, and receive an additional Pleasure from the *Novelty* of those Objects about which it is conversant; and that by this means it enjoys a greater Sum of Happiness than it could other ways attain to? See the *Spe&ator*, N^o. 590. N^o. 625. or N^o. 411. or *Watts* on the *Passions*, §. 4.

I shall only add an Observation on this Head from the Author of the *Vindication of God's Moral Character*, p. 21. which shews us the Necessity for this variety or increaseableness of Perfection, in order to our *Intellectual Happiness*, since most of that arises from our past Defects. 'By Intellectual Happiness, I mean the
' Discovery and Contemplation of Truth, with regard to which
' I have this to observe, that all the Pleasures we taste of this
' Kind are owing either to our preceding Ignorance, to the Care
' and Pains we take in the Discovery of Truth, or to the Degree
' of our Knowledge, when we attain to a greater measure than
' other Men. All Truth, when consider'd separate from these,
' is alike as Truth (tho' not of the like Importance to us) the
' Object of the Understanding, and as such, it must afford the
' same Delight. If we all could, with equal Ease and Clear-
' ness, see all the Relations of things, they must all in the Nature
' of the things equally affect us. We should taste as much Pleasure

when joined together and connected, acquire a new and peculiar Perfection, whereby they answer their proper

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* *sure in knowing or contemplating that two and two makes four, as in knowing or contemplating any Proposition which now appears the most difficult, and so affords the most Pleasure: Or rather, we should not have Pleasure from any of them. Now if this be the Case, then is it evident that the Capacity we have for tasting this kind of Pleasure renders us capable of its contrary. We could not be delighted in the Discovery or Contemplation of Truth, if we were not capable of being ignorant, and of the Unhappiness which arises from it.*

This is the Consequence we would draw from all that went before: But of this more at large under the Head of *Moral Evil*.

We reply then to *Bayle*, that this *Alternative* or variety of either Good or Evil, so far as concerns the present Argument is founded on the Nature of the *Subject which receives them*, and that our Soul in its present State, is not so susceptible of them after it has felt them two or three times as at first. What it might have been made capable of, is nothing to the Purpose, since (as it was observed before, and must often be repeated) we are to consider Man as we find him at present; and draw all our Arguments, not from such Faculties as are perhaps in other Beings, but from these only which we perceive and experience in him. If these cannot be alter'd and improved consistently with each other*, nor subjected to any general Laws more suitable to his present Circumstances, and productive of more good to the whole System†, then, all Arguments built on this Topic against the Divine Attributes must fall to the Ground. These and the like Suppositions therefore, *viz. that the same Degree of Pleasure might be communicated to us successively for a hundred Years*; — if understood of one uniform Cause producing it: *That our Pleasures, (meaning sensitive ones) might not depend on the Fibres of the Brain,* — and *That these Fibres should not wear out at all*‡, — or, if these Fibres did wear out, *that the Pleasure should never decay*, — are all unreasonable Suppositions: They offend against the Rule laid down above, and always to be remember'd, of taking the whole human Nature as it is; of considering our present Body and Spirit, and the obvious Properties of each, and the known Laws of their Union together. All such Objections therefore are beside the Question; and founded upon the old absurdity of reducing us to a different *Class* of Beings, when

* See Note 28.

† See Note 25.

‡ See *Bayle's* Dict. p. 2487.

proper Ends, which they could not do asunder; they defend themselves much better, and assist each other. The Perfection of the whole therefore, is not only more *extensive* than that of the Parts, by the accumulation of many Parts, perhaps equal to one another; but more *intense* also, by the Addition of certain *Degrees*, whereby the whole must of Necessity excell the Parts. As therefore we have proved that an absolutely perfect Creature is an Impossibility, so it may be proved from hence that all cannot have an *equal Degree* of Perfection. For the World consists of Parts, and those again of others, perhaps divisible *in infinitum*: But that every single Part should have the Perfection of all, or many, is impossible; and we are not to arraign the Power or Goodness of God for not working Contradictions. There must then be many, perhaps infinite (20.) Degrees of Perfection in the Divine Works; for whatever arises from *Nothing* is necessarily imperfect; and the less it is removed from nothing (taking *Existence* for one Degree, as we said before) the more imperfect it is. There is no Occasion therefore for an Evil Principle to introduce the Evil of Defect, or an Inequality of Perfections in the Works of God: For the very Nature of created Beings necessarily requires it, and we may conceive the Place of this malicious Principle to be
abun-

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when (as will appear presently) all conceivable Classes and Orders are already full.

Thus much for one Query about the manner of creating things, *viz* whether any should have been *fix'd immutably* in a certain Degree of Perfection: Our Author proceeds to examine the other, *viz*. Whether all Things could and ought to have been at first in the *same* Degree of Perfection?

(20.) That is *indefinite*, or greater than any given Number; for neither the Universe itself, nor any thing that belongs to it, can be properly and absolutely Infinite, as our Author maintains in his Note E, and we have largely proved from *Cudworth*, &c. in the former Chapter.

Things necessarily are of unequal Perfections with regard to their Attributes; but it is agreeable to the highest Goodness to create those which are least perfect, if they are no hindrance to the Number or convenience of the more perfect ones.

abundantly supplied from hence, that they derive their Origin from *Nothing*. (21.)

V. *Fifthly*, 'Tis plain, that Creatures are not only unequally imperfect in respect of their *Parts* and *Under-parts*, and so on, which by continual Subdivision, approach in a manner to nothing; but a necessary inequality arises among them also in respect to

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(21.) It is scarce necessary to observe, that this must all along be understood only *Materially*, i. e. that these things were not produced from any Matter *pre-existent*, but were made *ἐκ οὐκ ὄντος*, and brought into Being from mere *Non-Existence*. For the Possibility of which, and the Opinion of the Antients on this Subject see *Cudworth*, C. 5. §. 2. p. 738, &c. The other Senses of the Words, *viz.* That any thing can come from nothing *causally*, or be produced *by* nothing, or *by itself*, or *without* an *Efficient Cause*, are manifestly absurd, as is demonstrated at large in the same excellent Section. For an Illustration of our Author's Notion before us, see *Scott's Christian Life*, Part 2. Vol. 1. C. 6. §. 2. p. 46, 447, 1st. Edit. 'God is the Cause of Perfection only, but not of Defect, which so far forth as it is natural to created Beings hath no Cause at all, but is merely a Negation or Non-entity. For every created thing was a Negation or Non-entity before ever it had a positive Being, and it had only so much of its primitive Negation taken away from it, as it had positive Being conferred upon it; and therefore, so far forth as it is, its Being is to be attributed to the Sovereign Cause that produced it; but so far forth as it is not, its not Being is to be attributed to the Original Non-entity out of which it was produced. For that which was once Nothing, would still have been Nothing, had it not been for the Cause that gave Being to it, and therefore that it is so far Nothing still, i. e. limited and defective, is only to be attributed to its own primitive Nothingness. As for instance, If I give a poor Man a hundred Pounds, that he is worth *so much* Money is wholly owing to me, but that he is not worth a hundred more is owing only to his own Poverty; and just so, that I have such and such Perfections of Being is wholly owing to God who produced me out of Nothing; but that I have such and such Defects of Being is only owing to that Non-entity out of which he produced me.'

The same Notion is largely discussed in *Eilhardi Lubini Philosophus*, &c. Chap. 6, 7, and 17. From whom it appears, that most of the ancient Philosophers meant no more than this by their *Evil Principle*.

(22.) From

to their *Attributes*. For a conscious or thinking Substance is more perfect than one that wants Sense or Understanding. If it be asked, How is it agreeable to the Divine Goodness to have created these also? I answer, If the Creation of these be no impediment to the Production of the more perfect; if neither the Number nor Happiness of the more perfect be diminished by the Creation of those that are less perfect, why will it be unfit to create these too? Since God does what is best to be done, nothing more or greater can be expected from the most benevolent and powerful Author of Nature. If therefore it be better, *ceteris paribus*, that these more imperfect Beings should exist, than not, it is agreeable to the Divine Goodness that the best that could be should be done. If the Production of a less perfect Being were any hindrance to a more perfect one, it would appear contrary to Divine Goodness to have omitted the more perfect and created the less; but since they are no manner of hindrance to each other, the more the better. (22.)

VI. An

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(22.) From the Supposition of a Scale of Beings gradually descending from *Perfection* to *Non-entity*, and complete in every intermediate Rank and Degree [for which see Note 24.] we shall soon perceive the Absurdity of such Questions as these, Why was not Man made more perfect? Why are not his Faculties equal to those of Angels? Since this is only asking why he was not placed in a quite different Class of Beings, when at the same time all other Classes are supposed to be already full. From the same Principle also we gather the Intent of the Creator in producing these several inferior Orders under our View. They who imagine that all things in this World were made for the immediate Use of Man alone, run themselves into inextricable Difficulties. Man indeed is the Head of this lower Part of the Creation, and perhaps it was designed to be absolutely under his Command. But that all things here tend directly to his own use, is, I think, neither easy nor necessary to be proved. Some manifestly serve for the Food and Support of others, whose Souls may be necessary to prepare and preserve their Bodies for that Purpose, and may at the same time be happy in a Consciousness of their own Existence. 'Tis probable

This confirm'd by an Instance of Matter, which is no Impediment to pure Spirits.

VI. An Instance will make this more clear. Suppose that God made the World *finite*; suppose that *Spirits*, or pure immaterial thinking Beings, are the *most perfect* Species of Substances: Suppose in the last Place, that God created as many of this sort as were convenient for the System he had made, so that if there were more, they would incommode one another; yet there would be no less Room for Matter, then if there were none at all. (F.) This Supposition is by no means absurd; for

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bable that they are intended to promote each others Good reciprocally: Nay, Man himself contributes to the Happiness, and betters the Condition of the Brutes in several Respects, by cultivating and improving the Ground, by watching the Seasons, by protecting and providing for them, when they are unable to protect and provide for themselves*. Others, of a much lower Class, may, for ought we know, enjoy themselves too in some Degree or other; and also contribute to the Happiness even of superior Beings, by a Display of the Divine Attributes in different Ways, and affording ample Matter of Reflection on the various Ranks and Degrees of Perfection discoverable in the animal World; wherein the highest Order may with Pleasure contemplate numberless Species infinitely below them; And the lower Class can admire and adore that Infinity of Divine Wisdom and Goodness and Power which shines forth in so many Beings so much above them. They may conduce to the Beauty, Order, and Benefit of the whole System, the general Good of which was the Aim of its Creator, and with regard to which every Part is chiefly to be estimated†. They may have ten thousand Uses beside what relates to Man, who is but a very small Part of it: Several Instances might be given which would make this very probable; at least the contrary, I think, cannot ever be proved. See C. 4. §. 2. Subf. 4, 5.

(F.) If any one had a mind to fill a certain Vessel with Globes of various Magnitudes, and had distinguished them into their several Degrees, so that those of the second Degree might have Place in the Interstices left by those of the first; and

* See Chubb's *Sup. &c.* p. 12. and Dr. J. Clarke, p. 284, 285.

† See Cudworth, p. 875, 876. or Tillotson, *Serm.* 91. p. 683. 2d Vol. Fol. or Ray on the Creation, Part 2. p. 423. 4th Edit. or Note G.

for since these may be conceived without *local Extension*, and have no relation to *Space* or *Place*, as Bodies have *, in whatever Number they were created, they would contribute nothing at all either to the filling up of Space, or excluding Bodies out of it, yet they would have a certain *System* or *Society* among themselves, which might require a determinate Number, which if it were exceeded, they must become troublesome to one another by too great a Multitude in a finite World. Nay, if the World were supposed to be *infinite*, and as many such Spirits created as were possible, yet would they be no impediment to Matter, or Matter to them, neither would their Number be less, nor their Conveniences fewer, because Matter did or did not exist. Since then material and immaterial Beings consist so well together, is it not agreeable to the greatest Goodness to have created both? Let Matter be stupid and devoid of Sense as it is; let it be the most imperfect of all Substances, and next to nothing, (since not to perceive its Existence is little different from Non-existence) 'tis better to be even so, than not at all; for Existence is, as we said, the Foundation, or first Degree

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and those of the third Order in the interstices of the second, and so on. 'Tis evident that when as many of the first Magnitude were put in as the Vessel could contain yet there would be Room for those of the second. Neither could any wise Man ask why the whole Vessel was not filled with the greater Globes, or why all of them were not of the same Magnitude.

This Instance may afford an Answer to such as demand why God has not given a different and more perfect Nature to Animals. *viz.* There was no room in the mundane System for Beings of a more perfect Nature. But when as many Creatures were made of the superior Order as the System of the World was able to contain, whether you suppose it finite or infinite; nothing hinder'd but that there might be room for others of a lower Degree: As when as many Globes of greater Mag-

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nitude

* See Note 7.

Degree of Perfection, and the next as it were to this, the second is perception of Existence. But you'll say, Why did not God add this Second Degree to Matter? I answer, if that could, it is probable it would have been done: But since we see that Matter is in itself a passive, inert Substance, we must believe that its Nature would not admit of *sense*, or if it had been capable of Sense, that greater Inconveniences would have flowed from thence, than if it had been made insensible, as it is. (23.) However, without this there would be a kind of *Void* in the Universe, and something want-

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nitude were put into the Vessel as it could hold, yet there was still a Space for others of a less Dimension; and so on *in infinitum*. When therefore any ask why God did not make all of the same Perfection with the *Angels*:

We answer, that after as many Angels had been made as were convenient, there was a Place left for inferior Animals, and after as many Animals of a more perfect Nature were made as the System required, there was still room for other more imperfect ones; and so perhaps *in infinitum*.

If you ask why God does not immediately transplant Men into Heaven, since 'tis plain they are capable of that happier State: Or why he detains them so long from that Happiness, and confines them on the Earth as in a darksome Prison where they are forced to struggle with so many Evils.

I answer, Because the Heavens are already furnished with Inhabitants, and cannot with convenience admit of new ones, till some of the present Possessors depart into a better State, or make room some other way for these to change their Condition. See Note Y.

{23.) *Matter*, as such, and in itself, is at present incapable of Thought and Self-motion, it is therefore in a Degree below Animals, or (as our Author says) next to Nothing. But yet, such as it is, 'tis first, absolutely necessary to many Animals, and secondly, would not be so convenient for their Uses if it could think. It is the *Basis* or *Support* of Animals in this our System; it is, as we may say, the *Cafe* and *Covering* of their several Souls; it serves for the *clothing* of that Cafe, for their *Food*, their *Defence*, and various uses. But were it all Life, or conscious (not to insist on the Absurdities of such a Supposition in itself) what Misery and Confusion would arise? If all were Animals, what must these Animals subsist on? If they were

wanting which might exist : But it was better that there should be Matter than nothing at all, and since one side was to be chosen, the Divine Goodness prefer'd Matter, because that was the greater Good. For since it it no hindrance to the Multiplication or Convenience of thinking Beings, nor diminishes the Number of the more perfect, 'tis plain it adds to the Perfection of the Universe, and whatever it be, though the most imperfect thing in Nature, 'tis gain to the whole. It was therefore agreeable to the greatest Power and Goodness to have created this also ; nor need we the *Demiurgus* of the antient Heretics to produce it, as if unworthy of the great and good God. The Evils of Imperfection then must be permitted in the Nature of things ; an inequality of Perfections must be permitted also, since it is impossible that all the Works of God should be endowed with equal Perfections. (G.)

VII.

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the same Nature with such as we are acquainted with, they must also be sustained after the same manner, *i. e.* they must live by *Food*, and consequently live upon, and continually torment and consume one another ; and consequently more Happiness would be lost than got by such Life, which is as plentiful as present, || as seems agreeable to the System. If Matter as Matter, were endowed with the Power of *Self-Motion*, what Use could we put it to ? What Clothing or Habitations ? What Instruments or Utensils could we make of it ? But this, I think, needs no farther Explanation. Matter then, in its present State, as united with and subservient to such Spirits as we conceive ours to be, is in general more conducive to the Good and Happiness of the whole, than it would be in any other conceivable manner of Existence. To ask yet why some certain Portions or Systems of it might not have been made more perfect, or why it was not farther sublimated, refined, and so unaccountably modified as to be rendered capable of Thought ; is the absurd Question above mentioned, *viz.* Why was it not made something else, or removed into a higher Class ? When at the same time there appears so much Reason for the Existence of such a thing as this now is ; and all superior Classes are concluded to be full What Reason there is for this last conclusion may be seen in Note 24.

(G.) The Author has been blamed here for making any Difficulty about such Evils as these of Imperfection, which are

|| See Note 26.

properly

'Tis less agreeable to the Divine Goodness to have omitted, than to have created these more imperfect Beings.

VII. If you say, God might have omitted the more imperfect Beings, I grant it, and if that had been best he would undoubtedly have done it. But it

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properly speaking no Evils at all. 'Tis trifling, say the Objectors, since we see that the Perfection of any Structure or Machine consists in this, that the Parts thereof have different Powers and Offices, and therefore we can easily conceive it to be no Imperfection in the Machine of the World that its Parts are of unequal Perfections; for those that seem to have the less Perfection would not answer their Design, nor fill their Places if they were not so unequal. And as for inanimate things they are neither capable of Good nor Evil; it signifies nothing where they are placed, or to what Motions they are subjected, since they cannot complain or be sensible of their Condition. Consequently there is no such thing as the Evil of *Imperfection*, but all is properly *Natural*.

To all which we answer 1st. The World and every Part of it is in its own Nature imperfect, for whatsoever is naturally perfect, is self sufficient, and does not stand in need of the Combination of more Parts or the Assistance of other things; for that Complication of parts which is observable in Machines is necessary upon this account only, that one may supply the Defects of another.

2^{dly}. From hence it is evident, that the Perfection of the Parts is not to be estimated from their own private Convenience alone, but from the Relation which they have to the whole. And there's a great deal of Difference between relative and absolute Perfection; a thing may perfectly answer the Office it bears with regard to the whole, without any Convenience to itself, nay to its own Destruction.

3^{dly}. It appears that notwithstanding the Infinite Power, Wisdom and Goodness of God, Creatures must necessarily labour under the Evil of Imperfection; and that this Imperfection is to be considered two Ways, the one with regard to the whole, the other in respect of particulars.

4^{thly}. The Good of the whole cannot be in every thing at all times consistent with the Good of each Particular. For as every Part is in its own Nature imperfect and limited, 'tis possible for it not to be Self-sufficient, and that it may have as much Occasion for external Assistance, as reason to assist others. The Possibility of such a State follows from the very Nature of Limitation and Imperfection. For supposing more things than one of a limited Nature, if they have any intercourse together, they must necessarily affect each other. And it belongs to the Divine Goodness so to frame them, that they shall assist and relieve each other. Now limited Natures ought to have

it is the part of infinite Goodness to chuse the very best; from thence it proceeds therefore, that the
more

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have limited Powers and Acts, nor can all Faculties agree to every Nature, since they may be different, distinct and opposite. And though these Agents which have contrary Faculties cannot promote each others Benefit immediately; yet by taking a Compass, and conspiring to act in concert, they may conduce to the good of the whole and of each other. But since created things are almost infinite, and endowed with an infinite diversity of Powers and Properties, and since an intercourse is established between all of them so that they may act upon, and be acted on by each other, it is impossible but that some Opposition and Contention should arise among the parts, which nevertheless may make for the Benefit of the whole; neither can these Oppositions and Contentions be any bar to the Divine Power and Goodness, since they proceed not from any Defect in the Creator, but from the necessary Imperfection of such things as are in their own Nature limited and finite, but which are necessary to the Good of the whole System, the general Benefit whereof is to be preferred to the Good of some particulars whenever they are inconsistent. There must then be Defects, or want of Perfection in several parts of the Creation, and this Want of Perfection must of Necessity bring many Inconveniencies on the Person whose Lot it is to fill that Part of the Universe, which requires a Creature of such an imperfect Nature. For Example, a Man has no Wings, a Perfection granted to Birds. 'Tis plain, that in his present Circumstances he cannot have them, and that the Use of them wou'd be very mischievous to Society; and yet the Want of them necessarily exposes us to many Inconveniencies.

A Man falls from a Precipice or into a Pit; Wings wou'd save him from the Fall, and relieve him from his Imprisonment; whereas now he breaks his Bones, or starves by his Confinement. A thousand Instances may be given where the Evil of Imperfection necessarily subjects us to Disappointment of Appetite, and several other natural Evils; which yet are all necessary for the Common good.

If it be ask'd why God, as he is of Infinite Power and Wisdom, did not order things in such a Manner that the good of the whole should in all cases and at all times conspire with that of each particular. Or if these Evils necessarily arise from the mutual Intercourse of Parts of a different and contrary Kind, why did he ordain such an Intercourse? Could he not have created all Things in such a State of Perfection, that they should find their Happiness in themselves without the
Help

more imperfect Beings have Existence; for it was agreeable to that not to omit the very least Good that

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Help of any thing external? At least he should have made those things, which he himself had the Framing of, in such a Manner as to have no Intercourse with any Being but himself. For they might have had enough to exercise their Faculties upon in the Contemplation and Love of the Divine Nature: which would have been sufficient for their Happiness, without any Commerce with or dependence upon other Creatures; especially such as would incommode them. Why therefore did God choose such a System as made room for other imperfect, miserable Beings.

We answer, that granting such Creatures as those above-mention'd to be possible, God has actually created as many of that Kind as the System wou'd admit, inasmuch that if there had been more it wou'd have been more inconvenient. Nor is it of any consequence whether we suppose this System to be Finite or Infinite. If Finite, 'tis plain that a certain Number may fill it so that there will be no room for more. If Infinite, infinite Creatures of the same Kind will equally fill an infinite System, as a finite Number will fill a finite One; for there's the same Proportion. In this then as well as the former System there will be no Place for more. But yet when this System or Order of Creatures is filled up, there wou'd be room left for the other less perfect Orders, whose Natures and Faculties might have a mutual Relation to each other and whose Happiness might require their mutual Help and Assistance, 'Tis certain that many and various Orders and Degrees of this Kind were possible; neither would they, if created, be any Impediment to the more perfect Order, which is already compleated, and the Number of which could not be increased without Damage to the System; neither would the Addition of these inferior Orders and Degrees, lessen the Number of the prior and more perfect Ones.

What therefore was to be done? Let us now suppose God deliberating with himself (as a Man wou'd do) whether he should create any of the inferior Order. If he does, 'tis manifest that he will introduce unnecessary Imperfections into his Works. Nay, since some of these may have Natures and Powers contrary to each other, it will be possible for Clashing and Opposition to arise among his Creatures. If he does not create them, he will appear unkind in grudging and refusing them a Benefit, which he was able to communicate without Detriment to the System. For I suppose these inferior Ones not to be so very imperfect, but that their Existence wou'd be deem'd a great and valuable Blessing.

Who

that could be produced. *Finite* Goodness might possibly have been exhausted in creating the greater Beings,

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Who does not see what way the Divine Goodness would incline in this Debate? For since it was better that these shou'd be, than not, is it not agreeable to infinite Goodness to choose the best? At least such a Choice could be no Injury to the greatest Goodness.

Whatever System God had chosen, all Creatures in it could not have been equally perfect, and there could have been but a certain determinate Multitude of the most Perfect, and when that was compleated, there would have been a Station for Creatures less perfect, and it would still have been an Instance of Goodness to give them a Being, as well as others: And therefore whatever System had been chosen, it would have come to what we see, perhaps it would have been worse. Since therefore whatever God had chosen, there must have been Degrees of Perfection, and one Creature must have been more imperfect and infirm than another, ought we not to conclude that our present System is at least equal to any other that we could have expected?

Hence it appears why God created such Beings, as must necessarily have an Intercourse with each other, and how agreeable it was to the Divine Goodness not to deny them Existence. There could be no reason to ask why he did not make them of a more perfect Order, since as many of that Kind are made already as the System could receive, of what Kind soever that System were supposed to be. Neither could the Benefit of the whole be render'd absolutely, in all Cases, and at all times consistent with that of Particulars. For tho' this might perhaps be effected in the more perfect Orders, yet it is plainly impossible in the less perfect ones, such as have a Connection with Matter, that is necessarily subject to Contrariety and Dissolution; and especially those which have solid and hard Bodies. Either therefore no such Animals as these were to have been created, or these Inconveniencies tolerated: Supposing always that their Existence is a Blessing to them notwithstanding these Inconveniencies, and that more Good than Evil accrues to them from the Possession of it.

From hence it will appear how fruitful a Source of Evils this Imperfection of Creatures may be, and that from this Head there flows a Possibility of Evil among the Works of God, notwithstanding Infinite Power and Goodness. How every particular Evil may be reduced to this Origin, shall be shewn (God willing) in the Sequel.

In the Interim who can doubt whether this Source of all Evils be itself to be call'd an Evil? Evil is by many defined
A Pri-

Beings, but *infinite* extends to all. The infinite Power and Goodness of God then were the

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a Privation of Good. In this it agrees with Defect or Imperfection, and a Man is called Evil, or an Action Evil, which brings us into Inconveniences, or is prejudicial to the Author or any other Person. With how much more reason then may Imperfection be called an Evil, since 'tis the Origin of all the Evils we endure, or which arise in the Mundane System.

But inanimate Things, you say, are capable of neither Good nor Evil, and therefore it does not signify in what Condition they be placed, sensible Things only can be miserable. I answer, 'tis true inanimate Creatures are not capable of some kind of Evils, *viz.* Pain, Grief, or undue Elections; but are there no other Evils which they may be subject to? Who wou'd not think himself ill dealt with, if he should be reduced to the State of an inanimate Creature? He wou'd feel no Inconveniences, say you. I grant it, but this very not feeling is dreaded by us as one of the greatest of all Evils. This Deprivation of Sense therefore, is far from being desirable, and consequently far from being good. To be deprived of Sense is what we call an Evil of *Loss*, tho' it be not a sensible one.

If any one should take away a Man's Feeling by a blow or any other way, nay if he did not restore it to him when he had this in his Power, wou'd he not be mischievous and injurious to him, tho' the Sufferer be not at all sensible of the Injury? Now who can affirm that God cou'd not have endowed every thing with Sense, at least have join'd a sensitive Soul to every Particle of Matter? May we not complain therefore that he has not done it? Is it not equally disadvantageous for inanimate things never to have had Sense, as for animated Beings to be deprived of it?

And yet some are so perverse that they will not have this Imperfection called an Evil, tho' it really be as great an one as the other.

However, we must observe that inanimate Things are not made for themselves, but for the Use of such as are endowed with Sense and Reason, they have therefore a relative good or Evil, both in regard to God, and to those Creatures for whose Use they were design'd, and as far as they answer the End they were made for we esteem them good, such as do otherwise are Evil: Of which Good or Evil there is no other ground but their Perfection or Imperfection.

The Origin of Evil is the same therefore in both sensitive and inanimate Beings, *viz.* the Absence of Perfection.

the Cause why imperfect Beings had Existence together with the more perfect. 'Tis plain therefore that the System of the World may be the *Work of a Deity*, tho' it *has this Fault*. Nay, that it was created is evident for this very Reason, because it is *imperfect*; for if it were *Self-existent*, it would be *absolutely perfect*. (24.)

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(24.) The chief Argument of the foregoing Chapter is beautifully illustrated by Mr. *Addison* in the *Spectator*, No. 519. As frequent use will be made of this Observation concerning the *Scale of Beings*, I hope the Reader will excuse my transcribing so much of the abovemention'd Paper as is necessary to explain it.

Infinite Goodness is of so communicative a Nature, that it seems to delight in the conferring of Existence upon every Degree of perceptive Being. As this is a Speculation which I have often pursued with great pleasure to my self, I shall enlarge farther upon it, by considering that part of the *Scale of Beings* which comes within our Knowledge. There are some living Creatures which are raised just above dead Matter. To mention only the Species of Shell-Fish, which are formed in the Fashion of a Cone, that grow to the Surface of several Rocks, and immediately die upon their being sever'd from the place where they grow. There are many other Creatures but one remove from these, which have no other Senses besides that of Feeling and Taste. Others have still an additional one of Hearing, others of Smell, and others of Sight. It is wonderful to observe, by what a gradual progress the World of Life advances thro' a prodigious variety of Species, before a Creature is formed that is compleat in all its Senses; and even among these is such a different Degree of Perfection, in the Sense which one Animal enjoys beyond what appears in another, that tho' the Sense in different Animals be distinguish'd by the same common Denomination, it seems almost of a different Nature. If after this we look into the several inward Perfections, Cunning and Sagacity, or what we generally call *Instinct**, we find them rising after the same manner imperceptibly one above another, and receiving additional Improvements according to the Species in which they are implanted. This Progress in Nature is so very gradual, that the most perfect of an inferior Species comes very near to the most imperfect

of

* To which we may add, *Will and Liberty*. See *Bayle's Dict.* p. 2609. 2610.

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* of that which is immediately above it. The exuberant and
 * overflowing Goodness of the supreme Being, whose Mercy
 * extends to all his Works, is plainly seen, as I have before hint-
 * ed from his having made so little Matter, at least what falls
 * within our Knowledge, that does not swarm with Life :
 * Nor is his Goodness less seen in the Diversity than in the
 * Multitude of living Creatures. Had he only made one
 * Species of Animals, none of the rest would have enjoy'd
 * the Happiness of Existence, he has therefore specified in his
 * Creation every degree of Life, every Capacity of Being.
 * The whole Chasm in Nature, from a Plant to a Man, is fil-
 * led up with diverse kinds of Creatures, rising one over ano-
 * ther, by such a gentle and easy ascent, that the little Tran-
 * sitions and Deviations from one Species to another, are al-
 * most insensible. This intermediate Space is so well hus-
 * banded and managed, that there is scarce a Degree of Per-
 * fection which does not appear in some one part of the World
 * of Life. Is the Goodness or Wisdom of the Divine Being
 * more manifested in this his Proceeding? There is a Con-
 * sequence, besides those I have already mentioned, which
 * seem very naturally deducible from the foregoing Consider-
 * ations. If the Scale of Being rises by such a regular Pro-
 * gress, so high as Man, we may, by a parity of Reason, sup-
 * pose that it still proceeds gradually thro' those Beings which
 * are of a superiour Nature to him; since there is an infinitely
 * greater Space and Room for different Degrees of Perfection
 * between the supreme Being and Man, than between Man
 * and the most despicable Insect. This Consequence of so great
 * a variety of Beings which are superior to us, from that vari-
 * ety which is inferior to us, is made by Mr. *Locke*, in a Pas-
 * sage which I shall here set down, after having premised, that
 * notwithstanding there is such infinite Room between Man
 * and his Maker for the creative Power to exert itself in, it
 * is impossible that it should ever be filled up; since there will
 * be still an Infinite Gap or Distance between the highest crea-
 * ted Being and the Power which produced him.'

The fine Passage there cited from Mr. *Locke*, occurs in the 3d Book of his Essay, Chap. 6. §. 12.

See also Notes, K. and 26.

From the foregoing Observation, that there is no manner
 of *Chasm* or *Void*, no Link deficient in this great Chain of Be-
 ings, and the Reason of it, it will appear extremely probable
 also that every distinct Order, every Class or Species of them,
 is as full as the Nature of it would admit, and God saw pro-
 per. There are (as our Author says) perhaps so many in each
 Class as could exist together without some *inconvenience* or *un-
 easiness* to each other. This is easily conceivable in Mankind,
 and may be in superior Beings, tho' for want of an exact
 Knowledge

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Knowledge of their several Natures and Orders, we cannot apprehend the manner of it, or conceive how they affect one another; only this we are sure of, that neither the Species, nor the Individuals in each Species, can possibly be Infinite; and that nothing but an *Impossibility* in the Nature of the thing, or some greater *Inconvenience*, can restrain the Exercise of the Power of God, or hinder him from producing still more and more Beings capable of Felicity. When we begin to enquire into the Number of these and the Degrees of their Perfection, we soon lose ourselves, and can only refer all to the Divine Wisdom and Goodness: From our previous Notices of which Attributes, we have the highest Reason to conclude that every thing is as perfect as possible in its own kind, and that every System is in itself full and compleat.

CHAP. IV.

Concerning Natural Evil.

SECT. I.

Of Generation and Corruption.

A Creature cannot complain of its Fate, though it be less perfect than others.

The Origin of things from Matter, is the source of Natural Evils, as their rise from Nothing is the Cause of those of Imperfections.

IT appears from the foregoing Observations that created Beings must necessarily be *defective*, i. e. some must want the Perfections which others have, and that it was impossible for them to enjoy either an absolute or equal Perfection; also, that there is no Occasion for an Evil Principle opposite to infinite Goodness and Power. And from hence we may affirm that God, though infinitely good and powerful, could not separate things from the concomitant Evils of Imperfection, and did not esteem it unbecoming himself to create the Good, though that brought some Evils along with it, so long as these Evils are less than the Good with which they are connected. Nor can the Creature justly complain of its Condition, if it have not all, or equal Perfection with some others; since 'twas necessary that it should fill the Station wherein it was placed, or none at all. This we have shewn sufficiently, I think, in the former kind of Evils, viz. those of *Imperfection*.

II. The same must be attempted in the second kind, viz. the *Natural*. Now, as all created Beings are made out of *Nothing*, and on that account are necessarily imperfect; so all natural things have a Relation to, or arise from *Matter*, and on this account

count are necessarily subjected to natural Evils : Nor is the rise of all created Beings from Nothing a more fruitful and certain Cause of the Evils of Imperfection, than the rise of all natural things from Matter is of all natural Evils. (H.) If therefore

we

NOTES.

(H.) The Objection against this Position stands thus. Not only Generation and Corruption are natural Evils, but likewise Pains of Body and Dissatisfaction of Mind, Disappointments of Appetite and Death. Now it is manifest that all material Beings are not subject to these, particularly Man in Paradise as to his Body was material, and yet free from Death, and all natural Evils, and the same is true of the Blessed in Heaven. Since therefore material Beings may be free from all natural Evils, it follows that they are not necessarily subject to such because they are Material, and consequently we must look for another Origin of natural Evils distinct from Matter.

The Answer to this Objection, that seems to have so great force in it, is not difficult. 'Tis manifest from the Book that when it affirms all material Beings are liable to natural Evils, it is not meant that they are always actually affected by them, but that they are capable of being so affected at certain Times, and in certain Circumstances ; and yet their Circumstances may perhaps be so ordered that they shall be always free from them.

For Example, Man in Paradise was naturally Mortal, and though we do not know what sort of Body he had, yet we are sure that he had an Appetite to eat and drink, and needed these to support him.

How then could he avoid Pain, Disappointment of Appetite and Death ? I answer by being placed in such Circumstances that he should always have sufficient Provision ready to satisfy his Hunger and Thirst, and such Knowledge of all things that could hurt him, that he might easily avoid them. His Blood was inflammable then as well as now, and consequently he was subject to a Fever. His Limbs might be broken and disjoined then as well as now, and that must disable him to manage his Business, and disappoint a natural Appetite of moving where his Occasions required. But God gave him the Tree of Life as a Remedy against all natural Distempers and Decays of Body, and either such a Prospect of what could hurt him as might enable him to avoid the Occasion, or else if that happened he was restored by the use of the same Tree of Life. After all it doth not appear from Scripture, that Man in his Innocency was secure from all natural Evils, but only from such as might deprive him of Life, or make that Life uncomfortable to him. If any Divines have gone farther it is mere

we can shew that these Evils are so necessarily connected with this Origin that they cannot be separated from it, it follows that the Structure of the World either ought not to have been framed at all, or that these Evils must have been tolerated without any Imputation on the Divine Power and Goodness. But it is better that they should be as they are, since they could not be more perfect. Let us examine the particular Sorts of natural Evils, and if there be nothing in them which could be removed without greater Damage to Nature, and introducing a larger Train of Evils, the Divine Goodness may securely applaud itself, since it has omitted no manner of Good nor admitted any Evil which could possibly be prevented, *i. e.* hath done in every thing what was best.

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conjecture, and no part either of the Faith taught in Scripture, or conveyed to us by the Catholick Church. The Author of the Origin of Evil has given his Thoughts concerning the Estate of our first Parents more fully in a Discourse on *Gen. ii. 17.* Where he founds himself on the Word of God and speaks conformably to the Sense of the Primitive and reformed Churches, but it were too long to insert here. ||

From what has been said already I suppose it is manifest, that the Happiness of Man in Paradise is no Argument against the Position in the Book, that all things material are liable to natural Evils, to Corruption and Dissolution, and if united to a Spiritual Substance that has Sense or Reason, they make it likewise capable of Pain, and of the Dissatisfaction that arises from the Disappointment of Appetites.

As to the Blessed in Heaven, their Case is much more easy to be accounted for, and I think those Words of the 4th Ch. S. 3. Subf. 2. are sufficient. 'I answer, these Bodies are not therefore immortal, because they are naturally incorruptible (for that would be inconsistent with the Nature of that Matter whereof they are composed) but because they are put into such Places and Circumstances by the Deity, that they can even with Pleasure foresee, and prevent all such things as tend to introduce either *Corruption* or *Pain*. I am apt to think the Objector either never read, or did not consider this when he made the Objection.

III.

|| See the *Sermon* annexed.

III. God has accomplished this in the Creation of *Matter*, as we said before, nor has he been less beneficent in what relates to the *Motion* of *Matter*. In the first Place, *Matter*, though in itself unactive, is nevertheless capable of Action, viz. *local Motion*, which is the Action that belongs to *Matter*. But 'tis better that it should act as far as it is capable, than be entirely still and sluggish: If it were without Motion, rigid and fixed in the same Place, we cannot conceive what Benefit it could be of either to itself or any thing else: But when 'tis put into Motion, it may be of use, as is plain from Experience; though not always without a Mixture of Evils: But Action is *cæteris paribus*, preferable to Inactivity; it is therefore agreeable to the Divine Goodness to produce Motion in *Matter*, if the Good arising from thence do not overballance the Evil, and so long as no Evils are permitted which are separable from Motion, nor such as can affect Spirits, which are purely immaterial.

IV. Now, if it be granted that God could, consistently with his Goodness, both create *Matter* and put it into *Motion*, it necessarily follows that its Motions must interfere with one another. If you say that *Matter* might move uniformly and all together, either in a *direct Line* or a *Circle*, and the contrariety of Motions by that means be prevented: I answer, The whole Mass of *Matter* would be no less rigid and useless with such a Motion as this, than if it were entirely at rest; it would neither be more fit for Animals, nor more adapted to the uses which it now answers. Such a Motion therefore was to be excited in it, as would separate it into parts, make it fluid, and render it an Habitation fit for Animals. But that could not be without contrariety of Motion, as any one that thinks of it at all will perceive: And if this be once admitted in *Matter*, there necessarily follows a *Division* and *Disparity* of Parts, *Clashing* and *Opposition*,

Matter is useless except it have Motion.

Such Motion was to be raised in *Matter*, as might separate it into parts. Hence the Generation and Corruption of Bodies.

Communion, Concretion and Repulsion, and all those Evils which we behold in *Generation and Corruption*. God could indeed have removed all these from Matter, by taking away its Motion, but they are either to be tolerated, or Matter must remain fix'd and immoveable in the same Situation. Some may ask, why God would not produce such Motion in Matter as might render all its Concretions so perfect as not to be liable to *Dissolution or Corruption*. For since the Power of God is infinite, nothing on his side hinders this from being done; what hinders therefore on the side of Matter? I answer, Its *Motion and Divisibility*. For if you suppose any sort of Motion in Matter, it must necessarily be either *useless*, as we said before, or in *opposite Directions*. The mutual clashing of these Concretions could therefore not be avoided, and as they strike upon one another, whether we suppose them hard or soft, a Concussion of the Parts and a Separation from each other would be necessarily produced: But a Separation or Dissipation of the parts is *Corruption*. This therefore could not be avoided without violence done to the Laws of Motion and the Nature of Matter. For to hinder moveable things from ever interfering, and the Parts which are naturally separable from ever separating by mutual impulses, would require a *perpetual Miracle*. (25.)

V. Secondly,

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(25.) That is, there could be no general pre-establish'd *Laws of Nature*, but God must continually interpose and effect every thing by his own direct and immediate Power: The bad consequences of which are very obvious. There could be no *Arts or Sciences*, no *Skill or Industry*; no regular Methods of providing for our Bodies, or improving our Minds in the Knowledge of things. All which evidently presuppose and are entirely founded on some settled, certain Laws of the Universe discoverable by us.

‘ We are so far acquainted (says the Author of the *Religion of Nature* delin. p. 96.) with the *Laws of Gravitation and Motion*, that

V. Secondly, Since it is proper that Matter should be put into Motion, 'tis better that this should be done according to some certain Laws and in an orderly Course, than at random, and as it were by chance. For by this Means the Systems compos'd of Matter will have both more durable and more regular Periods. The first Evil arising from Matter was, we said, the *jarring* of Elements; from hence comes this Corruption and Dissolution, Instability and Vicissitude. It may be surprizing, that all these should proceed from a stable, fix'd and uniform Good. But we have made it appear that Matter could not move at all without these, and it was more eligible that the World should be liable to them, than destitute of Animals. And that these Evils should not multiply beyond Necessity the Divine Goodness has taken care, by restraining its Motion under certain Laws, so as to make it steady, and as constant as could be; so that the Machines compos'd of it might be as little shock'd with contrary Motions as possible, and endure for a long time; nay some of them in certain Places and Circumstances for ever. For if no parcels of Matter were directed by any certain and determinate Rule, such a confused Motion would jumble every thing together, nor could any thing last for ever so short a time. On this account God establish'd certain Laws of Motion, and perpetual Rules; and framed the great Mass of Beings into certain Machines and Systems, which have such an exact Correspondence

Motion under certain Laws tends more to the preservation of things, than if it were left at random: Hence God distributed Bodies into various Systems.

as

NOTES.

- that we are able to calculate their Effects, and serve ourselves
- of them, supplying upon many Occasions the defect of Power
- in ourselves by *Mechanical Powers*, which never fail to answer
- according to the Establishment, &c.' Concerning the Necessity of the present Laws of Motion, and the Fitnefs of them to attain the intended Ends, see Dr. *J. Clarke* on *Natural Evil*, p. 92, &c. and 150, 158.

as to contribute their mutual Assistance towards preserving the Motion and Order prescribed by the Deity. (L.) Neither was it convenient that Matter should every where consist of the same kind of Parts; but rather that it should be in one place very fluid, similar and homogeneous, such as we believe the *Æther* to be; in another, solid and compact, as the Earth is, and perhaps the Stars; in another, mix'd with heterogeneous Particles, such as we find the Air and Water.

It appears from Light and other Phenomena, that the Systems of the Universe are very good and beautiful.

VI. We must confess that such a Mass as the Earth is, seems not so beautiful or so fit for Motion, as the pure fluid *Æther*; 'tis also more liable to Corruption and Changes; yet it is most certain that the Earth was not constituted in this manner for no reason at all, or unnecessarily: Perhaps the

NOTES.

(L.) 'Tis objected that the Author avoids the chief Difficulty, and which stood most in need of an Answer. For he supposes certain general Laws upon the Establishment whereof Evils must necessarily invade the Works of God; but he does not tell us why God established these Laws, which must bring so great Evils along with them: could not an Omnipotent, All-knowing, and absolutely Good God have made other Laws free from all these Defects? Why did he bind himself to such universal Rules? Could he not have interposed his Omnipotence and dispens'd with these Laws, and thereby prevented every Evil which would arise from the Observance of them? The Author is silent on this Head.

But it is evident that the Author had these Difficulties in view, and has given a proper Reply to each. Wherever he has mention'd any universal Law, he shews that it arises from the very Nature and Constitution of things, and that a better could not possibly be made, nor one which is more necessary for the Preservation of those Beings to which it is given: And that it could not be dispens'd with, at least frequently, without detriment to the whole*.

If therefore all the Fault must needs be laid upon God; yet he is not to be blamed for fixing such general Laws, but rather for making such imperfect Creatures, which necessarily required these Laws and were incapable of better. This is the true state of the Question, and of this the Author has also given an account in the foregoing Chapter. See Note (G.)

* See C. 5. §. 5. Subf. 3.

the *Mundane* System could no more consist without these solid Masses, than the human Body without Bones. No sober Man doubts but God could have disposed this Material World into other Systems; and of what kind soever these had been, our reason could never have comprehended the contrivance of them. For, since our Planetary System is incomprehensible to us, much more will the Fabrick of the whole Universe be so; but as far as we do understand the Disposition of it, all is well, elegant and beautiful: and if, among all the Phenomena of Nature, we were only acquainted with Light, that would shew us the just and admirable Structure of it. It is reasonable therefore to believe that this is the very best, and attended with the least Inconveniencies.

VII. You'll say that some particular things might have been better. But, since you do not thoroughly understand the whole, you have no right to affirm thus much. We have much greater Reason to presume that no one Part of it could be changed for the better, without greater Detriment to the rest, which it would either be inconsistent with, or disfigure by its Disproportion *. For we have shewn before, that all manner of Inconveniencies could not be avoided, because of the Imperfection of Matter, and the Nature of Motion. That State of things was therefore preferable, which was attended with the fewest and least Inconveniencies. And who but a very harsh, indiscreet Person will affirm that God has not actually made choice of this? Nay, who can do it with any Shadow of Reason, unless he thoroughly understands both this and that other which he would prefer to it? Whoever pronounces upon them before this, gives Sentence before he has look'd into the Cause, and is at the same time both a partial and an incompetent Judge.

'Tis rash to affirm that Matter might be distributed into better Systems, since we do not thoro'ly understand the present.

It

* See Note 28.

It concerned us the more to have this well explained, that being convinced of the Convenience or *Meliority* of the whole Material System, we may more easily perceive the Origin of those Evils which necessarily follow from the *Contrariety* of Motion, and the *Corruption* of things.

S E C T. II.

Concerning Animals and the Variety of them.

Matter does not seem to be made for its own sake, since it is not Self-conscious, 'tis therefore design'd for the Use of Animals.

SINCE Matter is not self-conscious, nor able to enjoy itself, nor capable of receiving any Benefit from itself, it follows that it was not made for itself, but for something else, to which it was to be subservient in Sensation, Thought, or Fruition. We find by Experience that Matter can be thus serviceable to a thinking Being, tho' stupid and insensible itself: 'Tis probable therefore that God designed and directed all Matter to this end as far as was possible. Hence comes the Union of sensible and thinking Beings with the Particles of Matter, as we experience in ourselves. The same may be said of all its Parts, as far as the order and constitution of things allow'd. There is nothing therefore in vain, nothing idle, nor any Region without its Animals. For supposing, as we said, so many pure Spirits separate from Matter, to be made as were convenient; as these occupy no Place *, there would be no less Room for other thinking sensible Substances that stood in need of Matter for the Exercise of their Faculties, and enjoyment

* See Note 7.

joyment of themselves, which for the future let us call *Souls*. (K.)

II. Now

NOTES.

(K.) The Author has endeavoured to account for this *Variety* of Creatures in the following Manner. All Beings could not be placed in the same Degree of Happiness, or in the same order of Perfection, neither could all of the same Order be in the same Degree, or enjoy the same Conveniencies. The good of the whole would not allow it. For instance, suppose a certain Order of intelligent Creatures made by God, which have a mutual Intercourse, and stand in need of each others Assistance to promote the common Happiness, which they are obliged to promote with united Powers and Inclinations.

'Tis plain, that there's a Necessity for Government among them; for as they have Appetites and Choice, and a limited Understanding, 'tis impossible for them to administer the Affairs of the Publick (in which the good of all consists) by the same means, at the same time and with a joint Endeavour, without devolving a Right to determine these things on some one or more Persons. Whence arises a Necessity for Rule or Government among such reasonable Creatures. Nor could it be avoided where there is both a mutual Intercourse and a limited Understanding. On which account the same is observable among the Angels themselves.

But now 'tis plain that those who happen to have this Government over such as are naturally their equals, are in better Circumstances with regard to externals, than those which have only the Honour of obeying. They may with greater certainty and ease, and in more Cases obtain their Ends, effect their Choice, and accomplish their Desires, (*i. e.* be happy) than those which are obliged to postpone the Gratification of their Senses and the Execution of their Designs, and absolutely conform themselves to another's Will, which they must necessarily do who are subject to the Rule of others.

And yet it is impossible that this should be every one's Lot. 'Tis impossible all should be Rulers and none Subjects. From this Example we see how the Relations which Creatures have to one another, may put a Restraint even on infinite Power, so that it will be a Contradiction for them while they keep the Nature which they have at present, to be in some Respects otherwise disposed than they now are, nor can all of the same Order be gratified with the same Conveniencies. From hence it follows either that a God of infinite Wisdom and Goodness, is obliged by these Attributes to restrain his Power from creating any such Creatures, or that he must assign them Stations very distant from the highest Happiness which they are capable of.

Hence

'Tis probable that Animals vary according to the variety of those regions which they are destin'd to inhabit : Therefore the Æther and Air, in all probability, have their proper Inhabitants, as well as the Earth.

II. Now, since the Structure of this visible World consists of various Bodies, *viz.* pure Æther, Air, Earth, &c. 'tis highly probable, as we said before, that each of these has its proper Inhabitants, *viz.* by the Union of Souls with Parcels of Matter. Without such an Union, we cannot apprehend how there should be either Æthereal or Aerial Animals. For the most fluid Bodies if not united to an immaterial Soul, or compacted together, would be immediately dissolved, and every blast of Wind would dissipate such Animals : Either then these vast Fields of Air or Æther must be entirely destitute of Inhabitants, which very few will believe, who behold every clod of Earth stock'd with Animals ; or furnished after some such Manner as we conjecture. (26.) If you

NOTES.

Hence also it appears, why all things do not answer every one's Appetite. Why we are not enriched with as many Benefits as the Capacity of our Nature seems to require. For tho' the infinite Goodness of God encourages us to promise ourselves thus much, yet Wisdom and Justice set bounds as it were to his Goodness, and shew that this cannot be done without Detriment to the whole ; that either this Inconvenience must be tolerated, or no such Creatures made ; and that it was better not to give some so great a Degree of Happiness as their Natures might receive, than that a whole Species of Beings should be wanting to the World.

If it be ask'd why God did not make this Species in another and more perfect Manner, so as to be free from this Inconvenience. I answer, that then it would have belonged to another Species, and been of a different Order of Creatures : And I suppose as many of the Species to be made already as the System would admit, but that there was still room for these inferior ones, which must necessarily have had the Nature they now are of or none at all, as has been often said, and I'm unwillingly obliged to repeat it.

(26.) We have a beautiful Description of our Author's conjecture in the *Speſtator*, N^o. 519. 'If we consider those Parts of the Material World which lie the nearest to us, and are therefore subject to our Observations and Enquiries, it is amazing to consider the Infinity of Animals with which it is stocked. Every part of Matter is peopled ; every green Leaf swarms with

you say, here's Room for pure Spirits. I answer; Since these do not fill up Place, nor have any Relation to it, 'tis the same thing wherever they be, and Material Substances have nothing at all to do with them: It is not therefore necessary to suppose such large Tracts of Air or Æther void of Animals, in order to make Room for these, for which it would be no less commodious, if replenish'd with, than if destitute of Animals. If then this be granted us, we may affirm that there is as great variety of Souls, as of Animals; and that it is one Species which exerts its Operations by the help of Ætherial Matter,

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with Inhabitants. There is scarce a single Humour in the Body of Man, or of any other Animal, in which our Glasses do not discover myriads of living Creatures. The Surface of Animals is also covered with other Animals, which are in the same manner the Basis of other Animals that live upon it; nay, we find in the most solid Bodies, as in Marble itself, innumerable Cells and Cavities that are crowded with such imperceptible Inhabitants, as are too little for the naked Eye to discover. On the other Hand, if we look into the more bulky Parts of Nature, we see the Seas, Lakes and Rivers, teeming with numberless kinds of living Creatures: We find every Mountain and Marsh, Wilderness and Wood, plentifully stocked with Birds and Beasts, and every Part of Matter affording proper necessaries and conveniencies for the Livelihood of Multitudes which inhabit it. The Author of the *Plurality of Worlds* draws a very good Argument from this Consideration, for the *peopling* of every Planet; as indeed it seems very probable from the analogy of Reason, that if no part of Matter which we are acquainted with, lies waste and useless, those great Bodies which are at such a distance from us, should not be desert and unpeopled, but rather that they should be furnished with Beings adapted to their respective Situations. *Existence* is a Blessing to those Beings only which are endowed with Perception, and is in a manner thrown away upon dead Matter, any farther than as it is subservient to Beings which are conscious of their Existence. Accordingly we find from the Bodies which lie under our Observation, that Matter is only made as the Basis and Support of Animals, and there is no more of the one than what is necessary for the Existence of the other. See also Dr. *Scott's Works*, Vol. 2. Discourse 15. p. 308, &c. Fol.

Matter, and another which stands in need of Aerial, and a third of Terrestrial. Neither will every Element be fit for every Animal, but each will have its proper Inhabitants: Nor can there be any just Cause of Complaint that they are uneasy out of their proper Element, that Men cannot live any while commodiously in Æther, nor perhaps Ætherial Animals upon the Earth: For 'tis sufficient if every one nourishes its proper Inhabitants, according to the Nature and Constitution of each.

The Earth as being the least part of the Mundane System, is not to be chiefly regarded but yet is not made to no purpose, or without design.

III. That is a foolish Objection therefore of the *Epicurean Lucretius* *, that the World owes not its Original to a Divine Power and Goodness, because Mountains, Woods and Rocks, large Fens, and the Ocean cover so great a share of it: that the *burning heat*, viz. of the *Torrid Zone*, and the *eternal Frost*, viz. of the two *Frigid*, take up almost two Parts of it; since the Sea, the Rocks, Winds and Mountains are not entirely useless in their present Situation; which was requisite for the good of the Universe, and the Order of the Mundane System. Neither was the Earth or its Inhabitants to be regarded in the first Place. For, since it is but a small Part of the whole, and almost a Point, where would have been the Wonder if it had not been fit for any Inhabitants at all? If it did but promote the good of the whole, while itself was barren and empty. If this had been the Case, it would not have proved an useless part of the World, any more than a Nail is of a Man's Body; and it is as absurd to desire that all parts of the Universe should immediately afford Habitation to Animals, as that every Part and Member of an animated Body should by itself constitute an Animal; 'tis sufficient if every particular Member conspire with the rest, and exercise its own

* See Bentley's Eighth Sermon § 10. p. 329. 5th Edition or Bates on the Existence of God, &c. Chap. 1, 2, and 3. or Cockburn's Essays, 1st Part, Ess. 7. par. 5, &c. and 2d Part, Ess. 4. par. 5, &c. and the Authors mention'd in Note 38.

own proper Function, and consequently that the Earth, which is a Member of the Universe, have its peculiar use in promoting the Good of the whole. If therefore the whole Earth was serviceable, not to preserve Animals, but only Motion, nothing could be objected from thence against the Goodness of its Author. Neither would it appear strange to any that considers the Immensity of the Works of God, and how minute a Portion of them the Earth is, if it were entirely destitute of Inhabitants: Nor would it therefore be in vain. How much more then may we admire the Goodness and Wisdom of God therein, who has filled the whole and every part of it with Life.

IV. He knew best what Creatures every part of it was fit for, and has assigned to each its proper Place, as is evident to every Observer: The Mountains, the Woods, the Rocks, the Seas, have their proper Inhabitants, which they supply with Nourishment. The System of the World required a Globe of solid Matter such as the Earth is, and we have Reason to believe that this is; as it were, a Wheel in the great Automaton, without which its Motion would be very imperfect. But besides this principal End, the Divine Wisdom saw that it might serve for Nutriment to several kinds of Animals, that no manner of Good therefore might be omitted which was consistent with the primary End, he filled it with all those Animals that it was capable of, nor could the Earth afford Sustenance to any superior or more proper Beings. God has given those Parts to the Brutes which are unfit for Men; and that there might be nothing useless, which yet could not be alter'd without Detriment to the whole, he has adapted Animals to every Part and Region of it; and since the Habitations could not conveniently be converted into any other Form, he provided such Animals as wanted and were agreeable to these

The Earth may be conceived as a Wheel in this Automaton of the World, without which its Motion would be defective: in the interim it affords an Habitation and Food to Animals.

Habitations. Hence Mountains, Woods and Rocks give Harbour to wild Beasts, the Sea to Fishes, the Earth to Insects. Neither ought we to complain that the whole Earth is not of use to Man, since that was not the principal End it was made for; but, on the contrary, Man was for this reason placed upon the Earth, because it afforded a convenient Receptacle for him. And what if it had been totally unfit for Man? Would it therefore have been in vain? By no means. On the contrary, we are certain that God would have given it other Inhabitants, to whose Maintenance it might have been subservient. (27.)

V. Those

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(27.) Our Author's Argument here might be carry'd much farther, and the infinite Wisdom of the Creator demonstrated not only from his having made nothing in vain, or useless in *itself*, but also from the distinct and *various* Relations which every thing bears to *others*, and its contribution to the good of the whole: From the double, the *manifold* apparent *Uses* of almost every thing in Nature.

Thus the Mountains mention'd in the Objection of *Lucretius*, and which many Moderns have also misrepresented as deformities of Nature, have not only their own peculiar Inhabitants, but also afford to other Animals the most commodious Harbour and Maintenance, the best Remedies and Retreats. To them we owe the most pleasant Prospects, the most delicious Wines, the most curious Vegetables, the richest and most useful Metals, Minerals, and other Fossils; and, what is more than all, a wholesome Air; and the Convenience of navigable Rivers and Fountains.

The Ocean, besides the Support of its own Inhabitants (which are, in all probability, as numerous and various as those of the Earth) provides also vast Quantities of Vapours, which refresh and fructify the Earth itself, and nourish and support its Inhabitants, producing Springs, Lakes and Rivers. The lesser Seas, Fens and Lakes, are so admirably well distributed throughout the Globe, as to afford sufficient Vapours for Clouds and Rains to temper the Cold of the Northern Air, to cool and mitigate the Heats of the Torrid Zone, and refresh the whole Earth with fertile Showers: As is fully proved by *Derham*. *

As

* *Physico-Theol.* B. 2. C. 5. & B. 3. C. 4.

V. Those therefore who urge the unsuitness of certain Parts of the Earth for the Sustenance of Man, as a Fault and Defect of the Divine Skill in making them, are oblig'd to prove that the Earth was made for the sake of Mankind only, and not of the Universe; and that every thing in the World is useless which does not immediately tend to the use of Man. But this is absurd, and what no one would object, who is not blinded with Pride and Ignorance*. We ought rather to admire the Power and Goodness of God who has so temper'd his Works, though they be immense and infinitely various, that there is nothing in them which exists not in the very best manner with respect to the Whole, and which he has not replenish'd with its proper Inhabitants. And since the Variety of

The Earth is made not for Man alone, but for the Universe: to think otherwise favours of human pride.

NOTES.

As to the variety of Uses which the same thing is render'd capable of and manifestly designed for by its All-wise Author, see *Colliber's Impartial Enquiry into the Existence, &c. of God*, p. 80. 'To obtain a great number of Ends by as few means as may be, is the highest point of Wisdom. But nothing can be imagin'd more admirable in this respect than the present frame of things. Thus tho' the human Body is composed of a great variety of Parts, yet how much more numerous are their Uses? How many are the Uses of the Hand, which directed by Reason is instead of all other Instruments? How many Advantages do we owe to the Eye, the Ear, and the Tongue? And if we take a deeper View, and look into the minuter parts of which these are compounded, what can be more admirable than the Variety of Aims and Intentions that may be observed in each? The several Uses of the Structure and Position of each single Muscle have been computed by *Galen* in his Book *de Formatione Fetus* to be no less than ten. The like may be observed with reference to the Bones and other similar Parts, but especially with respect to the Members of such as are heterogeneous or dissimilar.' p. 81.

The same is shewn at large by Dr. *Grew*, *Cosmologia Sacra*, B. 1. C. 5. par. 13, 14, &c. or *W. Scott* on the *Wisdom and Goodness of God*, Sermon. 1. p. 15, &c. or *Bp. Wilkins* *Princ. of Nat. Relig.* C. 6.

* See Note 22.

of the constituent Parts and Regions of the Earth is no greater than the Nature of the whole Machine required, nor the Species of Animals fewer than the Food would supply, we must conclude there is nothing deficient or redundant. (28.)

NOTES.

(28.) Hence I think we may safely conclude with our Author in general, that there could have been no *partial* Alteration of this System, but for the worse, as far as we know; at least not for the better. They who hold that there might have been a *total* one, that the whole Scheme of Things might possibly have been alter'd or revers'd, and that either the direct contrary, or a quite different one, would have been more worthy of God; the Men, I say, that hold this, are oblig'd to shew the possibility of conceiving it, and to explain the manner how it may be, before we are oblig'd to believe them. They must shew that the same things which are now conducive to our Happiness, and consequently the Objects of our Love, might as easily have tended to our Misery; and consequently have been as reasonably the Objects of our Aversion; that the same Passions, Objects, Exercises, and Inclinations which now create pleasure in us, might have produced a different, a quite contrary effect, or no effect at all. This they are obliged to do: and when they have done all this, and completed their System, and made a total alteration of things, as they imagine, for the better, they are at last only got to the above mention'd absurdity of putting this System into a higher *Class*, whereas all the different Classes in every conceivable Degree of Perfection, were suppos'd to be entirely filled at the first. We must therefore take things as they are, and argue only from the present Nature of them collectively: In which View we shall find no possible alteration of any thing, but what would produce the same or greater Inconveniences, either in itself, or others, to which it bears a strict relation. Instances of this kind are every where to be met with: particular Proofs of it in the natural World, occur in *Bentley's Boyle's Lect.* particularly with regard to the five *Senses* of the human Body, p. 95, 96. [See also *Locke on Human Understanding*, B. 2. C. 23. §. 12.] with respect to the figure and stature of it, in *Grew's Cosmologia Sacra*, B. 1, C. 5. §. 25, &c. and to the several Parts of it, all over *Boyle**, *Cheyne*, *Derham*, *Newentyt*, *Ray*, *Cockburn*, *Edwards*, *W. Scott*, or *Pelling*.

The

* On Final Causes.

NOTES.

The same might easily be shewn in the immaterial World, and in the most exceptionable Part of it, *viz.* the Soul of Man, its Knowledge, Freedom, Affections†.

I shall take the liberty to borrow a Section from Mr. *Maxwell's* general Remarks on *Cumberland*, C. 5. which sets this Subject in a very good light. "The *Nature of Things* in the "natural World is so exactly fitted to the natural *Faculties* "and Dispositions of Mankind, that were any thing in it "otherwise than it is, even in Degree, Mankind would be "less happy than they now are. Thus the dependence of "all natural Effects upon a few *simple Principles*, is wonder- "fully advantageous in many respects, The degrees of all "the sensible Pleasures are exactly suited to the use of each ; "so that if we enjoy'd any of them in a greater degree, we "should be less happy: for our Appetites of those Pleasures "would by that means be too strong for our Reason; and, "as we are framed, tempt us to an immoderate enjoyment "of them, so as to prejudice our Bodies. And where we "enjoy some of them in so high a degree, as that it is in "many cases very difficult for the strongest Reason to regulate "and moderate the Appetites of such Pleasures, it is in such "Instances where it was necessary to counterpoise some disad- "vantages, which are the consequences of the pursuit of "those Pleasures. Thus the pleasing Ideas which accom- "pany the Love of the Sexes, are necessary to be possessed "in so high a degree, to ballance the *Cares of Matrimony*, "and also the Pains of Child-bearing in the Female Sex. "The same may be said of our *Intellectual Pleasures*. Thus "did we receive a greater Pleasure from Benevolence, "Sloth would be encouraged by an immoderate Bounty. "And were the Pleasures of our Enquiries into the Truth "greater, we should be too speculative and less active. It "seems also probable, that the Degree of our Intellectual "Capacity is very well suited to our Objects of Knowledge, "and that had we a greater degree thereof, all other things "remaining as they are, we should be less happy. More- "over, it is probably so adapted to the Frame of our Bodies, "that it could not be greater, without either an alteration in "the Laws of Nature, or in the Laws of Union between "the Soul and Body. Farther; were it much greater than "it is, our Thoughts and Pursuits would be so spiritual and "refin'd, that we should be taken too much off from the sen- "sible Pleasures: We should probably be conscious of some "Defects or wants in our bodily Organs, and would be

K 2

"sensible

† See Sir M. Hale's *Prim. Orig. of Mank.* C. 2. *De Ho- mine*, p. 52.

NOTES.

“ sensible that they were unequal to so great a Capacity,
 “ which would necessary be followed by Uneasiness of
 “ Mind. And this seems to hold in the Brute Creation:
 “ For, methinks it would be for the disadvantage of a Horse,
 “ to be endowed with the Understanding of a Man; such
 “ an unequal Union must be attended with continual dis-
 “ quietudes and discontents. As for our Pains, they are all ei-
 “ ther Warnings against bodily Disorders, or such as, had
 “ we wanted them, the Laws of Nature remaining as they
 “ are, we should either have wanted some Pleasures we now
 “ enjoy, or have possessed them in a less degree. Those
 “ things in Nature which we cannot reconcile to the fore-
 “ going opinion, as being ignorant of their Use, we have
 “ good Reason from Analogy to believe, are really advanta-
 “ geous, and adapted to the Happiness of the Intelligent Beings
 “ of the System: though we have not so full and com-
 “ plete a Knowledge of the entire System, as to be able to
 “ point out their particular uses. From these Observations
 “ we may conclude, that all the various Parts of our System
 “ are so admirably suited to one another, and the Whole con-
 “ trived with such exquisite Wisdom, that were any thing,
 “ in any part thereof, in the least otherwise than it is, with-
 “ out an alteration in the whole, there would be a less Sum-
 “ of Happiness in the System than there now is.”

See also the Ingenious Author of the *Nature and Conduct of the Passions*, p. 179, 201, 202.

But this will be more fully considered in the 4th Section.

S E C T. II.

Of Death.

‘Tis pro-
 bable that
 the Solidi-
 ty of our
 Bodies is
 the cause
 why we
 move
 them whi-
 ther we
 please.

A soul
 united to

WE know by Experience that Souls united to
 Bodies move them some way or other; viz.
 by Thought and Volition: for thus we move our
 own. And ‘tis probable that the Gravity, Solidity,
 and Hardness of our Bodies, together with the Re-
 sistance of the adjacent ones, are the Causes why we
 cannot move them every way as we please.

II. A Soul when united to a portion of ethereal,
 uniform, and perfectly fluid Matter, free from the
 Impedi-

Impediment of Gravity and Resistance, may in all probability move its Body whithersoever it pleases. Such a Body therefore would be perfectly obsequious to the thought and will of the Soul that inhabits it: and if it receiv'd any detriment from the neighbouring Bodies, it could repair it by its Will alone; at least so long as the Æther continued in its Fluidity and Purity. Unless the Animal therefore willed the contrary, its Body would be *incorruptible*, and always fit for Union, *i. e. immortal*. If any one object that the Bodies of the Blessed, which we call *Celestial*, need no Motion or Change of Condition, since they enjoy continual Pleasure; for no one moves or changes his State, but in order to remove some present Uneasiness. I answer; These Bodies are not therefore immortal, because they are naturally incorruptible (for that would be incompatible with the Nature of that Matter whereof they are composed) but because they are put into such Places and Circumstances by the Deity, that they can, even with Pleasure, foresee and prevent all such things as might tend to introduce either *Corruption* or *Pain*. Neither does their Pleasure or Happiness consist in Rest properly so called, but in Activity, in such Acts and Exercise of their Faculties as they choose: Now, since they may exercise themselves perpetually according to their own Choice, and there is nothing to hinder them, they may be perpetually happy; as will be declar'd below. All which are different in solid Bodies.

III. We cannot certainly determine what Life is in these Animals which have solid Bodies; but we sufficiently apprehend *where* it is, from certain Marks and Tokens. For where there is a circular motion of the Fluids, there is a Nutrition and Increase, there is, as I conjecture, some sort of Life. Now 'tis evident that this circular Motion may be interrupted by the force of the adjacent Bodies: the

a portion of Ætherial Matter, &c. can move it whither it will, and preserve its Union, such a Body therefore is immortal.

The Body of a terrestrial Animal is a kind of Vessel, which may be broke, the humours

may flow
out, and
the circu-
lar motion
cease.
Such Ani-
mals then
are natu-
rally mor-
tal.

solid Body of an Animal is a kind of Vessel in which the Humours have a flux and reflux through certain ducts and channels framed by Divine Skill, in the motion of which Life consists. Now this Vessel may be broke in pieces by the impulse of other Bodies, since by the native imperfection of Matter it is capable of Dissolution: but when the Vessel is broken, the Fluids therein contained must necessarily flow out, the circular motion must cease, and together with it animal Life. Such Animals therefore as have solid Bodies, are by Nature Mortal, and cannot last for ever, without violence done to the Laws of Nature, of Matter, and Motion. There must then have been either none at all created, or such as are naturally Mortal. The imperfection of Matter could not suffer it to be otherwise. For the hard and solid parts belonging to these Bodies are of such a Frame as must necessarily be shaken and separated by others of the same bulk and hardness. Every thing therefore that consists of such kind of Parts, may be corrupted and dissolved. (29.)

There-

NOTES.

(29.) This point is very well illustrated by Dr. J. Clarke, on *Natural Evil*, p. 245, &c. whose Reasoning is entirely built upon Sir I. Newton's Experiments. " Human Bodies
" as well as those of all other Animals, and of Plants, are
" compounded of very different Materials, fix'd and vola-
" tile, fluid and solid; as appears by the resolution of them
" into their constituent Parts; and they are nourish'd in the
" same manner, *viz.* by attraction. For as a Sponge by
" Suction draws in Water, so the Glands in the Bodies
" of all Animals draw different Juices out of the Blood, ac-
" cording to the particular Nature and Constitution of each
" of them: So long therefore as the nourishment is proper
" to assimilate itself to the several parts of the Body, as it
" approaches them in its several channels; or so long as the
" solid Particles (suppose of Salts, which are absolutely ne-
" cessary to the preservation of all Creatures) retain their
" form and texture; so long is Life preserv'd and main-
" tain'd. And when the nourishment becomes unfit to assi-
" milate; or the saline Particles (which towards the Center
" are

Sect. 3. Concerning Natural Evil.

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Therefore the Divine Power and Goodness did the very best even in creating Beings that were mortal: for an Animal subject to Death is better than none at all.

IV. But God, you'll say, created Man at first immortal, as we understand by sacred History: Mortality is not therefore an inseparable attendant on solid Bodies. I answer; It does not appear to us of what sort the Bodies of Mankind were before the Fall, and consequently nothing can be argued from thence against the necessary Mortality of all terrestrial ones. Farther, we should remember that our first Parents were naturally mortal; but that God covenanted with them for Immortality as a matter of Favour, and upon particular Conditions. Not that they should have continued upon Earth for ever; but that God promised to translate them at a proper time by his especial Favour, and preserve them in a place fit for the Enjoyment of Eternity: as we believe he did with *Enoch* and *Elias*. But as soon as this Covenant with God was broken by Sin, Man

This Hypothesis reconcil'd with sacred History, concerning the immortality of the first Man.

NOTES.

“ are very dense, and therefore capable of strongly attracting the Fluids to them) lose their power of Attraction, either by being divided into less Particles (as they may be by the watry parts insinuating themselves into their Pores with a gentle heat) or else by having those watry Parts violently separated from them: in either of these Cases all their Motion will cease, and end in Corruption, Confusion and Death. And this is abundantly confirm'd by Experience, in that every thing which is corrupted or putrify'd is of a black Colour; which shews, that the component Particles are broken to Pieces, and reduced so small, as to be unable even to reflect the Rays of Light. Thus we see that *Death*, or the Dissolution of the Body, is the necessary Consequence of those Laws by which it is framed and generated: and therefore is not in itself properly an *Evil*, any more than that Fabric can be filed *ill*, the Materials, or manner of building of which, would not permit it to last a thousand Years, nor was originally intended to continue half so long.”

Man was restor'd to his Native Mortality, and subjected to those other Inconveniences to which the Order of Nature, and the Chain of Natural Causes, render'd such Bodies as these of Mankind obnoxious. For though God has not so far tied himself up to the Laws of Nature, but that he may in many Cases suspend and supersede them; yet this is not done frequently, nor to be expected for the sake of Sinners. God can indeed preserve Man from *actual Death*; but that a solid Machine consisting of heterogeneous Parts, such as the human Body is, should not be *naturally Mortal*, is impossible: 'Tis a Contradiction therefore that Man, in the present State of things, should be by Nature immortal. (L.)

NOTES.

(L.) All the Objections brought against this Section are, that the Author maintains some things in it which destroy his own Hypothesis. 1st, He holds that a Soul united to an aetherial, uniform matter, perfectly fluid and without weight or resistance, may transport its Body where it pleases, and if it receive any damage from the neighbouring Bodies it may repair it again, by the power that the will of such a Creature has over its own Body: so if it please it may be immortal. From whence the Objector concludes, that according to the Author, there is no connection between a Creature made of matter and mortality, or any natural Evils.

But surely this is raising Objections against a Book before one read it. For if he had read it, he might have seen that the Author expressly affirms that those Bodies are not immortal, because incorruptible by Nature; for the Matter of which they consist will not permit them to be so; but because they are placed in such Stations and Circumstances, in which they may foreknow and prevent with pleasure all those things which cause corruption or pain. From whence it is manifest that the Author supposes these corruptible, as well as our earthly Bodies, but it does not follow from thence that they must be corrupted. There's a great difference between the Power and Act; nor is it a good Consequence, this is capable of being corrupted, therefore it must be actually so. The Circumstances plainly make the difference between Bodies of this sort and ours that are solid, heavy and heterogeneous, subject to the shock and impulse of others that are likewise hard, heavy, &c.

But

NOTES.

But then, *2dly*, the Objector alledges that this ought not to be so; for how knows any body that such compositions as these have any more malignity in them than subtil uniform Bodies? *Answer.* If by malignity be meant actual Corruption, every body must see that these are more liable to it than the other: that a heavy Body can't be moved with the same facility that a Body exempt from Gravity can; that a certain portion of matter to which the Soul is immediately united, and which it uses in Sensation, will become unfit for it when it is dissipated or mix'd with heterogeneous particles, and that in the Earth it must meet with such, whereas there are no such particles to mix with it in an uniform *Æther*.

Our first Parents knowledge or Power, if they had continued in their Innocence, could not have prevented all effects of these, tho' God out of particular favour wou'd have preserv'd them from the worst and most mischievous of 'em, which are reckon'd up in the Book*, and this but for a time, 'till he found it convenient to translate them to a better place. Tho' after all, we know not how the Bodies of our first Parents were framed, or what alterations were introduced on their sinning, and therefore no good Argument can be taken from thence.

But, *3dly*, 'Tis pretended that to say, on Man's sinning God abandon'd him to his natural Mortality, and to the other inconveniences that necessarily follow the Laws of Nature, is a sort of Contradiction. For if there be a natural Necessity that Man should be expos'd to Pains and Death, his Innocence could not protect him from them.

But this is still to confute Books without reading them. The Author does not say that Death or Corruption necessarily follow the Laws of Nature, but only that they are the Effects of these same Laws when left to themselves, which God did not think fit to do in all things whilst Man continued Innocent.

Nor lastly, does it follow from thence, as pretended, that Matter is indifferent to Dissolution or Continuance of itself, and only determin'd to one or other as the Creator pleases. For the Possibility of Corruption is inherent in all Matter, but whether it shall in all times and places actually be corrupted depends on the Pleasure of God, and in many Cases on the Pleasure of other Agents, and that the Matter of human Bodies in their present Circumstances shou'd not be corrupted, is impossible.

SECT.

* Sect. 9. par. 5.

S E C T. IV.

Of the Passions.

Our Souls require Bodies of a peculiar *Crafs*, when that is disordered or removed, the operations of the Soul are either hindered or destroyed.

The Soul and Body admit of a mutual Sympathy; hence it is the first care of the Soul to keep the Body free from harm.

The sense of Pain is necessary to preserve Life, as also the dread of Death.

SUPPOSING the Union of a thinking or sensitive Soul with Matter, its Thought and Will must necessarily be affected by the Motions of that, as Body must be again by these. For since the Soul is of such a Nature as to require Matter of a peculiar *Crafs* and *Figure*, in order to discharge its Functions, it follows that when this Disposition is faulty, or quite fails, the Operations of the Soul must be impeded, or entirely cease; nor can it possibly be otherwise while the Soul and Body are of such a Nature as they really are.

II. Since therefore it is no diminution of the Divine Goodness to have assigned such a Nature to them, as was shewn before; we must also admit of a mutual Sympathy between them. Now, if they mutually affect each other, the consequence will be that it is the principal business of the Soul to preserve the Body from harm. In order to this, 'tis necessary that the Soul have a perception of what is good for, or prejudicial to the Body; and this could not be more effectually procured, than by providing that those things which tend to its preservation should communicate an agreeable sensation to the Soul, and what is pernicious, a disagreeable one. For otherwise, the first thing we met with might destroy us, while we were unaware or regardless of it; nor should we be solicitous to avoid a River or a Precipice.

III. 'Tis necessary therefore that the Soul and Body should affect each other mutually; that the Impairing or Dissolution of the Body should create uneasiness, which, by its importunity, might recall the Soul that was indisposed or otherwise engaged, to take care of the whole; nor ought it to cease

cease urging, till what was hurtful be removed : without this importunity perhaps the strongest Animal would not last even a Day. The Sense then of Pain or Uneasiness produced in the Soul upon the Mutilation or Dissolution of the Body, is necessary for the preservation of Life in the present State of Things. It may be proved from the same Principles, that the aversion to, or dread of *Death*, is not in vain, since it cannot even be conceived how a frail and mortal Body, tossed by continual Motions; and tumbled among other hard Bodies, should escape Dissolution, if the Soul which moves that Body were not forewarned to avoid Death by the natural horror of its approach. (M.)

IV.

NOTES.

(M.) Here the Enemies of the Unity of God alledge that they are satisfied, that Matter must be moveable, that a Body composed of solid and heavy Parts, as ours are, environed with other Bodies in continual Agitation and perpetually liable to their Shock, must be also subject to be broken and dissolved; but then why should such Separation and Dissolution cause uneasy Sentiments in us? 'Tis true, if a Man be benighted in a Wilderness and deprived of Light, he may fall into a Pit and break his Bones; if he fall asleep, the Wind may blow down a Tree on him and crush his Body, or cut off a Leg or an Arm; these are by the very Nature of Matter easily separable; but our Misery doth not consist in losing these, but in the Trouble and Concern we have for the loss of them. If the losing them caused no Pain or Vexation to us, we were as happy without as with them. Now they suppose that the Soul is united to the Body on what Terms God pleases, and that he could as easily have joined the Sensations of Pleasure with these Impressions on our Bodies, as that of Pain, and that an infinitely good God would have done so, if a contrary Power had not hindered him.

For ought I find the whole Difficulty concerning natural Evils is reduced to this Point, and methinks 'tis strange that any Stress should be laid on it; which will appear if we consider,

1st, That the Argument is drawn from a Matter concerning the Nature of which we have no Knowledge, I mean from the Union of the Soul and Body, and from the Manner in which the one affects and operates on the other. We can give no account how one Part of Matter acts on another, how they are united,

The rest
of the Pas-
sions are
connected
with
these.

IV. Now the rest of the Passions are Consequences of Pain, Uneasiness, and Dread of Death ; viz. Anger, Love, Hatred, &c. An Animal in the present State of things, must therefore either be obnoxious to these, or quickly perish. For 'tis impossible that the Soul should have a disagreeable Sensation, and not be *angry* at the Cause which produces it : and so of the rest.

V.

NOTES.

united, or what it is that makes them stick together. Much less do we know how a Soul and Body are united to one another, or how it is possible that there should be a mutual Action and Re-action between them; and therefore to say that this proceeds from an Arbitrary Power, or that it might have been otherwise, is to affirm what Nobody either doth or can know. We see the Action of one part of Matter on another is necessary, and arises from the Nature of it : If it had been otherwise, it had not been Matter but something else, and he that would not have it so, would not have God to have created any Matter at all; which, as the Author shews, had been to lessen God's Goodness, and to hinder him from doing a thing which was better done than let alone. And how doth the Objector know but 'tis the Nature of Souls, and as necessary to them to be affected thus with certain Motions of Matter, as for one Part of Matter to be moved by the Impulse of another? If then our Souls did not receive these Impressions from the Motions caused in our Bodies by external force, they would not be human Souls, but some other Creatures ; of which sort, I suppose there were as many created as the System wou'd allow, and therefore there must either be wanting in the World this Species of Beings, or they must be subject to such Impressions. If therefore it be better for Men to be as they are, than not to be at all, God has chosen the better Part in giving them a Being, and acted according to his Infinite Goodness.

But 2dly, If all the uneasy Sensations caused in us by the IncurSIONS of external Bodies tend to our Preservation, and without them we could neither live nor enjoy ourselves for any time ; then they do more good than hurt, and consequently are a Present worthy of God to bestow on us. Now this is demonstrated by the Author in his Book, and 'tis confessed that as things are now ordered, the Sense of Pain is necessary to oblige us to avoid many Perils.

But then again 'tis urged, that this doth not remove the Difficulty, because it is alledged by the Followers of *Manes* that these Pains are from the evil Principle, and as the good causes

V. God could have avoided all this by ordering that the Soul should not be affected by the Motions of the Body; or at least, that every thing done therein should be agreeable: But how dangerous this would be to Animals, any one may understand, who recollects how very short their Lives must be, if they died with the same Pleasure that they eat or drank or propagate their Species. If on tearing the Body

The Passions could not be avoided otherwise, than by ordering that the Soul should not be affected with the Motions of the Body: By these means Animals would be very short liv'd.

NOTES.

causes the Taste of Meat on the Tongue to please, so the Evil causes the Fire to create Pain in us when it burns us.

2dly, They alledge that there was no Necessity for these Pains, because *Adam* was without them in Paradise. 3dly, We might have been *sufficiently obliged* to avoid what could hurt us, if we had a perfect Knowledge of its approach, and had been warned to avoid the Danger, not by the Pain or Fear which we now feel, but by withdrawing of the Sense of Pleasure on the Approach of what might hurt or destroy us. Lastly, that these Warnings are often in vain.

To give this Argument its full Consideration, I will examine it by Parts. And first, as to what is alledged, that the pleasant Sensations produced in us by external Motions on the Organs of our Senses are from God, and the painful from the evil Principle. I desire it may be considered, 1st, whether any Motion causes Pain in us that doth not tend to our Destruction, and whether the Pains do not serve as a Means to prevent it. And if the Preserving our Being be a greater Good to us than these Pains are a Mischief, then it is plain 'tis better we should have than want them. But 2dly, Pain seems to be nothing else but a Sense that our Being is impairing, and if so, it seems impossible whilst we love Being and are pleased with it, that we should perceive it to decay, and not be displeased with the Sense of it, and the Sense of a thing displeasing to us is Pain. Either therefore in the present Case our Sense must be taken away, or Pains seems unavoidable. For that a certain Motion caused in our Organs shou'd please us, because it contributes to support our Being, and the contrary which tends to destroy us, should not displease us when we feel it, seems a Contradiction. God therefore in making us feel the Sense of Pleasure by the First has likewise made us of such a Nature, that we must either not feel the Second at all (*i. e.* the Motion that hurts us) or be uneasy at it; and let any one judge which of these two is most for the Advantage of Animals.

There needs not therefore, any ill Principle to introduce a Sense of Pain at the Presence of what tends to destroy us, for giving

Body the Soul had either no Sensation at all or a pleasant one, we should be no more aware of Death than of Sleep, nor would it be any greater injury to kill a Man than to scratch him. And thus Mankind would quickly fail. We must then either have been armed with these Passions against Death, or soon have perished: But the Divine Goodness chose that Animals should be subject to these, rather than the Earth should be entirely destitute of Inhabitants.

It is not contrary to the Divine Goodness to permit these Inconveniences, since they could not be avoided without greater.

VI. Behold now how Evils spring from and multiply upon each other, while infinite Goodness still urges the Deity to do the very best. This moved him to give *Existence* to Creatures, which cannot exist without *Imperfections* and *Inequality*. This excited him to create *Matter*, and to put it in *Motion*, which is necessarily attended with Separation and Dissolution, Generation and Corruption. This persuaded

NOTES.

giving us the Sense of Pleasure at the Presence of what supports us of Necessity infers the other.

And 'tis remarkable, as the Author of the Book observes, that when the Pain exceeds the Pleasure of Being, the Sense of both ceases, that is when our Being ceases to be a Benefit God takes it from us.

As to the 2d Objection, that these Pains on the Presence of destructive Motions attacking us are unnecessary, because *Adam* in Paradise was without them; I have already accounted for it, and shewed that it doth not appear that he was altogether without Pain or Passion; and that he was only secured from such Pains as might cause his Death, and that for a time, till removed to a better place.*

As to the 3d Objection, that if we had a perfect Knowledge of the Approach of every thing that could hurt us, and had only felt a withdrawing of Pleasure when any such thing was nigh, we might by this means have been obliged to avoid it as effectually as the Sense of Pain could do it. I answer.

1st, The withdrawing of pleasure or diminishing it, is a greater Evil to us than the pains we feel on such Occasions; Which plainly appears from this, that we rather choose to endure these pains than lose the pleasure our Senses afford us; which is manifest in so many Instances, that I hardly need mention them. The Gout is one of the most tormenting Diseases

* See Note H, and the Sermon annexed.

suaded him to couple Souls with Bodies, and to give them mutual Affections, whence proceeded Pain and Sorrow, Hatred and Fear, with the rest of the Passions; yet all of them, as we have seen, are necessary.

VII. For, as *created Existence* necessarily includes God the Evil of Imperfection, so every Species of it is therefore subject to its own peculiar Imperfections; that is, compared to Evils. All the Species of Creatures then must the Good in Things either have been omitted, or their concomitant Evils with the tolerated: the Divine Goodness therefore put the Evils in one Scale and the Good in the other; and which necessarily since the Good preponderated, an infinitely good attend God would not omit that, because of the concomitant Evils; for that very Omission would have been tolerated those Evils attended with more and greater Evils, and so would have been less agreeable to infinite Goodness. which were inseparable from the Good.

VIII.

NOTES.

Diseases that attend us; and yet who would not rather endure it, than lose the Pleasure of Feeling? Most Men are sensible that eating certain Meats, and indulging ourselves in the use of several Drinks, will bring it; and yet we see this doth not deter us from them, and we think it more tolerable to endure the Gout, than lose the Pleasure that plentiful Eating and Drinking yields us. What pains will not a Man endure rather than lose a Limb, or the advantage that a plentiful Fortune yields? This expedient therefore is very improper: for it would be an exchange for the worse; deprive us of a greater Good, to prevent a lesser Evil.

But, 2dly, Either this Diminution of the Pleasure would be a more sensible loss to us than Pain is now, or otherwise. If it were more uneasy to us than Pain, the exchange, as before, would be for the worse. If it were not, it would not be sufficient: for we plainly see that in many cases the greatest pains and clearest prospect of them are not sufficient to divert us from what may be hurtful, when it comes in competition with a Pleasure. We have therefore no Reason to complain of God, who has given us warning by Pain of what might destroy us, since a less effectual means could not have secured us. In short, this is God's way; and for us to think we could have found a better, is pride and impudence; and there needs no more to give us a sensible proof of it, than to consider the folly of the expedient proposed by the Objector.

But

The Axiom about not doing Evil for the sake of Good, does not take place where the least Evil is chosen.

VIII. The least Evil, you'll say, ought not to be admitted for the sake of the greatest Good. (For to affirm that God does Evil that Good may come of it, is Blasphemy.) Neither does the Distinction between

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But then it is urged that here is a farther Degree of our Misery, and an argument that an ill Principle had a hand in framing us, that we cannot avoid one Evil but by the fear of a worse, and that we do not endure the pains and fears that accompany Life but on account of the greater fear we have of Death; and the imprinting in us so great a Love of Life which has so little Good in it, and in truth much less than it has Evil, must be the Work of a malignant and mischievous Author. But I answer, I have shewed || that it is the Good we feel in Life that makes us love it and afraid to lose it, and we only apprehend the loss of Life, and flee it, because we fear the losing so good a thing. The love of Life is no otherwise imprinted in us but by the sense we have of its Goodness, and then the Quarrel against God is, that he has given us so good a thing that we are unwilling to part with it, and chuse to endure such pains as tend to preserve it, and without which we could not long enjoy it. Is is a most wicked thought to imagine that God is like a Tyrant that delights to torture and torment his Creatures. The contrary is plain by his subjecting them to Pain in no cases but where that sense is necessary to preserve a Good to them that counterbalances it.

But then, in the 4th Place, the Objector urges, that these Pains are in many cases fruitless, and no way tend to help us. 'Tis alledged that the Gout and Gravel, and many acute Pains, are of no use, nor do they any ways contribute to prolong our Lives. I reply, the Gout, Gravel, &c. are distempers of the Body, in which the Humours or solid Parts are out of order: The Question then is, whether it would be better for us to be insensible of this Disorder, or to feel it. Let us suppose then a Man in a Fever (*i. e.* that his Blood and Humours should be in such a Ferment as is observable in that Distemper) and that he should feel no Pain or Uneasiness by it; the consequence would be that he would die before he were aware. He would not avoid those things that increase it, or take those Remedies that allay it: He would not know how near he were to Death, or when he was to avoid the Air or Motion, either of which would destroy him. There are Diseases that take away our Senses and become mortal, without giving us warning: None are more terrible than these, and most would chuse to die of the most painful Distemper rather than be thus furnished;

|| See Note Z.

between *Moral* and *Natural* Evil help any thing toward the Solution of this Difficulty : For what we call *Moral* Evil, as shall be shewn below, is that which is forbidden ; now nothing is forbidden by God

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prised : We may judge then how it would be with us if all Distempers were of the like Nature. I doubt whether we could survive one fit of the Gout, Gravel, or Fever, if the Pain we feel in them did not warn us and oblige us to give ourselves that Quiet, Ease, and Abstinence that are necessary to our Recovery. Thus foolishly they reason that go about to mend the work of God.

But, 2dly, we find that Providence has joined a certain train of Thoughts and Sensations with certain motions in our Body, and it is as impossible that all motions should beget the same Thoughts in us, as that the same Letters should express all Words, or the same Words all Thoughts. If therefore only some Motions in our Body occasion pleasing Thoughts and Sensations, then the Absence of these Motions must likewise deprive us of the Pleasure annexed to them, which is so great an Evil that we are ready to prevent it with a great deal of Pain. And the contrary Motions must by the same Rule occasion contrary Sensations, that is unpleasant.

If therefore, a Fever or Gout deprive us of these grateful Motions in the Body that give Pleasure, and be contrary to them, it is a clear Case, that uneasy Sensations on such an Occasion cannot be avoided, except Man were something else than he is, *i. e.* no Man. Either therefore God must not have made Man in his present Circumstances, nor given him a Body that is apt to be put out of order by the impulse of those neighbouring Bodies that surround him, or else he must suffer him to be sometimes disturbed by them, and let that Disturbance be accompanied with Pain.

If it should be alledged that God might have put Man into such Circumstances that no impulse of other Bodies should have caused such Motions in his as procure Pain. I answer, this might have done if the very Motion of his Joints and Muscles, and the Recruiting of the Liquids of his Body did not continually wear and destroy the Organs, and alter and corrupt the Blood and other Juices ; and lastly, if there were no Bodies in his Vicinity that could hurt or alter these : But as the Frame of the World now is with solid and heterogeneous Bodies in it, and which the good of the whole required there should be, and whilst these are all in Motion, and there is a continual Change of the Vicinity of these Bodies to the Bodies of Men : whilst there is variety of Bodies on the Earth, and these

God but generally, at least, on account of the *Inconveniences* attending the forbidden Actions : These *Inconveniences* are *Natural Evils* ; therefore *Moral Evils* are prohibited on account of the *Natural* ones, and for that reason only are Evils, because they lead to *Natural Evils*. But that which makes

NOTES.

these necessarily send out different and contrary Effluvia, that mix with the Juices of our Bodies : Lastly, whilst not only new Bodies move toward us, but we move from place to place, without which Power we should be very imperfect, and incapable of the greatest part of the Happiness we now enjoy ; 'tis inconceivable that we should not meet with things that by the Laws of Matter necessarily disturb and disorder our Bodies ; and therefore, either the Earth must be void of Inhabitants, or they must be content to submit to and suffer these Disturbances ; and I have already shewed that these must necessarily occasion uneasy Sensations in us, which I take to be the Definition of Pain.

To Sum up this Head. For ought I can see, the Fundamental Objection concerning natural Evils, is that God has given us mortal Bodies, for which I think the Book fully accounts ; and if it once be confessed that it is not contrary to the Goodness of God to make some mortal Animals, I do not see how we can imagine such Animals should apprehend the Approach of Death and not fear it ; or feel the Decay of their Bodies and not be uneasy at it ; especially when that Fear serves to preserve them, and the Sense of that Uneasiness puts them on proper Methods to support themselves. I do not deny but the Infinite Wisdom of God might have found other means, but I deny that there could be any better ; and he that undertakes to prove that there might be better, must understand all the Circumstances of these Animals as they are now, and all the Consequences that must happen in an infinite series of times, in pursuance of the Method he proposes ; but it is impossible any one should know these things ; and therefore, as the Book concludes, no Man has any Right to make use of such an Objection.

[For a particular account of all the *Passions* and their final Causes, and the Necessity of each, see Mr. *Hutcheson's* Essay on the *Nature and Conduct* of them, § 2. p. 48, 50, &c. and § 6. p. 179. or Dr. *Watts* on the *Use and Abuse* of them, § 13. or *Chambers's* Cyclopædia under the Word *Passion*, or *Scott's* Christian Life, p. 2. C. 1. § 2. par. 23. or the *Spectator*, N^o. 255, 408. or Dr. *J. Clarke* on Natural Evil, p. 256, &c. or Dr. *More's* Enchiridion Ethicæ, B. 1. C. 8, 9, 10, 11.]

any

any thing to be such, is itself much *more such*: therefore the *Natural*, you'll say, are greater Evils than the *Moral*, and cannot with less Blasphemy be attributed to God.

Granting all this to be true, yet though Evil is not to be *done* for the sake of Good, yet the *less* Evil is to be chosen before the *greater*: And since Evils necessarily surround you whether you act or not, you ought to prefer that side which is attended with the least. Since God was therefore compelled by the necessary Imperfections of created Beings; either to abstain from creating them at all, or to bear with the Evils consequent upon them: and since it is a less Evil to permit those, than to omit these, 'tis plain that God did not allow of Natural Evils for the sake of any *Good*; but chose the least out of several Evils, *i. e.* would rather have Creatures liable to *Natural Evils*, than no Creatures at all. The same will be shewn hereafter Concerning Moral Evils.

S E C T. V.

Of Hunger, Thirst, and Labour.

A Terrestrial Animal must, as we have said necessarily consist of mixed and heterogeneous Parts; its Fluids are also in a perpetual Flux and Ferment. Now 'tis plain that this cannot be without the Expence of those Fluids, and Attrition of the Solids; and hence follows *Death* and *Dissolution*, except those be repaired: a new Accession of Matter is therefore necessary to supply what flies off and is worn away, and much more so for the Growth of Animals.

The parts of the Body fly off: it stands in need therefore of Reparation, *viz.* by Food.

Choice
must be
had in
Food,
since all
things are
not equal-
ly proper.

II. But Animals have particular *Constitutions*, and cannot be nourished by any sort of Matter : some *Choice* therefore must be made of it, to which they are to be urged by an Importunity strong enough to excite their endeavours after it. Hence *Hunger* and *Thirst* come to affect the Soul ; Affections that are sometimes indeed troublesome, but yet necessary, and which bring more Pleasure than Pain along with them.

The
Materials
of Food
are soon
corrupted:
they can-
not there-
fore be
procured
without
Labour.

III. But why, say you, are we obliged to *labour* in quest of Food ? why are not the Elements themselves sufficient ? I answer, they are sufficient for some Animals : but Mankind required such a Disposition of Matter as was to be prepared by various Coctions and Changes, and that daily, because 'tis soon liable to Corruption, and if kept long would be unfit for nourishment. Hence Labour becomes necessary to provide Victuals in this present state of things : neither could Hunger, or Thirst, or Labour, * (which are reckoned among *Natural Evils*) be prevented without greater Inconveniencies. The Divine goodness therefore had the highest Reason for affixing these to Animals.

Every A-
nimal is
placed by
God
where it
may have
its proper
Nourish-
ment ;
hence al-
most every
herb
maintains
its proper
Insect.

IV. Now as Animals require different sorts of Food, as was shewn, according to their different Constitutions, so God has placed every one of them where it may find what is proper for it : on which account there is scarce any thing in the Elements but what may be Food for some. Every Herb has its Insect which it supports. The Earth, the Water, the very Stones, serve for Aliment to living Creatures.†

Some Ani-
mals are
produced
for Food
to others,
and would
not have
existed on
any other
terms.

V But some stand in need of more delicate Food : Now God could have created an *inanimate* Machine, which might have supplied them with such Food ; but one that is animated does it much better and with more ease. A Being that has Life is (*cæteris paribus*) preferable to one that has not :
God

* See Note 33.

† See Notes 24, and 26.

God therefore animated that Machine which furnishes out provision for the more perfect Animals ; which was both graciously and providently done : for by this means he gained so much Life to the World as there is in those Animals which are Food for others : by this means they themselves enjoy some kind of Life, and are of service also to the rest. An Ox, for instance, or a Calf, is bred, nourished and protected for some time in order to become fit Food for Man. This certainly is better and more eligible, than if the Matter of its Body had been converted into an inanimate Mass, such as a Pompon, or continued in the state of unform'd Clay. Nor is it hardly dealt withal, by being made for the Food of a more noble Animal, since it was on this Condition only that it had Life given, which it could not otherwise have enjoyed. Matter which is fit for the Nourishment of Man, is also capable of Life ; if therefore God had denied it Life, he had omitted a Degree of Good which might have been produced without any Impediment to his principal Design, which does not seem very agreeable to infinite Goodness. 'Tis better therefore that it should be endowed with Life for a time, though it is to be devoured afterwards, than to continue totally stupid and unactive. The common Objection then is of no force, *viz.* That inanimate Matter might have been prepared for this Use ; for 'tis better that it should be animated ; especially as such Animals are ignorant of Futurity, and are neither conscious nor solicitous about their being made for this Purpose. So that so long as they live, they enjoy themselves without anxiety ; at least they rejoice in the present Good, and are neither tormented with the Remembrance of what is past, nor the Fear of what is to come ; and lastly, are killed with less Pain than they would be by a Distemper or old Age. Let us not be surpris'd then at the Universal War as it were among A-

nimals, or that the Stronger devour the Weaker ; for these are made on purpose to afford Aliment to the others. (30.)

VI.

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(30.) What is here laid down will upon Examination be found to be perfectly consistent with our Observation in Note 23.

As the Point before us is set in a very good Light by Dr. J. Clarke, || I shall not scruple to transcribe the whole Paragraph. 'If we consider the Effect of Animal Creatures being thus made Food for each other, we shall find that by this means there is the more Good upon the whole : For under the present Circumstances of the Creation, Animals living in this manner one upon another, could not have been prevented but a much greater Evil would have followed. For then there could not have been so great a Number, nor so great a Variety of Animals as there are at present, some of which are so very minute, and the Quantity of them such, that mixing themselves with Herbs and Plants, and Grain on which, themselves feed, and with the Water and Liquids which they drink, they must necessarily be devoured by larger Animals who live upon the same Food, without so much as being seen or any way perceived by them. It is therefore much better upon the whole, that they should live upon one another in the manner they now do, than that they should not live at all. For if such Animal Life is to be esteemed superior to not existing at all, or to a vegetable Life ; and the more there is of such Animal Life, the more of Good there is in the World ; it is evident that by this means there is Room for more whole Species of Creatures, at least for many more individuals of each Species, than there would otherwise be ; and that the Variety of the Creation is hereby much enlarged, and the Goodness of its Author displayed. For the Constitution of Animal Bodies is such as requires that they should be maintained by Food : Now if this Food can be made capable of Animal Life also, it is a very great Improvement of it. A certain Quantity of Food is necessary for the Preservation of a determinate Number of Animals : Which Food, were it mere vegetable, would perhaps serve for that Purpose only : But by being so formed as to become Animal, though it be in a lower Degree, and the Enjoyment of Life in such Creatures less, yet it is more perfect than unformed Clay, or even than the most curious Plant. Thus the Animal Part of the Creation has its several Degrees of Life, and as much Variety in it as is to be found in the inanimate and vegetable Part ; so that in this respect there is so far from being any just ground of Complaint, that the Wisdom and Contrivance

|| Discourse concerning Natural Evil, p. 289.

VI. As for the *Difficulty* of procuring Food, and the *Want* of it in some Places, 'tis to be observed that the state of the Earth depends upon the light and heat of the Sun ; and though we do not perfectly understand the Structure of it, yet we have reason to conjecture that it is carried about its Axis by a *Diurnal*, and about the Sun by an *Annual* Motion : that its Figure is a Spheroid described by the Revolution of a Semi-Ellipse about a conjugate Axis ; and that this proceeds from the Laws of Motion and Gravitation. Now in such a Situation, some Parts of it must necessarily be unfit for such Inhabitants as Men, since the Parallelism of its Axis is preserved in the annual Motion, and the Revolution about the same Axis in the diurnal. If these should undergo the very least Alteration, the whole Fabric of the Earth would be disordered ; the Ocean and dry Land would change Places to the Detriment of the Animals. Since therefore neither the annual nor diurnal Motion of the Earth could be altered without harm ; 'tis plain that some parts of the Earth must necessarily be less convenient for the Habitation of Mankind, namely those about the Poles ; and that others must require much Labour to make them convenient, as we find by Experience in our own Climate ; but it will evidently appear to any considering Person that in what Situation or Motion soever you suppose the Earth to be, either these or worse Evils must be admitted ; 'tis in vain therefore to complain of these Inconveniencies, which cannot be avoided without greater. (31.)

All parts of the Earth could not have afforded Nourishment and Reception for Men, whatever Situation they had been placed in.

VII.

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'ance of the Animal World is admirable, and plainly shews the Excellency of the whole, and Subserviency of all the Particulars in order to obtain the greatest Good that they are capable of.'

See also the Beginning of the *Spectator*, N^o. 519.

(31.) Thus if the *Figure* of the Earth were changed into a perfect *Sphere*, the Equatorial Parts must all lie under Water.

Of Earth-
quakes,
Lightning
and De-
luges.

VII. Neither are *Earth-quakes, Storms, Thunder, Deluges and Inundations* any stronger Arguments against the Wisdom and Goodness of God. These are sometimes sent by a just and gracious God for the Punishment of Mankind; but often depend on other natural Causes, which are necessary, and could not be removed without greater Damage to the whole. These Concussions of the Elements are indeed prejudicial, but more Prejudice would arise to the Universal System by the Absence of them. What the genuine and immediate Causes of them are I dare not determine: They seem in general to derive their Origin from the unequal heat of the Sun, from the Fluidity, Mutability, and Contrariety of things. To these we may add the Asperity and Inequality of the Earth's Surface, without

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If it were of a *Cubic, Prismatic*, or any other *Angular* Figure, it would neither be so *capacious* for Habitation, nor so fit for *Motion*, nor so commodious for the reception of *Light* and *Heat*, for the Circulation of the *Winds*, and the *Distribution* of the *Waters*; as is obvious to any one that is acquainted with the first Elements of Natural Philosophy, and is at large demonstrated by *Cheyne, Derham, Ray, &c.* If its Situation were removed, its Constitution must be altered too, or else, if placed considerably farther from the Sun, it would be frozen into Ice, if nearer, 'twould be burnt to a Coal. If either its annual or diurnal Motion were *stopped, retarded, or accelerated*, the useful and agreeable Vicissitudes of *Summer and Winter, Day and Night*, would cease, or at least cease to be so useful and agreeable as they now are. The immoderate Length or Shortness of the Seasons would prove pernicious to the Earth, and the stated times of Business and Repose would be as incommodious to its Inhabitants; as disproportionate to the common Affairs of Life, and the various Exigences of Mankind. || If, in the last place, we alter the *Inclination of the Earth's Axis*, the like Inconveniences will attend the *Polar Parts*: If we destroy the *Parallelism* of it, besides destroying at the same time the useful Arts of Navigation and Dialling, we bring upon us much worse Consequences. A Description of some few of them from Dr. Bentley's Sermon above cited may perhaps not be disagreeable. 'We all know, from the very Elements of Astronomy, that

|| See Bentley's last Sermon, p. 315. 5th Edit.

without which nevertheless the whole Earth, or the greatest part of it, would be uninhabitable. For instance, we complain of the Mountains as Rubbish, as not only disfiguring the Face of the Earth, but also us useless and inconvenient ; and yet without these, neither Rivers nor Fountains, nor the Weather for producing and ripening Fruits could regularly be preserved. * In Mountainous Countries we blame Providence for the Uncertainty of the Weather, for the frequency of the Showers and Storms, which yet proceed from the very Nature of the Climate, and without which all the Moisture would glide down the Declivity, and the Fruits wither

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* that this inclined Position of the Axis, which keeps always the same Direction, and a constant Parallelism to itself, is the sole Cause of these grateful and needful Vicissitudes of the four Seasons of the Year and the Variation in Length of Days. If we take away the *Inclination*, it would absolutely undo the Northern Nations, the Sun would never come nearer us than he doth now on the 10th of *March*, or the 12th of *September*. But would we rather part with the *Parallelism*? Let us suppose then that the Axis of the Earth keeps always the same Inclination towards the Body of the Sun : This indeed would cause a variety of Days, and Nights, and Seasons, on the Earth ; but then every particular Country would have always the same diversity of Day and Night, and the same Constitution of Season, without any alteration. Some would always have long Nights and short Days, others again perpetually long Days and short Nights : One Climate would be scorched and sweltered with everlasting *Dog-Days*, while an eternal *December* blasted another. This surely is not quite so good as the present Order of Seasons. But shall the Axis rather observe no constant Inclination to any thing, but vary and waver at uncertain times and places? This would be a happy Constitution indeed ! There would be no Health, no Life, nor Subsistence in such an irregular System : By those surprizing Nods of the Pole, we might be tossed backward or forward, in a Moment, from *January* to *June*, nay possibly from the *January* of *Greenland*, to the *June* of *Abissinia*. It is better therefore upon all accounts that the Axis should be continued in its present Posture and Direction ; so that this also is a signal Character of the Divine Wisdom and Goodness.

See also *Cheyne's Phil. Princ.* C. 3. § 24, 25, 26, &c.

(32.)

* See Note 33.

wither away. The Earth then must either not be created at all, or these things be permitted. (32.)

VIII.

NOTES.

(32.) The several Objections mentioned in this Paragraph, are solidly refuted by Dr. J. Clarke in his Treatise on *Natural Evil*, part of which I shall take the liberty to insert as usual, and refer the Reader to the Book itself for the rest.

Having described the Nature and Use of the Air's *Elasticity*, and the *acid nitrous*, and *sulphureous* Particles with which it is impregnated, which are the Cause of *Fermentation*, he proceeds to account for Earthquakes, &c. p. 190. 'Thus the internal Parts of the Earth being the only proper Place for containing so large a store of Sulphur and Nitre and Minerals, as is required for so many thousand Years as the Earth in its present State has, and may yet continue; it must necessarily be, that when the *Fermentation* is made in such subterraneous Caverns as are not wide enough for the Particles to expand themselves in, or have no open Passage to run out at, they will, by the fore-mentioned Law, shake the Earth to a considerable distance, tear those Caverns to pieces; and according to the depth of such Caverns, or Quantity of Materials, contained in them, remove large pieces of the Surface of the Earth, from one place to another, in the same manner, tho' to a much higher degree than artificial Explosions made under ground; the effect of which is sensible to a great distance. If it happens that those Fermentations are in places under the Sea, the Water mixing with these Materials increases their Force, and is thereby thrown back with great violence, so as to seem to rise up into the Clouds, and fall down again sometimes in very large drops, and sometimes in whole Spouts, which are sufficient to drown all that is near them. If the *Fermentation* be not so violent, but such only as raises large Vapours or Steams, which can find their way through small occult passages of the Earth, those near its Surface, by their continual Exspirations, are at first the Cause of gentle Winds; and those afterwards by their continual Increase, become perhaps Storms, and Whirlwinds, and Tempests which many times destroy the Fruits, tear up the Trees, and overthrow the Houses: But if they be still more gentle, there being always some sulphureous Exhalations, especially if the Earth be dry, they then ascend along with the lighter Vapours, into the upper Regions of the Air, where, when a large Quantity of them is gathered together, they ferment with the acid Nitre, and taking fire cause Thunder and Lightning, and other Meteors. This, as far as can be gathered from Experience and Observation of the Works of Nature, is the Origin and Cause of those Imperfections and Evils,

VIII. The same must be said of the *Lakes* and *Ocean*. For 'tis manifest, that Fruits, Vegetables, &c. which are the Food of Animals, depend upon Moisture, and that this is exhaled from the Sea, and watry places, by the Sun; and since the Showers and Dews thus elevated, are not more copious than suffice for the Vegetation of Plants, 'tis plain that the Seas and Lakes do not exceed what is necessary, and could not be diminished without Detriment to the whole. Vain therefore is the Complaint of *Lucretius*, who arraigns all these as *faulty*. Neither was the Earth too narrow nor needed it too much Labour to sustain its Animals: For it was sufficient for those Animals which God had given it. † But when they multiply above the Proportion

The Number of Animals to be proportioned to the Food and not the Food to the Animals.

NOTES.

‘ Evils, which the present Constitution of the Air, and the
 ‘ Laws of Motion observed by those Particles mixed with it,
 ‘ unavoidably subject it to. They are the natural and genuine
 ‘ effects of the Regulation it is under, and without altering
 ‘ the primary Laws of it (that is making it something else
 ‘ than what it is, or changing it into another Form: the Re-
 ‘ sult of which would be only to render it liable to Evils of
 ‘ another kind, against which the same Objections would e-
 ‘ qually lie) or in a supernatural manner hindering it from
 ‘ producing such Effects, it is impossible to prevent them.
 ‘ And if we add to this, that these Evils are the fewest that in
 ‘ the Nature of things could be, without hindering a much
 ‘ greater Good: That they are in the most convenient Parts,
 ‘ and the most guarded against doing Mischief that could be;
 ‘ and that there are also good Uses to be made of them: we
 ‘ shall have no Reason to complain of or find fault with them.
 ‘ Were the Quantity of Sulphur and Nitre much diminished,
 ‘ there would not be sufficient to fill the Region of Air for
 ‘ the purposes of Vegetation and Life; but the Ground would
 ‘ grow barren, and the Animals would waste and die: And if
 ‘ there were a much greater Quantity, the contrary Effect
 ‘ would happen, the Earth would be too fat, the Plants would
 ‘ grow too gross, and the Animals would be suffocated and
 ‘ choaked. The Temperature is therefore as exact as it could
 ‘ be, all Circumstances considered; and the small Inconveni-
 ‘ encies are nothing compared with the general Good.’ See
 also the Word *Earth-quake* in *Chambers’s Cyclopaedia*.

(33.)

† See *Derham’s Phys. Theol.* B. 4. C. 11.

The hundredth part of Mankind which might live upon the Earth, does not yet inhabit it : vain therefore is the complaint about Seas and Deserts.

'Tis absurd for any one to desire a different place or station from that which is allotted him ; since he was made to fill that place, and would otherwise have had none at all.

portion of their Food, 'tis impossible that it should be sufficient ; it would not be enough if it were all converted into Food. For a certain Proportion is to be observed between the Provision and the Eaters, which if the Number of Animals exceed, they must at length necessarily perish with Hunger. Want of Provision then ought not to be made an Objection : for if the Number of Creatures to be provided for be enlarged above this Proportion, the greatest Plenty would not suffice ; if this Proportion betwixt the Food and Animals be kept up, the least would be sufficient. 'Tis our own fault therefore, not God's, if Provisions fail ; for the Number of Men may be confined within the Bounds prescribed by Nature, as might easily be shewn, if it were worth our while.

IX. But there's no need of Artifice on this occasion ; for by our fault things are come to this pass, that even the hundredth part of those Eatables which might be had, don't meet with any to consume them. The Divine Beneficence has therefore dealt bountifully with Mankind in respect of Provisions.

X. 'Tis to be observed in the last place, that Animals are of such a Nature as to delight in Action, or the Exercise of their Faculties, nor can we have any other Notion of Happiness even in God himself.* Since then the Faculties of both Body and Mind are to be exercised in order to produce Pleasure, where's the wonder if God destined that Exercise in part for procuring of Food, and connected this Pleasure with it. (33.) The infinite Power

NOTES.

(33.) Beside the Necessity there is for Labour, in order to restrain Man in his present State from an Excess of Folly and Wickedness, (which our Author considers in the two last Paragraphs of this Chapter) the use and advantage of it appears also from the manifest tendency it has to preserve and improve the

* See Ch. 1. § 3. par. 9. and Ch. 5. § 1. Sub. 4.

Power of God was able to produce Animals of such Capacities ; and since the Creation of them was no Inconvenience to other Beings who might

NOTES.

the Faculties of both Body and Mind. If used in a moderate degree, it preserves our Health, Vigour, and Activity ; gives us a quick Sense and Relish of Pleasure, and prevents a great many Miseries which attend Idleness. This is well described by the *Guardian*, N^o. 131. and the *Spectator*, N^o. 115. 'I consider the Body as a Sytem of Tubes and Glands, or, to use a more rustic Phrase, a bundle of Pipes and Strainers, fitted to one another after so wonderful a manner, as to make a proper Engine for the Soul to work with. This Description does not only comprehend the Bowels, Bones, Tendons, Veins, Nerves, and Arteries, but every Muscle, and every Ligature, which is a Composition of Fibres, that are so many imperceptible Tubes or Pipes interwoven on all sides with invisible Glands or Strainers. This general Idea of a human Body, without considering it in the Niceties of Anatomy, lets us see how absolutely necessary Labour is for the right Preservation of it. There must be frequent Motions and Agitations, to mix, digest, and separate the Juices contained in it, as well as to clear and cleanse the Infinitude of Pipes and Strainers of which it is composed ; and to give their solid Parts a more firm and lasting Tone. Labour or Exercise ferments the Humours, casts them into their proper Channels, throws off Redundancies, and helps Nature in those secret Distributions, without which the Body cannot subsist in its Vigour, nor the Soul act with Chearfulness. I might here mention the Effects which this has upon all the Faculties of the Mind, by keeping the Understanding clear, the Imagination untroubled, and refining those Spirits that are necessary for the proper Exertion of our Intellectual Faculties, during the present Laws of Union between Soul and Body. It is to a Neglect in this Particular that we must ascribe the Spleen which is so frequent in Men of studious and sedentary Tempers, as well as the Vapours to which those of the other Sex are so often subject.'

He proceeds to illustrate both the Wisdom and Goodness of God, from his having fitted and obliged us to this Labour and Exercise, which is so necessary to our well-being : which Observation will help us to account for the second and third Evil arising from the *Fall* mentioned in § 9. par. 5. The Fitness of a State of Labour for fallen Man is shewn at large by *Sherlock on Judgment*, C. 1. § 8. p. 179. and *D'Oyly* in his *first Dissertation*, C. 9. p. 98, &c. 2d Edit.

exercise

exercise themselves in a more noble manner, may not the infinite Goodness of God be conceived to have almost compelled him not to refuse or envy those the benefit of Life? Some of this kind were to be created, since there was Room left for them in the Work of God, after so many others were made as was convenient. But you may wish that some other Place and Condition had fallen to your Lot. Perhaps so. But if you had taken up another's Place, that other, or some else, must have been put into yours, who being alike ungrateful to the Divine Providence, would wish for the Place which you have now occupied. Know, then that it was necessary that you should either be what you are, or not at all. For since every other Place and State which the System or Nature of Things allowed was occupied by some others, you must of necessity either fill that which you are now in, or be banished out of Nature. For do you expect that any other should be turned out of his Order, and you placed in his room? that is, that God should exhibit a peculiar and extraordinary Munificence toward you to the prejudice of others. You ought therefore not to censure, but adore the Divine Goodness for making you what you are. You could neither have been made otherwise, nor in a better manner; but to the Disadvantage of some others, or of the whole.

SECT.

S E C T. VI.

*Concerning Propagation of the Species,
Childhood, and Old-Age.*

FROM what has been said it appears, that Animals which have solid Bodies are naturally mortal; though the Earth therefore were at first fully stock'd with them, yet their Number being continually diminish'd by Death, it would at length be quite destitute of Inhabitants. There might, it seems, have been a threefold Remedy for this Evil: First, if God by his Omnipotence should prevent the natural Effects of the mutual Percussion of Bodies, *viz.* the Corruption and Diffolution of themselves, and the Change or Effusion of their Fluids. For from these the Destruction of Animals necessarily arises, as these do from the Composition of Bodies, and their acting on each other. Secondly, by leaving Nature to itself, and letting it act by universal Mechanic Laws; and when these brought on a diffolution of Animal Bodies, that others be substituted in their room by Creation. Thirdly, by ordering that an Animal should generate its like, and provide another to supply its Place when it declin'd.

Animals may be repaired, three ways; 1st, If Death were prevented by Omnipotence; 2^{dly}, by Creation; 3^{dly}, by Propagation.

II. Who does not see that this last is the best Method of preserving a constant Number of Inhabitants upon the Earth? For 'tis the same thing, *ceteris paribus*, with regard to the System, whether the Earth have these Inhabitants which it has at present, or others equal in Number and Perfection: but it is not the same thing whether the Laws of Nature be observ'd or violated*. In the former Methods God must have interfered every Moment

This third Method is the best, because it can be effected without doing violence to the Laws of Nature.

* See Note 25.

ment by his absolute Power, he must have done infinite violence to the Laws of Nature, and confounded all the Constitutions and Orders of things, and that without any Benefit; nay, with extraordinary detriment to the whole. For since the universal Laws of Motion are the best that could possibly be establish'd, they would seldom be revers'd without damage to the whole. Neither does it become the Wisdom of God to have left his Work so imperfect as to want continual mending even in the smallest Particulars. 'Twas better therefore for it to be made in such a manner as we see it is, *viz.* that a new Offspring should be propagated out of the Animals themselves, and by themselves.

The Divine
Goodness
and Wisdom
admirable in
the contrivance
of it.

III. And herein we may admire the Divine Wisdom and Goodness, which hath so prudently and effectually contrived this End. For it has implanted in all Creatures (as we see) a strong and almost irresistible appetite of propagating their Kind, and has render'd this act of propagation so useful and agreeable to them who perform it, that Posterity becomes dearer to many than Life itself; and if it were left to their choice, they would rather die than lose their Offspring and the Rewards of Love: nay there is scarce any one that is not ready to protect its Young at the hazard of its Life. God has therefore by one single Law and a Sort of Mechanism, replenish'd the Earth with living Creatures, and provided that a sufficient Number should never be wanting, without the Intervention of a Power, which would be irregular and an Imputation on the Skill and Wisdom of the Architect. Who would not prefer such a piece of Mechanism, where one Machine generates another, and continually produces a new one in its turn, without any new and extraordinary Intervention of the Artificer, before one which would immediately

mediately and every Day require his Assistance and Amendment?

IV. This Method, you'll say, is fit enough for the Brutes, many of which must necessarily die not only by the Law of their Nature, but also for the sake of others, for whose use they were created to serve as Food. Neither is Death the greatest of Evils to them, since they live without being sensible of their Mortality. But Man is hardly dealt withal, who from his very Infancy is troubled with Fear and Dread more bitter even than Death; and who frequently foretastes, and by ruminating thoroughly digests, whatever Bitterness there is in Death itself. Neither does the Hope or Care of Offspring, nor the Enjoyment of these Pleasures, compensate for so many Miseries and Evils: The Divine Goodness might therefore have either concealed from Man his Mortality, or else removed that innate Terror arising in our Minds from the prospect of Death, which is always dreadful. (34.)

Why Men are tormented with the continual dread of Death while Brutes are not at all concerned about it.

V. 'Tis

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(34.) A sufficient Answer to this Objection may be found in the last Chapter of Dr. *Sherlock's* admirable Treatise on *Death*. I shall insert a little of it. 'There are great and wise Reasons why God should imprint this Aversion to Death on human Nature; because it obliges us to take care of ourselves, and to avoid every thing which will destroy or shorten our Lives: This in many Cases is a great Principle of Virtue, as it preserves us from fatal and destructive Vices; it is a great Instrument of Government, and makes Men afraid of committing such Villanies as the Laws of their Country have made capital: and therefore since the natural Fear of Death is of such great Advantage to us, we must be contented with it, tho' it makes the Thoughts of Dying a little uneasy; especially if we consider, that when this natural Fear of Death is not encreased by other Causes, it may be conquer'd or allay'd by Reason and wise Consideration.' p. 329. 4th Edit.

For a farther Account of both the rational and irrational Fear of Death, what it is, and what it ought to be: the Ends and Effects, and also the Remedies of it. See *Norris's Discourse on Heb. 2. 15.**

* *Practical Discourses*, Vol. 4th.

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This is a sign that the present Life is a prelude to a better.

V. 'Tis to be confessed indeed, that these are Indications that Man has some Relation to Immortality, and that the State in which he is placed at present is not entirely natural to him, otherwise he would not be uneasy in it, nor aspire so eagerly after another. The present Life of Man is therefore either assign'd him for a time, by way of Punishment, as some think, or by way of *Prelude* to, or *Preparation* for a better, as our Religion teaches, and our very Nature persuades us to hope and expect. This is presumed, you'll say, and not proved. Be it so. But if by the Supposition of a future State this Difficulty may be solv'd, and Providence vindicated, when it is arraign'd as dealing hardly with Mankind, who is so foolish as to be willing to call in question the Power and Goodness of God, rather than admit of so probable an Hypothesis? To which we may add, and believed by almost all Mankind. But if it were not so, God has bestow'd other Benefits of Life upon us, which in our own Judgments are not all inferior to the Preservation of Life; and this appears from hence, that we often prefer these Benefits to Life itself, which we should never do, if we did not sometimes esteem them dearer to us. To come to a Conclusion: Without an universal confusion of Nature, without violence offer'd to the Laws and Order of it, the same Animals could not prolong their Life for any considerable time, it remained therefore that some supply the Place of others successively, and that the *Species* be perpetuated, since the *Individuals* could not, lest the whole Animal kind should prove a thing of but one Age's Duration.

'Tis expedient for Men to be born helpless; hence the Foundation of social Life, &c.

VI. From hence it appears that the Race of Mortals is to be perpetuated by the Propagation of their Species; and since every Animal is in a perpetual Flux, and may either increase or decay, it was proper to proceed from less Beginnings to greater; by this means the new Offspring would be less burthen-
some

some to the Parents, and the *Young* and *Old* agree better together. I confess indeed Men are born defenceless and unable to protect themselves, and less qualified to provide for themselves than any other Animals: But God has assign'd us Parents, Guardians, and faithful Guides, so that we are never more happy than when under their protection. Hence *Childhood*, blessed with the simple Enjoyment of good things, and void of Care, becomes more pleasant to us than any other Age. Hence also comes Reverence and Relief to the Aged; hence proceeds Comfort to the *Mature*, and Support to the *Decrepit*. Nay the Seeds and Principles of Social Life are all laid in this appetite of Generation. To this propension we owe almost all the Benefits of Society. Nothing therefore could be more desirable to Creatures mortal (as we are by the necessary Condition of terrestrial Matter) and obnoxious to Miseries, than to be born after such a manner as in the first part of Life, while we are tender, unacquainted with things, and put under the Guardianship of others, to enjoy the Sweets without the Care; in the *middle*, to please ourselves as much in taking care of others; and in the *Decrepit*, feeble Age, to be assisted in our turn by others whom we have educated. This part of the Divine Oeconomy is so far therefore from needing an Apology, that it is rather a *Demonstration* of his Goodness. The Race of Men was to be repair'd, since Death could not be prevented without a greater Evil; and that Reparation is order'd in so wise and beneficent a way, that nothing can be more worthy of the Divine Power and Goodness, nothing deserve greater Admiration.

VII. Now these two Appetites, *viz.* of *Self-preservation*, and the *Propagation* of our Species, are the primary, the original of all others. From these spring Pleasure and an agreeable Enjoyment of things; from these comes almost every thing that is

The chief Appetites are those of Self-preservation, and Propagation of the Species.

advantageous or desirable in Life. But all these are mingled with some Evils, which could not be avoided without greater.

S E C T. VII.

Of Diseases, Wild-Beasts, and Venomous Creatures.

Bodies are liable to dissolution, and humors to corruption; hence Pains and Diseases.

WE must observe (as before*) that our Bodies consist of solid and fluid Parts, and that these solid Members may be either cut or broken to pieces, disjointed, or otherwise render'd unfit for Motion: Whence *Weakness, Languishing* and *Torments*: that the Fluids also are liable, not only to Consumption, but Corruption too; to E-bullition by too intense Heat, or Stagnation by Cold: whence proceed various Maladies and Diseases.

The strength of poisons &c. arises from the contrariety of things, which could not be removed without taking away Motion.

II. Now there are certain Juices in the Earth which we inhabit, from a mixture of which arise Changes and Coagulations. There are other Bodies also which fly asunder with greater Violence when mix'd. Thus Milk, by the infusion of a little Acid, turns to Cheese and Whey: Thus Spirits of Wine and Gun-powder, when touch'd by the Fire, run into Flame; and there is nothing to hinder the same from coming to pass in the Blood and Humors of a human Body. Now those things, which being mix'd with them suddenly dissolve, coagulate, or render them unfit for Circulation, we call Poisonous. And if we consider those contraries by which we are nourish'd, and in the Struggle or Opposition of which Nature consists, 'tis scarce conceivable but that these things should often happen. Nor can all contrariety be taken away, except Motion

* Sect. 3.

tion be taken away too, as we have shewn; nor could all these things that are contrary to our Constitution be removed, except some Species of Creatures were extinct, or never created; that is, our Security must have been purchased at too dear a rate. For if every thing that is in any respect repugnant to us were removed, it would cost either the whole System, or ourselves more Evil than we receive from thence at present, as will sufficiently appear to any one that enumerates the Particulars.

III 'Tis to be observ'd that the Parts of this mundane System which are contiguous to us, *viz.* the Air, Waters, and the Earth itself, are liable to changes; nor could it possibly be otherwise, if the whole Machine, of which these are but small Parts, be thoroughly consider'd: nor could these Changes, especially the sudden ones, always agree with the Temperature of the Humours of a human Body. For they enter into the very constitution of the Body, and infect its Fluids according to the Laws of Nature: whence it is that the due Crasis of the Blood and Health of the Body depend upon the Temperature of the Air and Weather. Hence arise *pestilential* and *epidemical* Diseases; nor could they be avoided, unless the Animals had been made of a quite different Frame and Constitution. Nay, whatever State they had been placed in, they would have been subject either to these or others, no less pernicious. For Marble, and the very hardest Bodies, are dissolv'd by the Vicissitudes of Heat and Cold, Moist and Dry, and the other Changes which we are insensible of; how much more the Humours and animal Spirits of Man, on a right Temperature of which Life depends? God might indeed, by a Favour peculiar to us, have expell'd all the Contagions arising from these alterations, or provided that they should not hurt us. But what reason have such Sinners as we now are, to expect

Of epidemical Diseases.

it? 'Tis more agreeable to the Justice of God to leave the Elements to themselves, to be carried according to the Laws of Motion for our Punishment. (35.) Neither ought we to wonder that God denies the Guilty a Favour, which even the Innocent have no right to: nay, we ought to think that he has inflicted a very light penalty on rebellious Men: For since the natural Evils we are forc'd to struggle with are for the most part of such a nature as could not be warded off, but by the particular extraordinary favour of the Deity, God should seem rather to have resumed a free Gift, than inflicted a punishment, when he is pleas'd to permit them.

Rocks and
Desarts are
given not
to Man
but other
Animals
for their
habitation.

IV. If the Earth had been made for the use of Man alone, we might have expected that there should be nothing in it that was prejudicial or useless to him; but since it was made, as we have observed *, for the Benefit of the Universe, Man is placed therein, not because it was created for him only, but because it could afford him a convenient Habitation: for God must be supposed in this case
not

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(35.) Our Author's Argument here seems to be framed rather in compliance with the common Method, than in strict conformity to his own Scheme of the *τὸ βέλτιον*, or absolute *Me-liority* in things: which System maintains that God is still infinitely beneficent, or as kind as possible to all, or dispenses every thing for the very best in the Main. Tho' what is here introduced by way of Punishment, may, if rightly understood, be defended as an Instance of the greatest possible Kindness; since the only End of all the Divine Judgments is either the Correction and Amendment of the Offenders themselves, or Admonition to others, or both: and consequently is a means of the greatest Good to Mankind in general, and the very best dispensation towards them in this degenerate corrupt Estate, and the most proper method of fitting them for, or directing and drawing them to a better. And if all this can be effected by the same general Laws of Nature, which also bring Plenty, Health and Happiness to the World, here is a double demonstration of the absolute Wisdom and Goodness of its Author.

* Chap. 3. Note 22.

not to have adapted the Place to the Inhabitants, but the Inhabitants to the Place. If therefore Man can dwell commodiously enough in these Regions of the Earth which are fit for his purpose, he must allow God in his Goodness to give the Earth as many other Inhabitants as it can sustain consistently with the Good of Men. Neither ought he to repine that the Rocks and Desarts, which are of no use to Men, supply the *Serpents* and *Wild-Beasts* with Coverts. But these, you'll say, sometimes invade the Countries which are most delightful, and best stored with conveniencies for human Life; destroy the Fruits and cultivated Fields, and kill the Men themselves by *Bites* and *Poisons*. I grant it; but it may be question'd whether it has been always so.

V. For in the first place, this Evil might have had its Origin from Man himself; viz. Rage might be given to the Lion, and Venom to the Serpent, for the punishment of Mankind; and this antient Histories, both sacred and prophane, declare. But since this Question was first moved by such as either denied reveal'd Religion, or at least were ignorant of it, I would not call that in to our assistance, or make any other use of it than as a bare Hypothesis.

Antient Histories declare, that Wild-Beasts and venomous Creatures weremade for the punishment of Mankind.

VI. We may affirm then in the second place, that those things happen through the fault of Men, who by Wars and Discord make fruitful and rich Countries void of Inhabitants to till them, and leave them to the possession of Wild-Beasts and venomous Insects: Since therefore they neither cultivate them themselves, nor allow other persons to do it, what wonder is it if God, for the reproach of Men, give them up to be inhabited by Brutes, Wild-Beasts, and Insects? Those Parts which we have deserted belong by right to them, nor do they otherwise multiply more than is proper.

'Tis the fault of Mankind that these multiply: Countries laid waste by War, &c. to the disgrace of Man, of right belong to them.

We may more easily avoid Wild-Beasts and venomous Creatures than other Inconveniencies of Life, about which we never quarrel with Providence.

VII. Thirdly, 'Tis no more repugnant to the Divine Goodness to have made an Animal, by the Bite of which a Man might be destroy'd, than a Precipice. There's nothing in the whole Earth but what may hurt or kill a Man, if it be not used with caution: Meat, Drink, Water, Fire. Must these then not be created, because they may hurt a Man? Nor is it more difficult to be aware of Poisons and Wild-Beasts, than of these: Nay, scarce one is killed by Poison or torn by Wild-Beasts of a thousand that die by the Sword; and yet we don't at all blame the Divine Goodness for this. It may be said, that Iron, Earth, Water, Meats and Drinks, are necessary, and on that account the Evils attending them may be tolerated. And who will undertake to assure us that venomous Animals and Wild-Beasts are not necessary? Must we reckon them entirely useless, because we do not know the use of them? Must we say that every Wheel in a Clock is made for no manner of purpose, which a Rustic understands not the Design of? But suppose we grant that these are of no service to us, yet may they not please and enjoy themselves? *

All Animals are under the Divine Care: to think otherwise favours of Pride.

VIII. You may urge, that these are not worth the notice of the Divine Providence. Thus indeed proud Mortals, admirers of themselves alone, despise the Works of God: But 'tis not so with the Divine Goodness, which chose that some Inconvenience should befall Mankind rather than a whole Species be wanting to Nature.

Beasts and venomous Creatures are of use to Men.

IX. If you insist, that a Lion might have been made without Teeth or Claws, a Viper without Venom; I grant it, as a Knife without an Edge: But then they would have been of quite another Species, and have had neither the nature, nor use, nor genius, which they now enjoy. In short, I say once for all, they are not in vain. The very Serpents

* See Note 22.

pents, though a Race hateful to us, have their uses; among the rest they may serve to gather Poison out of the Earth. (36.) Nor is the Country less habitable where they are, than where they are not. Now, *ceteris paribus*, Animals ought to multiply; for Life is a perfection: and since it is as noble a one as Matter will admit of, 'tis preferable to none at all. 'Tis therefore the Work and Gift of God wherever he has bestow'd it, and does not stand in need of an *Evil Principle* for its Author.

NOTES.

(36.) For an account of the various ends and uses of these noxious Animals, poisonous Plants, &c. see *Derham's Answer* to the abovemention'd Objection, in his *Phys. Theol.* B. 2. Ch. 6. with the References; and *Ray* on the *Creation*, Part 2. p. 432, &c. 4th Edit. Or *Chambers's Cyclopædia*, under the Word *Poison*.

S E C T. VIII.

Concerning the Errors and Ignorance of Man.

SINCE Man (nay every created Being) is necessarily of a limited Nature *, 'tis plain that he cannot know every thing. The most perfect Creatures therefore are ignorant of many things: Nor can they attain to any other Knowledge than what is agreeable to their Nature and Condition. Innumerable Truths therefore lie hid from every created Understanding: For perfect and infinite Knowledge belongs to God alone; and it must be determin'd by his pleasure what degree every one is to be endow'd with: for he only knows the nature and necessity of each, and has given what is agreeable thereto. *Ignorance* is therefore an *Evil of Defect*, and no more to be avoided than the other kind

Human
Under-
standing is
necessarily
ignorant
of many
things.

* See Note 18.

kind of *Imperfection*; for an imperfect Nature (as that of all Creatures is) understands also imperfectly.

We are sometimes forced to make use of conjectures, therefore we may not only be ignorant, but also mistaken.

II. As to human Knowledge, 'tis confessed that we acquire it by the Senses; and that certain Characters denote, not so much the *Nature*, as the *Uses* and *Differences* of things. Now, since things very different internally, have sometimes the same external Marks, we must of necessity be often doubtful and sometimes deceiv'd by the similitude of the Marks.

Neither is it sufficient to the avoiding of Error that we suspend our assent in doubtful Cases; for 'tis often necessary for us (especially if we have to do with other Persons) to act upon conjecture, and resolve upon action, before we have thoroughly discuss'd the Point or discover'd the Truth: on which account it is impossible that we should totally avoid Errors. God must therefore either have made no such Animal as Man is, or one that is liable to Errors. As Contrariety results from Motion, which is as it were the action of Matter; so a possibility of Error is consequent upon the Action of a finite Being.

God cou'd not always guard us from Errors without violence done to Nature.

III. If any one reply, that God can immediately reveal the Truth to us in such Cases: I answer, he may so, nor can it be denied that he has done and will do it sometimes: But that this should be done always, would be a violence repugnant to the Nature and Condition of Man, and could not possibly be done without more and greater Evils arising from an Interruption of the Course of Nature. Now we must distinguish between those Errors which we fall into after our utmost diligence and application, and such as we are led into by carelessness, Negligence, and a depraved Will. Errors of the former kind are to be reckon'd among Natural Evils, and not imputed to us: For they arise from the very State and Condition of the Mind of Man, and are not to be avoided,

ed, unless God would change the Species of Beings, and order that different things should not affect the Senses in the same manner, that is, that there should be no more Species nor Individuals than there are Sensations in us: for if the Number of these exceed the Discrimination of our Sensations, variety of them must necessarily produce either the very same Sensations in us, or none at all, and a great many answer to the same Sensation; so that we must certainly be sometimes imposed upon by the similitude of things. Either then the Distinctions of our Sensations must be multiplied *in infinitum*, or the infinite variety of sensible Objects taken away. But 'tis evident that neither could have been done in this present State. We must therefore bear the Inconvenience not only of being ignorant of innumerable things, but also of erring in many Cases.

IV. To this it may be replied, That Error is a Defect in that part of Man, in the perfection of which his Happiness chiefly consists: If therefore he may naturally fall into Errors, it follows that he may be naturally miserable without his fault. But I answer: Any particular Evil does not bring Misery upon us; otherwise every Creature would be miserable, as of necessity labouring under the Evils of *Imperfection*. He only therefore is to be denominated *miserable*, who is oppressed with more and greater Evils than his Good can requite with Happiness; so that upon balancing the Conveniencies and inconveniencies of Life, it were better for him not to be, than to be.

V. 'Tis to be observ'd also, that God has in his Wisdom and Goodness so temper'd our present State, that we very seldom, if ever, fall into grievous and pernicious Errors without our own fault. But if this ever comes to pass, as soon as the Evil preponderates, Life is taken away together with the

Man is not
therefore
miserable
because
exposed to
Errors.

Those
Errors
we fall in-
to without
our fault
are seldom
pernici-
ous.

the Benefits of Nature. Now 'tis to be esteem'd an Happiness, and an Argument of the Divine Goodness, that the Natural Benefits of Life cannot be taken from us, but Life is taken from us also. Life then can be a burden to none; nor is it necessary that any one should withdraw himself from natural Evils by voluntarily putting an end to his Life. For if these Evils be such as take away the Benefits of Life, they also bring it to an end. God produced all things out of nothing, and gave us Being without our Advice; he seems therefore oblig'd in justice not to suffer us to be reduced to a State that is worse than Non-entity. (37.) When therefore any State is overwhelmed with Evils which outweigh the Good, 'tis reasonable that God should remit us to our former State; that is, let us return to nothing. Neither ought we to accuse the Divine Power and Goodness, which has bestow'd as many Blessings and Benefits upon us, as either the whole Universe or our own Nature would admit of; and since it was impossible but that some time or other, upon the increase of Evils, his Gift (*viz.* Life) must become burdensome; when this happens he breaks off its thread.

Our
Know-
ledge is
adapted
to our
State.

VI. But Man, you'll say, is ignorant of those things which it was his greatest Interest to know, namely, of Truths that are necessary to the attainment of Felicity. It was convenient for our present State to understand these; and who will affirm that God has not bestow'd upon us all the Knowledge that is agreeable to our State? We ought therefore never to be deceiv'd about such Truths as these, while we apply all our diligence to

NOTES.

(37.) It would be so indeed if this were our only State; but as it is at present, I fear many have nothing but the hopes and expectations of another to support them under almost complete Misery; to comfort and encourage them to undergo
Evils

to the Search. I answer; If this be understood of the Happiness due to us in this Life, 'tis very true; nor is our Understanding ever so far mistaken as not to inform us of the Truths necessary to this kind of Happiness, if proper care be not wanting. But such Happiness ought to suffice us, as may serve to make Life a Blessing, and better than the absence of it. A greater indeed was promised to the first Man by a *gratuitous Covenant*, (38.) but when

NOTES.

Evils infinitely greater than all the benefits of Life; Evils which make Life itself an Evil, and (as our Author says) put them into a State worse than nothing. Witness the long and acute Torments of numerous Martyrs, the Pains of Confessors, the Labours of common Gally-Slaves, &c. (this is granted by the Author, *vid.* Sermon on the *Fall*, p. 77. 4 last lines, and p. 81. l. 2.) But the least hint of this is sufficient, and the common Answers to it very satisfactory; as will perhaps appear from the References to the last Chapter of the Appendix, where this Question comes more properly under consideration.

(38.) Though the first Man might have been created more perfect in all his Faculties than any of his Posterity (which, as some think, cannot be easily proved from the account we have of him in *Genesis* *) though his Knowledge might have been much clearer, as coming entire and adult from the immediate hand of his Creator; yet it seems highly probable that this could not have been propagated in a natural way, that is, by any general preestablish'd Laws, as our present Faculties are; but Mankind, as a successive Body, must necessarily have been left to the known Laws of Propagation, and the present Method of improving their Intellects, and deriving all their Notice from the common Sources of Sensation and Reflection. And so our bountiful Creator may be supposed to have deprived Mankind of no Blessings he could, consistent with his other Attributes and the Order of the Creation, possibly have bestow'd. Nay, why may not he be thought to have converted even this necessary, unavoidable Imperfection in us, compared with the first *Adam*, into a greater Perfection arising both from our Notions of his Fall, and the consequences of it, and of the wonderful Remedy prepared for it and promised

* See Bayle under the Word *Adam*, Remark D. Taylor on *Original Sin*. p. 170. &c. Curcellæi *Instit. Relig. Christ.* L. 3. C. 8. p. 108, &c. And *dissert. de Pecc. Orig.* §. 11. Or *Episcop. Instit. Theol.* L. 4. C. 6, 7. p. 358, 359. Or our Author's *Sermon on the Fall*.

when that was once broken by Sin, he and his Posterity were remanded to those imperfect Notices which could be had from an imperfect Understanding, and the Information of the Senses; which yet are not in the least to be despised: neither had Man a Right, nor could he naturally attain to a greater Perfection. For when the Faculties of our Souls were injur'd, and the Health and Vigour of our Bodies impair'd by our own Vices, as well as those of our Parents, our natural Perfections must necessarily be impaired also. For since our Knowledge is to be acquired by Care, Industry, and Instruction, if Mankind had continued innocent, and with diligent care communicated true Notions of things

NOTES.

in the second *Adam*? We seem to be made more highly sensible of the infinite Wisdom and Goodness of God, and more thankful for our Condition, from our knowledge of his just permission of so deserv'd a Fall, and his gracious undeserv'd *Exaltation* of us again to a superior State, than if we had conceiv'd the Misery attending human Nature to be (as perhaps most of it was) a necessary consequence of our being created in this inferior Class. But whether this Notion be allow'd or not, the Scheme of Providence relating to *Paradise*, &c. as deliver'd in Holy Scripture, if taken all together, can be no just Objection against the moral Attributes of God. He created Man entirely innocent, and absolutely free, which Freedom was absolutely necessary to his Happiness (as will appear under the Head of Moral Evil) He gave him the Means and Abilities to complete his Happiness, and placed him in a World every way suited to his Condition. This Liberty made it possible for him to lose that Innocence, though he had but one single opportunity of doing it*, and it was highly reasonable and necessary that he should have that†. This one Opportunity he embraced (which it does not seem possible for God himself, though he foresaw it, to have prevented, con-

* See Nichols's *Conference with a Theist*, p. 220, 221. 1st. Edition.

† See Dr. J. Clarke on *Moral Evil*, p. 211, &c. and Limborch *Theol. Christi*, L. 3. C. 2. §. 2. and Jenkins's *Reason. of the Christi. Relig.* Vol. 2. C. 13. p. 253. 5th. Edit.

things to their Posterity ; and had not infected their Offspring by Example, Instruction, or any Contagion attending Propagation, we should have been less liable to Errors ; nay, free from pernicious ones ; and have enjoyed a more perfect Knowledge of things. For our native intellectual Faculty would have been stronger ; and being better furnished both with the means and principles of Science than we now are, we should more easily have prevented the Occasions of Error. All pernicious Errors therefore, at least in Matters of Necessity, are to be imputed to our own Guilt, or that of our Parents.*

VII. If any be so ungrateful as to murmur still, and affirm that he would not accept of Life on these Conditions, if he might have his Choice ;

and
We prefer
Life, with
all its in-
conveni-
encies,
before
Death.

NOTES.

sistently with that Freedom he had for good Reasons given him and determined thus to exercise) and so altered his Nature and Circumstances, and consequently made it necessary for God also to change his Place and Condition, and to withdraw such extraordinary favours as his infinite Wisdom and Goodness might otherwise have thought proper to bestow. Thus with his Innocence Man lost all Title to a Continuance in Paradise, and of consequence became naturally liable to the common Evils and Calamities of a transitory Life, and the Pains attending its Conclusion. Those that descended from him and partook of the same Nature, must necessarily partake of the same Infirmities ; in particular, they must inherit *Corruption* and *Mortality*. Which Evils, though we now lament them as the chief parts of our Fore-father's Punishment, yet could they not in the present Circumstances of things be prevented, nor indeed, were such a Prevention possible, would it be in the main desirable, as will appear from the following Section, par. 6, 7. Nay these, by a most wonderful Scheme of Providence, are infinitely outweighed, and made the means of bringing us to much greater Happiness, by Faith in him who was promised from the beginning, and hath in these latter Days brought *Life* and *Incorruptibility* to light. See more on this Subject in Note (X.) and Note 81.

(39.)

* For what relates to the Doctrine of Original Sin, &c. See the latter End of the next Section, and Note 40.

and that himself is the best Judge of his own Interest, and he no Benefactor that obtrudes a Gift upon a Man against his Will; that consequently he owes no thanks to God on account of a Life which he would willingly refuse: We must reply, that thus indeed impious Men and Fools are used to prate; but this does not come from their Hearts and Consciences. For none are more afraid of Death, none more tenacious of Life than they that talk thus idly. A great many of them profess that they don't believe a future Life; and if so, they may reduce themselves to the wish'd-for state of Annihilation as soon as they please, and cast off that *Existence* which is so disagreeable. No Person therefore, except he be corrupted in his Judgment and indulge himself in Error, can seriously prefer Non-existence to the present Life. (39.)

Some put themselves to Death, not on account of natural, but voluntary Evils.

VIII. But if any one think so from his Heart, he is not fallen into this Opinion from any natural Evil, but from others which he brought upon himself by *wrong Elections*. We see many Persons weary of Life, but 'tis because of their bad Management, lest they should be ridiculous for missing of Honour, of Riches, or some empty End which they have unreasonably proposed to themselves. But very few

NOTES.

(39.) 'Self-Murder is so unnatural a Sin, that 'tis now-a-days thought reason enough to prove a Man distracted. We have too many sad examples what a disturbed Imagination will do, if that must pass for natural Distraction; but we seldom or never hear that mere external Sufferings, how severe soever, tempt Men to kill themselves. The *Stoics* themselves, whose Principle it was to break their Prison when they found themselves uneasy, very rarely put it into practice: Nature was too strong for their Philosophy. And though their Philosophy allowed them to die when they pleased, yet Nature taught them to live as long as they could; and we see that they seldom thought themselves miserable enough to die.' *Sherlock on Providence*, C. 7. p. 249, 252. 2d Edit. See also Note (Z.)

have

have been excited to Self-murder by any natural and absolutely unavoidable Evil or Error. Life therefore, of what kind soever it is, must be looked upon as a benefit in the judgment of Mankind, and we ought to pay our grateful acknowledgments to God, as the powerful and beneficent Author of it. Nor will it be any prejudice to the Divine Goodness, if one or two throw Life away in despair. For it is to be supposed that this proceeds not from the greatness of any natural Evil, but from Impatience arising from some depraved Election; of which more hereafter. For none of the Brutes which are destitute of Free-will, ever quitted its Life spontaneously, through the uneasiness of Grief, or a Distemper. If any Man therefore has killed himself voluntarily, we must conclude that he did this, as all other wicked Actions, by a depraved Choice.

IX. As to the second sort of Errors into which we are led, not by nature, but carelessness, negligence, curiosity, or a depraved will, the number of these is greater and their effects more pernicious: nay, 'tis these only which load and infest Life with intolerable Evils, so as to make us wish that we had never been. But since they come upon us through our own fault, they are not to be reckoned among *Natural Evils*, but belong to the third kind, viz. *Moral Evils*. Those Errors which we fall into by our own fault, are to be reckoned among Moral Evils.

up what has been delivered in this Chapter.

S E C T. IX.

*Containing the Sum of what has been said on
Natural Evils.*

The
whole
Universe
one Sy-
stem, of
which e-
very thing
is a part.

IN order to give the Reader a better view of what has been said, we must conceive this whole World as one System, whereof all particular things are the parts and Members, and every one has its place and office, as the Members have in our own Body, or the Beams in a house; the Doors, Windows, Chambers and Closets: Neither is there any thing useless or superfluous in the whole. And in order to unite all more closely together, nothing is self-sufficient; but as it is qualified to help others, so it stands in need of the help of others, for its more commodious Subsistence. And though in so immense a Machine, we do not so clearly perceive the connection or mutual dependence of the parts in every respect, yet we are certain that the thing is so. In many Cases 'tis so evident, that he will be esteemed a Mad-man who denies it. Since therefore the World is to be looked upon as one Building, we must recollect how many different parts, and how various, so grand, so magnificent an Edifice should consist of. We may design a House divided into Halls, Parlours and Closets; but unless there be a Kitchen too, and places set apart for more ignoble, more uncomely Offices, 'twill not be fit for Habitation. The same may be affirmed of the World and the frame of it. God could have filled it all with Suns: but who will engage that such a System would be capable of living Creatures, or proper to preserve Motion? He could have made the Earth of Gold or Gems: But in the

the mean while *destitute* of *Inhabitants*. He that has lived a Day or two without Food, would prefer a *Dunghill* to such an Earth. God could have created Man *immortal*, without Passions, without a Sense of Pleasure or Pain; but he must have been without a *solid Body* also, and an inhabitant of some other Region, not the Earth. He could have made the whole human *Body* an *Eye*, but then it would have been unfit for Motion, Nutrition, and all the other functions of Life. He could have taken away the contrariety of *Appetites*, but the contrariety of Motions (nay Motion itself) must have been taken away with it. He could have prevented the frustrating of Appetites, but that must have been by making them not *opposite*; for 'tis impossible that contrary Appetites, or such as desire what is at the same time occupied by others, should all at once be satisfied. He could, in the last place, have framed Man *free from Errors*, but then he must not have made use of Matter for an Organ of Sensation, which the very Nature of our Soul requires.

II. In short, if the mundane System be taken together, if all the Parts and Periods of it be compared with one another, we must believe that it could not possibly be better: if any part could be changed for the better, another would be worse; if one abounded with greater Conveniencies, another would be exposed to greater Evils; and that necessarily from the Imperfection of all Creatures. A Creature is descended from God, a most perfect Father; but from nothing, as its Mother, which is Imperfection itself. All finite things therefore partake of nothing, and are nothing beyond their Bounds. When therefore we are come to the bounds which nature has set, whoever perceives any thing, must necessarily perceive also that he is deficient, and seek for something without himself

If the whole and all its parts be taken together, none could be changed but for the worse.

to support him. Hence come Evils, hence opposition of things, and as it were a mutilation in the Work of God. Hence for the most part Men fear and desire, grieve and rejoyce. Hence Errors and Darknes of the Mind. Hence Troops of Miseries marching through human Life : whether these grow for the punishment of Mortals; or attend Life by the necessity of Nature ; that is, whether they proceed from the constitution of Nature itself, or are external and acquired by our Choice. Nor need we the bloody *Battle* of the *Ancients*, nor the malicious God of the *Manichees* for Authors of them. Nor is it any Argument against the Divine Omnipotence, that he could not free a Creature in its own Nature necessarily imperfect, from that native Imperfection, and the Evils consequent upon it. He might, as we have often said, have not created mortal Inhabitants, and such as were liable to Fears and Grievs : nor, as will be declared below, such as by their depraved Elections might deserve Punishment: but with regard to the System of the whole 'twas necessary that he should create these or none at all : either the Earth must be replenished with these, or left destitute of Inhabitants. Nor could any of the foregoing particulars be omitted, but that very Omission would bring along with it much greater Evils.

Hence the Error of the Epicureans who knew only the least and worst part.

III. From hence sprang the Error of the *Epicureans*, who pretended that this World was unworthy of a good and powerful God. They, we may believe, knew only the least part, and as it were the Sink of the World, viz. our *Earth*. They never considered the good and beautiful part of Nature, but only contemplated the Grievs, Diseases, Death and Destruction of Mortals, when they denied that God was the Author of so many Evils: In the interim they forgot that the Earth is in a manner the Filth and Offscouring of the *Mundane System* :

System: and that the Workmanship of God is no more to be condemned for it, than a Judgment is to be formed of the beauty of an House from the Sink or Jakes. They were ignorant also that the Earth was made in the manner it now is, not for itself alone, but in order to be subservient to the good of the whole; and that it is filled with such Animals as it is capable of, with a due Subordination to the good of the Universe, and the Felicity of Souls that inhabit the purer and brighter Parts of this Fabric, *viz.* the *Æther* and the *Heavens*. These are as it were the Gardens, Parks, and Palaces of the World; this Earth the *Dungbill*, or (as some will have it) the Workhouse. Nor is it a greater wonder that God should make these, than the *Intestines*, and less comely, but yet necessary Parts of a human Body. Lastly, they are unmindful that more and greater Good is to be found here than Evil, otherwise they themselves would reject Life: and he that has more good than Evil is not miserable except he will. If therefore we could compare the Good things with the Evil; if we could view the whole Workmanship of God; if we thoro'ly understood the Connection, Subordinations, and mutual Relation of things, the mutual assistance which they afford each other; and lastly, the whole series and order of them; it would appear that the World is as well as it could possibly be; and that no Evil in it could be avoided, which would not occasion a greater by its absence.

IV. We have endeavoured to clear up these Points, and I hope effectually, as to this kind of Evil. For upon the supposition of our Principles, (which by the way, are commonly acknowledged,) some natural Evils must inevitably be admitted; and if even one could arise in the Work of an infinitely wise and good God, there's no occasion for the *Bad Principle* as the Origin of Evil, for Evil

Hence a
reply to
the Dif-
ficulty,
*Whence
comes
Evil?*
Since it a-
rises from
the very
nature of
created
Beings,
and could
not be a-
voided
without a
contradic-
tion.

might have existed notwithstanding the Divine Omnipotence and infinite Goodness. The difficult Question then, *Whence comes Evil?* is not unanswerable. For it arises from the very nature and constitution of created Beings, and could not be avoided without a contradiction. And though we be not able to apply these Principles to all particular cases and circumstances, yet we are sure enough that they may be applied. Nor should we be concerned at our being at a loss to account for some particulars; since this is common in the Solution of almost all natural Phenomena, and yet we acquiesce. For presupposing some Principles, such as Matter, Motion, &c. though we are ignorant what Matter and Motion are in any particular Body, yet from the variety of these we take it for granted that various Compositions and Qualities proceed. In like manner we are persuaded, that from the various kinds of Imperfection necessarily inherent in things, various Species of Evils arise, though in some the manner in which this comes to pass does not appear; agreeably to what we experience in Light and Colours. We are certain that Colours arise from the different disposition, refraction and reflection of Light; but yet none can certainly tell how it is reflected or refracted when it forms a blew, a green, or any other Colour: So that I dare affirm that the Origin of natural Evil is more easily assigned, and more clearly and particularly solved, than that of Colours, Tastes, or any sensible Quality whatsoever.

This reconciled with the *Mosaic* History, which does not attribute all kinds of natural Evil to the fall of the first Man.

V. I confess, that according to this Hypothesis, Natural Evils proceed from the original Condition of things, and are not permitted by God, but in order to prevent greater; which some perhaps may think repugnant to sacred History and the Doctrine of *Moses*. For they will have it, that the abuse of Free-will was the cause of all natural Evils, and that when God created every thing good and perfect

fect in its kind, it was afterwards corrupted by Sin, and subjected to natural Evils : But this is asserted without Proof. For the Scripture no where teaches that there would have been no manner of natural Evil, if Man had not sinned. God indeed made all things good and perfect in their kind, that is, he created and still preserves every thing in a state and condition suitable to the whole System of Beings, and which it need have no Reason to repent of except it will. But neither the Goodness of God, nor the Perfection that belongs to the Nature of things, required that all natural Evils should be removed : some created Beings have Evils inherent in their very Natures, which God must of necessity either tolerate or not create those things in which they do inhere. If therefore the sacred History be carefully examined, it will appear that some kinds of Evil are attributed to the Sin of the first Man, but others not. Of the former kind are, *first*, the *Mortality* of Man, who would otherwise have been immortal by *Grace*. *Secondly*, the *Barrenness* of the Earth, and growth of *noxious* and *unprofitable Plants* in the Room of such as were fit for *Food*, for the punishment of Mankind. *Thirdly*, that hard *Labour* necessary for providing Food, which is a consequence of the former. *Fourthly*, that *impotent Affection* and Necessity of Obedience whereby *Women* are made subject to *Men*. *Fifthly*, the pains of *Child-birth*. *Sixthly*, the *Enmity* between Man and the Serpentine kind. *Seventhly*, Banishment out of Paradise, *i. e.* as appears to me, an Expulsion out of that State of Grace, in which the Favour of God had placed Man above what was due to his Nature. These, and some others, are expressly enumerated as punishments of the First Fall. (40.) But besides these there

NOTES.

(40.) For an account of the Scripture History relating to the Fall of *Adam*, and the consequences of it, both upon himself and

there are many consequent upon the necessity of Matter, and concerning which the Scripture has nothing to induce us to believe that they arose from Sin.

The Evils which arise from thence are permitted for the good of the Universe, and also of Man himself.

VI. 'Tis to be observed farther, that these are not permitted by God to no purpose, but for the good of the Universe, and at the same time of Man himself. For as to Mortality, it was by no means expedient for the System, that a sinful Creature should enjoy Immortality, which was not owing to its nature, but granted by an extraordinary favour of the Deity. Nay, God seems to have forbidden our first Parents the use of the Tree of Life out of mere Compassion, lest if their Life should by virtue of it be prolonged, they should live for ever miserable. Even this Punishment, as all others, contributes to the restraint of bad Elections, and the preparation of a new way to Happiness. For when Man transgressed, and a perverse abuse of his Free-Will was once introduced, there would have been no end of Madness if the Divine Goodness had continued to preserve Life, Understanding, an easy Food, and other Gifts of the Primeval State, to the abusers thereof, as well as to the Innocent. 'Tis notorious how exorbitant bad Elections are even amongst the Cares and Labours which Mortals undergo in providing the Necessaries of Life; and how pernicious strength of Parts becomes, when upon a corruption of the Will

NOTES.

and his Posterity, see *Ibbot's Boyle's Lect. Serm. 5. 2d. Set. Rymer's General Representation of Revealed Religion*, Part 1. C. 4. and Dr. *J. Clarke on Moral Evil*, p. 224, &c. or *D'Oyly's four Dissertations*, C. 1. p. 3. Note b. and C. 9. p. 97, &c. or *Bp. Taylor's Polemical Discourses*, p. 614, 615, 623. See also *Limborch's Theol. Christi. L. 3. C. 3, 4, 5.* or *Episcopus de Libero Arbitrio*, &c. or *Curcellaci Rel. Christi. Instit. L. 3. C. 14, 15, 16.* and his *Dissert. de Pecc. Originis*, or our Author's Sermon on the Fall.

Will it degenerates into Cunning. How much more intolerable then would it be, if the Fear of Death were away; if the same facility of procuring Food, the same vigour of intellect, which our First Parents enjoyed, were continued to their corrupt Posterity? (*)

VII. Nay, to confess the truth, it could not Mortality possibly continue; for let there be never so great Hunger, plenty of Provision, it might be corrupted by Thirst, the voluntary Act of one Man. When our First Diseases, Parent had therefore once transgressed, what hopes &c. are for the could he conceive of his Posterity? Or, by what good of Right could they claim the supernatural Gifts of the World of God? certainly by none. All then are made mortal, in this not only through the *Justice*, but the *Goodness* of corrupt Estate. God. For while Men are obliged to struggle with Hunger, Thirst, Diseases and Troubles, few of them are at leisure to run quite mad, and leap over all the bounds of Nature by their depraved Elections. 'Tis better therefore for us to undergo all these Inconveniences, than to be left to ourselves without restraint in this corrupt Estate. For by that means we should bring upon ourselves still greater Evils. But these things belong to revealed Religion, and this is not a proper Place to treat on them at large. (41.)

NOTES.

(41) Thus our Author has, 'I think, sufficiently accounted for all sorts of Natural Evil, and demonstrated the τὸ βέλτιον, or Meliority of things in the Universe, taking the whole (as we always ought) together: at least, he has laid down such Principles as may easily and effectually be applied to that End. He has clearly proved, and closely pursued this one single Proposition through all the abovementioned Particulars, viz. that not one of those Evils or Inconveniences in our System could possibly have been prevented without a greater: which is an ample Vin-

* See *Sherlock upon Death*, C. 2. § 1. and C. 3. § 3. As to the Vigour of our first Parent's Intellect, see the Author's referred to in the beginning of Note 38, particularly Mr. D'Oyly's first Dissertation, C. 9.

NOTES.

Vindication, an evident Proof of all the Divine Attributes, in the original Frame and Government thereof. And indeed this seems to be the best and most convincing, if not the only proper Method of handling the Argument and examining the Works of God, so as to attain a due sense of, and regard for the Author of them. Which Maxim therefore, we conclude from the numberless instances of its apparent Validity, ought to be allowed, and may be safely insisted on, though by reason of our great ignorance of Nature, it cannot always be so clearly applied. However it has been applied successfully to the Solution of the most material Difficulties in the present Question, as may appear more fully from the Authors referred to in the foregoing Chapter.

CHAP.

CHAP. V. Of MORAL EVIL.

INTRODUCTION,

Containing the Substance of the Chapter.

HAVING given some Account of *Natural Evils*, the *Moral* come next under Consideration: we are now to trace out the Origin of these, and see of what kind it is, whether they flow from the same Source with the Natural, *viz.* the necessary *Imperfection* of created Beings; or we are to seek for some other entirely different from it.

By *Moral* Evils, as we said before, are understood those Inconveniencies of Life and Condition which befall ourselves or others, through wrong Elections. For it is plain that some Inconveniencies happen without our Knowledge, or against our Wills, by the very Order of natural Causes; whereas others come upon us knowingly, and in a manner with our Consent (when we choose either these themselves, or such as are necessarily connected with them.) The *Moral* are to be reckon'd among the latter kind of Inconveniencies: and he must be esteem'd the Cause of them, who knowingly, and of his own accord, brings them either upon himself or others by a depraved or foolish Choice,

But

But in order to make this whole Matter concerning Moral Evils more fully understood, we must consider in the

1st Place, *What the Nature of Elections is.*

2dly, *That our Happiness chiefly depends upon Elections.*

3dly, *What kind of Elections may be said to be made amiss, or foolishly.*

4thly, *How we come to fall into depraved or wicked Elections.*

5thly, *How such Elections can be reconciled with the Power and Goodness of God.*

S E C T. I.

Concerning the Nature of Elections.

S U B S E C T. I.

A View of their Opinion, who admit of Freedom from Compulsion only, but not from Necessity.

That it is not easy to understand or give a true representation of the Opinions concerning Liberty. Some acknowledge a Liberty from Compulsion

I. IF there be any thing obscure and difficult in Philosophy, we are sure to find it in that Part which treats of Elections and Liberty. There is no Point about which the Learned are less consistent with themselves, or more divided from each other, Nor is it an easy Matter to understand them, or to give a certain and true representation of their Opinions. I think they may be distinguish'd into two Sects, both admitting of Liberty, the one from

ex-

external *Compulsion*, but not from internal *Necessity*; the other from both.

only, others from Necessity also.

The Authors of the former Opinion suppose Appetites implanted in us by Nature; what is agreeable to these is called good; the contrary, Evil.

Things are agreeable to the Appetites in a threefold respect.

Hence three kinds of good.

That which is actually agreeable is called Pleasant.

That which is connected with something which is of itself agreeable, is called

II. As far as I can understand the Opinion of the former, it is this: First, they observe that there are certain *Appetites* implanted in us by Nature, which are not to be esteem'd *useless*, but contributing toward our Preservation, as was shewn before; and that some things are naturally agreeable, some contrary to these Appetites: that the *former*, when present, please and impress a delightful Sense of themselves; the *latter* displease and create uneasiness. These therefore are called incommodious, troublesome and Evil; and those commodious, convenient and Good.

III. Secondly, That Nature has given us *Reason*, a *Mind* or *Intellect*, to distinguish Conveniencies from Inconveniencies, Good from Evil. And since this may be considered by the Mind in a threefold Respect, hence also arise three kinds of Good and Evil; namely *Pleasant*, *Profitable* and *Honest*.

IV. For if Good be considered as present with regard only to the Appetite which is delighted with the Enjoyment of it, and acquiesces in it, 'tis called *Pleasant*.

V. If it be not agreeable to the Appetite of itself, but only *connected* with something else which is of itself agreeable, or produces Pleasure, and on that account only desirable; then 'tis called *Profitable*. For though the Appetite cannot come at the immediate Enjoyment of it, yet the Mind makes use of it in order to procure those things which it can enjoy, and from thence it is esteem'd *convenient*, i. e. Good.

VI. But, Profitable.

That which is judged by the Understanding to be the best, all things considered, is absolutely good, and called *Honest*.

VI. But since that which is agreeable to one Appetite, may be repugnant or less agreeable to others; and that which pleases now, may have some things connected with it which may be displeasing afterwards, there is need of enquiry and deliberation, to procure an absolute Good, *i. e.* one which, all Appetites and Times considered, will afford as great, as certain and durable a Pleasure or Delight as possible. For this End therefore was the Mind or Understanding given us, that we might be able to determine what appears fittest to be done upon a view of all such things as create Pleasure or uneasiness for the present or the future. And what is thus judg'd by the Understanding to be the best, if there be no Error in the Case, must be look'd upon as *Honest*. For that is *Honest* which is agreeable to a rational Agent; but it is agreeable to a rational Agent, and Reason itself directs, that, all things consider'd, we should prefer that which brings the greater, the more certain and more durable Advantages.

Instances in Health Medicines and such things as are agreeable to the Rational Appetite.

VII. The Defenders of this Opinion reckon these kinds of Good to be *Moral*, so far as they respect Man, because they fall under the Government of Reason. But since all things cannot be always had together, a comparison must be made between them, and that embraced which appears to be the best. Now the kinds may be compared together, as well as the particulars of each kind. For instance, Health is a thing pleasant in itself, and desirable above all things that relate to the Body; but for the preservation of it Medicines must be sometimes taken, which of themselves are far from being agreeable to the Appetite, but as they are means to an End which in itself is delightful, they are said to be profitable, and on that account fit to be chosen. Now the Goods of the Mind are greater, more certain and more durable than those of the Body; if therefore they cannot be had without the loss of Health,

Health, or even Life, right Reason dictates, that Health, or even Life be despised in regard to these. For this appears to be the most convenient, all things consider'd, and on that account is *bonest*: and as Goods of a different kind may be compared together, so may also particulars of the same kind, as any one will find that considers it.

VIII. As to *Liberty*, the Men of this Sect will have it to consist in this, that among all those Goods, an Agent can embrace that which pleases him best, and exert those Actions which his own Reason approves: For, according to these Men, he that can follow his own *Judgment* in Matters is free. For Example, he that is bound in Body, and has his Faculties and Limbs entire, if all external Impediments be removed, is at Liberty to walk: for he can if he *will*, and nothing but his will is wanting to exert that Action.

He that can act as his own Judgment directs, is free according to these Men.

IX. But as to the Actions of the *Will* itself, namely, to *will*, or to *suspend* the Act of Volition, they think that it is determined to these, not by itself, for that is impossible; but from without. If you ask from whence? They answer, from the *Pleasure or Uneasiness* perceived by the Understanding or the Senses; but rather, as they imagine, from the present or most urgent *Uneasiness*: since therefore these are produced in us *ab extra*, not from the Will itself, and are not in its power, but arise from the very things; 'tis manifest, according to these Men, that we are not free (at least from *Necessity*) to *will* or *not will*, that is, with regard to the immediate Acts of the Will. Some of them therefore expressly deny, that *Liberty* belongs to Man with regard to these Acts, or that an Election can be said to be free, or Man himself in that Respect: They will have it therefore, that *Liberty* belongs to us properly with respect to the *inferior* Faculties, which are subject to the Government of the Will, and discharge their Functions when the Man him-

But we are determin'd to choose either from the goodness or disagreeableness of objects perceiv'd by the Intellect or Senses; and therefore not free as to the Acts of the Will, but only of the inferior Faculties, which are subject to its determination.

self has willed : that is, a Man is free to walk who can walk if he pleases ; but not to will ; for he receives the Will to walk from elsewhere : nevertheless, he that can *do* what he wills, according to them, is free, even tho' he be necessarily determin'd to will. (42.)

X. IF

NOTES.

(42.) The most remarkable Defenders of this Opinion, among the Moderns, seem to be *Hobbs*, *Locke*, (if he be consistent with himself*) *Leibnitz*, *Bayle*, *Norris*, the *Authors* of the *Philosophical Enquiry concerning human Liberty*, and of *Cato's Letters*. But in order to have a more distinct Notion of the different Schemes of Authors all professing to treat of *Human Liberty*, *Free will*, &c. Let us in the first Place recite the several Powers or Modifications of the Mind, and observe to which of them Liberty is or may be apply'd. — These are commonly distinguish'd into *Perception*, *Judgment*, *Volition* and *Alien*. The two former are generally *necessary*, at least always *passive* : For I cannot help seeing a Light when my Eyes are open, nor avoid judging that two and two make four, whenever I think of that Proposition ; though I may hinder that Perception by shutting my Eyes, as well as prevent that Judgment by refusing to think of the Proposition. The Will then may properly enough be said to influence or impede these † ; but this doth not make them less *passive* in themselves ; nay, the more it does influence them, the more evidently they are so. The third will appear to be the exercise of a *Self-moving Principle*, and as such cannot properly be moved or influenced by any thing else. The last is the Exercise of the *inferior Powers*, the actual Production of Thought or Motion : this is generally directed by, and an immediate consequence of Volition, on which account several Authors have confounded them together ; but tho' they be properly both Acts of the Mind, yet they are certainly distinct ones ; the *Will* is an ability of choosing some particular Thoughts or Motions, *Agency* is a power of producing these Thoughts or Motions pursuant to the Act of choice, or of putting that choice in execution. A careful distinction between these will help us to judge of all such Authors as have either used them promiscuously or been content to treat of the last only, as most of those Persons have that are cited in the 14th and following Pages of the *Philosophical Enquiry*.

These two last then being the only *active Powers*, or rather the only *Powers* at all, are the only proper subjects of Liberty : to which again it is variously apply'd. With regard to the *Will*,

* See Note 45.

† See Note 58.

X. If it be granted that this is the Nature of our Elections, there is no doubt but all our Actions are really and truly necessary. For as to the proper Actions of the Will, to will or suspend the Act of Volition, the Men whom we are speaking of, give up Liberty with respect to these, while they af-

If this be so, all our Actions are absolutely necessary.

NOTES.

Will, some content themselves with asserting its Freedom from external *Compulsion* only, from being forced contrary to its own bent and inclination. And indeed it would be very strange to suppose it otherwise: For to say that it may be drawn a contrary way to that which the Mind prefers and directs, is to say, that it may tend two contrary ways at once, that a Man may will a thing against his Will, or be obliged to will what at the same time he does not will: but then such a Freedom as this equally belongs to the two former Powers, which cannot be forced to perceive or judge otherwise than they do perceive or judge, otherwise than as Objects appear, and their own Natures require; it may be apply'd to any thing the most necessary, nay the more necessary the better. Others therefore have contended for an absolute exemption of the Will from all imperceptible Biases or Physical Inclination, from all internal necessity, arising either from its own frame and constitution, the impulse of superior Beings, or the operation of Objects, Reasons, Motives, &c. which appear'd to them the very essence of human Liberty, the sole Foundation of Morality. And indeed these seem to be the only Persons that speak out, and to the Point, as shall be shewn in the following Notes.

Lastly, A great many will confine their Idea of Liberty to *Action* only, and define it to be a power of either actually taking up or laying down a Thought, of beginning Motion, or stopping it, according to the preference of the Mind or Will. But if this be all the Liberty we have, 'tis of small consequence, since we are conscious that in *fact* all such Actions, supposing the Organs to be rightly disposed, follow the determination of the Will; and also, that in *reason* they are no farther *moral*, nor we accountable for them than as they do so; we must therefore go up higher than this before we come at any valuable Liberty; and the main Question will be, Whether Man is free to think or resolve upon, to will or choose any thing propos'd, as well as to exert his other Faculties in consequence of such Resolution, Will, or Choice. This is the only Point worth disputing, and wherein all *Moral* Liberty must consist; and indeed if it be not here 'tis no where. For if the Mind be absolutely determin'd to choose in a certain manner

assert that it does not belong to them. For they are of Opinion that when any thing is proposed by the Understanding to be done, we either will it, or suspend the Act of Volition concerning it, according to the prospect of Happiness or importunity of the Uneasiness which appears to the Mind, in the present State and Circumstances; by these therefore our Election, according to them, is determin'd.

XL But

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manner in any given Circumstances, its other subordinate Faculties will immediately operate, and the several Actions which depend thereon all follow by necessary consequence. Nay, upon this Hypothesis there is properly no such thing as Choice or Action in Man; but all are Passions propagated in a chain of necessary Causes and Effects. And indeed all who suppose any external Determination of the Will (meaning always a necessary and irresistible one) whether they place it in the *Desire of Good*, *Anxiety* for the absence of it, or the *last Determination of the Judgment*, are involv'd in the same Consequence, how many Steps soever they may take to remove the Difficulty. For it is equal to me, if what I call my Choice or Action be necessary, wherever that Necessity be placed. 'Tis the same thing whether I be acted upon and over-ruled by one immediate Cause, or drawn on by several successively. Suppose, v. g. that I am necessitated to obey the last result of my own Judgment. From the *Existence of things* follow certain *Appearances*; those *Appearances* cause certain *Perceptions*; these *Perceptions* form a *Judgment*, this *Judgment* determines the *Will*, and this *Will* produces *Action*. All this is fix'd and inevitable, every Link of the Chain is equally necessary, and 'tis all one to me on which my Determinations hang: 'Tis as good to take them from the first as last, from the Existence of outward Objects as from my own Will; since the supposed choice or action is in reality as much out of my power, or as incapable of being alter'd or prevented by me, as the existence of external things. 'Tis easy to observe how destructive this and the like Schemes must prove, as well of Morality as Liberty, both which must stand and fall together, and can, I think, only be secured effectually upon the Principles laid down by our Author; of which in their proper place.

See also Mr. Chubb's *Reflections on Natural Liberty. Collection of Tracts*, p. 379, &c. or Notes 45, 48, 58.

XI. But when the Election is made, if we can effect what we will, then they say we are free in respect of such Actions, not from Necessity, but only from Compulsion; for it is plain that nothing but our will is wanting to the exertion of them, and supposing us to will them, they necessarily follow. For instance, when nothing hinders a Man from walking but his own Will, supposing this Volition, it cannot be conceiv'd but that he must walk, nor can he rest while this continues. If therefore, according to them, all acts of the Will are necessary (as being determin'd from without, viz. by the convenience or inconvenience of things or circumstances) the actions of the inferior faculties will be no less necessary, for they will depend on the same circumstances and acts of the Will, which, as they are necessary, these actions will be necessary also. (43.) Though, according to them, therefore, there be no *Compulsion* of the Will, yet there is *Necessity*, from which Necessity nothing in the World will be free; nay, a great many of them openly profess to believe that this is the Case.

That human Actions are free, not from Necessity, but Compulsion.

XII. Now,

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(43.) To call an Action *necessary*, is properly speaking to affirm that it is no Action. For by the Word *Action* we mean an immediate effect of what is metaphorically stiled a *Self-moving Power*: or the exercise of an ability which a Being has to begin or determine a particular train of *Thought* or *Motion*. Now the Idea of this Power in any Being, and of such exercise of it, is directly repugnant to that of *Necessity*, which supposes the *Thought* or *Motion* to be already begun or determined, and to be obtruded on this Being by something else, and consequently implies a Negation of any such Self-moving Power in this Being, or of its exercise by this Being in the Cases abovementioned. 'To be an *Agent* (says Dr. Clarke*), signifies to have a *Power of beginning Motion*, and *Motion* cannot begin necessarily, because *Necessity of Motion* supposes an Efficiency superior to, and irresistible by the thing moved, and consequently the *beginning of Motion* cannot be in that which

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* *Remarks on the Philosophical Enquiry*, p. 6.

According
to their
Opinion
there is no
contingency
in things,
nor could
any thing
be done
otherwise
than it is.

XII. Now, from this Hypothesis, which they extend to the Divine as well as Human Will, the following Corollaries seem deducible. First, that nothing in Nature could be done otherwise than it is. For, the whole Series of things being as it were connected together by Fate, there's no Room for Chance or Liberty, properly so called: *Contingency* then is removed out of Nature.

XIII. Se-

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' is moved necessarily, but in the superior Cause, or in the efficiency of some other Cause still superior to that, till at length we arrive at some *Free Agent*.' Where, though the Doctor's Definition of Agency seems to be imperfect, that Word generally including the Power of beginning reflex *Thought* as well as *Motion* (which are two distinct Species of Action, and proceed from different Powers, tho' they be often confounded together and comprehended under the same general term) yet it shews us an evident contradiction in these two Words *necessary Agent*, in either Sense: Unless he uses the Word *Agent* in both Senses together, and then his Reasoning will be false, since what is acted on and determined by another in regard to its *Will*, or *Thought*, and in that Sense moved by a superior Efficiency, may yet have a power of beginning real corporeal Motion (which is a quite different sort of Action) in consequence of such pre-determined Will, or Thought, and in that sense be an *Agent*, though not a moral one. But whatever the Doctor might mean by the Word *Agent*, his Argument will hold in either of these two Senses separate, viz. that nothing can be said to *act* either in thinking or moving, which does not properly *begin* the train of Thought or Motion, but is put into Thought or Motion by something else; and also, that every thing cannot be so put either into Thought or Motion; and therefore that there must be some first Cause of both.

And will not the same Argument hold equally for some first Cause of *Existence*? If the Doctor can suppose a first Cause of all Thought and Motion (as he does here, and we think very reasonably) why may he not also suppose a first Cause of all *Existence*; and so entirely exclude that *antecedent Necessity* which he has often Recourse to as a kind of support of the existence of the first Cause, but is obliged to exclude from its Will and Actions? Is it harder to conceive how an Eternal Independent Being, or First Cause, may *exist* without any antecedent Necessity, than how it can *will* or *act* without any?

But

XIII. Secondly, That nothing more can be understood by wicked or wrong made Elections, than that they are prejudicial to the Elector or some others; which Sense is very remote from the vulgar one; for in that Evil Elections are blamed, not for being hurtful, but for being hurtful without Necessity, and because they are made otherwise than they ought to have been: In this Hypothesis then there is no Election made amiss. (44.) Nor can any thing be said to be done otherwise than it ought to be: for what could not possibly be done otherwise, is certainly done as it ought; since it is done according to the exigence and necessary order of things.

By Evil they understand nothing more than hurtful.

XIV. Thirdly, By the same Principle all Evil would be in the strictest sense *Natural*, for it would derive its Origin from natural and necessary Causes. The distinction then would be lost between natural and moral Evil, as commonly understood. There would be no Moral Evil at all. For that only is reckoned Moral by the common consent of Mankind, of which the Man himself is properly the Cause: but no body looks upon himself as properly the Cause of a thing which he could not avoid, or to which he was necessitated by natural Causes, and such as were antecedent to the Will. For e-
very

Villanies are to be placed the account of human Misery, and not looked upon as Crimes, properly so called.

NOTES.

But to return to the chief Design of this Note. We see how necessary it is to fix the precise meaning of the Word *Action* in a Controversy of this kind, and if the Signification of it as laid down above be allowed, then necessary Action is the same as passive Action, or beginning a thing and not beginning it at the same time, and in the same respect; in which terms every one perceives it to be a contradiction.

(44) *Leibnitz* declares it to be his settled Opinion; † ‘That whenever we resolve or will contrary to an evident Reason, we are carried by some other Reason stronger in appearance.’ If this be always the Case, we certainly can never will amiss or unreasonably, since that Reason which appears to be the strongest must and ought always to determine us.

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† *Remarques sur le Livre de l'Origine du Mal.* p. 483.

very one blames himself only on this account, because he was of himself unnecessarily the Cause of Evil to himself or others. Those Inconveniencies which come by Necessity, he looks upon as Miseries, as Misfortunes, but never as a Crime. Thefts therefore, Adulteries, Perjuries, nay the Hatred of God himself, and whatever we esteem base in Villanies (as well as the disgrace and punishment attending them) must be placed to the account of human Misery and Unhappiness, but by no means reckoned criminal, nor any more repugnant to the Will of God, to his Justice, Purity or Goodness, than Heat or Cold.

A Malefactor is reproved, not because he deserved it, but because reproof may drive him from Evil.

XV. Fourthly, When therefore we blame a Thief, Adulterer, Murderer, or perjured Person, when those Crimes are arraigned as scandalous; this is not done because they have deserved it, or because these things are in themselves really shameful or culpable; but because that Infamy may be a means of deterring the guilty Persons or others from the like Elections. And this is the only Reason why we reproach a Thief, &c. and not a sick Person, with Infamy; because Reproach may cure a Thief, &c. but can do no Good to a sick Person.

Punishments are applied as Medicines to the Sick; neither are Laws useless, since they prevent Vice.

XVI. Fifthly, Malefactors are punished not because they deserve Punishment, but because it is expedient, and Laws are used to restrain Vices, as Physic to remove Diseases; Men sin therefore after the same manner as they die, viz. because an effectual Remedy was not applied. And yet Laws are not entirely useless, since they prevent some Vices, as Medicines protract the Deaths of some diseased Persons: and a Person infected with the Plague may be as justly cut off by the Law, as a Witch, when by that means there's hope of avoiding the Contagion. (*)

XVII.

NOTES.

(*) All this, and a great deal more to the same purpose, is expressly asserted (as indeed 'tis a necessary consequence) of their Hy-

XVII. Sixthly, We are obliged to repay good Offices, since by being thankful we may excite the Benefactor to continue or increase his Benevolence, and also induce others to do us Service. And hence it comes to pass, that we are obliged to be grateful towards God and Men, but not to the Sun or a Horse, because God and Men may be excited by thanks to some farther Beneficence, whereas the Sun or a Horse cannot. Thus no regard is to be had to a Benefit received, but only to one that may be received; nor are we obliged to be grateful to the most generous Benefactor for what is past, but only for the prospect of what is to come. All sense of gratitude then, as commonly understood, is destroyed; for the Vulgar reckon him a cunning, not a grateful Person, who returns one favour merely out of hopes of another.

XVIII. Seventhly, If this Opinion be true, we must despair of human Felicity, which will not in the least be in our own Power, but entirely depend upon external Objects. Our happiness (if there be any) must, according to them, be conceived to arise from the perfect enjoyment of those things which are agreeable to the Appetites. Where the contrary to these are present, or the agreeable ones absent, we must necessarily be uneasy, and while we struggle with Anxieties we cannot be happy. According to this Hypothesis therefore it follows, that our Happiness necessarily requires such an Enjoyment as we have spoken of, and that this is at the same time impossible. For who can hope that all external things (with which he has to do) should be so tempered as in every respect to answer his Wishes,

We are obliged to be grateful only in prospect of a future Benefit.

According to this Opinion, human Happiness is impossible, since it depends upon things which are not in our Power.

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Hypothesis) by *Hobbs** and by the Author of the *Philosophical Enquiry*, † and much the same by *Bayle*. ‡ The bare recital of such Principles is a sufficient refutation of them.

* See his *Treatise on Human Liberty*, or *Bp. Bramhall's Works*, p. 678. . † P, 91, &c. ‡ *Crit. Dict.* p. 2609, &c.

so as never to want what he desires, or to be forced to endure any thing contrary to his natural Appetites? If Happiness arises from the Enjoyment of those things which are agreeable to the Faculties and Appetites, and which can move Desire by their innate, or at least apparent Goodness; if also the Will is necessarily determined to these, according to the Judgment of the Understanding, or Impor-tunity of Appetites, every man must necessarily want a great many things which he has chosen, and bear a great many which he would not, than which nothing is more inconsistent with Felicity. For we cannot possibly conceive any State of Life where-in all things answer to the natural Appetites. In vain then do we hope for Happiness, if it depend upon external Objects. (N.)

XIX.

NOTES.

(N.) Against the Argument here urged 'tis objected that it is lame in all its Feet; 1st, there is no consequence in it. 2^{dly}, the Conclusion may be granted; and 3^{dly}, the Argument may be retorted against the Author.

To begin with the last; It is alledged that Men are never the happier, or more independent of the accidents of Fortune, by having a *power to choose without Reason*.

To which I reply, that the Author has no occasion to assert any such power; all that he pleads for, is that the will ought not to be determined by the Judgment of the Understanding concerning things antecedently agreeable or disagreeable to our natural Appetites, because all the good of a Man does not lie in them; If it did, there would be no need of a will at all, but we ought to be absolutely determined by them. But the will is a faculty that by choosing a thing can make it agreeable, though it had no Agreement with any natural Appetite, nay, were contrary to them all; and for the will to choose a thing in order to please itself in the choice, is no more to choose without reason, than to build a House in order to preserve one from the inclemency of the Weather, is to act without reason.

But 2^{dly}, 'Tis asked, will Men be any happier, or less dependent on the accidents of Fortune by having such a Faculty? Yes, sure a great deal; for no accident of Fortune can take this Liberty from them, or hinder their being pleased with their choice; and in the midst of sickness, pain and torment, if they have this faculty, they will find pleasure and satisfaction in it, and make the most adverse Fortune easy to them; (as we see
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XIX. This, and a great deal more that might be added, must seem hard and repugnant to the common Notions of Men, and cannot be believed without extraordinary Prejudice to Mankind. I confess indeed that, for the most part, one cannot argue

Its consequences hard, and tho' the Argument from consequences be generally a bad one, yet these bring some prejudice against an Opinion which seems attended with them, especially if they be acknowledged.

NOTES.

wife Men frequently do,) at least, more easy than such circumstances would be without it.

3dly, 'Tis objected, that it must be impossible to give agreeableness to a thing which has none antecedently to the Will. For to do so we must have a power either to change our taste of things, or the things themselves; but that wou'd almost be the same as to say to a piece of Lead be thou Gold, or to a Flint be thou a Diamond, or at least produce the same effect on me. To which the answer is easy; Good is not an *absolute* thing, but *relative*, and consists in the agreeableness of one thing to another, as suppose between the Appetite and Object; if then these be disagreeable to one another, the one is Evil to the other, and to make them agreeable, one of them must of necessity be changed, and the change of either will cause it. Although therefore I cannot change Lead into Gold by any act of my Free-will, yet I can condemn Gold as much as if it were Lead, and be as well content with a leaden Cup as if it were Gold. Thousands make this use of Free-will, and arise to this pitch of Happiness by the help of it: It is an old Rule *Si res haberi non potest, deme aliquid de cupiditatibus*. If you can't have Wealth or Honour resolve, that is *choose*, to be satisfied without it, and experience will teach you that such a Choice is much to your Ease and Happiness. To say that this is impossible, is to give the Lie to all who treat of Morals and Divinity: Of so great moment is such a power of making things good by choice, that in truth all moral Advices suppose us to have it, or else they are not sense.

But 4thly, 'Tis objected, That if the will can make a thing agreeable by choosing, such a power would be *infinite*, and might make a Man happy in all circumstances, even in *Hell*. For if it can give six degrees of Pleasure to an Object, it may as well give infinite; since it is without reason that it gives these Six. I answer, all created Powers and Pleasures are limited, and no subject is capable of more than such a certain Degree, therefore there is likewise a limitation of the pleasure arising from the use of Free-will, as well as from the use of seeing or hearing, or any other Faculty or Appetite; and as the Will is an Appetite, so the Pleasure of it bears some proportion to the Pleasure arising from the satisfaction of other Appetites; but in what degree we cannot precisely determine,
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argue well against an opinion from its consequences, since a great many things are true which have consequences hard enough : not to mention how easily we mistake in deducing consequences. But yet when

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any more than we can settle the proportion between the Pleasures of seeing and hearing ; which yet we know are neither of them infinite. Though therefore we cannot precisely determine the Proportion, yet we are certain that we frequently cross all our natural Appetites to maintain our choice, and by means of it bear up against the strokes of adverse Fortune, and a flood of natural Evils.

But 5thly, 'Tis objected, that if we had this Power of making things agreeable or disagreeable by choice, we need not trouble ourselves how our other Appetites were satisfied, for we might be absolutely happy in spite of all the accidents of Fortune.

He that objects this, assuredly did not consider the description given by the Author of this Faculty, nor that the having it doth not destroy our other Appetites; and that when it chooses things contrary to them, it necessarily creates a great deal of pain, uneasiness and torment; which abates *so far* the pleasure we take in our Elections, that the pleasure we obtain by such a choice is little or nothing in respect of what it might be if we did not choose amiss. These things are so plainly and frequently repeated in the Book, that it seems strange how any one could imagine that because we have a Faculty to please our selves by choosing, that therefore we may be absolutely happy in spite of all the Accidents of Fortune.

If by Happiness be meant a state more eligible than nothing, I believe by means of this Faculty we may generally speaking be so far happy, and that is sufficient to justify God's putting us into our present Circumstances. But if by Happiness be meant, as it ought to be, a state wherein we have a full and free exercise of all our Faculties, then in as much as our power of choosing is but one Faculty, though superior to all the rest, the exercise of it alone can never make us absolutely and compleatly happy, though it may in such a degree as is very desirable.

6thly, The Conclusion of the Argument is granted, and it is looked on as no inconvenience that our Happiness should in some cases depend on things without us, and not in our own Power. But the conclusion is quite another thing. The words are, *If this Opinion be true, we must despair of human Happiness, for it will not be in the least in our own power, but entirely depend upon external Objects.*

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when these are acknowledged by the Authors themselves; and, if believed, would prove detrimental to Morality, they bring no small prejudice against an Opinion which is attended with them, and recommend us to some other as more probable, tho' it be not supported by any stronger Reasons.

XX.

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The accidents of Fortune, such as an Earthquake may sink a Man and all his concerns, and though in that extraordinary case, as it is put, my choice be not able to prevent my death, yet my Happiness in the general management of Life may be very much in my own power, and not altogether in the power of foreign Accidents. And even in the case of an Earthquake, a good Man that had fixed his Election to submit to such a death and circumstances as it should please Providence to assign him, would not be without some pleasure, even in such an accident: at least not so unhappy as another that had made no such Resolution or Election. But if such an Election can make him no easier or do him no good, it were to no purpose to make it. He can have no prospect or design in making it, if the Good or Evil resulting from the Agreement or Disagreement of what happens to his natural Appetites be the only Considerations that can determine his will. It is plain that in such a case he must be miserable, if outward things happen cross to his Appetites; whereas if he can make them agreeable or disagreeable in any measure by his own choice, he is still master of his Happiness, and the consideration that he can make them so is a good reason for choosing. So far is he from choosing *without Reason*, as is falsely objected.

But 7thly, 'Tis urged, that if the will were not moved but by the Representation of antecedent Good and Evil in the things that happen, it would not indeed be in our power to be happy, supposing there were no God, and that all things were governed by Matter and Motion: But God has so ordered it, that to be virtuous is sufficient to make a Man happy. If therefore the Soul follows Reason and the Orders God has given her, she is sure to be happy, although she cannot find enough to make her so in this Life.

To which I answer, 1st, That this is giving up the Happiness of this Life, and acknowledging that God has not provided any Natural means to make us happy here, which is a Confession that one who is zealous to defend the Wisdom and Goodness of God will not easily grant.

2dly, I have no other Notion of *Virtue* than that of an Election within the limits prescribed by God and Nature; I think the definition of it is *Habitus cum ratione electivus in mediocritate*

All those who declare that the Will is passive in its Operations must be of the same Opinion with the former, and press'd with the same consequences.

XX. 'Tis to be observed also, that among the foregoing Authors I reckon those who declare that the Will is determined by the last Judgment of the Understanding,* which has taken with a great many Philosophers; and in short, all who maintain that the Will is *passive* in Elections. For these must be esteem'd to have the same Sentiments of Liberty with the former, which way soever they explain their Opinion; as may appear from hence, that most of them expressly deny that *Indifference* belongs to the Nature of Freedom; so that their Opinion is attend'd with the same consequences as the former. (45.)

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discrete confitens; if then to be virtuous is enough to make us happy, it is plain that our Happiness consists in our *Election*, which is the very thing I plead for: but if our Election make the things elect'd neither better nor worse, neither more nor less agreeable, it is inconceivable how our Happiness should consist at all in Virtue. If the meaning be that God will reward us hereafter; that is to confess we are miserable for the present, but shall be happy some other time. I own indeed that *Hope* is a great cause of Pleasure, but except we *choose* the crossing our natural Appetites for the present out of prospect to the future, it will no ways render our present suffering tolerable. Nor will such a prospect, how clearly soever offer'd by our Understanding, yield us this Pleasure, except the will consent. For then it would do so to all to whom the offer is made; whereas we see one perseveres by means of it, and another in much more advantageous Circumstances yields to the present Temptation, and knowingly loses the Reward.


(45.) As Mr *Locke* has particularly labour'd the point before us, and seems to defend by turns the several Principles which our Author attacks here and in the following Section, we shall examine a little into his Method of treating the Subject. Having first of all defin'd Liberty to be 'A Power in any Agent 'to do or forbear any particular Action, according to the Determination or Thought of the Mind, whereby either of them 'is preferred to the other.'† He takes a great deal of Pains to prove that such Liberty does not belong to the Will: which is very certain, granting his sense of Liberty to be the only one, since by his Definition it is evidently subsequent to the choice

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* *Against this Notion see* Sect. 5. Subsect. 2. par. 13.

† *C. Of Power*, § 8.





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